Federalism in Russia of the 1990s Proved to Be ‘an Easy Victim’ of Putin’s Policies, Busygina Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 5 – Russian Federalism in which so many had placed their hopes in the 1990s arose because Moscow’s weakness allowed regional and republic elites to force the center to make concessions turned out to be “one of the victims of Putin’s policies,” Irina Busygina says, and what is especially sad, “one of the easy victims” of his approach.

            The Russian specialist on federalism who now works at Harvard’s Davis Center says that deference to Moscow among regional and republic elites meant that “no one” including Tatarstan fought openly against what Putin was doing but instead went along (idelreal.org/a/federalizm-okazalsya-odnoy-iz-zhertv-putinskoy-politiki-kak-tatarstan-za-35-let-prevratilsya-v-loyalnuyu-moskve-respubliku/33521622.html).

            Indeed, Busygina says, “many of Putin’s initiatives were met with approval in the republics, by part of their Russian-speaking populations and by populations who were oriented toward all-Russian movements, both democratic and non-democratic.” And “in Moscow itself, the democrats, still in the Duma, voted for Putin’s proposal rather than against them.

            As a result, “the democratic conquests of the 1990s, including federalism, were given up without a sound. And this,” she continues, “is he collective responsibility of us all – politicians, civil society, governors, regional parliaments, the Federation Council and the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.”

            This process went so quickly because of what can only be called “the banal opportunism of regional and republic elites” who saw that resistance was impossible. They didn’t establish “a broad coalition of regions” but instead chose an “opportunistic” path, intended to save something for themselves. Putin then took them on one by one, including in Tatarstan, and won.

            Putin’s defeat of Chechnya in the second post-Soviet Chechen war played a major role in this because it showed all the regional and republic elites just how far the Kremlin was prepared to go if they did try to continue to resist. And consequently, they didn’t but at most tried to limit the damages he was inflicting on them.

            Putin’s launch of his expanded war in Ukraine in February 2022 continued this process, the Russian specialist on federalism says. “The war showed that the model of Russian ‘authoritarian federalism’ is completely stable.” After it began, “there was not a single case of the manifestation of disloyalty to Putin by regional elites.” Just the reverse.

            Instead, these elites gave up what little they had left. Tatarstan was able to save a bit more than the others because it had a powerful economy Moscow didn’t want to tamper with and because it continues to play a major role in Russia’s relations with the Islamic world, something the Kremlin valued.

            As far as the future is concerned, Busygina continues, the answer depends on whether the Russian Federation maintains its territorial integrity or not. That will depend on what happens in Moscow: “If again as in the 1990s, a period of continuing and long-term weakening of Moscow arises, then the events of those years could be repeated.”

            For there to be any chance of that, Putin must exit the scene and there must then be “a drawn out battle for the division of power.” In such a situation, Tatarstan and other republics may be able to claw back that which they have lost in the Putin years, she concludes.