Russians will Approve Amendments But That May Make Kremlin’s Situation Worse, Shelin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 5 – Despite the hopes of some opposition figures and the analyses of some experts, the findings of the main polling agencies suggest that between two-thirds and three-quarters of those who vote on July 1 will support the constitutional amendments Vladimir Putin and his regime want, Sergey Shelin says.

           

            Moreover, the Rosbalt commentator continues, the powers that be will do what they have to do, indeed, they are already doing so, in order to ensure that this Putin measure doesn’t lose.  And it isn’t going to.  The real question that should be asked is “what will follow this win?” (rosbalt.ru/blogs/2020/06/05/1847464.html).

            And there is every likelihood, Shelin suggests, that the results of this latest Kremlin “victory” will not be what the powers that be want and expect but rather resemble those when Putin won the presidency in 2018 with the highest percentage ever only to lose most of his support when he took actions afterwards. 

            When Putin won with 77 percent of the vote, it appeared that he was at the height of his popularity and had a broad mandate “for carrying out any course. But when two and a half months later, the pension reform was launched, it turned out that he didn’t have either super popularity or a mandate for this reform.”

            “In March 2018, the people voted, in part under pressure, in part by inertia, and in part out of an expectation of some benefits the main candidate appeared to offer. But as soon as it was discovered that the regime wasn’t giving money but taking it away, anger became stronger” than anyone expected after the victory.

            The same thing is likely to be true in the case of this plebiscite.  The amendments it will approve are intended to allow Putin to rule for life. But “this action will not give him a political mandate” to do so by itself, Shelin argues. And if he doesn’t make concessions to the people, this new mandate won’t have a different outcome than that of March 2018.

            Many will go to the polls on July 1 because they feel they have no choice, “but those who take part voluntarily are doing this only because of promised indexation of pay and pensions.” If those aren’t forthcoming, they will be angry, especially as the pandemic-driven lockdown has given them time to think about what is going on.

            “It is still a long way to 2024,” Shelin points out, “and people are seeking money from the authorities already now. After the plebiscite, their demands will become ever louder.”  If Putin doesn’t deliver such aid, he may find himself in a trap like in 2018 instead of putting the Russian people in a trap where they have to support him regardless.

            If the Kremlin is clever, it will work to get the Russian people to forget this plebiscite and these amendments as soon as possible lest they draw even harsher conclusions about the man behind them.  “It is so easy to organize elections, but it is so difficult to deal with their consequences.”