Thursday, November 6, 2014

Window on Eurasia: Under Putin, Repression Only Rachets Upwards Never Downwards, Volgograd Historian Says


Paul Goble

 

            Staunton, November 6 – Like many authoritarian leaders, Vladimir Putin justifies each round of repressive actions against his society by pointing to threats of one kind or another, but unlike the case of some others, the Kremlin leader never rachets down the repression when that threat passes or when he turns to other things.

 

            In an article on Szona.org, Ivan Kurilla, a historian at Volgograd State University, says that this is one of the three problems which Russia faces in the wake of the Ukrainian adventure and which appears likely to trigger “serious civic conflict” in Russia and to increase problems for this and the next Russian ruler (szona.org/problemi-rossii/).

 

            The first two problems -- Russia’s relationship with the outside world and its relationship with Ukraine – are serious and will require much time and effort given how much Moscow has lost as a result of its actions in Ukraine. But both will be made even more difficult by the third – changes in relations within Russian society and between the state and society more generally.

 

            Not only are these problems the most complicated, the Volgograd historian says, but they are the most immediate and cannot be put off for long.  As a result of state propaganda, “a significant part of the Russian population has come to believe not only that fascists have come to power in a neighboring country but that there is a harmful ‘fifth column’ in Russia itself.”

 

            Such convictions have led to “a search for enemies and a seeking after unanimity,” and those efforts in turn have given birth to “archaic models in politics and culture” which “threaten the future of the country.”

 

            Over time, of course, fewer people will believe in the messages of state propaganda about either. But “after several months of military activity in the east of Ukraine, several significant groups of people have appeared in Russia whose fate has been formed by these propagandistic myths,” and they will continue to play a role for some time.

 

            Among these are the volunteers and others who have fought in the Donbas, their friends, and all those who have been affected by losses “in this undeclared war,” including refugees and their relatives.  The notion that they were fighting evil, one promoted by Moscow propaganda, has “formed a picture of the world in which their victims and noble actions have meaning.”

 

            Any criticism of that propaganda casts doubt on these victims, Kurilla says, and will enrage those whose identity rests on its ideas. That sows the seeds of “serious steps in the direction of a civic conflict” within the Russian population and between it and the Russian state which authored this propaganda in the first place.

 

            What is especially worrisome, the historian continues, is that “the history of the last decade shows that ‘the screws,’ tightened under the pretextof a crisis situation will not be loosened by the state on its own initiative.”  That in turn points toward the emergence of a Novorossiya within the borders of the Russian Federation both figuratively and literally.

 

            Figuratively, he says, this will take the form of disputes between supporters and opponents of that notion, and literally, it will occur as a result of the return to Russia of the field commanders from the Donbas and those who went there to fight for them.

 

            Such conflicts can be avoided only by a change of course, but it appears unlikely that the current Kremlin regime is prepared to do that. Nonetheless, the historian says, “sooner or later the government of the country will have to restore the conditions for civic dialogue and return to the role of arbiter” among various factions rather than the promoter of a single vision.

 

            The Russian leaders who come after Putin will have to eat the bitter soup prepared and left over by this one. They will have to “pull the skeletons out of the closets,” and they will have to ensure “a portion of public anger for their ‘blackening of our history.’”  But unless they take such steps, the future is bleak not only internationally but even more at home.

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