Putin’s Approach to Armenia and Belarus Driven by Same Three Factors, Piontkovsky Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, October 1 – It is very easy to find oneself lost in the weeds given all the events taking place around Russia today, Andrey Piontkovsky says; but it is critical to recognize that in both the Caucasus and Belarus, Vladimir Putin is driven by the same three concerns, two reflecting his neo-imperialism and one his personal fears.

            First of all, the US-based Russian analyst says, Putin insists that both Armenia and Belarus “must subordinate themselves to Moscow” and that failure by leaders in Yerevan and Minsk to do that is sufficient basis for turning away from them and even supporting their opponents (nv.ua/opinion/armeniya-azerbaydzhan-zachem-putinu-konflikt-v-nagornom-karabahe-poslednie-novosti-50115195.html).

            Second, Putin wants to overcome what he calls “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe,” the disintegration of the Soviet Union, by bringing some or all of the post-Soviet states back into a single country. And third, he wants to ensure that no one in Russia sees presidents elsewhere lose power as a result of people going into the street and threatening his political survival.

            Piontkovsky says that in his view, “Russia initiated the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh having given Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev a clear sign that Moscow will not actively interfere on Armenia’s side.” The Kremlin media has shown “100 percent” sympathy for Baku as opposed to Yerevan, and without Moscow’s backing, Armenia could lose the war.

            Armenian President Nikol Pashinyan after coming to power has tried to demonstrate his loyalty to Moscow and to Putin, but “for Putin, the main thing is the precedent that anyone from the streets as a result of popular anger overthrew the existing powers. Such events produce on him a very personal impression.”

            Consequently, the analyst continues, “Moscow thought up a way to punish Armenia for its insufficient deference; and now some in the Russian capital say openly that “if Armenia wants to survive, it must become a complete vassal of Moscow or even enter in some way the Russian Federation.

            “This is part of the insane imperial policy of Moscow, the objective result of which will be simply the growth of anti-Russian attitudes throughout all the countries surrounding Russia,” Piontkovsky says.

            As one can see, Putin is doing the very same thing with the leader of Belarus. Putin and the Russian elite expected Lukashenka would help rejoin Belarus to Russia, but instead, the Belarusian leader has maneuvered in such a way that Moscow has had to keep subsidizing his country lest he turn completely to the West.

            Putin has no reason to like Lukashenka or his approach, “but when Lukashenka was rejected by his own people, he literally flew to Putin” for help. And Putin was willing to extend it because he did not want to see a leader go down in the face of popular anger. That could give Russians ideas.

            Instead, Putin provided Lukashenka was support “which is allowing him to remain in power. This was a signal for the Belarusian siloviki because if Putin had not done so, they would have known that Lukashenka was doomed and would have begun to move away from him” and find a modus vivendi with the opposition.

            That of course means, Piontkovsky concludes, that “all the crimes which Lukashenka is committing now are on Putin’s head,” something that both Russians and the West should remember about Kremlin policies that do not serve the Russian people or international stability but only Putin’s personal views and even more personal fears.