Paul
Goble
Staunton, November 2 – In the final
decades of the Soviet Union, many in the non-Russian union republics began to
ask why some of them were headed by members of their titular nationalities and
others by Russians and increasingly demanded that members of the titular nation
occupy key posts.
Over time, Moscow backed down, first
agreeing that the top party official in any union republic should be a member
of the titular nationality as a long as his deputy was a Russian and then
ultimately yielding on that point and allowing officials of the titular
nationalities to occupy ever more of the top posts.
That had the effect of reducing
central control over the union republics and ultimately set the stage for the
disintegration of the USSR.
Now, some non-Russians in the
non-Russian republics within the Russian Federation are asking the same
question about the heads of their republics, wondering why in some cases they
are members of the titular nationality but in others ethnic Russians who may not
even know the national language, a question that once again represents the
seeds of a challenge to Moscow.
Erdem Gomboyev describes the
existing situation among the non-Russian republics and suggests that at the
very least, those who occupy the top job in three republics where it is a
constitutional requirement should be members of the titular nationality or
speak the language, something that is not yet true in his native Buryatia (http://asiarussia.ru/articles/9716/).
The Buryat commentator notes that Russia
now consists of 85 subjects, 22 of which are national republics. Unlike the 63
others, these republics have the right to establish their government languages
and to have their own constitutions. All have titular nationalities except for occupied
Crimea.
In four of the republics, he notes, “representatives
of the titular nation were never heads.”
These include Karelia, Khakasia, Buryatia and Udmurtia, all places where
ethnic Russians form super-majorities in the population, ranging from 80
percent to eight percent in Karelia to 60 percent to 30 percent in Udmurtia.
One might have expected Adygeya and
Bashkortostan to fall into this category as well given that the Adygeys number
24 percent of their republic’s population and the Russians 65 percent and that Bashkirs
form only 30 percent of the population of their republic while Russians form 36
percent and Tatars 25 percent. But both have always had titular nationality
heads.
Ten other non-Russian republics –
Daghestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, Karachayevo-Cherkessia,
North Osetia, Tatarstan, Tyva, Chuvashia, and Chechenya – have always had
representatives of the titular nations as their heads. But in the remaining
five – Altay, Komi, Mari El, Mordvinia, and Sakha – the head has alternated
between a member of the titular nationality and ethnic Russians.
In the first four of these, Gomboyev
continues, ethnic Russians form a larger share of the population than do
members of the titular nation, but in one, Sakha, the titular nation is larger
but not by an overwhelming percentage, 50 percent Sakha to 40 percent ethnic
Russians. Occupied Crimea which Moscow does not view as having a titular
nationality as such completes the list.
Why is Buryatia on the list of those
whose head has never been an ethnic Buryat? the commentator asks. Can it be
that “out of the million people of the republic there cannot be found a single
worthy candidate?” However that may be, Gomboyev says, Moscow should at least
follow the constitutional requirement there that the top official speak the
local language.
The center has done that in the case
of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan but hasn’t in Buryatia. To ask these kind of questions is the beginning
of a kind of challenge that a generation ago Moscow proved it wasn’t up to
meeting without losing control over the situation. Now, it clearly faces those again, and it
will be interesting to see how the central authorities respond.
If they concede the point to the
non-Russians, they will not only suffer a loss of influence and control in
non-Russian republics but also spark demands in Russian-majority oblasts and
krays that their residents should have the same right. But if the center doesn’t,
that will ensure the rise of extra-systemic national movements that may be an
even greater threat to Moscow.
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