Compared to Original, Putin’s Neo-Stalinism ‘Much More Politically Flexible,’ Dobrenko Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 22 – Putin’s neo-Stalinism resembles its namesake in many ways, but it is “much more politically flexible” and demonstrates “an extreme and demonstrated legal pragmatism” far in excess of the original, according to Yevgeny Dobrenko, a Russian study of Stalinism based at a Venetian university.

            “Like Stalinism,” he says, “neo-Stalinism operates not so much on economic, political or military institutions as on the secret policy. But if in Stalinism, this foundation was its chief secret, under conditions of present-day Russia, the deep state in the form of the secret police is in the forefront politically” (svoboda.org/a/znakomjtesj-neostalinizm-evgeniy-dobrenko-o-vernuvsheysya-epohe/32553565.html).

            This foundation is not mediated with any special “ideological or political” vision, Dobrenko says. But like Stalinism, neo-Stalinism draws on nationalism and imperialism, even though in Stalinism these were combined with Marxism and its concern with the future while in neo-Stalinism, they are all about the past as the key to the future.

            This difference, the scholar says, affects Moscow’s ability to reach out to others. Stalin could appeal to the left generally because he presented himself as a harbinger of chances that the left wanted; Putin has no such opportunity but must instead appeal to marginal groups in the hopes that they will become mainstream.

            To put this in the most lapidary terms, Dobrenko continues, the Stalinist slogan was “never again” while the neo-Stalinist one is “we can repeat what we did.” And “the chief subject of Stalinism was ‘scientific communism,’ a doctrine about the future,” while for neo-Stalinism, it is the idea that “the Russia of the future is the Russia of the past.”

            Another major difference between the two is that Stalinism like other 20^th century totalitarian ideologies was a mobilizational ideology, “neo-Stalinism is an ideology founded on the de-politicalization of the population” which plays on popular resentments rather than commitments to broader goals.

            In addition, Stalinism was statist. Stalin was a bureaucrat, Dobrenko says, and he elevated the state to unprecedented heights. Neo-Stalinism in contract deprives the state “of all those functions which in Soviet times were marked in a socially positive way.” Now, there is the leader and the people: the state has been dethroned as an entity.

            Stalinism suppressed corruption while neo-Stalinism has made it a systemic element. And all these things rest on broader realities: in Stalin’s time, people believed; but under Putin, few if any do. His listeners know he is lying, “and he knows that his listeners know that he is doing so. Stalin could only dream of such an intimate contact with his audience.

            What makes neo-Stalinism stand out from other “neo-“ ideologies and practices is that it is deeply rooted “in the Russian authoritarian tradition and Russian imperial history. It is too national; and therefore, in part, Russia is practically in complete isolation in the present-day world.”

            “As one can see,” Dobrenko concludes, “the structure of power in contemporary Russia grew out of the political philosophy of Stalin. That isn’t surprising: Stalin was the father of the Soviet nation,” and those who came out of that environment had no other place to learn how to think and behave.

            But at the same time, “neo-Stalinism isn’t ‘the ideological kasha’ many view it as. Instead, it is a completely systemic adaptation of Stalinism to post-Soviet political reality.”