Paul
Goble
Staunton, February 7 – If Russian
television weren’t talking about Ukraine, it might be talking about Russia –
and that might be far worse for the powers that be, Andrey Makarevich says,
adding that this suggests that “if Ukraine didn’t exist, Moscow would have had
to invent it” (echo.msk.ru/blog/a_makarevich/2366519-echo/).
The commentator is saying no more
than what others have, but his observation raises bigger questions: what would
happen in a Russia without a Ukraine? Could any other country serve the same
functions? Could this be the greatest contribution the existence of Ukraine as
the subject of media attention? And could any other country serve the same
functions?
That Vladimir Putin’s regime has
used its aggression in Ukraine to build up Russian patriotism and build up
support for itself is widely recognized; but less often admitted is that those
results may have been more important to the regime than any tangible benefits
it obtained from illegally annexing Crimea or conducting its aggression in the
Donbass.
Because Ukraine is superficially
similar to Russia in some regards, Moscow gained the additional benefit of
being able to point to problems Ukrainians now face as an object lesson of what
Russians must avoid doing – even if most of the problems Ukrainians now
encounter were created by the Russian state itself.
No other country in the post-Soviet
space offers such a rich opportunity for the Kremlin relative to its own
people. The Caucasus and Central Asia are too exotically different. Belarus and
Moldova are ultimately too small. And the Baltic countries are so firmly part
of the West as members of the EU and NATO.
That doesn’t mean that one or more
of these countries won’t be the object of Russian aggression: it has already
invaded Georgia, subverted the territorial integrity of that country and
Moldova, and engaged in subversion elsewhere. But no other country could serve
the multiple functions Ukraine does.
Consequently, one can only agree
with Makarevich that if Ukraine didn’t exist, the Kremlin would have to create
one. But its ability to do so is far more limited than many imagine. And as a result, that has another consequence
even more important for the future: Ukraine may prove to be not the beginning
of the imperial reassembly Putin hopes for, but its end as well.
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