Paul Goble
Staunton, July 9 – Because of political turmoil in the South Caucasus and limited tracks in Central Asia, Moscow two years ago focused on the sea lanes of the Caspian to fulfill its plans for a north-south transit corridor (jamestown.org/program/moscow-shifting-focus-to-sea-lanes-rather-than-railways-for-north-south-corridor/).
But the rapid decline of water levels on that sea, the silting up of its three harbors on the Caspian and the retreat of the coastline from them, Moscow has been compelled to focus again on railways west and east of that sea (fondsk.ru/news/2025/07/09/uskorennoe-rasshirenie-areala-koridora-sever-yug-novye-gorizonty.html).
In the last year alone, the cargo Russia had been shipping via the Caspian has fallen 40 percent, an amount so large that even the political problems Moscow faces in the south Caucasus and the difficulties it has will rail networks in Central Asia pale in comparison as factors in Russian calculations.
This shift is likely to involve three major shifts in Russian plans: First, it is likely to reduce support for the development of Astrakhan as a port, something that will also have consequences on the ability of Moscow to move ships from its Caspian Flotilla from there to the Sea of Azov where it has been using them in Putin’s war against Ukraine.
Second, it is likely to open the way for other littoral states to expand their trade and military activity given that their ships are smaller and have less draft allowing them to operate where the larger and heavier Russian ships increasingly cannot as the Caspian continues to silt up and water levels fall.
And third, it will cause Moscow to become more involved with the South Caucasus states and seek political arrangements with them, as hard as that may be, and to work with China to expand rail networks in Central Asia so as to be able to meet the ambitious goals of Putin’s north-south route.
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