Staunton,
January 2 – Recent public demonstrations have called attention to “the vertical
division” between the powers and the people of the Russian Federation, but
according to a leading Moscow analyst, an equally important division for both
those in power and those who oppose them may be the existence of “four
Russias,” each very different from the others.
In an
article in last Friday’s “Vedomosti,” Natalya Zubarevich, the director of
regional programs at Moscow’s Independent Institute of Social Policy, describes
each of these Russias and argues that relations with and among them will play a
critical role in political outcomes in the coming year (www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/1467059/chetyre_rossii).
The “first Russia” is “a country of large cities.” It
includes the 12 Russian cities with a million residents or more and two just
under that figure, Perm and Krasnoyarsk.
In these 14 live 21 percent of the population – or one in every five.
And only in five of them – Ufa, Perm, Omsk, Chelyabinsk, and Volgograd – do
Soviet-era industrial enterprises still dominate.
In the others, “a post-industrial transformation” has
occurred, with this trend somewhat more pronounced in Yekaterinburg,
Novosibirsk, and Rostov and somewhat less in the others. As a result, professionals, entrepreneurs,
and white collar employees set the weather in this “first Russia.”
Moreover, over the last decade, consumption patterns in
all of these cities have approached those of Moscow even though incomes still
lag in many of them. Consequently, it is now appropriate to speech of the
emergence of a middle class and to note that this group forms an ever-growing
fraction of the population.
This group of cities is a magnete for migrants with “up to
80 percent” of all migration consisting of flows to and among them. And if one adds to this Russia the population
of other cities with more than 500,000, then this “Russia” includes 36 percent
of the country’s population, some 51 million people.
It is in this Russia that the 35 million domestic users
of the Internet and those who want a more open society are concentrated. But
what is most important, Zubarevich argues, is that it is in “the first Russia”
that “protest energy arose without being stimulated by a crisis: instead of the
reflexes of homo economicus have worked the mechanisms of moral alientation.”
Thus, she writes, “in the case of a new crisis, the
impact on the educated urban stratum will be strong, but mobility and a higher
level of competitiveness of the residents of major cities will permit them more
quickly to adapt to an unfavorable situation.”
The “second Russia” consists of the mid-sized industrial
cities of from 20,000 to 500,000 or even 700,000 in the case of Tol’yati. “Far from all mid-sized cities have preserved
an industrial specialization in the post-Soviet years,” Zubarevich notes, “but
its spirit all the same is strong as is the Soviet way of life of the
population.”
Bllue collar and government employees of relatively low
qualification, Zubarevich says, dominate the socio-economic scene. About 25
percent of all Russians live in this Russia, an in its “most unstable part,”
the company towns, about 10 percent of the total. (Official figures on the number of “mono-cities”
are exaggerated, she explains.)
If a new crisis occurs, this “Russia” will experience “the
greatest shock,” with industrial production falling faster than other branches
while “the mobility and competitiveness of the population [would be relatively]
small.” If the federal budget can maintain subsidies, the regime can control
the situation, but if not, then there could be a wave of populist protests.
Many of the factories in this “second Russia” should have
been closed long ago, Zubarevich says, because of low productivity, “but this
was not done in the [earlier] crisis, and most probably, it will not be done in
the case of another shock. “As 2009
showed, the vlasti recognize the danger of a protest by ‘the second Russia’ and
they know how to prevent it.”
The “third Russia,” in which 38 percent of all Russians
live, is “the enormous periphery of the country and consisting of residents of
villages, settlements, and small cities.” It is, Zubarevich says, linked to “the
land” and remains “outside of politics because the calendar of agricultural
work does not depend on a change of the powers that be.”
Consequently,
its “protest potential” is “minimal” even if pensions and pay are delayed, the
Moscow expert says.
Finally, she says, there is a “fourth Russia,” consisting
of the republics of the North Caucasus and the south of Siberia (Tyva and
Altay). Amounting to six percent of
Russia’s population, this Russia has some cities but “almost no industrial
ones.” And “the agricultural population continues to grow and is still young,
although young people are moving to the cities.”
What is important for this Russia as far as Moscow is concerned
are stable flows of federal assistance and investment from the federal budget,
something Vladimir Putin has pledged to do despite opposition. But the amount of money involved is much
smaller than many believe, Zubarevich says.
She points out that “the amount of transfer payments
[from Moscow] to the republics of the North Caucasus in 2010 consisted of 160
billion rubles, 10.7 percent of all transfers to the regions from the federal
budget, and with Tyva and Altay added 12 percent.” The amount the federal budget gave to Moscow
for transportation problems in 2012 was twice as much.
It is clear, Zubarevich concludes, that “sooner or later,
‘the first Russia’ will overwhelm” the others and determine political outcomes.
What is not certain and what she does not say in this article is whether this
will happen in 2012 – or whether operating on the others, Vladimir Putin will
be able to return to the Kremlin.
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