Paul
Goble
Staunton, June 17 – One provision of
the constitutional amendments that has attracted relatively little attention is
a change in the relationship between the president and the Duma as far as the
approval of a new prime minister and his deputies is concerned, Ivan
Preobrazhensky points out.
Under the existing rules, the
president nominates the prime minister and the Duma confirms him but if it
fails to do so three times, the president must prorogue the parliament and call
for new elections. The prime minster at least nominally also appoints his
deputies, the Russian commentator notes (dw.com/ru/комментарий-кремль-опасается-потерять-контроль-над-госдумой/a-53825658).
But if Putin’s amendments are
approved and go into force, then the president himself can confirm the prime
minster by himself and name his deputies if the parliamentarians vote them down
and need not call for new elections, a change that expands presidential control
but reflects Putin’s fear that he could at some point lose control over the
Duma.
This is why the Kremlin is so
concerned about ensuring the amendments are approved by the referendum and also
why Putin himself insisted in his recent interview on Russia 1 that the
plebiscite will be a step toward democracy.
He didn’t sound convincing and these changes help explain why.
Putin sought to assure everyone that
“’the final decision on the head of government will be taken by the parliament.’
But this isn’t true,” Preobrazhensky says. “Democracy which Russia lacks is as
different from the democratization Putin promises as a water pipe is from a
sewage line,” to use an expression from the 1990s.
Under the terms of the amendments, “the
prime minster will become a purely decorative figure,” and it is not surprising
that Putin will be able to send him into retirement as well as separate
ministers.” What this means is that under
“the Putin constitution, “there are no irreplaceable people in power. Except,
of course, one. And we all know his name.”
But this new arrangement reflects
not Putin’s power or legitimacy. Instead, it shows that “the Kremlin is
obviously concerned about losing control over the Duma or having a prime
minister who does not want to be satisfied with the role of a technical executor.” And consequently, Putin is preparing a
defense in depth against any such possibility.
According to Preobrazhensky, this
new arrangement speaks to something else as well: it shows that the Putin
constitution has been designed only for Putin and that when he is weakened or leaves
office one way or another, Russia will get another constitution rather than
continuing to live under one that worked only for him.
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