Putin Using Talks to Extend the War But They’re ‘Nonetheless Generating Expectations’ for Change in Russia, Morozov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Apr.1 – It is entirely possible that Putin is using the talks about a settlement in Ukraine to prevent any agreement anytime soon by leading Western leaders to think that the Kremlin leader wants a settlement and that therefore they should not do anything that might prolong the conflict, attitudes that help the Kremlin achieve what it really wants.

            But however that may be, the negotiations that have taken place, “however peculiar their format and despite having yielded no concrete results” last year “have nonetheless generated expectations” in the Russian population, according to Aleksandr Morozov (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/04/01/prizrak-normalizatsii-a191480).

            At present, the Russian commentator who lives in the Czech Republic says these expectations have manifested themselves “as a palpable sense of ‘war fatigue,” and have been “compounded by frustration over the continuously escalating restrictions [being imposed by the Kremlin] which are encroaching upon ever-wide spheres of daily life.”

            “A protracted war yielding meager results is as a result pushing the Kremlin down the path of ‘the securitization of everyday life,’ something which is intensifying across various segments of the population a clear and distinctly articulated sense of ‘abnormality’” has raised questions about “what constitutes ‘the norm’ and how to return to it.”

            That has led to a sharp debate over what normality consists of ranging from Putinism without a war to a democratic Russia with greater federalism, a debate that Morozov describes in his article; but none of the participants has specified exactly how such a normality would be achieved or what groups would come together in order to get Russia to that state.

            Consequently, while talk of normality is certainly a sign of the distress of the Russian people because of Putin’s war and repression, it has not yet produced any roadmaps that could lead to whatever form “the normal Russia of the future” should take and thus represents more a cry of despair than an advance toward such an understanding.