After Korkino Pogrom, Hostility toward and Repression of Roma Communities Spreading across Russia

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Nov. 29 – Following the violence in Korkino earlier this fall, hostility among Russians toward Roma communities across Russia has intensified and repression of these communities has increased as well, threatening both new outbreaks of clashes between Roma and Russians and worsening relations between Russians and other minorities as well.
    The Korkino events attracted enormous coverage at the time, but since then, the Roma issue has largely disappeared from the Russian media, despite warnings that it was a harbinger of worsening relations between Roma and Russians and even other ethnic groups (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/10/roma-pogroms-in-chelyabinsk-make.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/11/verkhovsky-on-sources-of-anti-migrant.html).
    Now that media neglect has been in part compensated by a detailed story by the Horizontal Russia portal about Roma in Leningrad Oblast which shows that Russian hostility to and official mistreatment of members of that nationality intensified after Korkino and shows no sign of dissipating anytime soon (semnasem.org/articles/2024/11/29/vse-dorogi-vedut-k-roma).
    The Roma, the name now commonly given to the gypsies, number between 200,000, the figure given by the last more or less reliable Russian census in 2010 but a clear undercount, and one million, the figure members of the community believe but that likely is at least slightly exaggerated.
    Consequently, if this trend continues and spreads, and in the Russia of Vladimir Putin, that is entirely likely, more clashes between Roma and Russians are likely; and there is a great danger that such violence will spread to conflicts between Russians and other ethnic minorities as well.

Moscow Claims It’s Winning Battle with HIV/AIDS But Statistics Suggest Otherwise, ‘To Be Precise’ Portal Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Nov. 28 – Russian Health Minister Mikhail Murashko said this week that HIV infections in Russia had reached “an historical minimum” (kommersant.ru/doc/7326840); but figures suggest that his optimism is misplaced and that the situation is far worse than officials acknowledge, even as they stop publishing the kind of data that would allow a real assessment.
    That is the conclusion Kseniya Babikhina, an investigator for the To Be Precise news portal, offers in a detailed new article (tochno.st/materials/minzdrav-uvelicil-biudzet-na-lecenie-vic-na-tret-no-prakticeski-zakryl-dannye-o-cisle-liudei-s-takim-diagnozom-glavnoe-o-situacii-s-vic-v-rossii).
    Although some Russian government agencies continue to publish figures about HIV/AIDS, the health ministry this year appears to have stopped, something that makes it impossible to know exactly how many Russians are now suffering from this disease and what share of those with it are receiving treatment.
    Moreover, independent researchers have found that in the last several years, fewer and fewer people in high risk groups are being tested at all, something that suggests the claims officials like Murashko are making can’t be taken seriously as large numbers of people with the disease aren’t being identified as such.
    Indeed, international assessments now suggest that half of all new cases of HIV in Europe are in Russia, a conclusion that suggests that the numbers of HIV/AIDS cases in that country are far higher than Moscow acknowledges (thelancet.com/journals/lanhiv/article/PIIS2352-3018(24)00212-1/fulltext).

Tatarstan Leader Again Takes Lead in Defending Federalism in Russia

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Nov. 28 – In the 1990s, Mintimir Shaymiyev, the then-president of Tatarstan, was the republic leader most frequently associated with the defense of federalism in Russia. Given Putin’s centralizing rule, his successor, Rustam Minnikhanov, has been less forthright. But now he too, in what may be a harbinger of a sea change in Kazan, is again defending federalism.
    Admittedly, there is a big difference. Shaymiyev was on the offensive, seeking greater autonomy and power not only for himself but also for the leaders of other republics and regions, while Minnikhanov has been on the defensive and has now dug in on an issue that is far less significant in its likely consequences – the fate of local slef-government.
    But having yielded on so many points, Minnikhanov is now fighting in the trenches to block Moscow from destroying local self-government as the Kremlin and Duma appear set to do and giving in the course of it a full-throated defense of the reasons Russia needs to become a real federal state and not just one in name only.
    Minnikhanov and the federal subjects are likely to lose on this issue as well, even though they have managed to delay Moscow’s destruction of local self-government for two years since the early days of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine given the Kremlin’s transparent concern that such a move could destabilize the country, a fear it apparently no longer has.
    However, the current Tatarstan leader, who now has the title rais rather than president, offers a two-pronged defense of federalism that others may pick up and that may challenge the Kremlin in the future, even if Moscow does steamroller the federal subjects on this issue as seems likely in the coming month.
    On the one hand, Minnikhanov makes the point in a message to Moscow that Russia is too diverse to be “governed by one template.” He admits “that there have been and will be some changes; we need to treat this normally and don’t mind.” But “our territories are different” and must make their own choices (ng.ru/politics/2024-11-28/1_9145_destabilization.html).
    And on the other, regional governments in fact need the advantages that local self-government offers: “Over the years, we have formed a layer of authoritative people” at the local level. “Are we going to lose them now? Who are they bothering? Are there no other problems the country should be addressing” especially as they’re a key link between the people and the power.
    Again, while Moscow almost certainly will push the new law through, it has already made a concession that suggests it takes such objections more seriously than many assume is possible under Putin. As drafted, the new law will give federal subjects ten years to make this change, an unusually long time to  adapt to something Putin wants.  

Infrastructure Inherited from Soviet Times Now Falling Apart More Rapidly than It is Being Repaired, Leading to Ever More Technogenic Disasters

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Nov. 28 – Moscow officials concede that technogenic disasters in Russia are happening at an ever-increasing rate primarily because so much of Russia’s infrastructure is left over from Soviet times and those responsible for its upkeep aren’t fixing it as fast as it is falling apart, according to an investigation by the Continuation Follows portal.
    Unless the Russian government changes course radically and soon, this means that the current record levels of elevator accidents, dam collapses, airplane accidents and other such disasters will continue to grow and at an ever-increasing rate, the portal’s findings suggest (prosleduet.media/details/utility-breakdowns/).
    The Continuation Follows portal notes that between 2018 and 2023, there were more than 330 elevator disasters which claimed 129 lives, the most widely publicized of these infrastructure disasters but hardly the most frequent. In only two months at the end of 2023 and the first of 2024, there were “at a minimum” 557 building collapses with more deaths as well.
    Indeed, the portal says, when winter begins and puts additional strains on housing and planes, accidents increase. This has sparked a bigger reflection among Russians: The country, their leader says, is ready for war; but it is never ready for winter even though the first doesn’t come that often and the latter comes ever year.
    Experts inside the government and out say that the reason things are heading south is that the country isn’t repairing the aging Soviet-era infrastructure which must be fixed or even replaced. According to one study, 58 percent of the pipes require replacement, but they are now being replaced at a rate so low that the total needing replacement is growing.
    The portal notes that similar problems exist in all of the infrastructure of the country and points out that those who built these facilities in Soviet times warned that even the best of their work would have to be replaced in 25 to 50 years. That time has now arrived, but the Kremlin acts as if it can ignore this reality. After all, it has other priorities, above all the war in Ukraine.   

Circassians have a Chance to Lead the Coming Parade of Exits from the Muscovite State

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Nov. 29 – Below is a speech I delivered online to the Second International Conference on Independent Circassia on Nov. 23. A video of this speech is available at youtu.be/AG8f94YS164?si=B_VxbzzCnfVD1-fz, and I want to thank Adel Bashqawi for producing a text version of it (justicefornorthcaucasus.info/?p=1251685433).  
I reproduce the text here with my own title for readers of Window on Eurasia:
Circassia’s Prospects for Recovering Independence have Never Been Better
A year ago, I had the opportunity to speak at an earlier conference of the ICIC, and I am honored and extremely pleased to have the chance to return and speak with you again. Although I know far less about Circassians and the Circassian cause than most of you, I can present the perspective of a sympathetic and supportive outsider, which is what I plan to do this morning.
As I said a year ago, I am—and remain—quite sure that Circassia is on the path to being restored. I believe this will happen within a decade or less, its independence will be recognized, and we will celebrate an enormous Circassian victory after so many years of struggle. However, at that time, I also cautioned that the final steps toward achieving these goals may prove to be the most difficult. The events of the ensuing months have only reinforced my confidence in both my prediction of Circassian independence and the immense challenges that lie ahead due to Moscow’s reactions. Ironically, while Moscow’s responses have made the outcome more likely, they have also complicated the path forward.
I believe the Circassian community will overcome these challenges only by confronting them directly and making full use of the resources at their disposal. Today, I would like to revisit some of what I said last year and provide an update in light of changes in the international environment. The strategies Circassians need to employ to achieve their goals have evolved in fundamental ways, and these changes must be recognized.
Five Key Considerations for the Circassian Cause
As I stated a year ago, Circassians and their supporters must keep five crucial considerations in mind as they pursue their goals. These points highlight both the resources available to Circassians and the difficulties in using them effectively, particularly in the face of Moscow’s likely escalation of its police powers, diplomatic efforts, security services, and propaganda aimed at discrediting the Circassian cause.
1. The Unique Strength of the Circassian Nation
Circassians are uniquely positioned among non-Russian peoples within the current borders of the Russian Federation. They have a large and increasingly assertive ethnic population in their homeland and an even larger, nationally conscious diaspora. In fact, the Circassians have the largest diaspora of any people within Russia’s borders. Moreover, many Circassians, including some of you here today, have learned to leverage social media to unite their homeland and diaspora communities. This creates a powerful dynamic: actions in one part of the Circassian nation strengthen the other, and Moscow’s moves against one lead to new losses for Russia elsewhere.
2. Ukraine as a Strategic Ally
Never before has the Circassian nation had as important an ally as it does now in Ukraine. Kyiv recognizes Circassians as natural allies in their shared struggle against Russian imperialism. The deeper Russia becomes embroiled in its war of aggression, the more Ukraine can be counted on to support the Circassian cause. If someone had predicted in 2020 that the Ukrainian parliament would endorse Circassia, it would have seemed unimaginable. Now, it’s only a matter of time before we see stronger declarations of support.
3. The International Shift in Perception
The international community is increasingly recognizing a truth they were once reluctant to admit: Putin embodies the problem, but the Russian Federation’s existence as an imperial state is an enduring threat to world peace. For true stability, Russia must be dismantled. The Circassians, along with other unrecognized or submerged peoples, stand to benefit from this geopolitical shift. The collapse of Russia’s centralized administration offers Circassians an unprecedented opportunity to reclaim their independence.
4. Alliances Within Russia
Circassians also have potential allies within the Russian Federation, including ethnic Russians outside Moscow’s power structure. These regionalists and non-Muscovite Russians also suffer under the centralized “Muscovite yoke” and increasingly see Circassians as a leading force for post-imperial transformation. Much like the Baltic nations’ role at the end of Soviet times, Circassians are poised to play a leadership role in shaping a post-Russian reality.
5. Moscow’s Institutional Weakness
In Soviet and early post-Soviet times, Moscow’s institutions were stronger, making it harder for Circassians to achieve their goals. Now, Putin’s systematic destruction of these institutions has backfired. This collapse makes the prospect of a radically new political order more likely, benefiting peoples like the Circassians. Recognizing this moment’s significance is critical.
Avoiding Self-Defeating Attitudes
Despite these opportunities, there are risks. Some may view the challenges as insurmountable and retreat into inaction, while others might assume victory is inevitable and fail to act decisively. Both attitudes are dangerous. Inaction forfeits today’s advantages, while complacency allows Moscow to claim undeserved victories. Circassians must act carefully, thoughtfully, and urgently. They must adapt to the shifting international environment and focus their efforts where they will have the greatest impact.
Focus on Europe and Turkey
Circassians must recognize that the future of their cause is now more dependent on Europe and Turkey than on the United States. While it is painful for me as an American to admit, Europe—along with Ankara—will play a more decisive role in shaping the region’s future. Circassians should focus their diplomatic and advocacy efforts on Brussels, Paris, Berlin, and Ankara while continuing to engage with Kyiv and their fraternal peoples within Russia.
Leveraging the Diaspora
The Circassian diaspora remains a unique and invaluable resource. To maximize its impact, Circassians need a centralized, multilingual internet portal to provide daily updates on developments in Circassia. Such a platform, accessible in Turkish, Circassian, Arabic, English, French, German, and Ukrainian, would ensure the global community stays informed. This information flow is critical for building and maintaining international support.
Unity Without Uniformity
Circassians must remain united while accepting that unity does not require unanimity. Agreeing on core principles is essential, but diversity of opinion is healthy and necessary. Moscow’s security services are adept at exploiting divisions, so Circassians must be vigilant against attempts to sow discord.
Preparing for Moscow’s Escalation
Finally, as Circassians approach their goal of reviving their state, they must anticipate increased aggression from Moscow. The collapse of the Russian Empire this time will be more radical and may even lead to Russia’s dissolution. This prospect terrifies Moscow, making its reaction likely to be more violent and subversive. Circassians must counter this with accurate, timely information to rally international support and prevent Russian narratives from dominating the discourse.
Conclusion
In closing, I want to thank the organizers for allowing me, a supportive outsider, to participate in this important gathering. I look forward to the day when the International Conference on Independent Circassia (ICIC) can hold such conferences not in foreign capitals, but in a revived and flourishing Circassian state. God willing, I hope to join you all there in celebration.
Thank you.

When Putin Called Kazakhstan ‘a Russian-Speaking Land,’ Tokayev Responded by Speaking Kazakh

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Nov. 28 – When Vladimir Putin came to Astan to take part in the summit of the Organization for the Collective Security Treaty, the Russian leader called Kazakhstan “a Russian-speaking land.” His Kazakhstan counterpart, Kasym-Jomart Tokayev, who spoke next responded in Kazakh, forcing Putin and his entourage to seek translations.
    In many respects, Tokayev’s response was emblematic of Putin’s failure in Kazakhstan, a failure that Russian commentators have acknowledged by suggesting that the Russian leader did not get want he wanted and that his meetings with Central Asian leaders were less than a success (novgaz.com/index.php/2-news/3828-путин-обещал-всех-прикрыть).
    In fact, as Viktoriya Andreyeva, one of these writers put it, “Putin’s visit to Kazakhstan demonstrated that Moscow is losing control over even its closest allies. Tokayev by his open gestures gave him to understand that Kazakhstan no longer intends to be a silent partner” but will speak with its own voice (rusmonitor.com/kazahstan-protiv-rossii-diplomaticheskaya-igra-na-vysshem-urovne.html).
    “For Russia,” she observes, such a signal is one more reminder that the era of the unqualified influence of Moscow on the post-Soviet space is coming to an end,” exactly the opposite of what Putin hoped for when he began his expanded war in Ukraine almost three years ago.

Part of Liberal Russian Opposition Now Ready to Cooperate Closely with Regionalist and Nationalist Groups

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Nov. 28 – Most liberal Russian opposition, whose members overwhelmingly come from Moscow but now live abroad, typically want little or nothing to do with their regionalist counterparts, let alone nationalist groups which aspire to independence from Moscow for their nations.
    On the one hand, this division means that the liberal Russian in most cases to cooperate with regionalists and nationalists not only takes Muscovite positions which are in many cases almost indistinguishable from those of the Kremlin but loses the opportunity to draw on the energy of opposition groups beyond the ring road.
And on the other, it means that regionalists and nationalists, having failed to win acceptance from the Russian liberals, often are excluded by governments in the West from the kind of contacts and support officials in these governments are prepared to extend to the liberals (e.g., windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/02/munich-security-conference-invites.html).
    (For background on this problem and occasional efforts in recent years to overcome it, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/11/russian-and-non-russian-opposition.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/12/russian-liberals-unwillingness-to-drop.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/07/russian-liberals-and-non-russian.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/09/russian-opposition-and-regionalists.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/03/russian-liberal-opposition-moves-closer.html).
    And on the other, regionalists and nationalists having failed to win acceptance from the Russian liberals often are excluded by governments in the West from the kind of contacts and support officials in these governments are prepared to extend to the liberals (e.g., https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/02/munich-security-conference-invites.html).
    Now,  one of the most prominent liberal Russian opposition structures, the Congress of Peoples Deputies of Russia, appears set to expand cooperation with h regionalist and nationalist forces (idelreal.org/a/ilya-ponomaryov-sobiraet-svoy-maydan-udastsya-li-soyuz-horoshih-russkih-s-natsionalno-osvoboditelnymi-dvizheniyami/33217982.html).
    Ilya Ponomaryov, whose brainchild the Congress is, has proposed creating a new consultative body that would include not only Russian liberals and regionalists but also nationalist groups that have declared as their goal the achievement of state independence from Moscow.
    His proposal which remains to be fleshed out and about which there is far from complete agreement even among his allies – they’ve already rejected his call to label the group “a maidan” -- will be taken up by the Congress at its next meeting in December. But his ideas are certainly music to the ears of regionalist and national liberation groups.
    Ponomaryov says that for his part, he and his allies don’t want to promote the disintegration of Russia but that “on the other hand, regions and national republics which want to become independent” should have such an opportunity “because we are talking about a new country in the future, a Russian Republic.
    Now and in the immediate future, the liberal Russian opposition leader continues, “the congress and the national liberation movements” can work together as “equal partners,” especially as there is much common ground for action and many problems about the future to be discussed.
    According to Ponomaryov, the republics most likely to leave are Chechnya and Sakha. What will happen in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan is far from clear, and “the most complicated region” in this regard is Dagestan.  He added that liberal Russians simply don’t know whom the people will support in many places – and it is their voice which must be heard and followed.