Paul
Goble
Staunton, November 14 – Vladimir Putin
is creating “an anti-globalist international” of those who see no good future for
themselves in the new world and thus hope to guarantee that nothing will ever
change, Vladimir Pastukhov says; and he hopes to use this ideology to link up
with others abroad to overcome Russia’s isolation and restructure the world.
Thus, it is wrong to say as many have that
the Kremlin leader wants to leave Europe, the St. Antony’s scholar says.
Instead, he wants to transform it according to the principles of the right wing
there and use these principles to form a new ideology for Russia itself (novayagazeta.ru/politics/70726.html).
Russia’s “union with China is a myth,”
Pastukhov says; its “Eurasian isolationism is a bluff.” And thus Russia is not
distancing itself from Europe but rather coming closer to it,” although it is
not likely that everyone in Europe will be especially pleased by this
rapprochement.
“But some in Europe, undoubtedly, will be
glad,” he continues. “the Kremlin has its own ‘fifth column’ in the West, and
more than that, its numbers are constantly growing. Having made anti-globalism
almost the official ideology of post-communist Russia, the Russian leader has
attacked a goldmine from which he will be able to draw political dividends far
into the future.”
In short, Pastukhov suggests, “Russia is
rapidly transforming itself into the center of European reaction,” not into
isolationism; and under Putin, it is “actively preparing for the release of the
second edition of the Holy Alliance” of the early part of the 19th
century.
All this is shown by what was said
recently at the Valdai Club in Sochi, the historian suggests when Putin and
others described what this new anti-globalist world would be like.
It has long been a commonplace that Russia
needs at ideology to be stable, and there is some truth in this, Pastukhov
says. It hasn’t had one, and even the
propaganda campaign against Ukraine was not a serious ideology but rather an
example of “primitive tribalist chauvinism” that like all emotions couldn’t
last.
As so often in the past, he continues,
when Russia couldn’t come up with a new ideology on its own, it is “borrowing”
it from Europe. “Despite having banned
the import of cheese and sausage from Europe, Russia in now way has blocked its
import of the ideas it requires,” only now, these are “different ideas than
those that came earlier,” reactionary rather than liberal.
Not surprisingly, most observers have
focused on Putin’s speech among those at Sochi, but the Kremlin leader did not
give the most interesting or instructive address, Pastukhov says. Instead, that
was given by Vaclav Klaus whose words made it clear that “a unified Europe like
aunified European policy or unified European view of the world no longer
exists.”
As the Czech leader made clear, “Europe
has split on the issue of its attitude toward the consequences of
globalization.” Some believe that the
solution to today’s problems is more globalization and greater integration, but
others, the Euroskeptics, think that the solution is to oppose both the one and
the other.
Now, as Klaus’ speech makes clear, “’the
Euroskeptics’ have extended to [Putin] the hand of help at a difficult time for
the Kremlin and have become the new spiritual friends of Russia.”
Klaus said that “existing problems … come
more from the West than from the East” and that “we are not ready … to
sacrifice our comfortable life … We have no strong opinions.” Instead, Europe is
sunk in apathy becauase “we have replaced education with political correctivness
and the imposition of a definite [liberal and globalist] ideology.”
“Ideologically,” Pastukhov suggests, “Putin
at Sochi was secondary and Klaus was primary” because Klaus’ remarks had the effect
of demonstrating that instead of “homegrown Eurasianism with its doubtful
intellectual base … the Kremlin prefers to raise above Russia the banner of ‘European
reaction.’”
Putin’s Russia has become the world leader
of anti-globalism;” and in this one can say that “while Klaus talks about this,
Putin is acting: he is building a bridge which should unite the opponents of
globalization ‘inside’ and ‘around’ Europe. He is establishing his own
anti-globalist international which should help Russia break out of its latest ‘hostile
capitalist encirclement.’”
“Anti-globalism,” of course, “is a mantra
for those who do not see their place int eh future and therefore want that the
future not come … They want to receive certain formal guarantees for the
preservation of the historical status quo. Leave Europe to the Europeans, the
CIS to Russia, the Middle East to Iran, and go on.”
This “might be a beautiful plan if it
could be realized,” Pastukhov says, “but so far no one has been able to stop
time.” Moreover, “in this international there is neither America nor China nor
India. America “believes in itself,” and
“China and India believe that in the still undescribed new world they will have
a better place than now.”
In fine, “the anti-globalists are those
who respond to Hamlet’s question with the answer ‘not to be.’ But although
anti-globalism is the religion of the weak, that doesn’t mean that it has no
future” given that “religions of the oppressed often have become later the
religions of the ruling classes.”
“Putin is part of a historical trend,” the
St. Antony’s scholar says. “Russian emperors always were more interested in
foreign countries than in their own land … [he] is not yet a Russian empire but
he’s not simply a president either.” Like his predecessors, Putin “is deeply
interested in geopolitics seeing himself in the role of the liberator of Europe
… from revolutionary infection.”
“The internal split of European society
hardly will permit the EU to stand as a united front against Russia,” Pastukhov
says. “Europe is obviously tired” from its support of Ukraine and is likely to
give way to the Kremlin leader over time.
Putin’s problem is inside Russia: he can do a lot abroad with this
approach but not much at home.
Organizing “a new world order” abroad is
obviously easier for him than managing housing or hospitals inside Russia.
Indeed, the St. Antony’s historian says, it sometimes seems that “the president
is also an émigré: he has lost his head in geopolitics.”
At present, Putin does not face “any
visible foreign threats. Being at the height of his political career and being
the unquestioned ruler of Russia and leader of a new Holy Alliance, he does not
face any threats -- except the growing loneliness and disappointment” he has created for himself.
“Something similar occurred 200 years ago
with his great predecessor, the conqueror of Europe and the creator of the
first Holy Alliance, the glorious emperor Aleksandr I. Until now rumors
circulate that he didn’t die in Taganrog but disappeared having lived out the
remainder of his life as a hermit in Siberia.”
The same thing could happen with Putin. He
“will never be overthrown; he will simply pass into history together with his
secrets.”
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