Paul
Goble
Staunton, November 6 – Like many
authoritarian leaders, Vladimir Putin justifies each round of repressive
actions against his society by pointing to threats of one kind or another, but
unlike the case of some others, the Kremlin leader never rachets down the
repression when that threat passes or when he turns to other things.
In an article on Szona.org, Ivan
Kurilla, a historian at Volgograd State University, says that this is one of
the three problems which Russia faces in the wake of the Ukrainian adventure
and which appears likely to trigger “serious civic conflict” in Russia and to
increase problems for this and the next Russian ruler (szona.org/problemi-rossii/).
The first two problems -- Russia’s
relationship with the outside world and its relationship with Ukraine – are serious
and will require much time and effort given how much Moscow has lost as a
result of its actions in Ukraine. But both will be made even more difficult by
the third – changes in relations within Russian society and between the state
and society more generally.
Not only are these problems the most
complicated, the Volgograd historian says, but they are the most immediate and
cannot be put off for long. As a result
of state propaganda, “a significant part of the Russian population has come to
believe not only that fascists have come to power in a neighboring country but that
there is a harmful ‘fifth column’ in Russia itself.”
Such convictions
have led to “a search for enemies and a seeking after unanimity,” and those
efforts in turn have given birth to “archaic models in politics and culture”
which “threaten the future of the country.”
Over time, of course, fewer people
will believe in the messages of state propaganda about either. But “after
several months of military activity in the east of Ukraine, several significant
groups of people have appeared in Russia whose fate has been formed by these
propagandistic myths,” and they will continue to play a role for some time.
Among these are the volunteers and
others who have fought in the Donbas, their friends, and all those who have
been affected by losses “in this undeclared war,” including refugees and their
relatives. The notion that they were
fighting evil, one promoted by Moscow propaganda, has “formed a picture of the
world in which their victims and noble actions have meaning.”
Any criticism of that propaganda
casts doubt on these victims, Kurilla says, and will enrage those whose
identity rests on its ideas. That sows the seeds of “serious steps in the
direction of a civic conflict” within the Russian population and between it and
the Russian state which authored this propaganda in the first place.
What is especially worrisome, the
historian continues, is that “the history of the last decade shows that ‘the
screws,’ tightened under the pretextof a crisis situation will not be loosened
by the state on its own initiative.”
That in turn points toward the emergence of a Novorossiya within the
borders of the Russian Federation both figuratively and literally.
Figuratively, he says, this will
take the form of disputes between supporters and opponents of that notion, and
literally, it will occur as a result of the return to Russia of the field
commanders from the Donbas and those who went there to fight for them.
Such conflicts can be avoided only
by a change of course, but it appears unlikely that the current Kremlin regime
is prepared to do that. Nonetheless, the historian says, “sooner or later the
government of the country will have to restore the conditions for civic dialogue
and return to the role of arbiter” among various factions rather than the
promoter of a single vision.
The Russian leaders who come after
Putin will have to eat the bitter soup prepared and left over by this one. They
will have to “pull the skeletons out of the closets,” and they will have to
ensure “a portion of public anger for their ‘blackening of our history.’” But unless they take such steps, the future
is bleak not only internationally but even more at home.
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