Paul
Goble
Staunton, November 4 – There are “two
Russian worlds” now, and no one should confuse them, Andrey Kolesnikov
says. The Russian authorities have their
“own Russian world or more precisely Russian myth,” while the Russians
themselves have their very different one which is truly universal.
In an essay entitled “The Russian
Myth against the Russian World,” the journalist discusses Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov’s claim that “The Russian World is Consolidating” (Kolesnikov’s article
is at gazeta.ru/comments/column/kolesnikov/7868771.shtml;
Lavrov’s at rg.ru/2015/11/02/lavrov.html).
Lavrov’s essay, Kolesnikov says, has
been published in advance of the upcoming World Congress of Russian Compatriots
and represents the beginning of “an ideological legitimation of a new ‘invisible
empire,’” one in which “the Russian World” will replace the more geographically
limited “’Novorossiya’” as an ideological meme.
This “’empire,’” he suggests, will
include not only Eastern Ukraine but also Syria and even “some active Russian
community” elsewhere, including perhaps in Chicago.
There really is a Russian world in
that American city and elsewhere too, but it is not the Russian world of Lavrov
and the Kremlin. The real Russian world
and not the regime’s version is active and adaptive. In the Baltics, for example,
its members are “completely satisfied with the status of EU citizens – even those
who for some reason remain non-citizens” of the countries in which they live.
Such people don’t need to be “united,” as Lavrov imagines.
The real “Russian world is becoming
globalist, and this involves not only oligarchs large and small from now
becoming mythical Londongrad but also and more often completely ordinary
representatives of the middle class,” Kolesnikov says, as anyone who has any
contact with these communities can see.
Several days ago, he witnesses this
Russian world in an apartment in Brussels. There, one of his relatives
criticized her daughter for “forgetting her Flemish language,” and the girl’s
father via Skype from Dusseldorf said he was travelling to Liege and might stop
in the Belgian capital to visit them.
This “Russian world,” Kolesnikov
says, “is becoming trilingual, quadrilingual, global, and the main thing
completely normal.” It hasn’t ceased to be Russian but it has become something
more as well. And it has no interest in the imperial dreams of Lavrov and his
boss in the Kremlin.
Indeed, representatives of the real
Russian world don’t want Moscow’s assistance because where Moscow has
intervened to provide “support,” it has brought war.
One way to get an idea of this “ordinary
Russian world” is to look at an issue of the “Russky Berlin” newspaper and its
personals column. There, “he seeks her, she seeks him, ‘even with physical
shortcomings’ (yes, this was there albeit only in one case), and someone
promises to make small repairs, and someone has something to sell or buy.”
“And in this small, pragmatic, but
filled with love and warmth Russian world,” the Moscow journalist writes, “half
if not more of the advertisers are Ukrainian men and Ukrainian women. There, no
one is fighting on the basis of nationality because this world is real and not
a political laboratory with invented but alas achieved conflicts.”
“This is the world Lev Tolstoy wrote
about in ‘War and Peace,’ a community of people united if you like by positive
views of the world and not by a negative program, a program of opposition to
Western civilization and a search for national traitors, enemies, foreign
agents and fifth columns.”
In his article, Lavrov says that
Moscow will “support not only Russians but also for example Tatars and Jews,” including
organizing “an all-European Sabantui in Great Britain.’”
Kolesnikov
suggests “that beyond doubt is very important especially if you consider that
the Russian Federation has already organized a world Sabantui with Crimea, the
Donbas, and Syria.”
But the journalist adds that it
might be better if Moscow did more to support such activities and the
population of Russia itself instead of bringing Moscow prices to Crimea without
bringing Moscow incomes to support them and if Moscow did more to make Russia
attractive rather than alienating everyone.
The Kremlin’s “Russian world” is “an empire, a map and territory, which
exists in the heads of the representatives of the current Russian establishment.
And for this reason, in the West, people are afraid that Russian will shift its
forces, for example, toward the Baltic countries.
There,
in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, “there is no Russian world … and the ethnic
Russian who live there now in general are not interested” in Moscow just as
Moscow is not really interested in them. “The borders of [this] Russian world
don’t extend further west than Eastern Ukraine.”
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