Paul
Goble
Staunton, November 1 – The new
society emerging in Russia under Vladimir Putin will be “a powerful and active
one, anti-democratic, militarized, with its own ‘leader cult,’ and ‘political
gnosticism’ but not comparable to the interwar regimes in Italy or Germany,
according to Aleksandr Morozov, the editor in chief of “Russky zhurnal.”
And he argues that this is the case
on the basis of an examination of seven aspects of Russian reality today,
aspects that call into question the conclusions of “enthusiasts” that what is happening is no
more than the end of “the post-Soviet transition” and the rise of “a so-called
‘nation state’” (russ.ru/Mirovaya-povestka/Novoe-obschestvo-Putina-kak-evropejskij-proekt).
First of all,
Morozov says, the formation of “the club of the sanctioned” has changed the
nature of Russian politics at the top. More than 100 Russians have now been
sanctioned by the West, and many others wish they were on that list because
membership confirms “the absolute devotion to Putin” that is the basis for
getting ahead.
Those on the list
“understand that personal sanctions won’t ever be lifted” even if sectoral
sanctions are, and consequently those who have been sanctioned have no choice
but to be loyal to Putin for life. “There is thus no basis of expecting ‘a
split in the elites,” Morozov says. Moreover, those who have been sanctioned
affect public opinion because they head so many firms and institutions in what
is already a “highly corporate” state.
Second, while Putin lacks the funds for arms that he has
talked about, the “’militarization of society’” will continue. For the first
time since the Soviet period, Russians are thinking and talking about a major
war with the West. And among other things, that has led more Russians to
volunteer for service in the military.
Third,
unlike in the past when any notion that guns should be in private hands was “a
taboo,” now those who are arming themselves are viewed as self-defense
detachments and even as “partisans” in the good World War II sense. These groups are becoming like the Freikorps
and are “much more attractive to young people in the provinces than were the
earlier formations of the National Bolsheviks,” not least because they enjoy
the backing of the state rather than face its opposition.
Fourth,
over the last year or so, Putin has made the Security Council the primary
institutionalized form of decision making at the top of the political system,
and its “gnostic” language has passed throughout the elite and into the Russian
population at large which now speaks in terms that Russia’s security services
prefer.
Fifth,
the political center of the country has disappeared. Radicals at both ends of
the political spectrum now make proposals that are taken seriously even though
a few months ago the ideas these proposals reflect would have been treated as
laughable absurdities. And that in turn
has been reflected in a change in the nature of political discourse.
Sixth,
the attitudes of the Russian middle class have shifted. Despite expectations of
some, this educated and even sophisticated group of people like it very much
that “Russia has suddenly shown the world several real ‘innovations,’ including
hybrid war, cyber-war, ‘polite people,’ and effective counterpropaganda.” They “consider
that the revision of history is completely justified.”
And
seventh, Putin and his propagandists have escaped the charges that the West
might have been expected to bring against him as acting like Hitler in the
Sudentenland. Instead, most Europeans view what he has done as annoying but not
reflecting his transformation into some kind of
fascist leader.
The
reasons for that are to be found in the Kremlin’s clever exploitation of the
following themes: the decline of the West, limits on the sovereignty of
European countries imposed by the US, the egotism of the United States, “the
paralysis of European democracy in the face of major problems,” and the
increasing distrust of European voters in their own governments.
“Crudely
speaking,” Morozov concludes, “Putin has begun an election campaign for the
imaginary post of ‘leader of Europe.’ He starts from a very low point but his
ratings are rapidly increasing. [And] it would be interesting to see the
results of the poll analogous to those which the Levada Center has conducted in
Russia for many years.”
“Do
you support Putin?” Yes, more yes than no, more no than yes, No. The answer ‘more yes than no,’” the “Russky
zhurnal” editor says, “is the indicator of the increase not of direct support
but of tolerance” by Europeans for what Putin has been doing.
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