Paul
Goble
Staunton, January 24 – Russian
commentators almost unanimously have argued that the ouster of the Medvedev
government and the introduction of changes in the 1993 Constitution are about
extending the time in office of Vladimir Putin; but Yevgeny Gontmakher says that
the Kremlin chose to make these changes because of concerns about a
socio-economic crisis.
“While the president has been
involved with global geopolitics,” the economist says, “corruption, the decline
of the standard of living and a demographic collapse have approached critical
levels, which are fraught with political risks.” The announced changes are an
effort to prevent those from emerging (theins.ru/opinions/197929).
The question now, Gontmakher says,
is “will this be sufficient … to improve the social situation of Russians?”
There are several developments which
have pushed Putin to make these shifts: his new focus on domestic issues, the
impact of the pension reform on his rating, problems with health care after his
“optimization” program, a new decline in the Russian population as a result of
deaths over births, growing corruption, and slow growth of the economy.
This combination of problems “led
Vladimir Putin to the conclusion that it is necessary to shift the government
machine which has begun to produce instead of progress and growth stagnation,
decline and degradation,” developments that in the most direct way “threaten
the firmness of his personal positions as president.”
The Russian president might have decentralized
power, allowed for real competition, reduced the role of the state in the
economy, reformed the law enforcement and judicial systems, and pulled the
government out of the media. But taking such steps could condemn those who
launch them to “very large political risks as a result of unplanned but
inevitable errors.”
And therefore, Gontmakher says, Putin
chose another way: a purge of cadres. But Putin wouldn’t be Putin if he didn’t
cover this with many other things at the same time, some well thought out but
others so poorly designed that they bear all the marks of something dreamed up
for the occasion.
Most likely, the economist says,
Putin moved quickly to complete the much-ballyhooed constitutional
modifications “so as to complete this operation and then forget about it.” He
wants the appearance of change without genuine structural changes. At the same time, however, he is prepared to
distribute more money to the population.
That is a good thing, Gontmakher
says, because many people are suffering as a result of stagnation and the
government has money. But people are unlikely
to be grateful because they understand what Putin is doing and more important
what he isn’t. He may give some money
but not the chances to make more and he may make the government more effective
but not different.
Despite all the talk, the economist continues,
“there will not be a qualitative reconstruction of the economy with the appearance
of really high-technology and highly paid work places, the bubbling up of
private entrepreneurial initiative, and a shift in the development of the
provinces, all of which will fall ever further behind the capital metropolises.”
“In order to secure all this,” he
says, “one need not change the Constitution but rather strictly fulfill its
existing edition, above all in the area of the functioning of political institutions.
This would be a real answer to the growing social demand for real and not
decorative changes.” But Putin is prepared only to offer the latter.
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