Paul
Goble
Staunton, October 22 – Most
countries suffering from an economic situation as dire as that of the Russian
Federation would see public support turn massively away from the incumbent
administration and major political as well as economic protests as well. But in Vladimir Putin’s Russia, neither has
happened.
While there has been a small decline
in public backing for the Kremlin leader and there have been some narrowly cast
economic protests, there hasn’t been the decline in the one and the rise in the
other to a political level that most analysts would normally expect. What is
behind this “Russian paradox”?
Following the release of a new study
by the Presidential Academy of Economics and State Service which shows that the
situation is quite dire (ranepa.ru/images/docs/monitoring/ek-monitoring/monitoring-sept-okt-2016.pdf),
Andrey Polunin of the Svobodnaya pressa portal queried three experts as to why
things are as they are (svpressa.ru/society/article/159039/).
Vladimir Rimsky, a sociologist at
the INDEM Foundation, says that most Russians consider that “they have adapted
to the crisis and that things are not so bad.” And they believe that the
government has “a very large number of levers” which it will use to improve
things – or at least “in the depths of their souls, they simply hope for
better.”
At the same time, many are
pessimistic about the future because they don’t see any obvious solutions to
the lack of growth, difficulties university graduates face in finding jobs, and
the problems of pensioners. Even those who appear to be well situated fear that
as the situation gets worse, they could lose their position and be forced to
take a lower-paying one.
But because of their fears of losing
their jobs or worse, such people are afraid “to express their opinion and to
show initiative …. That is especially obvious in science, education and in part
in marketing.” Consequently, there is no
one to serve as the leader of a movement around which those who are suffering
can coalesce.
And thus, Rimsky says, there will
not be any serious protests because there needs to be a social and political
basis for that; and in Russia, this is lacking. Russians know that they need to
work through parties, but the parties for various reasons won’t promote their
views and wait for orders from above.
What this means, the sociologist
continues, is that “the probability of acts of dissatisfaction is increasing in
Russia. But these will be actions” of specific groups, seeking specific
benefits for themselves, rather than promoting broader political goals. And
these actions will be premised on getting the attention of the authorities
rather than challenging them.
At most, these could grow into
street protests like those in 2011-2012; but right now, there is little
prospect of that, Rimsky concludes.
Sergey Markov, the director of the
Moscow Institute of Political Research, says that “the Russian economy has
reached ‘bottom’ and is frozen in that position.” The usual logic is that “the
social sphere falls later than the economy, but its fall continues even after
the economy stabilizes.” And thus it is quite likely that the standard of
living of Russians will fall more.
In most countries most of the time,
that would have political consequences. But not in Russia. The Russian
population, Markov argues, “has become accustomed to unpredictability in
economic life.” It remembers the fall of the 1990s and the remarkable rise of the
early years of this century. And it knows that declines now have only reduced
some of the gains.
“The classical model of a crisis
develops this way,” he says. “First arrives a financial crisis, then it grows
into an economic one, then into a social one and finally into a political one.”
But “the logic of the current Russian crisis is completely different.” People
see the causes as being “absolutely from abroad.” And so they don’t blame the
leadership; they support it.
“The majority of the population of
Russia considers the collective West rather than the president and government
responsible for their declining standard of living. Precisely this explains the
paradox in which a fall in the level of living and a growth of social tension
leads to the growth of support for the Kremlin,” Markov continues.
And Yekaterinburg political
scientist Fyodor Krasheninnikov says that “there is no direction connection
between the dissatisfaction of society and political activity. For people to
display political activity, they must have the opportunity to do so … [But]
today in Russia there is no such space.”
“Yes,” he says, “in the case of a
radical deterioration of live spontaneous risings may occur on the Russian
borderlands and in small cities. But the country is still very far from that.
One must beside this clearly understand that the majority of the population of
Russia is accustomed to live badly and remembers still worse times in the past.”
The current crisis has hid the
middle class hardest because they had gotten used to being able to take
vacations in Paris and now do not have that chance, Krasheninnikov says. “But
for those who earlier could purchase expensive catchup but today must buy a
cheaper brand, the crisis is no problem.”
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