Staunton, April 14 – Vladimir Putin’s
increasingly aggressive stance toward Russia’s neighbors is alienating even
those whom he had long counted as his allies, raising the question of how he
will respond to Kazakhstan’s increasingly independent course and Mongolia’s decision
to seek China’s help in gaining energy independence from Moscow.
In an article entitled “Will ‘Little
Green Men’ Threaten Kazakhstan?” Kseniya Kirillova interviews Aleksandr Sytin,
a former analyst at the Russian Institute for Strategic Research (RISI) about the
current and future state of relations between Moscow and Astana (nr2.com.ua/blogs/Ksenija_Kirillova/Ugrozhayut-li-Kazahstanu-zelenye-chelovechki-94549.html).
The former RISI analyst says that
for the moment Kazakhstan remains relatively close to Russia because “the
processes of strengthening its own sovereignty” are not proceeding as quickly
as they are in Belarus. That reflects its internal political situation, the
character of Nursultan Nazarbayev, and its geographic situation.”
But these processes are nonetheless
in train, Sytin suggests, as is shown by Astana’s criticism of Moscow over
Crimea, its unwillingness to follow Russia’s lead on integration in all
details, and its anger about recent Russian policies with regard to Kazakhstan’s
products.
Until recently, Moscow had been very
cautious in its relations with Astana, less because of a change of heart about
its policies in general than because, Sytin says, “the main direction of the
Kremlin’s aggression is the West, its main fear is the broadening of the sphere
of action of NATO, and its main enemy is the United States.”
Nonetheless, the former RISI expert
says, “we are observing in relation to Kazakhstan the very same [Russian] steps
with which the Ukrainian conflict began.” At present, few recall that “in the fall
of 2013, a Russian-Ukrainian trade war broke out.” Now there are signs that the
same thing is happening between Russia and Kazakhstan.
Russian consumer officials have
banned the import of certain Kazakhstan products ostensibly because they
violate Russian consumer protection standards, but these actions, Sytin says, “have
nothing in common with the struggle for consumer security in the Russian Federation
but are a political weapon in the hand of the Kremlin.”
Moscow took similar actions against
Ukraine and Belarus, but they will have less of an impact on Kazakhstan,
something the Kremlin still appears to understand. That is because Kazakhstan
is independent in terms of energy and its economy is doing relatively well. But
this is no guarantee Moscow won’t increase its pressure in the future.
“Kazakhstan has eastern industrial
oblasts with a predominantly Russian (Slavic) population,” something Moscow
might seek to exploit. And at some point there will be a succession in the
leadership of Kazakhstan and the new generation of leaders will be less
interested in integration with Russia than Nazarbayev is, Sytin says.
The rising generation in Kazakhstan already
views Russia far more pragmatically than does the one it will replace, Sytin
says, and they will be more concerned to develop ties with “a stronger China”
and with Iran than with an ever weaker Russia.
Moscow can see
this and it will respond harshly. “When the
Kremlin understands that its bet on china in the struggle for the overthrow of
the US from the geopolitical Olympus hasn’t justified itself – and that
understanding will come quite quickly – any efforts about the rapprochement of
Kazakhstan and China will be viewed as disloyal.”
Moreover, Sytin
says, “no one can guarantee that [Astana’s] attitude to the Russian speaking
population will remain even at the relatively favorable one of today. As a
result,” he says, “in the comparatively near future, we may observe a
significant deterioration of Russian-Kazakhstan relations.”
That will
accelerate the destruction of Putin’s project of Eurasian integration and of “the
disintegration of the post-Soviet space,” the former RISI analyst says.
But there is
another aspect of this situation that may prompt Moscow to move even more
quickly, Sytin suggests. To the extent
that Kazakhstan succeeds economically and politically, it could become a magnet
for Russian regions “deprived by their geographic position of the opportunity
for this or that form of European integration.”
Meanwhile,
another of Russia’s neighbors in Central Asia is also moving away from Russia.
Despite a 2006 accord between Moscow and Ulan Bator that would seem to have
precluded it, the Mongolian government has asked Beijing for a billion US
dollar loan to build a hydro-electric dam on a tributary of Lake Baikal (novayagazeta.ru/news/1693120.html).
Such a dam on the Selenga will make
Mongolia independent of what it describes as expensive Russian energy supplies,
but it will also increase its ties with China while offending Russia because of
Moscow’s concerns about the impact of such a dam on the already troubled
eco-system of Lake Baikal where water levels recently have fallen to historic
lows.
Moscow officials hope to dissuade Mongolia
from taking this step in the name of environmental protection, but the
Mongolians for their part seem set to go ahead so that they will have greater
independence from Russia and control over their own situation. What Russia will
do in that event remains to be seen.
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