Putin’s Favorite ROC Prelate Uses Pskov Base to Promote Himself as ‘Enlightened Russian Nationalist’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, February 4 – When Patriarch Kirill orchestrated the appointment of Father Tikhon (Shevkunov) to Pskov in mid-2018, many believed that this exile would reduce the influence of Tikhon, reputedly Vladimir Putin’s favorite prelate, and limit the ability of the churchman to challenge the more ecumenically inclined patriarch.

            But in the months since then, Tikhon has used his ties with Putin and his new base in Pskov to promote himself as “an enlightened Russian nationalist” and as such to increase his influence across the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian society more generally, according to a new Meduza study (meduza.io/feature/2021/02/04/prosveschennyy-russkiy-natsionalist).

            Journalists Andrey Pertsev and Svetlana Reyter report that Tikhon’s new perch, the Pskov-Pechora monastery has allowed him to modernize the church, transform the city and spread his ideas via social media, which have led many officials, businessmen and other church leaders to visit and consider emulating him.

            Nikolay Mitrokhin, a specialist on Russian Orthodoxy at Bremen University, says that the Pskov metropolitanate is “third of the five possible ranks” of Russian church structures and the region in which it is located is “one of the poorest in Central Russia, with a small population that is continuing to decline, without developed industry and not along transit routes.”

            Not surprisingly, the two journalists write, Tikhon was anything but pleased to be appointed there, having expected a more elevated position, possibly near Moscow. And it is certainly the case that he has lost some of the ties he had with the FSB and other agencies given Pskov’s distance from Moscow.

            But now, he is pleased with his posting. Not only does it put him in line to be considered for election as patriarch in the future, but Pskov has given him the opportunity to play a larger role in regional church affairs and the spread of his own nationalist doctrine than would have been possible in more prominent positions.

            He has restructured and centralized the see he is in charge of. And he has won popularity by eliminating there the practice of paying bishops and metropolitans money “on the side,” by raising money from corporate friends, and by establishing pensions for priests and giving money to build hospitals and recreational facilities for the population.

            According to Pskov opposition politician Lev Shlosberg, all this has made Tikhon, rather than the governoir, “the most influential politician” in the oblast. And he has exploited this to promote himself as “an enlightened Russian nationalist, a progressive church administrator with ties to the government, and a human face,” Mitrokhin adds.

            The Bremen scholar does not exclude the possibility that Tikhon is planning to use Pskov as a launching pad for a campaign to become patriarch after Kirill, although he suspects the metropolitan will have to seek an intermediate position such as St. Petersburg if he is to be successful.

            Orthodox church dissident Andrey Kurayev is more pessimistic about Tikhon’s chances not only because the metropolitanate he heads is so small but also because Tikhon is known to be personally honest, something that sets him apart from other “princes of the church” and makes them wary of him.

            A close friend of Tikhon’s told the Meduza journalists that at least for the present, “the metropolitan is not seeking the position of patriarch. ‘That isn’t freedom, and he doesn’t want to lose his freedom of action. In the post of patriarch, you do not belong to yourself.”