Putin Always Responds to Problems Not by Changing Course but by Increasing Control, Shelin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 30 – In small ways and large, Sergey Shelin says, Vladimir Putin responds to unexpected problems not by changing the policies that produced them but by increasing his control by requiring more reporting or by tightening the screws.  His new decree on “assessing the effectiveness” of federal subject heads is a classic example of this.

            But that approach, the Rosbalt commentator says, has the effect in this case as well as in others of exacerbating the tensions between the Kremlin leader, his officials, and the population rather than resolving anything, however much he and the Presidential Administration believe otherwise (rosbalt.ru/blogs/2019/04/29/1778845.html).

                The new decree requires more reports about gubernatorial effectiveness, but two things about it show that it is about anything but that. On the one hand, it rates the regional heads on things that are not under the constitution and the law their responsibilities. And on the other, it relies on statistical measures that can at best give a spurious sense of accuracy.

            The key part of this decree is its first point, the one calling for evaluating governors in terms of “the level of trust to the powers that be (the president of the Russian Federation and higher officials of the subjects of the Russian Federation).” There is no reference to the Duma or local assemblies, let alone to the people who are supposed to be the source of all power.

            This highlights “one of the most interesting paradoxes” of the Putin system: “The bosses of the regions are formally elected by the people. That is, theoretically, they are responsible to the voters. But in fact, their selection, promotion and subsequent removal is the business of the will of the most high.”

            Russians have long been accustomed to the situation in which those whom they supposedly elect look first and often exclusively to those who really appointed them rather than to the people. But lately, many of them are demanding that their governors pay attention to their needs. The new decree won’t end that trend; it will only make the contradiction more obvious.

            Moreover, the decree’s requirement that there be reporting on “the level of trust to the powers that” has nothing to do with “the real attitudes of people.” It is simply a line in a report, like all the other lines in the additional paperwork this decree requires. “Real conflicts and difficulties won’t be included.” Indeed, this is a way for further ignoring them.

                Perhaps the only good thing one can say about this new decree, Shelin implies, is that it makes clear what many have long assumed to be the case: Putin doesn’t trust the people and doesn’t want his governors to do so either. And because it makes that clear, the decree will cause ever more people to draw the necessary conclusions about his system.