Fake Charges of Extremism Powering Rise of Extremist Attitudes, Memorial Expert Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 15 – The number of extremist actions in the North Caucasus has declined significantly over the last two decades, but fake charges of extremism by Russian law enforcement bodies to justify themselves and their budgets have helped to power the rise of extremist attitudes, especially among the young, Aleksandr Cherkasov says.

            That is because young people can see how unjust the authorities are being and are thus prepared to listen to radicals who criticism them, according to the Memorial society expert (kavkazr.com/a/igilovtsy-kadyrovtsy-i-molodezhj-aleksandr-cherkasov-o-borjbe-s-terrorizmom-na-severnom-kavkaze/33637182.html).

            Indeed, he suggests, the sense of injustice is a more powerful driver in this regard than poverty or anything else. As a result, many of those in the North Caucasus who adopt what might be called extremist attitudes come not from the poor and dispossessed but from wealthier and more powerful people, a pattern that adds to the seriousness of all this.  

            In response, as some of these people do turn to extremist actions, the Russian law enforcement bodies ramp up their efforts to bring extremist charges as well as increase the use of repressive force, thus putting the region on a dangerous spiral that won’t end until the authorities change their approach and could lead to an explosion.

            That pattern is compounded by three other developments, Cherkasov says. First, like the worst of their Soviet predecessors, many of the law enforcement agencies have decided that it is enough to find someone to be a member of a group to accuse him or her of extremism even if the individual charged has nothing to do with any extremist action.

            Second, the authorities are so ignorant of these individuals and groups that they often act as did prosecutors in Stalin’s time and combine groups that are completely at odds with other another, further compromising their charges. Thus, Stalin attacked a supposed union of mensheviks and monarchists; and Putin’s police do something analogous.

            And third – and this may be the most important and dangerous development Cherkasov points to – Russian siloviki today send their reports to Moscow rather than keep them locally, making it likely that the center will order attacks against groups it doesn’t understand and thus make the situation worse.

            In Stalin’s time, the Memorial expert says, all reports about extremism went to the center and that led to campaigns that rapidly got out of hand. Then, after his death, siloviki in the regions retained the reports and thus reduced that risk. But now under Putin, the siloviki have lost that power – and broader and more absurd attacks have again become likely.