Since Putin Launched Expanded War in Ukraine, Ever More Russian Companies have Felt Free Not to Pay Workers On Time, ‘Okno’ Survey Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 28 – Since Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine, Russia government monitoring of firms concerning whether they are paying their employees reguarly has disappeared, a survey of workers in companies in the North says. As a result, the companies, even those working on defense contracts, have felt free not to pay their workers on time.

            Conducted by the Okno group, the survey found there are many reasons companies find it difficult to pay on a timely basis, including failure to be paid for their products and a desire to extract as much  money out of their factories as possible (okno.group/zastryali-v-arktike-bez-zarplat-kazhdaya-vtoraya-vahta-v-rossii-sidit-seychas-bez-deneg/).

            Wage arrears were a serious problem in the Russian Federation in the 1990s and have risen and fallen since them (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/04/ever-more-russian-companies-behind-in.html). But this is the first time investigators have linked the non-payment of wages and salaries to government policies arising from Putin’s war in Ukraine.

            What this means, of course, is that the natural anger workers and employees feel when they aren’t paid as scheduled will almost certainly feed anger about the war itself, pushing down support for what Moscow is doing there, however much the Kremlin and its propagandists seek to suggest otherwise.

            The coming together of these two types of anger thus presents the Kremlin with a serious problem, one that it can’t solve without infuriating either more workers or the company bosses who often are the closest allies of the Kremlin leader. 

Many in North Caucasus and Other Poor Regions Work Off the Clock and So Receive Government Assistance, ‘To Be Precise’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 27 – In some of the poorer regions of the Russian Federation, up to 73 percent of the population receives government assistance, most often because the adults in these families work unofficially, are listed as unemployed, and thus can collect unemployment aid, according to the To Be Precise portal.

            Other reasons that have pushed these figures above 50 percent in Tyva and the North Caucasus include large families and hence maternal capital subsidies and outright fraud which allows many to get themselves declared as invalids and receive government money for that (tochno.st/materials/kazdyi-12-i-municipalitet-v-rossii-ne-prozivet-bez-socvyplat-xorosaia-novost-takix-raionov-stanovitsia-vse-mense).

            The portal provides detailed data on this situation, notes that it is more typically the case in rural areas than in urban ones, and says that the Putin regime is successfully cutting the percent of Russians receiving government assistance, something that is deeply unpopular and may in fact harm many.

Russian-Ukrainian Talks Lead to Moscow’s Implicit Recognition that It has Political Prisoners

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 27 – One of the aspects of international negotiations often neglected by outside observers is that the greatest progress is made on issues that most people don’t think are central but that have enormous consequences and deserve to be noted and carefully assessed. Such have been the one and off Russian-Ukrainian “peace talks.”

            There have been two that are noteworthy. The first involved a Ukrainian decision to bring translators to the meetings, implicitly sending a message to Moscow that Ukrainians and Russians are not one nation but two (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/05/kyiv-gains-small-but-important-victory.html).

            The second may be even more important. Denis Mikhailov who headed Aleksey Navalny’s campaign office but now lives in Poland, notes that the Russians in the memoranda they handed over to Ukrainian negotiators acknowledge that Moscow has “political prisoners” (themoscowtimes.com/2025/06/27/the-kremlin-finally-acknowledged-russia-holds-political-prisoners-thats-a-big-step-a89548).

            In the past, Russian officialdom has always denied that there are any political prisoners in their country; but in this case, the Russian memoranda said “in black and white” that “there should be an exchange of political prisoners between the two countries, an implicit suggestion that this category must be recognized by both sides.

            This Russian move, Mikhailov insists, must not be seen as a simple recognition of reality or a magnanimous action. Instead, it was taken because the Kremlin needs “leverage” and by agreeing to have them as “bargaining chip, the Kremlin is now literally legalizing its own repressive policies on the international stage.

            There is no doubt that Moscow will seek to expand the definition of political prisoner to include Ukrainians under arrest in Russia and to demand that the many Russians who have committed crimes in Ukraine be returned as supposed political prisoners. Both human rights activists and Western democracies must come up with a serious response lest they be played.

It needs to be recognized that if dissidents in Russia are recognized as political prisoners who can become “bargaining chips,” then “there is a risk that freeing them will … strengthen the very system that produced them. But by making them that, Western governments and international must respond by being more supportive of those languishing in Russian prisons

But Mikhailov says he is “convinced that this recognition [of the reality of political prisoners in Russia, something the Kremlin has so long denied] opens up new opportunities. We cannot waste the opportunity that the Kremlin has provided us to secure the release of the hundreds of political prisoners held in Russia.”

Could Kyrgyz Republic Soon Become First Central Asian State Not Calling Itself ‘a Stan’?

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 25 – Kyrgyz became to call their republic Kyrgyzstan already in the 1930s to signal their close relations with the neighboring republics of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. But since 1991, various activists have called for insisting on a name for that country that doesn’t include that syllable.

            On the one hand, this reflects a desire of the Kyrgyz to stand out and signal to themselves and others their distinctiveness; but on the other, it certainly a the way also is a response to the way ome officials and analysts beyond the borders of the former Soviet space often refer dismissively to “the stans” when they talk about the region.

            The Kyrgyz were not the first Central Asians to try to drop the syllable “stan” from the names of their countries. Former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev pushed hard for doing in the 2010s, and the Kyrgyz followed course, although at the time neither made the change (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/01/push-to-rename-kazakhstan-kazakh.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/02/window-on-eurasia-could-kazakhstan.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/09/window-on-eurasia-might-another-stan.html).

            Now, however, there seems to be more support within the Kyrgyz elite for making a change. Toktogul Kakchekeyev, a leader of Kyrgyz veterans organizations, is one of those who think that changing the current name might be a good idea (asia24.media/comments/v-konstitutsii-net-slova-stan-tam-chetko-napisano-kyrgyzskaya-respublika-kyrgyzstan-eto-sokrashchenn/).

            He points that the country’s constitution “doesn’t contain the syllable ‘stan.’ Instead, it clearly says that the name of the country is the Kyrgyz Republic. But,” he acknowledges, “there is a note that the country can be called Kyrgyzstan for shot.” That abbreviation could be “abolished” and no other changes are needed.

            Kakchekeyev points out that the problem doesn’t exist in Russia or for Russian speakers who still refer to the country as Kirgizia; and presumably they will continue to do so whatever Bishkek does even if it takes more radical steps and decides to name the country  the Republic of the Kyrgyz People (“Respublika Kirgyz El”) or the Republic of the Land of the Kyrgyz (‘Respublika Kyrgyz Zher”).

            Whether any steps are taken now to rename the Kyrgyz Republic, the fact that such discussions are going on should be a warning to those in the West who constantly lump the Central Asian countries together as “the stans” that doing so is insulting and that at least some in the region are still searching for ways out.

 

Moscow Must Manage Shrinking of Its 800 Small and Mid-Sized Cities or Face Their Collapse, Russian Urbanist Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 27 – Moscow must come up with policies to manage the shrinking of the country’s small and mid-sized cities or watch as they collapse into chaos with serious consequences not only for themselves but for the country as a whole, Russian urbanist Yuliya Zubarik says.

            The head of the Master’s Plan Bureau says that demographic trends make the decline of such cities inevitable, and the government must  come up with a plan to manage that trend or face a cascading series of disasters (realty.ria.ru/20250627/urbanist-2025649914.html and on-news.ru/regions/kontroliruemaya-gibel-urbanist-dala).

            More than 800 of the 1125 cities in the Russian Federation have populations under 50,000; and the impact of the continuing decline in the population of the country as a whole on them must not be ignored, especially as 80 percent of these cities are already losing population, a figure that will only grow in the future.

            There is no universal solution for the problems these cities face, but there are models abroad, including the reaction of American officials to the collapse of Detroit’s population a half century ago. So far, there have been very few Russian efforts to address this trend, Zubarik continues.

            In her view, such cities will survive only by ensuring that they have some economic basis. Those who place their hopes in tourism as many are now doing will be disappointed. At tourism supports only 10 to 15 percent of all Russian cities, and that share is unlikely to increase dramatically in the future.  

Russian Yards Can’t Build Replacements for the 70 Percent of Russia’s Merchant Ships More than 25 Years Old, Forcing Moscow to Use ‘Shadow Fleet,’ ‘Novyye Izvestiya’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 25 – Seventy percent of Russia’s merchant ships are older then 25, and Russia’s shipyards aren’t capable of building replacements for them fast enough, Novyye Izvestiya reports, noting that is the major reason why “Russian shipping countries have been forced to switch to using a shadow fleet.”

            Vessels built in the last ten years amount to less than 15 percent of the fleet, a sign, the newspaper says, that there has been “almost a complete lack” of renewal in recent decades (newizv.ru/news/2025-06-25/den-moryaka-na-fone-morskogo-krizisa-chto-ugrozhaet-rossiyskomu-flotu-437279).

            The aging of the Russian fleet has an impact not only on its reliability but on the cost of using its ships -- older ones use more fuel and require repairs that put many ships out of action for a long period – and on the ability of Moscow to meet its trade and security goals, including on the Northern Sea Route where it has “fewer than half” of the 57 specialized ships it needs.

            Russia’s wharfs aren’t keeping up. They have long been troubled by corruption and poor management, and since 2022, they have suffered from Western sanctions which have prevented them from getting parts Russian companied don’t yet make. Last year, Russian shipbuilders delivered only 16 new ships for Russia’s merchant fleet.

            The aging of its existing fleet and the inability to replace older ships with newer ones has forced Russian companied to use a shadow fleet consisting of “ships officially not connected with Russian companies, often registered under flags of convenience and owned by ostensibly offshore structures.” Experts say Russia is now using up to 1400 such ships.

            All these factors are contributing to an increase in harm to the environment, to the collapse of port infrastructure in the Russian Federation, and to declines in Russian foreign trade, declines that many blame sanctions on but that in fact are the result of Moscow’s failure to build new ships.

Russian Rail Postpones Plans for Two-Track Routes in Far East for at Least a Year and Likely Far Longer, Verkhoturov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 25 – Russian Rail officials announced this week that they are postponing plans to open two-track routes in the Far East for at least a year and more likely two or more, a step that reflects falling profits and a significant cutback in the company’s modernization plans, Dmitry Verkhoturov says.

            As recently as last year, the economic analyst says, Russian Rail had an investment program of 1.5 trillion rubles (15 billion US dollars), of which 400 billion (4 billion US dollars) were to be spent adding dual tracks on the Trans-Siberian and BAM routes. But now the company has cut back both (sibmix.com/?doc=17146).

            Russian Rail will spend only 891 billion rubles (8.9 billion US dollars) for all investment projects and only 100 billion (one billion US dollars) in the Far East. That will make it impossible to build the tunnels on the two chief lines needed to add parallel tracks that would have allowed them to carry far more cargo.

            Much of that is coal being sold to China, and consequently, this delay will mean that Russia will have a harder time earning the money it needs for the things it purchases from Beijing and that relations between Moscow and China will be negatively affected because China very much wants the additional coal double tracking would make possible.

            Consequently, what might appear superficially to be a small problem has the potential to mushroom into a larger one unless the Russian government intervenes with more money for its rail lines in the east or the Chinese regime does, something that would change the balance of economic power there still further away from Moscow.

Despite What Kremlin Thinks, Moscow Shifted Crimea from RSFSR to Ukrainian SSR in 1954 for Economic Rather than Political Reasons, Kolezov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 25 – Despite what Putin aide Vladimir Medinsky says, Moscow transferred Crimea from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954 not to gain votes for Nikita Khrushchev or other political reasons but rather for economic ones concerning the recovery of that region from the results of World War II, Dmitry Kolezyov says.

            On his telegram channel, the Russian journalist says that Medinsky’s falsification of history on this point raises broader questions about how reliable the history textbooks he is overseeing the rewriting of. But this Crimean question is important in its own right (t.me/kolezev/16356 reposted at echofm.online/opinions/krym-i-mify-medinskogo).

            In the course of a conversation with Putin, Medinsky made two points about that historical event. On the one hand, he said that Khrushchev transferred Crimea to win votes from Ukrainian comrades because of the power struggle in Moscow. And on the other, he suggested that the party leader did so because he was a died in the wool Ukrainophile.

            Neither of these arguments is true, Kolezov says. Khrushchev didn’t need the votes of Ukrainian party members as there was no party congress even scheduled at which their support might have been needed. They amounted to only 15 percent of Central Committee members. And no one accused Khrushchev of Ukrainophilia until after he was dead and rarely before 1991.

            The reason that Moscow agreed to the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was economic rather than political, Kolezyov says. Kyiv was far better positioned to help Crimea recover from the destruction of World War II than was the RSFSR government in Moscow. And indeed, he adds, that calculation proved to be correct.

            Moreover, pace Medinsky, shifting territory from one republic to another was hardly rare in the USSR, the journalist continues. This was constantly happening for various reasons “from the ethnic composition of the population to the flourishing of pasture land.” (On that reality, see kommersant.ru/doc/2640080 windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/05/borders-in-post-soviet-space-were.html which contains my 1990 article for RFE/RL Report on the USSR “Can Republican Borders be Changed?”

Graves of Russians who Fought in Putin’s War in Ukraine Being Treated with Anything but Respect

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 25 – Russia does not have a proud history of taking care of cemeteries, but many had expected it would do better because of the stress Vladimir Putin has put on honoring those who died fighting in his war in Ukraine.  But that has not happened. If anything, those who have died there are being treated with even less respect than those who died in other wars.

            The Important Stories portal has catalogued horrors from one end of the Russian Federation to the other in the treatment of the graves of those Russians who died in Ukraine. Graves are being flooded, monuments are being defaced and coffins are even being robbed (istories.media/stories/2025/06/25/tam-gde-lezhat-nashi-parni-sploshnie-pomoiki/).

Much of the flooding appears to be the result of the rush to create cemeteries for those who have died in Ukraine, but most of the other actions reflect either official neglect or the Russian public’s lack of respect for those who died fighting for their country. Some of it, however, may be evidence of anti-war attitudes.

The Kremlin clearly feels this is a local problem and that it doesn’t need to devote attention to it given that such cases are so widely dispersed. But it may be in for a surprise when more veterans return from the front and see how the Russian government is treating those of hteir comrades who have died.

For those coming back, such lack of respect to those who gave their lives in Ukraine is likely to make them even more angry and skeptical about Putin’s promises to treat those who served not only with respect but honor. And such feelings will likely fuel more anti-regime movements in the future as the more than 500,000 Russian soldiers now in Ukraine return home. 

 

Non-Russians Less Likely to Says They Have an All-Russian Civic Identity than are Ethnic Russians, Barinov Concedes

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 26 – Moscow has long trumpeted figures showing that more than 92 percent of the residents of the Russian Federation tell pollsters that they have a common all-Russian civic identity; and officials from Vladimir Putin on down insist that this shows how overwhelmingly united the population now is.

            But in many ways, this figure is like the average temperature of patients in a hospital because it combines many who are prepared to declare that they have adopted a civic identity and those less likely to make such a statement. And thus the figure in which the Kremlin places so much faith conceals as much as it reveals.

            That was highlighted this week when Igor Barinov, the head of the Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs, made his annual report to the Duma committee on nationality affairs. Among other things, he spoke about differences among federal subjects on the issue of the identification of their populations as civic Russians (business-gazeta.ru/article/676106).

            According to the FADN chief, larger shares of residents of five federal subjects – Kaluga, Nizhny Novgorod, Omsk, Novosibirsk and Lipetsk – say they have higher rates of identification as civic Russians, from 97.5 percent to 99.4 percent than the countrywide average of 92.6 percent.

            But five others – the republics of Ingushetia, Chechnya, Dagestan, Mordvinia and Khakassia – have significantly lower rates – from 85.5 percent to 87.7 percent. All those above the all-Russian average are predominantly ethnic Russian oblasts, while all those below that number are non-Russian republics and three of the five have non-Russian ethnic majorities.

            On the one hand, one would expect that ethnic Russians would find it easier to identify as civic Russians given the way Moscow has promoted that identity. But on the other, it is clear that the decision of a greater share of non-Russians to resist doing so highlights the continuing importance of their ethnic identity and may limit the Kremlin’s integration plans.

            An article published more than 60 years ago in Soviet times -- Jerome M. Gilison’s “Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent” in The American Political Science Review 62: 3 (1968): 814-826 – suggests why that is so. It demonstrated that even though all Soviet citizens were expected to vote for CPSU candidates, a small percent did not.

            The way in which that share of those who didn’t vote for communist candidates was not the same everywhere. In those republics, like the occupied Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – it was far higher, albeit within this limited range than in ethnic Russian oblasts and krays of the RSFSR.

            At the time, Gillison’s article generated a certain amount of mirth given the small shares of voters who defaced their ballots even in the Baltic countries. But two decades later, the importance of such actions became obvious as the republics which had the highest negative votes proved to be the leaders of the march to independence that led to the end of the USSR in 1991.

            That is one of the reasons why Barinov and other Moscow officials are worried: They remember what happened in the last decades of Soviet power and they want to block anything similar from happening in the future to the absurdly misnamed given Putin’s policies Russian Federation. 

Veterans of Putin’s War in Ukraine Must Receive Far Higher Pay than Current Russian Average or There will Be Problems, Kremlin Official Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 26 – Sergey Novikov, who heads the Kremlin’s social projects directorate, says veterans must make significantly more than the average salary in Russia on their return home. Now, while fighting, they are earning at least 2600 US dollars a month, an amount that is two and a half times greater than the average in Russia.

            Speaking to a youth forum this week, the Kremlin official says that the veterans, most of whom are young, “need help with retraining and finding new jobs. But not just any jobs: decent ones. Because right now in the combat zone, they’re earning solid pay … They need to return home in a way that doesn’t cause a drop in household income” (tass.ru/politika/24361151).

But achieving that goal is almost certainly impossible: half of the 140,000 veterans who have come back as of now have not been able to find jobs at all and many suffer from injuries or PTSD (themoscowtimes.com/2025/06/26/nearly-140k-russian-soldiers-back-from-war-are-in-need-of-reintegration-kremlin-says-a89581 ).

Novikov’s words are the clearest indication yet that the Kremlin is worried about what will happen when more veterans return and does not yet have a plan for coping with a situation that gives every sign of being the seedbed for social explosions.

Veterans of Putin’s War in Ukraine Join Protesters in Altai Republic

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 23 – Moscow is going to find it harder to ignore protests in the Altai Republic against the elimination of local government organs and the heavy-handedness of the Kremlin-appointed governor now that veterans of Putin’s war in Ukraine are joining the continuing and growing protests.

            For background on these protests and their increasing politicization, see  windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/protests-in-altay-kray-likely-puts-on.html; for a report that soldiers Moscow drafted and recruited from the Altai Republic to serve in Ukraine are back and protesting, see holod.media/2025/06/23/zhiteli-respubliki-altaj-brosili-vyzov-kremlyu/.

            Moscow and its appointees in the Altai Republic have assumed that they can ignore even mass protests there because they involve a small nation most of whose residents live in rural areas as such actions and the repression the republic head is visiting on them won’t attract the attention in the Russian capital or abroad that might limit the Kremlin’s freedom of action.

            But the appearance of veterans in the ranks of an ethnic protest against Kremlin policy is yet another reminder that men who agreed to serve in Putin’s war in Ukraine for money may be an even bigger problem than anyone had imagined, especially if these men decide that Moscow must not ignore their interests if they fought for its. 

            That is potentially a far larger threat to the Putin regime than whatever happens in the small Altai Republic. 

Ethnic Russians Face Even More Challenges than Do Non-Russians in Preserving Their Culture, Moscow’s Nationality Policy Chief Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 25 – In explaining why 80 percent of the steps outlined in the new nationality policy strategy document are directed at the ethnic Russian majority rather than the non-Russians, Igor Barinov says that “the state-forming people experience … perhaps even more pressure in preserving their spiritual and moral values” than do non-Russians.

            The head of the Federal Agency for Nationality Policy said that on the release of a draft of a new strategy document for Moscow’s nationality policy (business-gazeta.ru/article/676004). (For a discussion of that document itself, see  jamestown.org/program/moscows-nationality-policy-to-promote-ethnic-russians-and-counter-threats-from-others/.)

            Barinov also declared that “for the first time, the text of the strategy will include a separate direction on preserving the traditions, customs, and culture of the Russian people who form the state.For some reason, we were embarrassed to talk about this before, maybe we didn't pay enough attention, and we thought that these issues would resolve themselves.”

            According to the FADN director who oversaw the preparation of this document, “we have singled this out as a separate direction. We believe that depending on how the Russian people feel, this will also apply to all large and small ethnic groups living in our country. If it is good for Russians, it will be good for everyone!" (emphasis added)

            Two other Russian specialists on nationality policy also commented on these changes. Academician Valery Tishkov, a former Russian nationalities minister noted that, “nationality policy had been seen as only about minorities … The majority was outside its scope even though [the Russian nation] also has its own problems and interests.”

            And Vladimir Zorin, the last person to serve as Russia’s nationalities affairs minister, agreed. He said that the new draft represents a significant improvement precisely because it devotes “special attention to the preservation and development of the culture of the Russian people as ‘a unique tie binding together civil society.’”

            But in commenting on the draft strategy document, a Tatar pointed to its shortcomings. Ilnar Garifullin, a longtime Tatar activist, said that he and other Tatars are disappointed that the new paper doesn’t speak about “the need to support and create language centers for the major peoples of the Russian Federation.”

            Such people also “need support for the preservation of their identities; and if the experts of FADN had proceeded seriously, they would have understood that the support of non-Russian-language compatriots abroad is also something that would serve to strengthen the position of Russia.”

            Garifullin also pointed to the “Russo-centric” nature of the new draft and noted that the document says “practically nothing about the support of cultural multiplicity,” despite efforts to proclaim that that is one of the goals of the document itself. Specifically, “there is nothing about the language issue which today is the most important thing agitating the peoples of the RF.”

            He also highlighted another change that the new draft has introduced: “In the former strategy there was no suggestion that all the problems [in nationality affairs] came from abroad and that everything in the country is good.” It looks like FADN wants to avoid responsibility by insisting that “if there are problems, then it isn’t we who are guilty but external forces.”

            “In my view,” Garifullin concluded, “this is irresponsible because FADN was set up to solve these problems and not lay responsibility in advance for them on external forces.”

Heavy Equipment Used by Russian Firms in the Arctic Destroying Environment and Life of Indigenous Peoples, ‘Arktida’ Study Concludes

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 24 – Russian firms developing the Arctic continue to use Soviet-style heavy-tracked vehicles, machinery that destroys the environment and lives of indigenous peoples ever more seriously because of expanded operations and global warming which leaves ever more of the region uncovered by a protective layer of snow.

            That is the conclusion of a new study by the Arktida organization of the situation in nine regions of the Russian North where Maria Ivanova, one of that group’s analysts say, the destruction of the land’s surface is so great that it can be seen in satellite photographs (nemoskva.net/2025/06/24/shramy-tundry/).

            While other countries operating in the north have adapted the equipment they use so as to do less damage, her investigation shows, Russia has not; and the destruction of the land’s surface by such heavy-tracked vehicles is accelerating at an ever-increasing speed, melting of the permafrost and thereby making what had been a dangerous situation even worse. 

            Indeed, the continued use of such machinery is inflicting “significant harm to the traditional way of life of the numerically small indigenous peoples.” Their land and water resources have been so destroyed that they can no longer practice their traditional way of life, despite the guarantees they have on paper in the Russian Constitution.

            And when they stop practicing their traditional way of life, the Russian government argues that they no longer qualify for the protections. It is then in a position to deny that they are in fact a protected minority, something that means when the heavy-tracked vehicles go through, they destroy more than the natural environment. They destroy a human one as well.   

            Arktida calls for the adoption of a federal law that will restrict the use of these dangerous vehicles, their replacement by more modern and less destructive ones, and compensation for the populations which have seen their way of life destroyed in Moscow’s headlong race to exploit the Russian North.

To Boost Birthrate, Moscow Must Spend More on Families, Something It can’t Do Now Because of Other Demands on the Budget, Russian Medical Specialists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 24 – Speaker after speaker at this years Russian Health Organization Congress meeting said that “we await the time when the financial possibility of the government will allow for fundamental changes” in the amount of money Moscow can give families, Nakanune journalist Elena Rychkova says.

            She does not draw the conclusion but many who read her words about what medical experts think are likely to view such comments as an implicit criticism of Putin’s high levels of spending on his war in Ukraine, something that has reduced resources available for other needs including healthcare (nakanune.ru/articles/123577/).

            The medical experts attending the conference said that the two primary causes of the declining birthrate in the Russian Federation are the rapidly falling number – more than 400,000 annually – of women in the prime childbearing age cohort and social-economic limitations such as apartment sizes and family incomes.

            Neither of these can be solved quickly, the first especially, but the second is so important that it cannot be denied as it so often is, the doctors and medical officials said. They also suggested that there was little room for improvement in infant and child mortality, but there is some and said that Moscow would do well to consider putting more money there.

            That is particularly the case, Rychkova reports that they argued, because such spending will likely lead to a higher birthrate (which after all is about live births rather than all of them) in a far shorter period of time than even massive investment in boosting family incomes and waiting for the appearance of a larger pool of mothers a generation from now. 

 

Moscow’s Progress in Registering Individuals as Members of Numerically Small Nations May Soon Threaten Larger Ones as Well

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 23 – Moscow is celebrating its registration of the 100,000^th member of the numerically small peoples of the North and Far East (nazaccent.ru/content/44141-oficialno-zaregistrirovan-100-tysyachnyj-predstavitel-korennyh-malochislennyh-narodov-rossii/), but this action threatens both those groups and larger non-Russian nations as well.

            The Russian government has long maintained a list of the numerically small peoples of the North and Far East whose members enjoy certain rights and privileges because of their indigenous status. It currently has just under 50 nations with a combined population of approximately 300,000.

            But in 2020, Moscow created a list of the individual members of these groups so the authorities could prevent people who are not members of this category of peoples could not claim benefits. And while control of the list was nominally put under the Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs, it has been from the beginning in fact controlled  by the FSB (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/10/moscow-sets-up-registry-of-northern.html).

            That meant that the Russian security services were in a position to decide not only who was a member of this or that nation but even whether a nation belonged on the list or even existed. Because of that, many of the members of these peoples refused to register at all, and the numbers doing so have increased relatively slowly.

            Between 2020 and mid-2022, some 75,000, roughly a quarter of the census figures for these nations applied for inclusion on this list; but only a third of that number – just 25,000 -- were registered (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/06/moscow-now-compiling-not-just-list-of.html).

            In the three years since those figures were released, only 75,000 additional members were added to the list, bring the total to the 100,000 that Moscow is crowing about – even though that figure is less than a third of the total census numbers for the numerically small peoples of the North and Far East.

            The slowness of this increase undoubtedly reflects skepticism about how this list may be used by the authorities, but it also equally undoubtedly is the product of a Kremlin effort to reduce the number of members of these groups and even the number of the groups and declare those not on the list Russians civic or even ethnic.

            Some in the numerically small peoples of the North and Far East are certain that this is one of the most serious risks they face (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/06/moscow-now-compiling-not-just-list-of.html). But if Moscow can do that to them, it can do that to others, first among the smaller nations of the North Caucasus and Middle Volga and then to others.

            Given Putin’s effort to boost the number and share of ethnic Russians in the population of the Russian Federation and his all-too-obvious hostility to non-Russians, that is a very real possibility – and so what Moscow is celebrating likely will now become something that all non-Russian minorities may come to fear. 

 

Moscow Patriarchate Suffers Another Defeat Abroad – This Time at Holy Mount Athos

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 22 – The Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has been suffering defeat after defeat abroad in recent years because of its slavish support of Kremlin aggression and its attacks on other Orthodox churches, most prominently the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.

            But now it has suffered one that not only hits key members of the Russian political elite but ordinary Russian Orthodox believers because the monastic republic at Holy Mount Athos in northern Greece has introduced strict limitations on pilgrims from the Russian Federation (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/06/22/afon-pokidaet-zonu-svo).

            Visiting that monastery complex has been important for ordinary Russians and for members of the Russian political elite – Putin has visited twice (in 2005 and 2016) and senior members of his team have visited so often that they have formed what many call an Athos Club in Moscow (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2022/08/01/na-vere-shapka-gorit).

            The governing body of Mount Athos, the Greek Orthodox Church, and many others have been alarmed by the ways in which Moscow has used the Russian monastery there to funnel money to various Kremlin projects abroad. Now, that body has imposed strict quotas on the numbers of Russians who can visit and the amount of money they can bring in with them.

            That will hurt the Kremlin in two ways: It will anger ordinary Russian believers who since the collapse of communism have hoped to visit this holy shrine and now are unlikely to be able to. And it will limit but of course not end Moscow’s ability to use the ROC MP abroad as a front for its various intelligence and subversive projects.

            As such, this move by Holy Mount Athos may prove to have a greater impact on the Kremlin than even the much more widely attended to declarations of autocephaly because as Novaya Gazeta pointed out in reporting this move, these restrictions “significantly complicate the work of Moscow agencies in this holy place.”

Moscow Oblast Experiment Allowing Immigrants who Don’t Know Russian to Work There Doesn’t Extend to Citizens of Former Soviet Republics

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 22 – Andrey Vorobyov, governor of Moscow Oblast, says that those who would like to come to his region from countries where a visa to enter Russia may do so even if they don’t know Russian, an experiment that excludes those from former Soviet republics where no visa is required but one that is going to spark demands that they be allowed to as well.

            Under the provisions of this experimental program, he says, “companies will be able to attract workers without a knowledge of Russian because they don’t need it [to do their jobs] and that will solve the problem of the deficit of labor resources” in his region (rbc.ru/politics/21/06/2025/6855a5419a79475114204068).

            Vorobyov says he is confident that such migrant workers from countries beyond the borders of the former Soviet space will quickly learn the limited number of Russian words they need to know in order to do their jobs and that their lack of Russian language skills won’t be a problem for them or for the oblast.

            On the one hand, this experiment highlights just how hard labor shortages are hitting Russian firms and the desire of businesses and some in the Russian government to find ways around the current limitations Moscow has placed on those who want to immigrate but don’t know Russian.

            But on the other – and this is far more serious – it is a certainly that many businesses and many potential immigrants from former Soviet republics for which Russian visas are not required will demand that they be treated equally and allowed to enter and work in the Russian Federation without a language requirement.

            If the Kremlin continues to insist on a language requirement for them, that will infuriate both the potential migrants and the governments of the countries from which they might come and deepen the yawning divide between the Russian Federation and countries that Moscow still views as part of its privileged sphere of influence.

Despite Kremlin’s Insistence, Fascism and Nazism Not One and the Same Thing, Inozemtsev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 22 – The Putin regime has conflated two related but different concepts – Hitler’s Nazism and Mussolini’s fascism – by suggesting that the Soviet Union fought fascism when it defeated Hitler and that it is doing the same thing now by invading Ukraine which Moscow claims is fascist as well, Vladislav Inozemtsev says.

            But insisting that Nazism is fascism, the Russian economist and commentator says, Moscow is not only ignoring the historical record and the international community’s judgment but also deflecting charges it is fascist given how different the Putin regime is from Hitler’s (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=6857E0580780F).

            In fact, as Inozemtsev has long argued, the Putin regime has increasingly come to resemble the basic features of Mussolini’s ideology and practice and thus deserves to be identified as fascist and opposed as such. (For an example of his argument on this point, see rbc.ru/opinions/politics/22/06/2015/5582da729a794713ec1a6b91.)

Intensifying Water Shortages in Central Asia will Spark Flood of Immigrants from There into Russia, Menzelintsev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 19 – Central Asians who have seen the amount of potable water available to them drop from 8400 cubic meters per capita per year a half century ago to only 2100 now, are certain to flood into the Russian Federation which has more than 20 percent of the world’s reserves of fresh water, Moscow historian Konstantin Menzelintsev says.

            Many have talked about such an influx as a possibility, the Federal City expert continues; but it is now inevitable. “I am certain,” he says, “that the era of wars over water is not something of the far distant future” (federalcity.ru/18653-uzhe-nedalekie-vojny-za-vodu-delajut-rossiju-potencialnoj-celju-dlja-agressivnoj-migracii.html).

            As a result, Menzelintsev continues, “the beginning of an aggressive migration into neighboring countries for residents of the countries of Central Asia is only a question of time.” This wave will hit Kazakhstan first and then it will flow onward into the Russian Federation.

            The Kremlin “must prepare for such a turn of events by strengthening its borders and taking control migration flows,” he says. Otherwise, it could quickly be overwhelmed and then collapse in much the same way other countries have when they have experienced uncontrolled immigration flows.

All Five of Russia’s Parliamentary Parties – Including United Russia -- Having Trouble Recruiting Candidates for Regional Elections, ‘Vyorstka’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 20 – All five of Russia’s parliamentary parties are having trouble finding enough candidates for September’s elections in 20 federal subjects which will choose governors, 11 that will elect deputies to regional legislative assemblies, and 25 which will select deputies to city councils, according to an investigation by Vyorstka reports.

            At least in part, potential candidates don’t see any real advantages to running and many “don’t want to be connected to the political system in wartime” lest it hurt them more than help them in their personal lives, the news service says (verstka.media/slishkom-dorogaya-czena-za-dekoracziyu-politiki-pochemu-v-rossii-nikto-ne-hochet-idti-v-deputaty).

            Moreover, many with whom the news service spoke don’t believe that those who serve in such positions in fact will get to make decisions on their own and fear that they will be blamed for supporting the powers that be when the latter decide what they want. That blame, they fear, will have a negative impact on their lives.

            In the words of one Vyorstka spoke – and all did so on condition of anonymity – “political apathy ahs reached the point when even systemic players don’t see it useful to participate.” If you lose, you will be blamed; but if you win, you will as well. “In general, it isn’t important whether you are loyal or not: you’ll pay a high price for being a political decoration.”

            Potential candidates are also put off by the low or non-existent salaries of deputies at the lower level and by restrictions on their activities if they get into office. And they face problems in raising money for their campaigns because many parties don’t have money for that and business no longer sees investing in candidates as useful, Vyorstka reports experts say.

            This problem, which has existed for some time, is now getting worse and affects both the situation in party list voting and in single-member districts. According to Stanislav Andreychuk of the Golos organization, “the stimuli to take part in elections are few, the benefits doubtful, and the risks high.”

Share of Elderly Varies from 9 to 29 Percent among Russia’s Federal Subjects, Data Show

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 19 – Russia’s federal subjects vary widely on many measures, but one of the most important is the comparative size of the elderly cohort and the working-age population. In general, the elderly form a much larger share in predominantly ethnic Russian regions and hence a larger load on workers and much lower shares on both counts in Muslim republics.

            At the end of last month, Rosstat, the Russian government’s statistical arm, published data on the age structure of the populations of the federal subjects (rosstat.gov.ru/folder/13877); and now Demoscope.Ru has published an analysis of these figures (demoscope.ru/weekly/2025/01079/barom03.php).

            The share of the elderly – defined in this case as those above working age, varies from 9.4 percent in Ingushetia, a Muslim republic in the North Caucasus, to 29.2 percent in the overwhelmingly ethnic Russian Tambov oblast. In six federal subjects, all but two Muslim majority, it was under 14 percent; and in 13 ethnic Russian regions, it was 27 to 28 percent.

            The load that the elderly place on workers thus varies widely as well, from 149 per 1000 working-age people in Ingushetia, to 533 per 1000 workers in predominantly ethnic Russian Kurgan Oblast. In 18 of the federal subjects, all of which were predominantly ethnic Russian, the elderly “load” was 480 to 533 per 1000 workers.

            These demographic differences, rather than any specific “ethnic” agenda, mean that the imposition of any common policy on pensioners or healthcare have very different consequences for the various federal subject, something that should be reflected in government policies but typically is not. 

20th Century was Time of Ethnic Minorities But 21st is Time of Ethnic Majorities, Tishkov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 19 –Academician Valery Tishkov, former Russian nationalities minister and longtime specialist on ethnography, says that there has been a fundamental shift regarding the relationship between ethnic groups who form the majority in various countries and those who are minorities in these countries.

            Commenting on the new Russian strategy document concerning nationality issues, the Russian scholar tells Kommersant that  “If the 20^th century can be called the century of minorities, now in Russia and in other countries, there is a tendency to devote greater attention to ‘demographic, historical-cultural and social-political’ majorities”  (kommersant.ru/doc/7797505).

            Tishkov develops this point with regard to Russia which during the 20^th century saw an explosion of interest by and in the numerically smaller peoples living within its borders but now, in the 21^st, is devoting more attention to the ethnic Russians who culturally and linguistically dominate the situation.

            But he situates what is happening in his country in terms of a broader trend, where in his view ever more countries are paying relatively more attention to ethnic majorities to ethnic majorities and ever less to ethnic minorities, although he insists that in both the latter won’t be ignored completely.

            And while Tishkov doesn’t say so, his words clearly imply that among countries where this shift has happened, there is a convergence of behavior and thus a convergence of interest that is likely to make those in one country be more likely to understand and even approve what is going on in another than many might expect on the basis of what happened in the 20^th century.  

            If the Russian scholar is correct in his observations about such trends, it is tragically likely that minorities will face more discrimination than they did in the last century and far greater obstacles to achieving their goals either within countries in which they live or in achieving independent statehood for themselves. 

Activists Form Groups to Shame Russian Women who Marry Soldiers for Money Putin's Given Those fighting for Him Rather than for Love

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 18 – Because Putin is giving so much money to soldiers to get them to fight against Ukraine, some Russian women have sought to get access to these funds by marrying for money rather than love. Horrified, other Russian women are now seeking to shame these women by publishing “blacklists” of those with only mercenary goals.

            The idea of shaming these women and warning Russian soldiers of their real intentions came on a VKontakte page (vk.com/podslushano_na_svo?w=wall-143277166_349644) and is described in detail in The Moscow Times (themoscowtimes.com/2025/06/18/blacklist-the-groups-shaming-russian-women-who-marry-soldiers-for-money-a89490).

            The women involved in efforts to expose those who marry for money are overwhelmingly pro-war themselves and likely enjoy the support of at least some in the Russian government. The Duma is now considering legislation that will limit the access of such women to such money if they seek divorces (ria.ru/20250512/proekt-2016587422.html).

            But however that may be, the rise of such shaming groups reflects two important realities in Putin’s Russia: the dangers of using money alone to motivate soldiers and others, and the willingness of other Russians to shame those who exploit this arrangement at a time when any public organization is at risk of repression from the Kremlin. 

Democratic Opposition’s Arrogant and Ill-Informed Centralism Pushing Non-Russians from Federalism to Nationalism, Latypova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 18 – The centralist convictions of Russia’s democratic opposition, ones not terribly different from those of the Kremlin, is pushing ever more non-Russians from seeking genuine federalism toward the conclusion that the only way to protect themselves and their future is to seek independence, Leyla Latypova says.

            Consequently, “the disintegration of Russia that the opposition fears so much would be its own doing,” the Moscow Times journalist who follows developments in the regions says (themoscowtimes.com/2025/06/18/the-disintegration-of-russia-that-the-opposition-fears-so-much-would-be-its-own-doing-a89462).

            Most meetings of Russian opposition politicians were exclusively made up of Russians from Moscow and St. Petersburg until relatively recently. Now, a certain “quota” of representatives of non-Russians have been added; but, Latypova says, they are treated with contempt and their ideas dismissed, alienating them ever more fully from Russians.

            Instead of reaching out to those non-Russians who favor the development of federalism, she continues, the Russian opposition figures are thus increasingly pushing non-Russians who may have begun as federalists into the camp of those who believe that only independence can save them.

            This is happening, the journalist says, because “members of the Russian opposition and many of their Western allies are petrified of the idea of Russia’s disintegration.” But because of the way they are acting on these fears, they are making “that unwelcome scenario increasingly likely.”

            At meetings of the opposition, Russian participants “again and again … talked down [on the non-Russians] and openly questioned their expertise and knowledge of the regions where their families lived for centuries,” assuming that non-Russians can’t cooperate against Russians and that non-Russians who speak Russian are well on their way to becoming Russian as well.

            In her native Bashkortostan, Latypova says, Bashkirs and Tatars are so closely related that they can shift from one identity to another – on that important and neglected reality, see the comprehensive study at instagram.com/p/C8pJjWkI2y2/ -- and together form a majority of the population while ethnic Russians form only 37 percent.

            Russian opposition figures often speak only Russian and assume like the Kremlin that language is the only true measure of identity. But “unlike their Russian counterparts, indigenous activists are universally multilingual. Many of them were raised speaking their indigenous tongues and learned Russian, English and other fourth and fifth languages later in life.”

            For them, identity is not defined primarily by the language they speak, especially since they speak so many but by a sense of who they are. The members of the Russian opposition and those in the Kremlin who share a different view are going to be surprised by the actions of those they regularly humiliate for not speaking perfect Russian.

To Fill Depleted Ranks of Police Force, Russian Interior Ministry Ready to Accept Less Qualified Candidates

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 18 – Russia has been facing an ever greater shortage of officers in its police force since the start of Putin’s war in Ukraine as militiamen have chosen to join the military where salaries and benefits are significantly better than in the country’s police (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/03/russia-scrambling-to-cope-with-mounting.html).

            Now, in a sign of just how serious a problem this is, the interior ministry has declared that it wants to have the power to accept candidates who earlier would have been rejected, something an expert says will inevitably have an adverse impact on quality of policing in Russia (nemoskva.net/2025/06/19/prihodite-hot-kto-nibud-mvd-hochet-snizit-trebovaniya-dlya-priema-na-sluzhbu-na-fone-katastroficheskogo-deficzita-kadrov/).

            Mikhail Pashkin, president of the interior ministry trade union section in Moscow says that “the lowering of standards will inevitably affect the quality of work and create the risk of systematic violations and mistakes.”  He says that what should be done is to raise pay so that policemen will stay on the job rather than turn to the military.

            But that is exactly the opposite of the direction in which the Putin regime has been moving and is unlikely to happen. Instead, the police will likely be forced to turn ever more often to para-police groups like the notorious Russian Community with the rights of Russians further trampled upon and hostility toward Russian law enforcement increased.

            For evidence of the likelihood of those trends, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/buryats-in-rf-should-carry-passports-to.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/russian-community-only-allows-people-of.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/russian-community-now-country-wide.html.  

Russians have Taken Part in Almost 40,000 Protests Since 2022, ‘Novaya Gazeta’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 16 – There have been 38,162 protest actions in the Russian Federation since Vladimir Putin launched his expanded invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Novaya Gazeta says; but only one-fifth of these – almost 8,000 -- have taken the form of street actions, which attract the most attention but which the authorities have come down hardest against.

            The Kremlin came down hard on protests at the time of Putin’s announcement and when mobilization was declared, making it clear that it would do the same should anyone seek to protest Kremlin policies in Ukraine in that way, the paper continues; and Russians have shied away from doing so (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/06/16/zhkkh-vmesto-fbk).

            But despite that, Russians continue to write complaints, collect signatures on petitions, circulate video appeals, declare strikes and go into the streets on issues that the authorities view as non-political or involve so few people that suppressing them would cost the powers that be more than doing so would benefit them. 

            As Russian political commentator Ekaterina Schulmann says, “even a totalitarian state is not all-powerful.” And consequently, instead of trying to suppress everything, the regime targets its repressions in order to send messages to others – and does not work to suppress all actions especially when they are small or local or the coverage of which can be severely curtailed.

All Peoples of Russian Federation ‘United by Common Moral Principles,’ Putin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 16 – Despite all differences in religion and ethnicity, “the Russian people and in general all the peoples of Russia,” precisely because “we have lived on the same territory for a long time,” are “united by shared moral and ethical principles,” Vladimir Putin told the Russian Security Council and then Moscow’s Russia One.

            Those principles include “the unity of peoples, a commitment to truth and justice, mutual assistance and patriotism, mercy and humanism, strong families and a love for children,” the Kremlin leader continued (nazaccent.ru/content/44099-vladimir-putin-nazval-cennosti-kotorye-obedinyayut-narody-rossii/ and nazaccent.ru/content/44087-vladimir-putin-my-vystupaem-za-uvazhenie-k-samobytnosti-stran-i-narodov-k-ih-obychayam-i-kulturam/).

            As so often has been the case and thus limiting the usefulness of this particular claim and the list of values he offers, Putin did not discuss the ways in which this list of values sets Russia apart, something that would seem to be required given that almost all peoples on earth at least claim the same ones.  

            But his suggestion does reflect his clear intention to reduce the importance of other values that each of the peoples inside the current borders of the Russian Federation have, including ethnic Russians, although it is likely that the Kremlin leader would deny that.   

Tatarstan Looks to Sakha for Ideas on How to Save Its Own National Language

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 16 – For most of the period since 1991, Tatarstan has been the leader among non-Russian nations in generating ideas for other Russian federal subjects in this category; but now there is evidence that this relationship is being turned on its head and that other republics are providing ideas for Tatarstan.

            While even in the past, this was a two-way street as far as influence between Tatarstan and the others was concerned and is likely to remain so in the future, the fact that Tatars are now focusing on what others are doing and even asking whether they can “help” Tatarstan is a shift that has not yet become widely recognized.

            Prompting this idea is a remarkable article on the Milliard.Tatar portal entitled “How Sakha is Saving Its Language and Can This Help Tatarstan” about a visit of Tatar scholars, activists and officials to the Sakha capital of Yakutsk (milliard.tatar/news/kak-v-yakutii-spasayut-yazyk-i-pomozet-li-eto-tatarstanu-7672).

            The Sakha presenters at a roundtable there identified a variety of steps their republic had taken to ensure that the national language would be preserved. The importance of three was stressed. First of all, the speakers said that sitcoms produced locally and in the Yakut language were attracting more viewers than even Russian-language ones produced in Moscow.

            Second, they highlighted the introduction last year of neural networks to create “digital authors broadcasting in the Yakut language,” something that has dramatically expanded audience size by reaching out to Sakha residents who rely on their cellphones for news, information and entertainment.

            And third, the Sakha speakers celebrated the fact that their republic’s parliament had taken a tough stand against Moscow’s efforts to do away with the category of “native language,” something they clearly hope that the Tatars will emulate. (On that Russian move, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/in-new-threat-to-non-russians-moscow.html.)

More than 40 Percent of Russians Now Say Stalin was ‘Most Outstanding Figure of All times and Peoples,’ the Levada Center Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 17 – Forty-two percent of Russians now identify Stalin as “the most outstanding figure of all times and peoples” in an open-ended poll conducted by the independent Levada Center polling agency, an increase of 18 percentage points since 1991 and putting the Soviet dictator far ahead of all others.

            In second place on the list is Vladimir Putin with 31 percent, almost double the figure of 15 percent in 2021; In third place, is Vladimir Lenin, whose identification as such has fallen from 31 percent in 1991 to 28 percent now (https://www.levada.ru/2025/06/17/samye-vydayushhiesya-lyudi-vseh-vremyon-i-narodov/).

            Russians overwhelmingly identified only other Russians as belonging in this category. Only two foreigners – Albert Einstein at five percent and Isaac Newton at four percent with both down from earlier ratings – were among the top 20 figures whom Russians were inclined to identify as such.