Stalin Promoted Belarusian Language to the End; His ‘More Liberal’ Successors Effectively Destroyed It

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 19 – Stalin committed many crimes against the Belarusian people, but in one area, he was far more supportive than his successors. He continued the policies of rooting (korenizatisya) to the end of his rule, something that meant the Belarusian language was in a far better position in 1953 than earlier or later, Kirill Averyanov says.

            Only his successors, in the name of liberalization, undermined Belarusian, the pro-Russian Minsk commentator says. They gave Belarusians a choice as to which language they could have their schools and publications in, a choice that led to the rapid demise of the status of Belarusian in that republic (iarex.ru/articles/86031.html).

            When Stalin died, Belarusian was used in 95 percent of the schools of the republic, he reports. And 85 percent of the books, 74 percent of the journals by print run, and 71.5 percent of the newspapers by print run were published in Belarusian. Within a decade, all of these figures had been reduced to single digits; and Belarusian lost its prominence.

            Averyanov presents this history as an indication that Stalin failed to make Belarusians want to use Belarusian instead of Russian and that their lack of attachment to the language ensures that anti-Lukashenka nationalists will have no more success in restoring Belarusian should they come to power.

            But in fact, his article offers support for three other very different conclusions. First of all, it shows that if a government is committed to the promotion of this or that language, it is likely to survive; but if the powers are not, that language, especially if competitors are available, faces a difficult future.

            Second, it highlights the fact that what may look like liberalism from one point of view in fact can be used to promote anti-liberal outcomes. By making the choice of language in schools voluntary, the post-Stalinist leadership in fact Russianized and even Russified Belarusians far more than he did.

            And third, his words show that language and national identity are not the same thing. A people may speak the language of another nation or state but retain its identity or even have it strengthened, as has been the case in many countries around the world. Those who think otherwise, Averyanov himself concedes, are only populists or those with “a low IQ.”

            But as he does not say, all three of these conclusions are important not only for the future of Belarusians and Ukrainians but of all the non-Russian nations living within the current borders of the Russian Federation or under present or future Russian occupation.