Chronic Stress in Russian Life Makes Mass Disorders Likely But These Won’t Necessarily be Political, Psychologist Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 14 – Because of the chronic stress Russians now are experiencing as Putin’s war in Ukraine drags on, individual and collective actions reflecting growing unhappiness and anger are likely but these will not necessarily be political in nature, Aleksandr Archagov says.

            The Moscow psychologist says that outbursts are likely because of a combination of institutional, economic, psychic, and ideological developments “and for the time being, one must not separate out a key driver from secondary causes.” They are too closely interrelated (pointmedia.io/story/691733f1e657f59b666dce5f).

            The force structures have their quotas to meet and so arrest more people, Archagov argues. The economic situation is deteriorating. The sense of hopelessness is increasing. And an ideological commitment to the idea that using force against those one doesn’t like except for the state itself is widespread.

            Consequently, he continues, “we probably will see outbursts of aggression and even mass disorders but these will not necessarily be politicized.” The authorities will try to suppress them by various means depending on where they are assumed to come from, “but to completely exclude such situations will be impossible.”

            Tensions will grow, Archagov says; and he gives as an example of how things in this regard could explode the possibility of a sudden return of veterans from the war in Ukraine. “This would inevitably lead to the growth of crime and the use of force.” That could become political or it might now. “You will never be able to guess which spark will lead to an explosion.”

            It is important to recognize, the psychologist suggests, “that there has not been any mass outburst of pro-government patriotism.” Even those who identify with the state and support the war have not engaged in that. And therefore what looks like support in fact is “not loyalty but a form of adaptation.”

            In Putin’s Russia, there is “no total identification with the state when society fuses with the powers as in classical totalitarian regimes. Even the most convinced ‘patriots’ often criticize the state.” That is because “people do not trust the powers but are prepared to subordinate themselves to them” because they don’t see any possibility of changing the latter.

            Put in lapidary terms, Russians see the powers and what they do as being like snow in winter. You may not like it, but you can’t do anything about it and so the best response is to adapt oneself to this natural phenomenon. This in turn leads to a sense of “helplessness, hopelessness, and burnout.”

            Archagov points to the theory of American psychologist Martin Seligman about “learned helplessness” in which animals and dogs learn not to resist repression when they find that resistance doesn’t have any chance of making things better and may more likely lead to even more suffering.

            Russians, he continues, “have almost no experience of successful resistance;” and therefore, their response reflects the apathy and depression such a lack inevitably produces. People adapt rather than protest. But their anger nonetheless leads to individual and sometimes collection actions – and as the situation in other countries has shown, can become political.

            When that will happen, Archagov concludes, “no one can predict in advance.”