Paul
Goble
Staunton, December 29 – Many in
Moscow are talking about creating a “civic” Russian nation, one based political
rather than ethnic self-identification; but there is one place in the Russian
world where such a nation already exists, the Russian-occupied Ukrainian
peninsula of Crimea, Vadim Shtepa says (caucasreview.com/2016/12/grazhdanskaya-natsiya-krymchan/).
The Russian regionalist’s argument
on this point is important not only for the future of Crimea and the right of
self-determination but also for what Moscow is likely to face if it succeeds in
imposing a “civic Russian” identity on everyone in the Russian Federation: the
rise of alternative “civic” nations among those attached to particular regions.
And such regional “civic”
identities, just like the ones that allowed ethnic Russians to vote for and
support the independence of the non-Russian countries of which they are apart, could
pose an even more serious threat to the territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation than any non-Russian nationalism.
(The author of these lines made this
argument more generally yesterday in “Regionalism is the Nationalism of the
Next Russian Revolution” on the AfterEmpire portal in Russian afterempire.info/2016/12/28/regionalism/).
For those who would like to have a copy of the English original, please email
me at paul.goble@gmail.com.)
Shtepa begins by suggesting that “a
civic nation of Crimeans exists,” something he recalls from his own childhood
and from the aspirations of the post-1917 Crimean Tatar leader Noman Celebijihan,
who was later shot by the Bolsheviks.
In his own early childhood, the
Russian regionalist says, he “remember that we (Russians and Ukrainians) in
eastern Europe identified ourselves precisely as ‘Crimeans,’ and not as ‘Russians’
or ‘Ukrainians.’ This was, Shtepa
continues, “similar to the situation in Switzerland.”
But more important, “the first
president of independent Crimea, the poet Noman Celebijihan” declared that he “wanted
to see Crimea as a poly-ethnic ‘Switzerland,’” one in which its ethnically
varied populace would identify with and be loyal to a common Crimean state.
“What is the criterion of a civic
nation?” Shtepa asks rhetorically. “Its ability to take political decisions.
The Crimeans in 1991 voted in a referendum for the return to their oblast of
its status as a republic, and in 1992, they adopted a republic constitution and
chose their own president.”
“But then the Kyivan empire (and
this is an empire if it suppresses the regions) did away with the Crimean
constitution and eliminated the position of Crimean president.”
Such actions, he argues, infuriated
the Crimeans “and led to the growth among them of pro-Russian attitudes. On the wave of these attitudes, the Muscovite
empire in 2014 [illegally] annexed Crimea.” But “a healthy resolution for the
future of Crimea will be found not in Moscow or in Kyiv. It will be taken by
the Crimeans themselves.”
Obviously, Shtepa says, “the role of
the Crimean Tatar population should grow, but again it must not grow into a
unitary ethnocracy.” That won’t happen if the Crimeans follow the advice given
by Celebijihan almost a century ago.
“On the Crimean peninsula grow
various roses, lilies and tulips,” he declared. “And each of these flowers has
its own particular color, its own irreplaceable fragrance. These are the colors
of the peoples living in Crimea: the Tatars, the Russians, the Armenians, the
Jews, the Germans and the others.”
“The goal of the Kurultay is, having
assembled them together, to make of them a beautiful and elegant bouquet and
thus to found on the beautiful island of Crimea a genuine and civilized
Switzerland. The Kurultay thinks not only about the Crimean Tatars but about
all the peoples who over the course of centuries have lived in fraternity with
them.”
And in this state, its first
president said, “the Crimean Tatars will play in this task not the role of
leader but rather the role of initiator,” a development the Bolsheviks couldn’t
tolerate and that Putinist Russia won’t want to either, yet another way in
which the Kremlin’s push for a “civic Russian nation” may backfire on Moscow in
unexpected ways.
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