Ukraine’s Successful Drone Campaign May Not End the War on Kyiv’s Terms, Pastukhov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 28 – There has been a tendency to see whatever tactic either side in Putin’s war in Ukraine is introducing and having success with inevitably presages the victory of that side because many people ignore the near certainty that the side losing because of that tactic will come up with one that will give it better chances, Vladimir Pastukhov says.

            That is what has happened in response to Ukraine’s remarkably successful use of drones against targets often deep inside the Russian Federation and led to widespread assumptions that Kyiv is now in a position to gain most of the goals it has set for itself, the London-based Russain analyst says (t.me/v_pastukhov/1914 reposted at echofm.online/opinions/my-chyotko-fiksiruem-novuyu-fazu-vojny).

            But despite Ukraine’s success with drones, Pastukhov continues, “serious doubts” remain that “such a favorable scenario for Ukraine to end the war is now the only possible one.” That it is one is a good thing, “but it is not so uncontested so that anyone should be speaking about that as categorically as many are doing.”

            “Historical experience shows,” he continues, “that when the blind mole of the Russian military machine runs into an insurmountable obstacle, it does not crawl out with a white flag but rather immediately begins to dig another tunnel nearby, and it is difficult to imagine that the Kremlin does not realize the impasse of the situation and isn’t looking for a favorable way out.”

            “In the near future,” as the Russian attacks on Kyiv show, Pastukhov argues, “we may witness an attempt to sharply aggravate the terrorist nature of the current war and qualitatively increase strikes on the civilian infrastructure of Ukraine to deplete its air defense resources and destroy the very logistics that allow maintaining the notorious kill zone at the front.”

            Given Moscow’s own difficulties, it is difficult to specify exactly what Moscow can and will do. But three steps are likely. First, Pastukhov says, Moscow is likely “to take more risks including with it aviation.” Second, “it will likely focus on objects that for some reason it has not yet touched, including Dniepr bridges and railway junctions.”

            “And third, it will begin to ‘work dirty,’ that is, by targeting and inflection disproportionate damage to the civilian population” as it appears to be doing now with its attacks on Kyiv and its people.

            That, rather than an easy road to peace, is what Ukraine and its supporters need to recognize and plan to respond to, Pastukhov suggests; and Ukraine’s response almost certainly will involve more drone attacks on Russian sites, likely sending up casualties on the Russian side as well and making what has been a bloody war even more so.