Paul
Goble
Staunton, November 20 – Yesterday,
Andrey Illarionov laid out the logic behind his suggestion that Vladimir Putin
is preparing to attack Saudi Arabia in order to destabilize and possibly
dismember it (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/11/putin-appears-preparing-to-attack-saudi.html).
Not surprisingly, that suggestion
precisely because it would involve an action few have thought possible immediately
sparked a vociferous reaction in Moscow and elsewhere. And so today, the Moscow
analyst provides additional arguments on behalf of his conclusion (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=564E431AA47E7).
As he did yesterday and has done before,
Illarionov lays out his argument point by point. In this case, he offers 10
additional detailed discussions that he says force the conclusion that Putin’s
new war “will be directed not only and not so much against ISIS” as “against
Saudi Arabia” with the goals being its “destabilization and it can’t be
excluded dismemberment.”
1.
“In
the course of the historic session of the force Politburo of the Russian
Federation November 16-17,” FSB chief Aleksandr Bortnikov focused on the
origins of the explosives that blew up the plane over Sinai rather than on who
carried out the attack, thus at a minimum confusing the issue concerning who
was responsible by “intensifying suspicions that arose earlier” about that.
2.
Bortnikov
also stressed that the bomb itself was “self-acting” rather than the work of a
suicide bomber, a conclusion of course supported by ISIS claims earlier the
same day and one that again has the effect of spreading the blame for the bombing
beyond Islamic State activists. The FSB chief insisted that Russian experts had
established this independently.
3.
“Kommersant”
carried a story suggesting parallels between the 1999 bombings and the downing
of the plane, a potentially dangerous one for the Kremlin if people conclude
that it might have been behind both but useful to Putin because the Russian
security experts the paper citied mentioned “nameless ‘people from the North
Caucasus’” as being to blame once again.
And these “experts” recalled “the names of those who ‘prepared those who
carried out the terrorist acts’ –‘Khattab and his right-hand Abu al-Walid.’”
And what “a surprise!” Illarionov says. “Both of the individuals named as is
well known were from Saudi Arabia.”
4.
“The
appearance in Russian anti-terrorist discourse of Saudi Arabia and the absence
in Putin’s commentaries … of any reference to ISIS hardly can be considered
accidental,” the analyst continues. The
Kremlin leader talked about unnamed “criminals” rather than being more specific
even in terms of suspicions, a marked contrast to analysts in the West who have
pointed to ISIS as behind this attack.
5.
Despite
not naming anyone, Putin nonetheless promised to take the harshest measures immediately
to “find and punish the criminals.” “In
other words,” Illarionov says, “Putin declared that there will be conducted
extra-judicial reprisals over unknown persons without offering any evidence of
their guilt or even their connection with the catastrophe of the Russian jet.” And
he added that these reprisals will be carried out “with the help ‘of people who
share our moral values.” Given what happened after 1999, one can only imagine
what that means.
6.
Putin
announced that Moscow would step up its air raids in Syria without presenting
any “cause and effect link” between those in Syria and the airplane
disaster. Russian commentators and many
Western ones have accepted his logic without any questions about his failure to
provide a link or to follow “the basic principles of the Western legal
tradition – the presumption of innocence, the need to present evidence of their
guilt to the accused, court hearings … [and] the right of the accused to a
defense.”
7.
In
this way and by attacking people before identifying them as guilty, “Putin in a
completely Freudian way demonstrated not only the lack of evidence of their
guilt … but the absence of any desire to find it.”
8.
“Despite
such a demonstrative violation by the Russian authorities of the basic
principles of Western (and now all-human) legal tradition, the expansion of the
Kremlin’s use of force won the approval from the side of the current American
president: ‘Barak Obama declared that he has always supported the struggle of
Russia against … ISIS.’”
9.
All
of this, Illarionov points out, follows what has become “the Putin model of
unleashing large (open and not hybrid) wars (the second Chechen and the
Russian-Georgian).” First, provocations,
then terrorist acts, then the loss of innocent life, then finding one’s
opponents guilty without evidence, loud promises to destroy them, the physical
destruction of the opponents Putin has identified, and then “an essential
change in the domestic or geopolitical situation.”
10.
“Nevertheless,
the war of 2015 in comparison with the former large wars of 1999 and 2008 is
different in certain key ways.” It is conducted far beyond Russia’s borders.
Unlike the earlier conflicts, “the beginning of the third war is openly
supported by the West and the Obama Administration is ready to greet it with
ovations.” And the new war is directed at a country Moscow has long blamed for
supporting terrorist actions against Russia, Saudi Arabia.
“In large measure,” Illarionov says, “this
is not a new war but a continuation directed at the defeat” of an enemy Putin
has long had in his mind. And that enemy is Saudi Arabia. If Putin does attack
and succeeds in defeating or even dismembering that country, he will achieve “the
radical reordering of the entire contemporary world as we have known it.”
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