Paul Goble
Staunton,
July 16 – The Putin regime has created an existential crisis for itself and
country over which it rules by adopting tactics to prolong its stay in powers
that increasingly have the effect of undermining the stability of the Russian
state and society on which it relies, Liliya Shevtsova says.
The
regime is so committed to its own survival “at any price” that it is taking
short term decisions designed to ensure that which already are showing larger
and longer-term consequences that run in exactly the opposite direction it
wants things to go, the Russian commentator says (echo.msk.ru/blog/shevtsova/2677145-echo/).
That does not mean that the regime
is about to fall. To predict that is “naïve,” Shevtsova says. It still has
enormous “administrative, force, and propaganda resources,” and its targeted repressions
are working. But at the same time, it is impossible not to see something else:
the stability it likes to talk about has become “a myth.”
Putin’s amendments of the constitution
make him “the Ruler” but they don’t ensure that he will have autocratic powers.
It only puts off into the future the tensions that have existed since Yeltsin’s
time which simultaneously created the position of “Ruler” but “did not ensure
that there would be autocracy. That is something that requires continuous actions.
But the question remains: how stable
can this arrangement be if the man who is supposed to be the guarantor of the Constitution
becomes “tired or the country becomes tired or his resources run out?”
According to Shevtsova, moreover, “the
concentration of authority in the hands of the individual who is the personification
of the system leads to the annulment of all branches of power and all elites which
could serves as lightning rods.” That leaves the ruler in an unbearably
difficult position, one that whether he recognizes it or not, will compromise
his goals.
Doubts are already arising about “the
existence of ‘the Putin majority.’” The Kremlin leader can control those who
work for the state most of the time, but even among those, like doctors who are
treating the coronavirus, there arise questions and doubts when they consider
what he is doing to them.
“The Khabarovsk protest speaks not only about
the anger of the regions” but also about the fact that the resources which have
allowed the center to buy off or otherwise control the regions are running out.
“So far, things are not so awful, but if suddenly there would be a chain reaction,”
what could the regime do?
“The paralysis of ‘the presidential
vertical’ during the pandemic speaks about the inability of the powers to rule
at a time of crisis,” but the problem is bigger than that. The regime is
putting things off because it is seeking to solve its current challenges at the
cost of the future. And thus, it is “making the future hostage to its present
failures.”
But even with time, the main problem
the regime faces, the conflict between autocracy and elections, is not being
solved. “The Kremlin is trying to
resolve it by converting the elections into a joke, but that method is
generating anger even among the passive majority.” And the Kremlin has no answer
how to stop that and allow Putin to be the autocrat.
It is not only at home that the
regime faces problems: it is in trouble abroad and thus cannot use foreign
affairs to solve domestic difficulties in the way it has in the past and
prefers to do. Demonstrating that Russia is a great power has been “a key
factor in garnering support for the system.”
But for that to work, Russia must
become part of “the World Concert” and how can it be if others who are don’t
want it there. “Today, only 18 percent of Americans, 31 percent of Europeans
and 25 percent of Japanese view Russia positively.” And “60 percent of those
polled in 22 countries do not trust Putin.”
The world powers don’t count Russia
among their number or want to relate to it as a partner. That is bad enough for the Kremlin, but there
is yet another problem for the Kremlin that it doesn’t want to face: “America
is losing its leadership” and Russia has always based its self-image on “a
struggle with American hegemonism.”
What is the Kremlin to do if that is
no longer the main challenge and if instead it has to confront a rising China?
Seizing Crimea helped the regime, but its actions in the Donbass have been a
mistake from the beginning, and the shooting down of the Malaysian jetliner has
brought Russia harm both financially and in terms of its reputation.
According to Shevtsova, “Ukraine has
exhausted its consolidating effect as ‘an enemy’ and become for the Kremlin a
problem rather than a solution.” But there is no possibility of exiting from it
without some victory, and there is no obvious course available toward one that
doesn’t leave Putin in worse shape.
“The Syrian gambit did not return
Russia to the club of world powers in the way it was planned. Venezuela turned
out to be an expensive adventure. The resistance of Belarus casts doubt not
only on the idea of a single state with Russia but even on the existence of
Eurasia under the aegis of Moscow.”
“Failures, dead ends, and mistakes
are what Russian foreign policy consists of,” and thus, “instead of being a
resource for the domestic agenda, it has become a burden,” Shevtsova
continues. And that is becoming “an
existential problem” not only for those in power in the Kremlin but for Russian
society as a whole.
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