Paul
Goble
Staunton, April 13 – As long as
Russian aggression against Ukraine continues, patriotism is likely to trump
concerns about domestic difficulties, according to Ella Libanova, a reflection
of the fact that “the Maidan and Russian aggression has pushed Ukrainians
toward more responsible attitudes toward both their country and their own fate.”
In a commentary today, the head of
the Kyiv Institute of Demography says that the events of the past two years
have produced “unexpected reactions in society,” with “Ukrainians beginning to
shift away from infantilism and a paternalistic relationship to the state” (nv.ua/opinion/libanova/chto-mozhet-sprovocirovat-novye-protesty-v-strane--43491.html).
Ever more Ukrainians “recognize that
they should not count on ‘the good authorities,’ and this is a positive sign in
the development of society,” one that it is giving birth to initiative and the
development of small business and the development of a volunteer movement in
many spheres.
Only “among people of the older
generation,” the demographer says, predominate people who place their hopes in the
state, a reflection of the fact that “in the majority of cases, they cannot
work and consequently cannot count only on themselves.” But working age Ukrainians no longer pin all
their hopes on the state.
“As long as the war goes on,”
Libanova says, the problems of unemployment and pensions are unlikely to lead
to a new wave of protests. “But this cannot last forever,” and society must “unite
itself, create various public institutions and take responsibility for itself
and for the country into its own hands.”
The scholar says that she “hopes
this process will not stop, that such organizations will multiply, develop,
structure themselves and thereby increase their influence on the politics and
further development of the country.” And she adds that “the development of
civil society will help promote decentralization, the transfer of authority to
localities.”
If the rise of civil society occurs
before decentralization, Libanova continues, “it will secure us against the appearance
of little princes who will concentrate all power and economic flows in their
hands.”
Despite the progress Ukrainian
society has made, she says, there remain “essential risks” that social protests
could become more frequent and widespread. “If the foreign policy of the state
concerning integration in the European space satisfies Ukrainians on the whole,
the internal situation is leading to significant criticism.”
“The main potential
catalyst for protests,” Libanova argues, “remains the catastrophically high
level of unemployment.” Most of them unemployed are men, she says, and “it is
more difficult for the than for women to find alternative activity.” If one
adds to the fact that there are a lot of guns in private hands, there is reason
for serious concern.
The government thus
needs to promote full employment by creating new work places and also by
boosting existing Ukrainian industry with government orders, Libanova says.
What she does not
say but what her argument implies are two other perhaps even more important
lessons. On the one hand, Libanova’s conclusions about the development of
Ukrainian civil society suggest that Vladimir Putin got it exactly wrong about
that country when he decided to invade.
Projecting his
Russian experience on Ukraine, Putin clearly assumed that Ukrainians would not
become self-sufficient and increasingly independent of the state if he invaded
but just the reverse. If he ultimately recognizes the truth of Libanova’s
observations, he would likely achieve more of his goals by moving to some kind
of peace than by continuing his aggression.
And on the
other hand, the Kyiv demographer’s conclusions are a warning to the West:
pushing Ukraine to reach an agreement with Russia before some of its domestic
problems are addresses and civil society becomes more firmly entrenched could
have the effect of weakening Ukraine and giving Moscow yet another victory it
does not deserve.
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