Putin’s War Threatens the Survival of Russian Federation Even if a Settlement is Reached

Paul Goble

    Staunton, Apr. 23 -- Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, as it enters its fourth year, increasingly threatens the survival of the Russian Federation and will do so even if some kind of cessation of hostilities is arranged. It has alienated the educated Russian elites in the major cities who do not want the kind of country Putin is seeking to create; and it has infuriated non-Russians who see themselves being used as cannon fodder while their basic needs are being ignored and their status as citizens is being undermined by Kremlin-promoted xenophobia. These trends, which have been intensified by Western sanctions that have affected how Russians now live and by Kyiv’s reaching out to and providing support for will not end if the fighting eases or stops. Instead, they will be exacerbated by three other developments that Putin will find it difficult if not impossible to change: expectations among all groups in the population that things will change, something he doesn’t want to allow; the return of a massive number of angry and well-armed veterans of that conflict whom it will be almost impossible to reintegrate and who give every sign of becoming the Freikorps of a new revolutionary upsurge; and the inclusion under Moscow rule of more Ukrainians, who will add to the growing share of non-Russians in the population, pushing it up to double or more what it was only a few years ago and making Putin’s promotion of a Russian world there even more counterproductive.   

    Putin’s expanded war has hit educated Russian elites in the major cities hard. Many of these people have left and others have become so alienated that they no longer feel as committed to their country as they did. That represents a double hit on the stability of the Russian Federation. On the one hand, these are precisely the people the country needs to grow and prosper; and on the other hand, their departure and alienation means that the Kremlin no longer has them in its corner and must resort to coercion, as it has, to keep them declaring their loyalty regardless of what they feel. That in turn means that their connection to Russia has been reduced to a thin threat that can easily snap if something else happens especially given that the Russia they want is precisely the kind of Russia Putin won’t create. That occurred in 1991, and there is every reason to think that similar shocks are ahead, given what else is going on.

    Putin’s war has also infuriated poorer Russians who know that they are disproportionately being asked to fight and die without any real benefit and even more non-Russians who know they are being used as cannon fodder so the Kremlin won’t have to further alienate urban Russians. And as the war has continued, Putin and his regime have increasingly played up xenophobia among Russians, forgetting the first rule of managing a multinational state: such a state won’t survive if it tries to rely on only the titular nation. It has to include others, and pointedly alienating them as now ensures that the non-Russians and many in the poorer Russian regions as well will exit when they can, something that is likely to occur during a transition or disaster.

    These trends would have occurred given the way in which Putin has conducted his war even if no one outside had done anything. But the West has imposed sanctions that have had a negative effect on most Russians, and Ukraine has reached out and provided support for the non-Russians, hosting their leaders forced into exile and proclaiming their right to seek an independent existence. Neither of those things – or at least neither of the consequences of these steps having been taken up to now – are going to stop if and when the guns fall silent.  And that highlights something many have failed to recognize: Putin won’t end the war because of these domestic problems he faces because he and those around him know that they will only intensify and metastasize if and when the conflict eases or ends.

    Three of the changes that a settlement will bring are especially important. First, there will be widespread expectations among all groups of the population that the sacrifices they have been asked to make will be ended and that they will be given rewards for what support they have offered or been compelled to offer. Putin has no interest and little capacity to make such changes, and he is unlikely to be able to manage the disappointment well, making a new war and new repression more likely. But that approach will only make things worse in time. Second, the return of a large number of angry, expectant and well-armed veterans will lead not only to increases in crime and instability but to the rise of a new Russian version of the Freikorps that rocked Germany to its foundation in the wake of the end of World War I and ultimately ushered in the rise of Hitler and the Nazis. Putin even now is trying to integrate them into his system. But it is unlikely he will succeed. And third, if as now seems likely Putin is given more territory and thus more Ukrainians to rule as part of a settlement, what will be created is in many ways the worst nightmare of all.

    The Soviet Union fell apart when the share of non-Russians in its population rose to 50 percent of the total. Initially, the Russian Federation was roughly 80 percent ethnic Russian. Now, it is less than 70 percent. If a significant portion of Ukraine becomes part of the Russian Federation, then the percentage of ethnic Russians will fall again to below 60 percent and possibly to 55 percent or even lower. In that event, Putin will have restored not the Soviet Union but the conditions that led to the disintegration of the USSR. And for that reason as well as for the others enumerated above, the prospect that Putin’s state will disintegrate as well in the coming months or years is very great indeed.