Paul
Goble
Staunton, December 22 – Vladimir
Putin’s stress on cultural unity at home and on the clash between the culture
of the Russian world and that of the West, a major departure from Soviet-era
propaganda which emphasized class divisions, is promoting xenophobia in Russia
itself and in response xenophobia against Russia abroad, according to Aleksey
Malashenko.
That may Putin at home, the analyst says
not only because it distracts attention from class issues in Russian society
but because it is hard for any Russian to reject. But at the same time, it
makes it far more difficult for Russia to cooperate with other countries
because of the negative views of them this propaganda produces and of the
anti-Russian xenophobia it provokes.
In a “Nezavisimaya gazeta”
commentary, the Carnegie Moscow Center expert on culture and nationalities
draws those conclusions on the basis of a survey of propaganda at the end of
Soviet time and as it has developed since 1991 and especially since 2000 (ng.ru/ideas/2016-12-19/9_6888_ideas.html).
During the last 15 years of the
USSR, he writes, “practically no one believed Soviet propaganda.” Under
Gorbachev, “there came a pause: to propagandize perestroika was impossible.”
And “in the 1990s, there was nothing to propagandize;” and so there was no
propaganda, Malashenko says.
Beginning about 2005, he continues,
there again arose a need for propaganda, and those who had worked for it before
redoubled their efforts. However, at the same time, there occurred “’a change of
monuments’” for them. No one talked any more about “’catching up and surpassing’”
anyone given how far down the list of countries Russia had fallen.
As a result, “the enemy” as
portrayed on Moscow television “ceased to be a class enemy” but rather the
result of “the gulf between us and them” in terms of values. Russian values, he
says, are “spirituality, patriotism, normal sex, and in general our identity.” Western values include “gay parades and
much-ballyhooed democracy.”
For Putin, this proved a “winning”
stragegy because while it may have been possible not to love or believe in
Soviet power, “it is impossible not to believe in one’s own positive cultural
and religious basis. To do so is to reject what makes oneself oneself.” Anyone
who questioned the Kremlin’s definition of these values didn’t get air time.
As a result, Malashenko says, “the
Enemy (with a capital letter) becomes doubly dangerous and the struggle against
him implacable and eternal, just as eternal as his and our systems of values
are.” And that means the following: “xenophobia triumphs, and alas … this
xenophobia becomes mutual.”
“Propaganda,” the Moscow expert
continues, “works on the emotions and works successfully,” and those who engage
in it know how to use staged clashes and even humor to promote the ideas they
want to implant in the heads of an audience they view as consisting of
children.
These Moscow propagandists are
prepared to say almost anything and then reverse themselves when that is
required because they swear allegiance to the Russian cultural world. Thus,
they condemned Donald Trump last spring but are now celebrating his victory in
the US elections.
One can unfortunately even imagine
that they will at some point be willing to suggest that Putin is going to marry
Condoleezza Rice and to “present such an alliance as a triumph for Russia.” Doing that is even easier than suggesting
that Bashar al-Asad could take Aleppo on his own.
There are five reasons for that
conclusion, Malashenko says. Firat, “this marriage would testify to the ‘masculine’
superiority of Russia over the West.” Second, it would reflect “Orthodox
messianism.” Third, it could be presented as a reflection of “the potential of
Eurasianism.” Fourth, it would mean the West has approved Moscow’s foreign
polices. And fifth, it would be presented as a victory of Moscow’s policy of
dialogue on its own terms.
The fact that such things are even imaginable,
he says, is one of the reasons that the European Parliament drew parallels
between Russian propaganda and ISIS propaganda. Both, as the Europeans noted,
propagandize xenophobia and do whatever they can to scarce their opponents.”
On the one hand, Malashenko says,
this is just about propaganda. But on the other, it reflects a judgment and
warning about the intentions of those who engage in it. “In the name of ISIS, there are terrorist
actions; in the name of Russia a whole series of various military-political and
purely military actions interpreted [by Moscow] as a response to Western
challenges.”
There is one question that is
anything but easy to answer, he concludes. Do those who put out this propaganda
really believe it or are they simply careers? The answer almost certainly is
that there is some of both in their calculations considering that many of them
own property abroad and send their children there to study.
That points to their hypocrisy, of
course; but it doesn’t lessen their role as promoters of xenophobia at home and
abroad, xenophobias that threaten the ability of Russia and other countries to
cooperate for a long time to come.
Others have made such charges in
more brutal fashion. One who did so this week is Ayder Muzhdabayev, the head of
the ATR television channel in Ukraine, who offered the following commentary (gordonua.com/news/worldnews/muzhdabaev-o-rossiyanah-nravy-pervobytnogo-plemeni-nacistskogo-reyha-chuzhih-prav-chuzhoy-boli-net-164886.html).
“’The
Russian world’ is when a Russian ambassador is killed and this generates among
thousands of Russians deep anger and the expression of sincere sympathies. But
when Russian forces kill thousands of people [as in Aleppo and elsewhere] there
is no such anger or sympathy,” Muzhdabayev writes.
“Crimea,
the Donbass, and Syria are stages in the dehumanization on one amoral latter
with a growing number of victims.” What is on display are “the morals of a
primitive tribe or of the Nazi Reich: The aliens do not have any rights or
suffer any pain” because “the outsiders are not people.”
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