Why are Only Some Non-Russian Republics Led by Members of Their Titular Nationalities? Non-Russians in Russia Begin to Ask

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 2 – In the final decades of the Soviet Union, many in the non-Russian union republics began to ask why some of them were headed by members of their titular nationalities and others by Russians and increasingly demanded that members of the titular nation occupy key posts.

            Over time, Moscow backed down, first agreeing that the top party official in any union republic should be a member of the titular nationality as a long as his deputy was a Russian and then ultimately yielding on that point and allowing officials of the titular nationalities to occupy ever more of the top posts.

            That had the effect of reducing central control over the union republics and ultimately set the stage for the disintegration of the USSR.

            Now, some non-Russians in the non-Russian republics within the Russian Federation are asking the same question about the heads of their republics, wondering why in some cases they are members of the titular nationality but in others ethnic Russians who may not even know the national language, a question that once again represents the seeds of a challenge to Moscow.

            Erdem Gomboyev describes the existing situation among the non-Russian republics and suggests that at the very least, those who occupy the top job in three republics where it is a constitutional requirement should be members of the titular nationality or speak the language, something that is not yet true in his native Buryatia (http://asiarussia.ru/articles/9716/).

            The Buryat commentator notes that Russia now consists of 85 subjects, 22 of which are national republics. Unlike the 63 others, these republics have the right to establish their government languages and to have their own constitutions. All have titular nationalities except for occupied Crimea.

            In four of the republics, he notes, “representatives of the titular nation were never heads.”  These include Karelia, Khakasia, Buryatia and Udmurtia, all places where ethnic Russians form super-majorities in the population, ranging from 80 percent to eight percent in Karelia to 60 percent to 30 percent in Udmurtia.

            One might have expected Adygeya and Bashkortostan to fall into this category as well given that the Adygeys number 24 percent of their republic’s population and the Russians 65 percent and that Bashkirs form only 30 percent of the population of their republic while Russians form 36 percent and Tatars 25 percent. But both have always had titular nationality heads.

            Ten other non-Russian republics – Daghestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, North Osetia, Tatarstan, Tyva, Chuvashia, and Chechenya – have always had representatives of the titular nations as their heads. But in the remaining five – Altay, Komi, Mari El, Mordvinia, and Sakha – the head has alternated between a member of the titular nationality and ethnic Russians.

            In the first four of these, Gomboyev continues, ethnic Russians form a larger share of the population than do members of the titular nation, but in one, Sakha, the titular nation is larger but not by an overwhelming percentage, 50 percent Sakha to 40 percent ethnic Russians. Occupied Crimea which Moscow does not view as having a titular nationality as such completes the list.

            Why is Buryatia on the list of those whose head has never been an ethnic Buryat? the commentator asks. Can it be that “out of the million people of the republic there cannot be found a single worthy candidate?” However that may be, Gomboyev says, Moscow should at least follow the constitutional requirement there that the top official speak the local language.

            The center has done that in the case of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan but hasn’t in Buryatia.  To ask these kind of questions is the beginning of a kind of challenge that a generation ago Moscow proved it wasn’t up to meeting without losing control over the situation.  Now, it clearly faces those again, and it will be interesting to see how the central authorities respond.

            If they concede the point to the non-Russians, they will not only suffer a loss of influence and control in non-Russian republics but also spark demands in Russian-majority oblasts and krays that their residents should have the same right. But if the center doesn’t, that will ensure the rise of extra-systemic national movements that may be an even greater threat to Moscow.

Kremlin Preparing to Purge Ruling United Russia Party

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 1 – The Kremlin is preparing but has not yet announced “a broad purge” of the ruling United Russia Party in advance of next year’s parliamentary elections, Kirill Martynov, the political and economic editor of Moscow’s “Novaya gazeta,” writes in his column yesterday (novayagazeta.ru/columns/70559.html).

            According to his sources, Martynov says, the leadership will use two “instruments” to eliminate from its ranks any who might prove to be baggage for the regime: requiring income declarations from deputies at all levels and mandating that future candidates win more or less open primary elections.

            Given that those who elected to the Duma next year will likely serve until 2021, well beyond the presidential vote and into a time when the Russian government will have to make some politically unpopular decisions, the Kremlin wants to ensure it doesn’t have anyone on the list who will create scandals or propose things the regime doesn’t want.

            In recent times, many United Russia members have been involved in scandals and some United Russia deputies have offered draft legislation that has embarrassed the leadership and reduced the standing of the party in the eyes of ordinary Russians, the “Novaya gazeta” columnist continues.

            If this purge happens, he suggests, the legislatures will be less contentious than now; and the chief places for feedback from the population to the powers that be will become the Social Chamber or talk shops like the presidential human rights council.

Putin Changing Nature of Russian Nation and Alienating Many Who had Been Part of It, Shtepa Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 1 – Finland’s Marshal Mannerheim offers a distant mirror of the evolution of identity that Vladimir Putin is again causing many Russians to make, Vadim Shtepa says. Prior to 1917, Mannerheim served in the Russian army and always spoke of Russians as “we.” After it, he never described himself as a Russian but rather fought against the Soviets.

            One can see this from Mannerheim’s memoirs, the Russian regionalist says. “Prior to 1917, ‘Russians’ are ‘we.’ He fought in the Russo-Japanese War and in World War I and between them even carried out confidential missions for Nicholas II in Tibet” (rufabula.com/author/shtepa/825).

            Then came “a total turnabout of meanings” after the Bolshevik revolution.  “From 1918 on, the formulas in his memoirs include ‘we built a defense against the Russians,’ ‘the Russians demand,’ ‘we responded to the Russians,’ and so on.” Soviet historians treat this “metamorphosis” as treason, but Mannerheim “never swore allegiance” to the Soviet state.

            This was not simply a reflection of the fact that he became supreme commander of the Finnish Army, Shtepa argues. It was about something even more fundamental: “the very quality of the Russian nation had been changed.” For Mannerheim, brought up in classical culture, “this Bolshevik insanity speaking Russia was unacceptable and an absolute evil.”

            Today, the same thing is happening, “the very same break,” the Russian regionalist argues. “It is easily possible to consider the Gorbachevs and the Yeltsins and the Lebedevs ‘normal Russians.’ Despite all their disagreements, this was one civilization. But today we are observing the arrival of a different civilization.”

            This new “civilization” speaks Russian as did the Soviets and claimed to speak in the name of “’the Russian world.’” But its “’Russian world’” seeks to revive “a wild empire and hates all those who think differently. This is again a qualitative change in the Russian nation. And in such a situation, Mannerheim’s response is the only appropriate one.