Paul Goble
Staunton,
December 19 -- Even
Russians who fled abroad to seek freedom overwhelming support Vladimir Putin
and the far from democratic system he has put in place, a pattern that the
Kremlin seeks to promote and one that many in the West fear means that the
Russian diaspora constitutes a kind of “fifth column” and thus a threat to
their societies, Kseniya Kirillova says.
Russian propaganda toward the
diaspora is far more effective than its Soviet predecessor, the US-based
Russian journalist says, in large measure because it is based on “the
exploitation of the feeling of guilt” that many Russians living abroad have
about their advantages abroad and their apparent betrayal of their homeland (day.kyiv.ua/ru/article/podrobnosti/ideynyy-cinizm).
Playing on that is “especially
effective” because in Russian history, the state always seeks to subordinate the
country to it. In Russia where there is no inviolable private property and
independent court system and the individual feels completely defenseless
against arbitrary actions, loyalty to the state is often the only means of
feeling a sense of having a defense.”
“For many Russians, except those who
consciously choose to become dissidents,” Kirillova says, there is a continuing
“trauma” of having broken with the state by leaving and a desire to resolve
that subconscious feeling of dread by maintaining or restoring some contact
with the Russian authorities.
That is why Moscow promotes so many
organizations abroad and why it gives its consulates a particular role in them.
That makes Russians abroad in many cases feel still part of Russia even though they
are living elsewhere because life is better for them there than in the homeland
of their birth. Moscow plays up this conflict and then exploits it.
The Russian authorities are able to
do so, she continues, because of the extraordinarily weak development of
horizontal ties among emigres. Even where such organizations do arise, Moscow
works hard to take them under its wing or to undercut their operations by
funding nominally similar groups. That is especially true in the
Russian-language media.
Moscow also plays up the image of the
enemy and in ways far more sophisticated than did the Soviets. Current Russian propaganda doesn’t deny the obvious,
that life in the West is better than in Russia, but rather it suggests that the
West doesn’t deserve what it has and therefore Russians should take it one way
or another, by emigration or even war.
In place of the Marxist theory of “class
war,” Kirillova says, “Russian propagandists operate today on misty discussions
of geopolitics, the essence of which in their treatment reduces to the postulate
that ‘the end justifies the means,’” a notion that allows some in the diaspora
to see no conflict between taking advantage of the West and wanting it
destroyed.
The frequent suggestions that this
kind of thinking works only with those in the diaspora who have failed to find
their place in the West; but such notions are true only in part. Yes, Kirillova
argues, failures do look to this attitude to justify themselves; but many
successful emigres accept this idea as well.
“The ideology of cynicism is at
times attractive for successful people because cynicism itself is often
associated by them with success. The desire ‘to sit on two stools’ and ‘to deceive
the enemy’ in combination with the principle that ‘in war one must fight with
all means’ does not depend on social status, education, or the standard of
living of the individual.”
Kremlin ideologists understand this
even if many in the West do not, and their willingness to send various messages
to various groups gives them the flexibility to win over far more than they
should. If the West is to respond
effectively, it must begin by understanding that the world of the diasporas is
far more complicated than many are inclined to think.
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