Tuesday, October 7, 2025

Putin Can’t Win in Ukraine with a War of Exhaustion, Kirill Rogov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 2 – It has become a commonplace that Putin can win a war of exhaustion in Ukraine because the Russian Federation is so much larger and has so many more resources than does Ukraine, Kirill Rogov says. But while some Russian leaders might be able to do that, Putin can’t because he can’t mobilize Russia effectively.

            That was shown in the very first weeks following his expanded invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and it remains so to this day, the Russian analyst who edits the Re-Russia portal says – and it will remain so as long as the West continues to arm the heroic Ukraine people and state (re-russia.net/analytics/0340/).

            Because Putin is incapable of mobilizing Russia’s resources, the best he can hope for is that Russia can achieve a stalemate and that over time the West will turn away from Ukraine. But even then, Putin won’t win because of Russia’s overwhelming advantages in resources but because of the failure of the West to stand up to him.

            Having superior resources is not the automatic key to victory that many Western and some Russian analysts assume, Rogov points out. Unless there is a leader and regime in power capable of mobilizing them, this advantage almost certainly will prove illusory as is now happening in Ukraine.

Era of Mass Car Ownership in Russia Ending with Fateful Consequences for People and the Powers, Nikulin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 2 – Many Russians and others have suggested that the right to travel abroad and return home without obstacles was one of the most important things Russians gained after the fall of communism. But the ability to purchase and use cars to travel around, something few had in Soviet times, may have been even more important to more people.

            Even now, relatively few Russians have travelled abroad; but any visitor to Russia knows that the streets now, in contrast to Soviet times, are full of private cars that allow their owners remarkably great freedom of movement, an opportunity that few had earlier and that they are reluctant to lose.

            But according to Moscow analyst Andrey Nikulin, the era of mass car ownership is ending with fateful consequences for the population and its relationship to the state (rosbalt.ru/news/2025-10-02/andrey-nikulin-vopros-svobody-peremescheniya-po-rossii-stoit-vse-bolee-ostro-5484428).

            This is happening, he continues, as a result of “the return of the Soviet practice of ‘taking extra money from the population’ with the help of artificially raising the cost of consumer goods” so that the state will have money for its purposes which at present include Putin’s aggressive war in Ukraine.

            That general Russian policy is transforming the private automobile from a means of moving about “into a luxury” by constantly raising the price of cars and items needed for their maintenance, taxes on transport, high taxes on fuel, and the constantly spreading practice of paid roads,” Nikulin says.

            This process is still taking place relatively slowly, but there are clear signs that it is picking up speed (rosbalt.ru/news/2025-04-30/nikolay-yaremenko-kak-zhit-v-rossii-bez-avtomobilya-5381214). As a result, Russians are facing a return to the situation in Brezhnev’s times when almost all of them had to use public transit to get around.

            With the loss of their cars, Russians will have to do that or walk. The rest of the time, they can watch television and pay taxes. The Kremlin doesn’t need anything more than that from them, but having experienced “the luxury” of private cars, many Russians aren’t going to be happy with those who are taking them away from ordinary people.

Tatarstan Writers Union to 'Unite' with Union of Writers of Russia and Limit Itself to Local Issues

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 3 – Tatarstan has lost yet another vestige of its efforts in the 1990s to pursue an independent course: The Writers Union of Tatarstan, with its 312 members, has agreed to become part of the Union of Writers of Russia headed by the notorious Vladimir Medinsky and allow that body to decide all “key” questions.

            The Writers Union of Tatarstan will continue to exist at least for the present, but its leaders say that the times require unity with the all-Russian body and that the republic body will make decisions about regional and republic issues (milliard.tatar/news/soyuz-pisatelei-tatarstana-soletsya-s-soyuzom-pisatelei-rossii-8338).

            While there is likely to be some back-and-forth concerning what are “key” questions and what are only local or regional ones, this step almost certainly guarantees the near total subordination of the Tatarstan group to Moscow, a step which would have been unthinkable until recently.

            Now that the Russian Writer’s Union has brought the Tatarstan one to heel, it is likely that Moscow will feel even freer to move against the last vestiges of republic independence not only in Tatarstan but in other non-Russian republics. Consequently, what may seem a small move to many in fact is one that is certain to cast a large and dark shadow. 

Sunday, October 5, 2025

A Market Economy Coexisted with Totalitarianism under Stalin, an Arrangement that Continues in Putin’s Russia, Savvin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 30 – Most people see a market economy and totalitarianism as antithetical phenomena and believe that where one exists, the other cannot. But in fact, even in the darkest days of Stalin’s totalitarian system, a kind of market economy existed albeit not in its own name; and a similar arrangement now exists in Putin’s Russia, Dimitry Savvin says.

            The editor of the Riga-based conservative Russian portal Harbin points to the case of Nikolay Pavlenko who created a private construction firm which operated in the USSR between 1948 and 1952, a case described by Russian historian Oleg Khlevnyuk in a 2023 Moscow book, The Corporation of Imposters (harbin.lv/algoritm-rynochnogo-pererozhdeniya).

            What Pavlenko did was criminal “only” in the official Soviet understanding, Savvin says. In fact, what he did was to “establish a private construction enterprise masked as a military institution and over the course of several years successfully conduct commercial activity” in a totalitarian state.

            As “phantasmagorical” as that may seem, he continues, “in essence, the mechanisms of coexistence with a totalitarian state and a private commercial enterprise which Pavlenko developed are in many respects typical” and were later employed “not only in the Soviet Union” but also in North Korea and since the 1990s by entrepreneurs in Russia.

            Shortly after the German invasion of the USSR in 1941, Pavlenko, “suddenly discovered” that if one had the write papers and stamps, one could operate as a kind of covert free market player. He ran one such business during the war and established a second in 1948, when he was routinely sought out by officials because of his good and speedy work.

            Eventually the party leadership caught up with him; and in 1952, hie operation was shut down and he was shot. But his operation, which was certainly far from unique, dis played four characteristics that help to explain why such things reemerged in some other communist countries, the post-Soviet USSR, and especially in Putin’s time.

            First of all, Pavlenko’s organization was not political but commercial in the purest sense. Second, his organization mimicked state institutions; third, he did nothing criminal except for operating as a private firm in a system that denied that possibility; and fourth, if the leadership hadn’t been obsessed with defending socialism, what he did might have continued.

            “We see that little islands of market arrangements are natural for man and humanity” and emerge in communist and other totalitarian states, Savvin says, a pattern that requires us to recognize that with the proper masking, free market phenomena can and will exist under totalitarianism rather than being totally excluded by it. 

            Savvin’s observation carries with it another implication that he doesn’t discuss but that is critical for those who want to overcome totalitarianism. In the 1990s, many Western leaders believed that if they got the economy right in the Russian Federation, totalitarianism would be precluded. But in fact that was not true.

            Had such leaders focused more on democratic procedures and laws and worried somewhat less about the economy which they expected would do all the heavy lifting Russians and the world might have been spared the rise of the new totalitarianism under Vladimir Putin now.

As Russia Falters in North, China Expands Its Role There to the Despair of Some in Moscow

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 29 – The end of the third quarter has brought a plethora of stories highlighting two interconnected developments: Moscow’s increasing problems in developing the Northern Sea Route and Beijing’s taking advantage of that to expand its role in northern Russia and across the Arctic more generally.

            Five stories about Russia’s problems are particularly important:

·       First, Moscow’s inability to build enough icebreakers and ice-capable ships has prompted it to send into the NSR ships which are not capable of handling ice, something that observers say is a recipe for disaster (thebarentsobserver.com/news/moscow-pushes-arctic-shipping-towards-disaster/437663).

 

·       Second, in reporting the success of its floating atomic power station, Moscow has unintentionally highlighted its inability to provide power to those places in the far north when that ship is not present (eastrussia.ru/news/patrushev-otsenil-rabotu-plavuchey-atomnoy-teploelektrostantsii-na-chukotke/).

 

·       Third, Moscow is now being forced to try to build new dredging equipment to clear ports and access to the NSR in the north because of declining water levels. Given its inability to come up with enough dredging equipment in the south, rising water levels and silting of ports will make at least some inaccessible to some ships (arctic.ru/infrastructure/20251001/1050975.html).

 

·       Fourth, Moscow announced that it had ended the period this year when it delivers supplies to the far north. Because there are few or even no roads and rail routes there, cities, villages and bases there will have to make do until next spring, not something new but an increasing problem given Putin’s aspirations (arctic.ru/news/20251002/1051243.html).

 

·       And fifth, so many people have fled the Russian North since the end of Soviet times that the Duma has now taken up a bill that will handle the processing of abandoned properties there, yet another indication that all is not well with the development of the North that Putin routinely hypes (arctic.ru/population/20251002/1051183.html).

 

Meanwhile, as Moscow falters, Beijing has been expanding its activities in ways that may help Russia in the short term but that will put China in the driver’s seat there in the future:

·       First, China is working to develop ports at both the eastern and western ends of the NSR, at Provideniye in Chukotka and Murmansk in the West (sibmix.com/?doc=18098 and https://arctic.ru/infrastructure/20250930/1050460.html).

 

·       Second, China is expanding its use of the NSR relative to everyone else including Russia, sending container ships as well as bulk cargo vessels along it (svpressa.ru/science/article/483971/).

 

·       And third, Russian officials are now talking about the NSR not so much as a Russian project but as “an icy silk road,” a not so veiled reference to China’s plans to link itself with Europe not only via Central Asia but via the Arctic as well (thebarentsobserver.com/news/governor-signs-contract-with-chinese-shipper-says-murmansk-can-become-hub-for-icy-silk-road/438199).

 

Most Russian commentaries about these Chinese developments are positive, viewing them as examples of Chinese support for Russia in its conflict with the West. But ever more of them have an alarmist undertone, with a Russian shipping official pointedly saying that Russian ships “must be built in Russia and not in China” (rosbalt.ru/news/2025-09-25/aleksey-gagarinov-suda-nuzhno-stroit-v-rossii-a-ne-v-kitae-5480637).

As Alcohol Prices Rise and Restrictions on Its Sale Increase, Russians Turning to Dangerous Surrogates

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 27 – The rising death toll from the consumption of alcohol surrogates in Leningrad Oblast, where more than 30 people have died so far, is calling attention to a serious problem that Moscow faces whenever it tries to reduce the still high level of consumption of alcoholic beverages in that country.

            Whenever the price of government-regulated alcohol goes up either as a result of inflation or increased taxation, Russians turn to what they call surrogates, either alcohol contaminated by other fluids or other fluids that contain alcohol but are not supposed to be consumed by human beings.

            The Russian government historically has not counted the consumption of these alternatives in its reports about alcohol consumption so as to make the situation appear better than it is. But consumption of surrogates is now surging and thus total alcohol consumption per capita in Russia is likely to be as high or higher than it ever war.

            What makes this situation even worse is that the surrogates including adulterated alcoholic products contain poisons that make seriously ill or even kill those who use them, while the government’s failure to count what experts have long pointed to means that this problem attracts widespread attention only when it hits a large city.

            For details on the Leningrad case, see ura.news/news/1053001991 and ura.news/news/1053001864; for background on surrogates and how Russian policies have contributed to increased consumption of them, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2017/12/russians-arent-drinking-less-theyre.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/07/in-seeking-to-reduce-alcoholism-in.html and https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/10/one-fifth-of-all-alcohol-russians-now.html.

Pollution Killed 20,000 Russians Died Last Year and Made Millions More Sick, ‘To Be Precise’ Portal Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 27 – The To Be Precise portal, which documents social developments in Putin’s Russia, has produced the most comprehensive survey so far of the ways in which polluted water, air, and ground is having an impact on the lives of Russians, killing many and making others sick, and the ways Moscow is seeking to hide all this by bureaucratic sleight of hand. 

            While various Russian media outlets have picked up parts of the story To Be Precise tells, the original article prepared by Aleksandra Chernova is devastating in its description of these health consequences and of the steps the Putin regime has taken to cover them up (tochno.st/materials/glavnye-ekologiceskie-problemy-rossii-v-2025-godu-issledovanie-esli-byt-tocnym).

            Russian government figures show that in 2024, approximately 20,300 people died from pollution, slightly over half from polluted water, two-thirds of the rest from dirty air, and 2800 from polluted soil and other physical factors. Almost three million were made sick by polluted water, and one Russian in ten did not have access to clean water at home. 

            These figures have had an impact on the Russian economy because those who have become ill in addition to their personal suffering aren’t able to go to work and produce for businesses and the state. And so to no one’s surprise, the Russian government has sought to hide the impact of pollution.

            The figures for 2024 are almost the same as those from 2023, but they are far lower than those from 2022. The reason is not any environmental cleanup but the way in which the authorities are counting and reporting such losses. The agencies charged with doing so have both used estimates rather than actual studies and then closed off public access to supporting data.

            As a result of this sleight of hand, Moscow has succeeded in impressing some that it is actually improving the situation whereas in fact, it is making the situation worse by allowing people to believe that things are getting better when in fact they are going in exactly the opposite direction.