Paul
Goble
Staunton, October 5 – The United
States is seeking to deal with Alyaksandr Lukashenka in much the same way it
dealt with Mikhail Gorbachev, but this approach will fail, Aleksandr Nosovich
says, because the Belarusian leader isn’t like the Soviet one and won’t make “’concession
after concession’ in exchange for beautiful promises alone.”
In a commentary for the RuBaltic
portal today, Nosovich argues that in the wake of the Belarusian parliamentary
elections, Washington has intensified its political pressure on Minsk even as
it “at the same time leaves the Belarusian leadership with space for political maneuver”
(rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/051016-ssha-lukashenko/).
“On the one hand,” he says, “the US
does not intend to eliminate sanctions against Belarus and send the American
ambassador back to Minsk.” But “on the other, the State Department noted
positive steps in the political system of Belarus,” US experts talked about the
need for Belarus to remain neutral, and the IMF offered new credits.
In short, Nosovich concludes, “the
Americans are working with Aleksandr Lukashenka exactly as they worked with
Mikhail Gorbachev 30 years ago, even though Lukashenka is not Gorbachev” and
will not fall into step in the ways that Washington seems to believe he
eventually will.
Lukashenka not only can look back to
the ways in which the West did not live up to its promises to Gorbachev, but “in
a well-known sense,” Lukashenka is “not Gorbachev.” In fact, he is “the
anti-Gorbachev,” something some in the West do not understand, Nosovich says,
and thus are pursuing an impossible dream.
“Gorbachev destroyed Soviet
civilization. Lukashenka restored it on the territory of the Belarusian SSR.
Gorbachev divided up the Soviet Union. Lukashenka from the moment of his coming
to the position of president of the Republic of Belarus has begun work on the
restoration of lost integration connections among the former Soviet republics,”
the RuBaltic writer says.
Nosovich continues: Lukashenka isn’t
attracted to suggestions that he can be part of the Western club. He has always
reacted in a calm way to sanctions against his person. Consequently, he won’t
change sides just by being offered the chance to travel and join the closed
elite of the West.
If the West wants to attract
Lukashenka to its side, it will have to offer more than it has so far, he
implies. Indeed, it will have to reverse course on such issues as beefing up
NATO’s presence near Belarusian borders.
That doesn’t seem likely, and so the notion that Lukashenka is about to change
sides is unconvincing.
Three things make this commentary
intriguing: first, it is a rare Russian defense of Lukashenka and suggests that
at least some in Moscow very much want to curry favor with him rather than
criticize the Minsk leader’s actions as has been the norm over the last several
years.
Second, Nosovich’s words suggest
that Moscow views Belarus as a card it can play to try to get the West to do
what it wants rather than as a problem it has to address by various means up to
and including military intervention or hybrid war.
And third, this article also
unintentionally underscores what many in the Belarusian opposition have said
for years: If the West wants Belarus to change sides, it will have to wait
until Lukashenka exits the scene. Otherwise, there aren’t going to be the
changes in Minsk’s domestic or foreign policy the West says it wants.
Поэтому технология, сработавшая четверть века назад с Советским Союзом, при попытке вновь применить её на оставшемся от советской цивилизации белорусском осколке может дать сбой.
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