Paul
Goble
Staunton, October 5 – The Russian
Orthodox Church increasingly functions like the CPSU did in Brezhnev’s times,
Kseniya Kirillova says; but its actions are restricted by the state of which it
is a part – it can’t attack people like Ramzan Kadyrov, for example – and so it
is directing its energies elsewhere.
On the one hand, the Moscow
Patriarchate is positioning itself as a major defender of the Russian world
abroad and of the uniqueness of Russian culture, both with state support. But
on the other, it is increasingly attacking the old “faiths of the small
indigenous peoples, including those protected by law at the regional level” (afterempire.info/2017/10/05/clerical-empire/).
That has led to
some serious clashes, the US-based Russian journalist says. A year ago, for
example, the Russian church attacked a Chuvash cultural celebration accusing
its organizers of “paganism and separatism,” charges that were not taken up by
the political authorities at the time.
The Russian church has also gone
after paganist groups among Slavs in the Urals region, and against shamanism in
Tuva, despite the fact that in the latter case, that is one of “the three
dominant religions” in the republic. And
the church has backed Cossack attacks on the faith of the Nentsy in the Far
North.
Some of this activity may enjoy
official government support, some may be sanctioned by the Moscow Patriarchate,
and some may simply be the work of local priests and bishops who see this as a
way of building their authority among Russians by attacking others. But however that may be, this has the potential
to create serious problems.
That is because the government does
not appear to be in full control of “the demons it has unleashed” and thus has
created a situation in which Orthodox fundamentalists feel free to act within
what they but not necessarily all the powers that be in Moscow define as “the
clerical empire” they want Russia to be.
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