Moscow Wrestling with Multiple Dimensions of Global Warming Especially in the Far North

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 9 – Like people elsewhere, most Russians have accepted the fact that global warming is occurring; but like others, they remain divided and are only beginning to recognize that this trend does not mean that there will be an even warming of all regions but rather introduce “climate chaos” across the board.

            Not only will some regions grow warmer while others remain or even grow colder but there may be wild “swings” in temperature and precipitation both within one region and between it and its neighbors, a pattern that makes predicting what will happen increasingly difficult if not impossible, experts say (akcent.site/novosti/44822).

            In some places, warming may make some kind of agricultural activity more possible but in others, the warming trend may lead to too much rain or too little for that to take place.  And in others, the warming trend may destroy infrastructure or even lead to forest fires and desertification.

            Officials are now being forced to try to predict what they should prepare for in a situation where predictions are far more difficult to make and where errors are likely to exacerbate problems, something that will provoke anger in populations affected who do not yet understand fully how diverse the impact of global warming actually is turning out to be.

Most Expressions of Russian Discontent Still of Loyalist Variety, Dubrovsky Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 9 – The message most Russians now openly expressing discontent remains of a loyalist nature, Dmitry Dubrovsky says, a sign that most still have faith in Putin but not his officials, “although we are beginning to have our doubts” given Internet shutoffs and Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian cities.

            The Russian sociologist now at Prague’s Charles University says that the Kremlin and the population of Russia have long operated under an unspoken contract in which the regime promises stability and growth and the latter agrees to stay out of politics (svoboda.org/a/armiya-poklonnikov-siljnoy-vlasti-ustala/33752858.html).

            But that contract has “cracked” at least a little because it “never anticipated a scenario where the internet would be cut off, cities subjected to regular shelling or people would be unable to pay for things simply by using a bank card,” the Russian sociologist continues.

            Many Russians are upset about these developments, but they don’t have either leaders or the experience of acting collectively that allow them to protest in anything like the traditional ways. And that is why some public figures with “absolutely no  connection to political life” have stepped in.

            That has gotten the attention of the Kremlin and analysts in Russia and abroad, who are very much aware that “an authoritarian regime operates under conditions of a severe deficit of reliable information [because] everyone lies to it.” As a result, “it fears everyone, everyone fears it, and thus everyone lies to everyone else.”

            In this situation, Dubrovsky continues, it is important to remember that only “a limited number of people” in Russia love Putin. Most who support him do so for cultural, ideological or completely practical reasons. Their lack of alternatives mean that they have not turned on him because they do not yet have anyone to turn to.

            Moreover, Russians lack solidarity because, as a result of government efforts, people believe that they do not bear responsibility for anyone “because there is an authority – the government – that is responsible for everything.” Solidarity doesn’t simply exist. It is a skill that requires practice and must be learned.

            Putin and his regime have done and will do everything possible to prevent Russians from acquiring that skill. But until Russians learn it, they may be angry about what is going on but they won’t present the kind of challenge to Putin that some imagine, although their anger may be a precondition for the rise of just such a threat.

Russia Now Reversing Earlier Draining of Swamps to Combat Forest Fires, Air Pollution and Global Warming

Paul Goble

              Staunton, May 9 – Thirty years ago, Russian officials launched a campaign to drain swamplands around the country in order to prevent drownings and to open the way to the harvesting of peat; but as the Province portal says, “they tried to do what was bt but in the end things turned out just as they always do.”

              The number of lives saved by the draining of swamps was microscopically small, and the destruction of these areas did not result in any major increase in the use of peat as a fuel (province.ru/society/4495414-opasno-bez-tryasiny-v-rossii-nachali-vosstanavlivat-bolota/).

              Instead, the destruction of the swamps released dangerous gases into the atmosphere, sparked more and larger forest fires than Russia had ever seen before, and contributed to global warming not only inside the RussianP Federation but everywhere else as well.

              Last year, officials decided to “rewet” the swamplands beginning first in Tver and then in other hard-hit federal subjects (iz.ru/2092251/sergei-gurianov/opasno-bez-triasiny-zachem-v-rossii-vosstanavlivaiut-bolota), a program that is now spreading to other  regions as well.

Moscow Responds to Growing Income Inequality by Changing How It is Measured

Paul Goble

              Staunton, May 5 – Instead of taking measures that will actually reduce growing income inequality among Russians, Moscow has responded in the first instance by changing the way statistics about that are gathered and presented to make comparisons more difficult and the situation look better than it is, Maksim Blant says.

              In 2025, income inequality in the Russian Federation rose to the highest level it has been since 2007. Putin promised to change that, but the greatest change his government has made is to modify the way his government processes data about that, the Radio Liberty analyst says (svoboda.org/a/zagnatj-dzhini-v-butylku-kak-vlasti-boryutsya-s-neravenstvom/33750448.html).

              It has redefined the Gini coefficient in ways that make comparisons with the past in Russia more difficult and at the same time make it far more difficult to compare with the situation in other countries, Blant says.  And he suggests that if Russia doesn’t meet the income equalization goals it has announced, Moscow will do the same again.

              Consequently, he continues, however defensible the changes in how the Gini coefficient is calculated in Russia may be – and there are reasons to see the new method as improved on a standalone basis – the ways this change will hide what is really going on are likely to be far more important at least politically.

Ukrainian Society Now Fundamentally Different than When Putin Began His Expanded War in 2022 and Won’t Revert to What It was Before, Minakov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 6 – Ukrainian society has changed significantly since Russia began its expanded war in 2022 and will not simply revert to what it was before that date, according to Mikhail Minakhov who as surveyed senior Ukrainian social scientists who have remained in their positions since the war began on what has changed and what won’t change back.

            The Ukrainian political scientist who now works at the Kennan Institute in Washington, D.C. makes the following points (sapere.online/chto-proishodit-s-ukrainskim-obshhestvom-na-pyatom-godu-vojny/):

·       First, the Ukrainian population has declined by 20 to 35 percent as a result of emigration and deaths in combat. It will not immediately return to what it was even if a sizeable portion of those who left return and change Ukrainnian life as a result of their experiences abroad.

·       Second, the country’s economy will depend on older workers than ever before and on different regions than it did earlier.

·       Third,  those serving in the military now are “the main middle class in Ukraine, the country’s class structure has changed, and the average income is now defined by those in the army. Around them has arisen a service sector.”

·       Fourth, “the state now is the main source for the redistribution of means as more than 90 percent of them passes through the budget and those who had been at most risk, the precariat, have moved into the bureaucracy.”

·       Fifth, the territorial structure of the population has changed, with young men dominating front areas, the elderly behind them, and others having moved further back or emigrated.

·       Sixth, social solidarity has changed. Both vertical and horizonal solidarity were strong, but now the former has strengthened at the expense of the latter. People still trust volunteers but the amount of funds they control has declined precipitously.

·       Seventh, society is now divided between fighters and non-combatants, something that affects both local and regional divisions. All other divisions have become relatively less important.

·       Eighth, attitudes toward the state have changed. On the one hand, Ukrainians view it with greater detachment; but on the other, they see it as a key defender of their country. Anarchic attitudes have declined precipitously.

·       Ninth, the war years have seen a rollercoaster development in popular attitudes from optimism to pessimism and back again among others, something that may continue and create a society very different from the one that displayed less turbulence than before the war.

·       And tenth, for Ukrainians, the war has become routine but not as the norm. They think of their future not as one of permanent conflict but as peaceful and look forward to a future without fighting all the time.

Kazakhstan will Soon Again have a Vice President, a Position It Dispensed with in 1996

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 8 – Kazakhstan soon will again have a vice president, a position which it dispensed with in 1996 but which is mandated by recent constitutional changes and is now being defined more precisely by a bill that that country’s parliament has already passed its first reading (eurasiatoday.ru/v-kazahstane-vnov-poyavitsya-dolzhnost-vitse-prezidenta-podrobnosti/).

            Like the Russian Federation which dispensed with a vice presidency after the October 1993 clash between him and Boris Yeltsin, Kazakhstan first introduced that position to make transitions easier and divide power but then eliminated it to avoid the creation of any alternative power to the president.

            Because the new position in Kazakhstan will be filled directly by that country’s president, the government of that Central Asian country hopes to avoid the basis of any such clashes in the future; but if remains unclear whether the position can fill a real political niche or will remain vestigial except in the case of the death or incapacity of the president.

            Some in Kazakhstan think that this new post will transform Kazakh politics, but others are less certain. What is beyond question is that it will be closely watched not only there but in other post-Soviet states that currently lack vice presidencies and may bring them back or introduce them if the Kazakhstan revival works in a positive way.

Kursk Oblast Makes Plans to Erect Memorial to Leonid Brezhnev

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 8 – Officials and activists in Kursk Oblast have formed a regional committee to plan the commemoration of the 120^th anniversary of the birth of Leonid Brezhnev in December of this year, an action that likely enjoys Putin’s backing and may spread to other locations in the Russian Federation in the months ahead.

            The organizing committee wants to establish a memorial to the former Soviet dictator in the center of the regional capital of Kursk and includes among its members the father of one of Putin’s assistants (echofm.online/news/vlasti-kurskoj-oblasti-ponjdderzhali-ustanovku-pamyatnika-brezhnevu-s-inicziativoj-vystupil-otecz-pomoshhnika-putina).

            Lt.Gen. Gennady Dyumin says that he will bear all the costs of the erection of such a monument and stresses that while Brezhnev was not born in Kursk, he lived and worked there in the first years of his life. Consequently, it is important that the city and region take the lead in memorializing him.

            Brezhnev today has neither the large number of supporters or large number of opponents among Russians. Instead, most have mixed feelings about him, as someone whose rule was generally quiet for most of them but who behaved in ways that made him the subject of some of the best Soviet anecdotes.

            Dealing with the Brezhnev period is especially hard for Putin now given that like the late Soviet dictator, the current Russian one is aging and has both supporters and opponents who back Putin in much the same way they earlier backed Brezhnev with mixed feelings.

            Calling attention to Brezhnev by putting up memorials will only increase the number of those on both sides who will draw parallels between Putin and the former CPSU leader.

Moscow Softens Punishment for Many Baymak Protesters Lest It Provoke Greater Bashkir Opposition to Itself, Davidis Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 6 – When hundreds of Bashkirs went into the streets in January 2024, the Russian authorities took a hard line arresting a large of them and sending them to prisons and camps. But now, it is releasing many from such facilities although still imposing lighter restrictions and punishments on them.

            Many Bashkir activists see this as a great victory for the Bashkirs in their struggle to protect their republic from untrammeled economic development that has had devastating environmental consequences (idelreal.org/a/eto-bolshoy-shag-k-pobede-osuzhdennye-po-baymakskomu-delu-vozvraschayutsya-iz-koloniy-v-bashkortostan/33750988.html).

            That may be true, but Memorial’s Sergey Davidis suggests that more may be going on and that it is likely to inform how the Kremlin will deal with mass protests in non-Russian areas in the future by offering not only sticks but carrots to those who may take part in such demonstrations.

            According to the expert on protests in Russia, Russian judges aren’t releasing prisoners to lesser punishments now out of some kind of humanism but only in response to a central decision that the use of repression alone may make protests in the republics more anti-Moscow and that a calibrated approach is more effective.

            Moscow doesn’t like any independent movement, Davidis says; and it is especially nervous about ethnic movements. But these aren’t going to disappear and so the center wants to use methods that will divide and weaken such groups rather than unite them against the Russian center.

            “The Baymak events,” he continues, “were neither an anti-war nor even an anti-Putin protest. Instead, they arose as a result of a specific ethno-national grievance. Consequently, the authorities sought to intimidate those involved … [but] recognize that they cannot afford to turn these people into enemies.”

            Therefore, Davidis says, the powers that be “are currently employing a ‘carrot and stick’ approach. The ‘stick’ has already been applied: people have been frightened, and the unacceptability of protesting against the authorities has been clearly demonstrated. Now, the ‘carrot’ is being offered” with some being released.  

            Obviously, such “carrots” are being offered only to those not deemed to be leaders, he says. As for the others, they may receive even harsher sentences now and in the future. But Moscow’s effort to treat the followers more gently may have the effect of slowing the growth of national movements to the point that they could threaten the center.

Police from Tajikistan Now in Moscow to Deal with Tajik Migrants There

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 8 – To cope with its severe shortage of police and especially with the problems of crime among immigrant communities, Moscow has agreed to bring in police from their homelands to help Russian siloviki do their jobs, even though the appearance of such foreign policemen in Moscow and other cities offends many Russians.

            The first case of this involved Kyrgyz officers who arrived in the Russian capital in 2024 (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/12/to-cope-with-enormous-shortage-of.html). Last year, Vladimir Putin called for an expansion of this program to include officers from Tajikistan (nazaccent.ru/content/44674-v-moskve-poyavitsya-policiya-tadzhikistana/).

            Now, that additional step is being realized with an unspecified number of Tajik officers taking an ever more public role in Moscow, according to the Nazaccent portal (nazaccent.ru/content/45460-policejskie-iz-tadzhikistana-priedut-v-moskvu-chtoby-reshat-migracionnye-problemy/).

            As their role increases, many ethnic Russians are likely to be offended and upset that their own government has taken this step. At the very least, they will probably give more support to notorious groups like the Russian Community, something that will in itself provoke more problems (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/07/russian-community-complains-chelyabinsk.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/russian-community-now-country-wide.html).

Moscow Counts Soviet Troops who Fought Nationalist Underground in Baltics, Belarus and Ukraine until 1951 as Veterans of the Great Fatherland War

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 8 – Only 6800 men and women who fought in the Soviet army or in partisan detachments against the Germans or worked as war correspondents are still alive, down from 230,000 two decades ago, according to official Russian statistics surveyed by the To Be Precise portal.

            But as the number of people whom most would count as veterans in the normal sense as fallen with the passage of time, Moscow has included two other groups to keep the number of veterans up, including those who lived through the blockade of Leningrad, the battle of Stalingrad, and those  who worked in construction or transport near the front lines.

            There are approximately 40,000 of these people, bring the total number of veterans of fighting between 1941 and 1945 to about 47,000, the portal says, all of whom continue to be celebrated as their numbers decline with the passage of time (tochno.st/materials/ostalos-v-rossii).

            But there is an additional category of people Russian law defines as veterans of the Great Fatherland War: those who took part in operations “for the liquidation of the nationalist undergroundon the territories of Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia between January 1, 1944 and December 31, 1951” (kremlin.ru/acts/bank/7432).

            To Be Precise does not give figures for this category nor do Russian officials, likely because the numbers of Soviet troops involved in the tens if not hundreds of thousands to suppress these national movements only serves to highlight just how much resistance there was in these places and for how long.

            But despite this silence, the 1995 Russian law that adds them to the number of veterans of the Great Fatherland War remains very much in force and is no doubt actually applied so as to ensure that for another decade or so there will be at least a few remaining veterans the Kremlin can celebrate, although some in these countries may feel differently.

Since Putin’s War Began. More Russian Women have Been Jailed and Suffered More Abuse Behind Bars, ‘Vyorstka’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 5 -- While the total number of Russians behind bars is less than in the past, the number and share of women among them have risen dramatically as have the mistreatment they have received, according to a detailed study of the situation by the independent Vyorstka portal.  

            The number of men behind bars has declined for two reasons, it says. On the one hand, the war has taken out of civilian life many in the age cohorts most likely to commit crimes; and on the other, men can get out of jail by volunteering to fight in Ukraine (verstka.media/zhenskij-prigovor-pochemu-v-rossii-rastyot-achislo-osuzhdyonnyh-zhenshhin).

            At the same time, the siloviki have arrested and courts have sentenced to imprisonment ever more women for crimes that had sometimes been overlooked earlier given the more violent ones committed by men, something the police have done to keep their numbers up and prove they are doing their jobs.

            Once incarcerated, Vyorstka says, on the basis of conversations with experts and activists, women are treated far worse them men, often because they lack the clans within prisoners that sometimes have succeeded in convincing jailors that everyone will be safer and better off if concessions are made.

            In 2008, 140,000 Russian prisoners were women. That figure fell to 73,300 in 2020 but has now risen again to 87,305, figures that meant women formed roughly 15 percent in the first two of these years but now almost 20 percent – 19.94 to be precise – at the present time, the portal continues.

Russian Businesses Call on Kremlin Not to Force Them Pay to Support Population Growth

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 5 – Igor Shchegolyev, presidential plenipotentiary for the Central Federal District, says that companies which provide cash, time release and other forms of support to workers and their families have met “the gold standard” as far as their responsibilities for helping to solve Russia’s demographic problems.

            Others agreed, but business leaders urged Moscow not to make these steps obligatory given the economic problems they face. Doing so, they suggested, could further undermine the ability of their firms to survive in the current ecoinenomic environment (https://readovka.news/news/242281/).

            Given that Putin has made solving Russia’s demographic problems including the continuing decline in fertility rates to ever further below the replacement level of 2.2 children per woman per lifetime, such opposition by businesses to calls for them to bear some of the burden are intriguing if not unexpected.

            Clearly, some business leaders feel they can openly resist effort to force them to bear more of the costs of trying to turn the country’s demographic situation around, resistance that they were far less likely to offer in the past but may feel that the situation has changed and a kind of real political struggle has returned.

            And it is such judgments that are the most important aspect of this resistance, not the specifics of what Moscow officials have said is desirable or even the specifics of what Russian businessmen are saying they’ll do if they can but don’t want to be forced to do if they can avoid it.

Worried about Opposition If It Doesn’t’ Achieve Victory, Kremlin Discussing How to ‘Sell’ Ending War in Ukraine with Less, ‘Dossier’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 7 – Earlier this year, Russia’s Presidential Administration prepared a report on how best to “sell” an agreement on Ukraine that will be less than many Russians assumed Moscow would achieve and that could spark both anger and even  opposition in that case, according to a PA document the Dossier portal has obtained.

            According to that document, the PA has begun to prepared what might be called “the model of victory” including “propaganda narratives with the help of which it will be possible to ‘sell’ a peace agreement to Russians despite the high losses among Russian soldiers and the absence of significant results” (dossier.center/ura-pobeda/).

            The document specifies that “one must know when to stop as going too far constitutes defeat and continuing the special military operation would amount to a Pyrrhic victory,” a judgement that reflects the view of Sergey Kiriyenko’s “close associates” who “warn that continuing the war in Ukraine could force the revision of ‘fundamental positions.’”

            Those include, Dossier says, “the implementation of a general mobilization and the complete and final conversion of the entire economy to a war footing,” steps that would be deeply unpopular and make the achievement of Putin’s other goals for the country almost impossible to achieve.

            Preparing such a plan is needed, its authors say, because the most likely scenario for ending the war would be “far from the goals” Putin has declared as the reason for conducting it. And the compromises that such an accord will entail must somehow be presented as “a great victory and contribution of the president personally.”

            The PA document says that “the main achievements” of the operation will be “territorial conquests,” additional natural resources, a land bridge to Crimea and control of the shoreline of the Sea of Azov, and “the acquisition of millions of new Russian-language citizens,” according to Dossier.

            At the same time, the document says, “the propagandists plan to continue to insist that in the course of ten to fifteen years, Ukraine will cease to exist and the European Union will suffer a major economic shock” and that after such an agreement, Russia’s neighbors will adjust themselves to this new reality whatever they say now.

            But it continues, the reasons for preparing such a document are obvious: “if a war which has carried off the lives of hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens ends without obvious achievements, certain segments of Russian society may view that in a negative way,” especially the z bloggers and veterans.

            The first will be compelled to change their line and jailed if they do not, while the second must be given new positions and tasks to show how important they are to Russia and its future, the document says. For all other Russians “tired of the war and their problems,” the PA says Moscow will be able to announce good news about developments at home and abroad.

            At home, it says, Russians will face an easing of problems including the end of drone attacks and easing of sanctions and thus economic development; and abroad, they will see Russia having returned to a position as a world power that has been able thanks to the special military operation to redefine the world order and make Russia its leader well into the future.

            Dossier concedes that “it is unknown whether Putin will approve this plan,” despite PA support and the fact that it is based on a Russian endgame for Ukraine very close to what is currently the Kremlin’s negotiating position.

Russia’s Northern Capital Must Remain Both Petersburg and Leningrad, Yaremenko Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 3 – The debate over whether to restore the name Stalingrad to Volgograd continues, but despite the centrality of World War II in Putin’s thinking and his hostility to the founder of the Bolshevik state, there has been nothing equivalent in the case of Petersburg/Leningrad.

            Instead, Nikolay Yaremenko, editor of the Rosbalt news agency, says, both names of the city and the combination of imperial and Soviet names for streets and squares not only coexist but reenforce the unity of the city on the Neva (rosbalt.rInstu/news/2026-05-03/leningrad-peterburg-toponimika-podviga-5588342).

            “In the run-up to Victory Day, the question of naming the city and its landmarks transcends the realm of linguistics, becoming instead a part of the broader discussion regarding historical justice,” Yaremenko says, especially as it is obvious that no one can speak of “the blockade of St. Petersburg.”

            Moreover, according to the commentator, “the name "Leningrad"—within the context of the years 1941–1944—has long since detached itself from the persona of the political figure in whose honor it was originally bestowed; it has instead evolved into a semantically constitutive element of ‘the blockade lexicon.’”

            Yaremenko continues: “’the toponymy of heroism’ manifests itself most vividly in the names of streets, squares, and monuments that emerged during the post-war era. While the city center preserves the classic fabric of St. Petersburg, the mass-development districts to the south and north constitute a frozen chronicle of the city’s defense.”

            Importantly, “These names serve as a kind of ethical compass, a reminder that the well-being of today’s St. Petersburg was paid for by the resilience of the people of Leningrad.
 the writer insists, adding that “an ideological analysis of ‘Blockade-era toponymy’ reveals that, for the city, the synthesis of both names is of critical importance.

“St. Petersburg is a museum-city, a cultural capital, and ‘a Window on Europe, while Leningrad is a soldier-city, a symbol of resistance unparalleled in history. Any attempt to "purge" Leningrad-era place names from the urban landscape would result in a form of philological amnesia,” he argues.

And he concludes that “by preserving Leningrad-era names of streets and landmarks in modern St. Petersburg, we affirm that the city’s history is not divided into “black” and “white,” but constitutes a single, unbroken continuum—a process in which the grandeur of the imperial capital was safeguarded by the fearlessness of the people who called themselves Leningraders.”

Fertility Rates in North Caucasus Falling with Chechnya Alone having One Just Above Replacement Level

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 4 – Historically and in the minds of many still today, the North Caucasus is a place where families include many children. Even Vladimir Putin is given to recommending that Russians copy the North Caucasian pattern to overcome Russia’s population decline (kavkazr.com/a/pravozaschitniki-raskritikovali-predlozhenie-putina-zhenitj-detey/33629760.html).

            But in reality, Natalya Kildiyarova of the Kavkazr portal says, that picture is out of date. Fertility rates, the number of children per woman per lifetime, have been falling across the North Caucasus (kavkazr.com/a/konets-demograficheskogo-isklyucheniya-chto-proishodit-s-rozhdaemostjyu-na-severnom-kavkaze/33748640.html).

            Except for Chechnya, which has a fertility rate of 2.56, just above the replacement level of 2.2, all the other national republics there have rates below that level and thus are seeing their populations decline. That means that the region is no longer the outlier it once was but is going to decline in total population, albeit not as rapidly as most of the rest of Russia.

            That of course means that the North Caucasus will in fact increase compared to predominantly ethnic Russian regions, but far less than many have been predicting and that Moscow has counted on to make up for losses in Russian areas where the fertility rate is now 1.0 or even lower. 

            On another related matter, a demographer with whom Kildiyarova spoke on condition of anonymity ts that this decline is part of a broader trend in modern societies and should not be explained by reference to the war in Ukraine. The statistics available simply do not support such conclusions, he says.

            The anonymous demographer says that his research suggests that 0.5 percent of men aged 18 to 60 have died while fighting in Ukraine but that the percentages of such losses are lower in the North Caucasus than they are in many other federal subjects and thus less likely to have a demographic impact.

            In Chechnya, for example, the percentage of men killed in Ukraine is only 0.12 percent. In Ingushetia, it is about 0.2 percent and in Dagestan, approximately 0.25 percent, far lower than the all-Russia average and much lower than in Buryatia where combat losses are 1.6 percent of the population, and Bashkortostan where the figure is 0.8 percent.

15 Languages Spoken in Russia a Century Ago have Died Out and a Third of the Remaining 155 are Now at Risk of Sharing That Fate

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 4 – Fifteen languages spoken in Russia a century ago have died out with the passing of their last speakers, and a third of the remaining 155 are at risk, mostly among the numerically small peoples of the north and far east where in some cases fewer than ten people now speak some of their languages, according to Semen Syrdyk, an ethnic activist.

            The most recent language to die in the Russian Federation was Aleut which ceased to be a spoken by anyone there in 2022 when the last speaker passed away, but approximately 50 are at risk because only a few people use them. In 10 cases, fewer than 10 people know the language  (mariuver.eu/2026/05/04/korennje-narody-i-jazyki-rossii-na-grani-ischeznovenija/#more-85571).

            Syrdyk points out that Russian census data overstates how many people speak these languages because many who have only a passive or incomplete knowledge and in fact don’t use these languages in heir daily life nonetheless claim the titular language as their own. That means the situation of these tongues is far more dire than many now think.

            As is true in other countries, languages spoken by such small numbers are at risk because of urbanization, the passing of traditional ways of life and assimilation; but in the Russian Federation now, these tongues are particularly at risk given Putin’s active promotion of Russian at the expense of all other languages.

Fertility Rate in Belarus Lower than Russia’s and Only Slightly Higher than Ukraine’s, a Country at War

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 4 – The fertility rate in Belarus is now 1.22 children per woman per lifetime, lower than in the Russian Federation where that measure stands at 1.3 and only slightly higher than in Ukraine, a country now at war where tis metric stands at 1.0. All these figures are below the replacement level of 2.2 and will lead to more population declines.

            On the one hand, more tan 70 percent of the world’s countries now have fertility rates below replacement levels, according to the Visual Capitalist Project as reported by the Belarusian Think Tanks portal (visualcapitalist.com/mapped-every-countrys-fertility-rate-births-decline/ and thinktanks.pro/publication/2026/05/04/belarus-v-kontse-mirovogo-reytinga-po-koeffitsientu-rozhdaemosti.htmcl).

            But on the other, Belarus like the Russian Federation has relied more heavily on population growth, an extensive rather than intensive way, that boosting productivity in the workplace. Consequently, these declines are having a serious negative impact on economic growth, one reason both Minsk and Moscow are worried about these figures.

Since Putin Began His Expanded War in Ukraine, Regional Statistical Offices have Stopped Publishing Data on Population Size to Hide Massive Declines, Especially among Men

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 1 – Like Rosstat in Moscow, regional statistical offices have also stopped publishing data on population size to hide massive declines not only in the overall size of the population but also to distract attention from the fact that this decline has been greatest among adult males, who have died in the fighting or fled to avoid service,

            The People of Baikal portal sys that the Buryat counterpart of Rosstat stopped publishing this and 114 other statistical measures last year, but figures released in late 2024 allow one to see just how great the impact of Putin’s war has been (baikal-stories.media/2026/05/01/muzhchin-v-buryatii-stalo-menshe-na-155-tysyach-za-chetyre-goda/).

            Between 2021 and 2024, the portal says, the number of men in Buryatia dropped by 15,500 while the number of women increased by almost 2,000. Previously the two figures had moved more or less in tandem, except of course during World War II. At least 4600 Buryat men have died in Putin’s war; the 11,000 additional decline likely reflects flight from that republic.

            The portal says similar demographic trends are occurring in Irkutsk Oblast. Prior to the covid pandemic in 2020 and the expanded war in Ukraine, that region’s population fell on average between 3,000 and 5,000 each year. Since 2020, the annual declines have risen to between 15,000 and 19,000, earlier from the pandemic and later from the war.

            As was the case with the Soviet Union as a whole following World War II, the loss of so many men in these republics has led to a massive gender imbalance in the prime childbearing age groups and thus is depressing growth still further. Clearly, the longer Putin’s war continues, the greater this impact is going to be.   

Kalashnikov Says Putin will Soon Be Gone and Russia will Face Collapse But Only for a Time

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 2 – Maksim Kalashnikov, a Z blogger who has frequently criticized Putin for failing to be more aggressive in Ukraine, says that “Putin’s tenure” as Russian leader is “drawing to a close” because of his failure to win the war in Ukraine decisively and that in the wake of his departure, Russia will enter “a period of chaos and instability.”

            Indeed, the Putin critic from the right argues that after Putin goes, Russian elites will “install a weak puppet leader to try to mend relations with the West and secure the lifting of sanctions” (dialog.ua/russia/z-bloger-kalashnikov-prizval-rossiyan-gotovitsya-k-tomu-chto-putina.html).

            "I foresee an inevitable inter-clan struggle for the redistribution of spheres of influence, assets, and financial flows," he says; and as that takes place, “the security services will be weakened, fragmented, and demoralized by the outcome of the so-called "Special Military Operation."

            Kalashnikov argues that returning veterans will face “a destitute and unsettled life” and sill thus contribute to further economic decline, a rise in crime, the growth of inter-ethnic clashes, and the radicalization of Russian society. And all this, he concludes that “the disintegration of the Russian Federation can’t be excluded, at least for a couple of years.”

            While Kalashnikov’s predictions are likely overstated, they are noteworthy for three reasons. First, his fears of what a Russian loss in Ukraine will mean for Putin and his country are likely widespread among Russian elites and will likely dictate that the Kremlin to the extent it can work to avoid that outcome.

            Second, his suggestion that returning veterans will exacerbate problems in Russian life goes far beyond the usual suggestions that they will increase crime. Such a broader impact will be far more difficult for Putin or his successors to cope with given that repression alone is unlikely to work.

            And third – and this is by far the most important – Kalashnikov’s suggestion that Russia will face a high risk of disintegration but only for a few years in the future means that in his view, Russia may disintegrate for a time but will with any luck be able to reassemble itself, as the Bolsheviks did after 1917.

Stalin’s Horrific Plan for Great Northern Railway Cancelled within Weeks of His Death by His Successors

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 2 – At a time when Moscow is praising Stalin and whitewashing his crimes, when Russian officials are suggesting Stalin’s giant projects are something that should be emulated, and when Putin is trying to build a railway across the Russian North, the NeMoskva portal provides a useful correction and even critique.

            Sergey Tashevsky, a commentator for that portal, tells the horrific story of Stalin’s  plan to build the Great Northern Railway from Salekhard to Igarka using tens of thousands of GULAG prisoners, a 1200 km project that became known as “the Way of the Dead” (nemoskva.net/2026/05/02/mertvaya-doroga-salehard-igarka/).

            Under discussion for most of Stalin’s time in office, this project was officially launched in January 1949 without any of the preparatory investigations of the ground and permafrost that were needed but with Stalin’s assurance that there would always be plenty of workers because he wanted to use GULAG inmates to construct this line.

            The line was not completed, but it left in its wake thousands of graves and enormous amounts of steel and other construction equipment. But it was such a failure that less than three weeks after Stalin died on March 5, 1953, his successors shut the project down completely, recognizing as Putin and company don’t seem to how awful Stalin’s “giant” plans were.

Duma Deputy from Sakha Introduces Draft Bill to Exempt Children of the Numerically Small Peoples of the North from Any Russian Draft

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 1 – Fedor Tumusov, who represents the Sakha Republic in the Russian State Duma, has introduced a draft bill that would exempt children of the numerically small peoples of the North from any Russian draft, a measure needed given the risk that the loss of young men from these nations could put their peoples on the path to extinction.

            The Sakha deputy,  first deputy chairman of the Duma committee on health, says that “the number of many of the ethnoses involved is less than a thousand” and that losses of young men thus have outsized demographic consequences (nemoskva.net/2026/05/01/deputat-gosdumy-predlozhil-dat-korennym-narodam-severa-pravo-ne-sluzhit-v-armii/).

            Tumusov’s bill contains two other provisions: On the one hand, it gives young men from these nations a larger list of alternative service to choose from; and on the other, it allows those who may already have been drafted the right to leave service early so as to return to their home areas.

            Such a measure is unlikely to pass given how hard the Kremlin is working to find men to fill the depleted ranks of its invasion force in Ukraine, but it is a sign that representatives of at least some non-Russian groups who have been drafted disproportionately since 2022 are now seeking redress – yet another indication of opposition to Putin’s war among such groups.

Buryat Woman Attacked by Russians on Moscow Bus for Speaking Buryat

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 2 – In an example of what has become an increasingly frequent occurrence in Russian life, a Buryat woman was attacked by two Russian women for speaking her native language in the Russian capital. The attackers said that they shouldn’t have to listen to a language other than their own there.

            The NeMoskva portal describes what happened (nemoskva.net/2026/05/02/sk-vozbudil-delo-o-razzhiganii-nenavisti-posle-napadeniya-na-buryatskogo-dizajnera-v-moskve/), and a telegram channel provides a clip showing part of what happened in the Russian bus (t.me/tassovkaru/75273).

            Two aspects of this case are noteworthy: On the one hand, Russia’s investigation committee has opened a criminal case against the attackers, a welcome but hardly a sufficient response; and on the other, the Kremlin’s increasingly nationalistic and xenophobic messaging is leading ordinary Russians to conclude that they have every right to attack non-Russians.

Russian Orthodox Church Gets Official Recognition in Third African Country

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 30 – The Republic of the Congo has given the exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate official registration, the third African country to do so. Earlier, Cameroun and Madagascar took the same step, and an indication of the  expansion of the Moscow church in sub-Saharan Africa.

            Since 2021, when Moscow created an exarchate on what has been the Alexandria Patriarchate’s canonical territory, the ROC MP has increased its presence there from four countries to more than 30, the number of clerics has grown to 270, and the number of parishes now stands at 350 (tass.ru/obschestvo/27272251 and rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=121586).

            The Russian church says that it has taken these steps to provide spiritual aid to Russians now working in Africa and to Africans who have converted to Orthodox Christianity, but critics have long suggested that the Moscow church has made these moves to obscure its losses elsewhere and to provide cover for Russian intelligence operations.

            (For background, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/09/moscow-claims-to-have-recruited-more.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/09/moscows-claims-about-russian-orthodox.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/12/moscow-patriarchate-says-it-has.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/03/moscow-patriarchate-has-moved-into.html,) 

Not Just in Moscow or Not Just for Security, May Day Parades Cancelled Across Russia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 1 – Putin’s decision to cut back in the size of the May Day parade in the Russian capital has attracted international attention, but most cities in the Russian Federation has done at least as much or more often cancelled such actions altogether and quite clearly not just for reasons of security at least in the usual sense.

            The GoGov.ru portal provides the most comprehensive list available of cities where parades either weren’t planned or were cancelled and reports that only in a few places did the parades go forward in anything like the size that they did in the past. In all cases, these reductions were also taken in the name of security (gogov.ru/articles/1may26-demonstration).

            But the Tallinn-based regionalist portal Region.Expert suggests that these cancellations like the reduction of the parade in Moscow were not about the security of the population given the threat of Ukrainian drones but rather a political decision to protect the Putin regime against protests (region.expert/1may-cancelled/).

            “In reality,” the portal says, “the cancellation of May Day demonstrations in many Russian cities stems from the authorities' fear that citizens might use these legally sanctioned marches to voice protest slogans—against the war, internet and messenger blockades, tax hikes, and so forth. Historically, empires have often crumbled precisely because of social protests.”

Yet Another Critical Putin Project to Support Northern Sea Route Suspended for Lack of Funds, Reducing Russia's Ability to Export Coal

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 30 – When Putin announces a project in support of the Northern Sea Route or indeed anything else, it gets extensive coverage in both the Russian and international media; but when the lack of funds force suspension or even cancellation, something that is increasingly happening, that receives little attention from the media at all.

            The latest case is the suspension of efforts to complete a 50 km rail line in support of the Lava port near Murmansk. Announced in 2022, construction has been suspended because Russian Rail doesn’t have the money to pay the builders (ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/u-rossii-net-deneg-ctoby-dostroit-zeleznuu-dorogu-k-portu-lavna/449749).

            Earlier this year, Russian officials were proclaiming that the Lavna port had reached “67 percent of its design capacity;” but already it isn’t handling that amount of coal because there is no track to carry the cargo to the port itself, yet another bottleneck blocking the realization of plans for the NSR.

            In reporting this development, The Barents Observer says that “a similar situation prevails at the Murmansk Sea Trade Port, where a steady decline in cargo turnover is being recorded—also due to the coal sector. By the end of 2025, cargo handling had contracted by approximately 30%, and the downturn accelerated in early 2026.”

But “even if the state manages to secure the funding to fully commission the Lavna port and the railway line leading to it, there will be nothing to load,” the portal says, because “the primary flow of coal to the facility originates in the Kuzbass region, where production has been in steady decline in recent years.”

Moscow’s Failure to Block Drone Attacks on Key Businesses Prompts Mironov to Call for Such Firms to Set Up Their Own Defense Forces

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 30 – After Ukrainian drones succeeded in knocking out major Russian businesses and infrastructure, Sergey Mironov, head of the Just Russia Party, has called for Russia’s energy companies to become the first to set up their own anti-drone defense forces to protect themselves.

            According to the Russian politician, they now have the authority to do so under the terms of legislation that entered into force at the end of March allowing companies to “acquire firearms for the protection of critical infrastructure (gazeta.ru/social/news/2026/04/29/28368235.shtml and nemoskva.net/2026/04/30/zashhiti-sebya-sam-sergej-mironov-predlozhil-predpriyatiyam-sozdat-sobstvennye-podrazdeleniya-dlya-zashhity-ot-dronov/).

            "All of this should have been done yesterday,” Mironov continues, but after recent events, “it is even more crucial to avoid red tape and dishonesty today, in order to ensure elections can proceed and to minimize the economic and environmental damage resulting from enemy attacks.”

            Regional officials have urged this step for some time (t.me/Govorit_NeMoskva/31014 and t.me/Govorit_NeMoskva/53966), but Mironov is the first all-Russian politician to call for it, undoubtedly part of his election campaign because it highlights the inability of the Russian state with all its powers to protect Russians. 

Moscow Gives Indigenous Status to One Percent or Less of Russia’s Population, Evenk Scholar Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 30 – Like other countries, the Russian Federation seeks to control the indigenous peoples on its territory so that the regime and its business allies can have access to the valuable mineral resources in those regions. But unlike them, Yekaterian Zibrova says, it restricts the number of peoples who have indigenous status and thus greater legal protection.

            The Evenk scholar who teaches at the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa says that Russian laws limiting that status to groups pursuing a traditional way of life and numbering under 50,000 people means under one percent of Russia’s residents have it (themoscowtimes.com/2026/04/30/regions-calling-who-is-indigenous-in-russia-anyway-a92647).

            Numerically small groups of the size of her own Evenks have more protections under Russian law, although these are typically ignored when the economic or strategic needs of the Russian state are involved, than do larger non-Russian minorities, especially those without the status of an autonomous republic. 

            “Indigenous groups not recognized by Russia” as indigenous such as the Tatars, Zibrova says, “account for roughly 12% of Russia’s population, while those recognized [now some 57] are between 0.6% to 1%. Together, they live on around 20% of Russia’s territory” which just happens to be where some of its largest holdings of natural resources.

            If Moscow were to recognize all of this 12 percent of its population as indigenous, she continues, these peoples “would gain stronger legal grounds to demand restricted access or resource control based on indigenous rights.” But that is unlikely because then “Russia’s own criteria of indigeneity would work against the state.”

            According to Zibrova, Russia’s efforts to limit the status of indigeneity are breaking down at the international level because the UN, PACE and other international bodies are increasingly treating non-Russians inside the Russian Federation as indigenous even if Moscow continues to insist on this distinction. 

 

Average Age in Non-Russian Municipalities Far Lower than in Ethnic Russian Ones, ‘To Be Precise’ Survey Finds

Paul Goble

              Staunton, April 30 – The To Be Precise portal has surveyed Russia’s 2300 upper-tier municipalities to come up with a portrait of the all-Russian average of this category of administrative structures in which 27 percent of all residents of that country live. But its references to outliers is especially useful for several reasons.

              On the one hand, it provides data on a category smaller than federal subjects, in which Rosstat data are typically gathered and released; and on the other, it highlights differences between predominantly non-Russian and predominantly ethnic Russian areas that are often obscured when data are grouped in those larger categories.

              In a typical municipality which is located west of the Urals and is predominantly ethnic Russian, the average age is 40, although in some Russian areas, it is far higher with the average being over 50. In non-Russian municipalities, in contrast, the average age is far lower where it stands at 21 or 22 (tochno.st/materials/kakoi-vygliadit-tipicnyi-rossiiskii-municipalitet-obieiasniaem-na-dannyx).

              That means that the Russian areas in this category will have far fewer children than the non-Russian ones and that the non-Russian share of the population, barring assimilation or outmigration, will increase rapidly over the coming decades, a trend that often is obscured if the data are presented about only larger units.

              In nearly 40 percent of these upper-tier municipalities, “90 percent or more of the population identify as ethnic Russians,” and in only 13 percent “does the ethnic Russian share of the population fall below 30 percent,” the portal reports But in some municipalities in Dagestan, Chechnya and Tyva, the Russian share of the population is “less than one-tenth of one percent.”

              In general, the To Be Precise portal continues, “the larger the upper-tier municipality, the lower the proportion of ethnic Russians.” In small ones with fewer than 10,000 residents, “the median share of Russians in 91 percent but in cities with populations exceeding 50,000, this figure drops to 75 percent.”

              That pattern, the portal continues, is “the result of urbanization and migration: larger municipalities particularly those including major cities attract people from other regions and countries, resulting in a more diverse ethnic composition. Small settlements in contrast remain largely outside these migratory flows and thus more ethnically homogeneous.”

              To Be Precise concludes: “the typical Russian municipality belongs to [Natalya Zubarevich’s] ‘Third Russia”—a vast peripheral territory inhabited by residents of villages, settlements, and small towns, an area which ‘survives on the land' and exists outside of politics, as the agricultural calendar remains unaffected by changes in government."

Kremlin’s Promotion of Traditional Values Failing to Change Russian Behavior in Directions Putin Regime Wants, ‘Re-Russia’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 29 – Kremlin propaganda has succeeded in promoting anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian views but it is failing in its effort to gain real support for what Putin calls “traditional values” like getting Russians to have more children or want to see their children go into the army, the Re-Russia portal says.

            Indeed, a survey of recent polls suggests, according to this outlet which is produced abroad by Kirill Rogov, those efforts not only have failed to change the behavior of Russians but appear increasingly counter-productive with Kremlin critics arguing like the z-bloggers arguing that the Putin regime is on the wrong course (re-russia.net/analytics/0421/).

            While it is possible that over the longer term, the Kremlin propagandists may succeed, Re-Russia says, its resources for doing so are “limited: the influence of television is declining, the attempts to dominate the Internet have produced anger and alienation, and the Kremlin’s monopoly on ‘patriotism’” is now being challenged.

            “As a result,” the portal concludes, “ideological pressure ‘from above’” is proving counterproductive, “tending to foster the emergence of neo-Soviet ‘doublethink’ or to provoke a backlash of resistance particularly among young people at whom the Kremlin is directing its primary ideological thrust.”

            The article offers details on polls over the last few years concerning Russian attitudes about traditional values which confirm these conclusions.