Paul
Goble
Staunton, August 10 – Russia truly
is “a unique civilization,” one that like ancient Sparta is based on militarism
and expansionism now as in the past, Liliya Shevtsova says. Even when there is
peace, the country is engaged in “preparation for a new war;” and the efforts
of some of its people to break out of this “cycle of militarism” after 1991
have been blocked by Putin.
But the Kremlin leader faces a
problem as it begins this “new cycle of militarization,” she continues. “Russia
cannot militarize in the old way. It doesn’t have the resources, and the budget
is limited,” and very few Russians either in the elites or the population are
prepared to pay the price (apostrophe.com.ua/article/politics/2015-07-08/liliya-shevtsova-vozmojno-put-rossii--eto-raskol-na-melkie-chasti/1926).
Therefore, the Russian analyst
continues, “we have landed in a very complicated situation when on the one hand
the country has not escaped from militarism but on the other the country
already cannot carry out a constant struggle with the entire world. It has
turned out that the Kremlin is capable only of fake militarism and an imitation
of war.”
“This is the war Russia is carrying
out in Ukraine,” Shevtsova says; and she suggests it will continue for some
time because Moscow has decided that it can portray its “fake war” in Ukraine
as standing for a struggle against the entire world and by so doing win the
support of the Russian people.
To date, that calculation appears to
have worked, but it is increasingly evident that it won’t forever. The elites
have their money in the West and vacation there, and thus “we have a completely
new situation in which the Russian class turns out to be a Western class.” And
the population’s declaration of support for Putin is a danger signal.
Russians know that they live badly,
but they support Putin because they are afraid that any change might be worse
and that at present they do not see an alternative to his rule, Shevtsova says.
This is an indication of “the illness of society and the lack of prospects” for
it and its members.
Unfortunately, she continues, “Russia
in many respects differs from today’s Ukraine.” Ukraine has pluralism; Russia does
not. Ukraine has changed leaders by relatively peaceful and open processes;
Russia has not. Ukraine has a civil society that is based on strong horizontal
ties; Russia doesn’t because it doesn’t have those. And Ukraine has elites that
can work with each other on a compromise basis; again, Russia does not.
Consequently, while a Maidan might
be possible in Russia, it could turn out to be “destructive,” as even the
opponents of the Putin regime fear.
On the more general question of
Russia’s place between Europe and Asia, Shevtsova argues that “Russia as a
civilization does not belong to either Asia or Europe.” It has some
European-thinking people, but in contrast to Ukraine, Russians are not prepared
to struggle for it, although they would accept it if offered by the elites.
At the same time, she suggests, “the
Russian Federation will never be a real Asia. We don’t have the Asian qualities
with the exception of the means of rule which we took from the history of the Golden
Horde. Therefore, in the immediate
future, we will not leave this interregnum, this historical pause.” Indeed,
Russia may remain trapped between the two.
“It is possible,” Shevtsova says, “that
the path of Russia will lead to its splitting up into small pieces. Perhaps one
of these pieces will survive as a European state. As a whole, the Russian
Federation which consists of incompatible parts possibly really will undergo a
transformation.”
But one thing is clear: “It is
impossible to build a contemporary state including within it the European part
of Russia and let us say Chechnya’s Kadyrov regime. The number of people calling for a transition
to a legal state gives hope; the only problem is what price we will pay for this.”
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