Putin’s Constitutional Changes Mark Shift from ‘Soft’ Authoritarianism to Harsh Variant and an Attack on Western Values, Skobov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, March 4 – Vladimir Putin has ignored the provisions of the Russian Constitution and the laws adopted on the basis of it so often that any changes that may be adopted now won’t have an impact on their lives. But that is a mistake, Aleksandr Skobov says, because the changes eliminate weak but existing barriers to a far harsher authoritarianism. 

            Moreover, they are a call for others who oppose liberalism to rally around the Kremlin to attack the Western values that have been the foundation of European development for more than two centuries, making what happens to the Russian constitution a matter of fundamental concern for the Western world, the Russian commentator says.

            Putin’s amendments, Skbv says, represent “an ideological rejection of the principles of a legal state” because they remove some “very serious barriers which up to  now have blocked the transition of the Putin regime from a ‘hybrid’ soft authoritarianism to the stage of pure and harsh authoritarianism” (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=5E5F4A937648C).

            To be sure, he continues, the authorities have routinely trampled on the constitution and laws when it suits them. But up to now, they have done this informally and have been unwilling to change the language of the basic law under which they are operating. Now, it appears they are ready to do just that.

            As long as the democratic provisions of the constitution remain, the authorities have to take some notice of them and the population can see what is considered normal and thus what is being violated and how things should change. That is what happened with the Soviet Constitution in the case of Perestroika times. 

            But there is an even more immediate consequence of the changes in language that Putin wants. The new words give officials a directive as to what directions they should move, vectors along which they are almost certain to go far beyond what the specific language of the amendments specify.

           

            Many Putin officials have been waiting for an indication that the Kremlin leader is fully committed to subordinating the rights of the individual to the interests of the state; and they will now take his amendments as “a signal for a new massive attack on the remnants of democratic freedoms” in Russia.

            But the implications of the Putin amendments don’t stop at the borders of the Russian Federation, Skobov says.  That is because they are intended as “the declaration of a Vendee revolt against European liberalism” and a sign that Moscow and no one else will be the leader of this revolt (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=5E5E1AA883A80).

            Succeeding in having Russia reject European liberalism is only the first step in the agenda of the Putinists, the Russian commentator says. “The next is to return prodigal liberal Europe to its ‘traditional values.’ Thus, ‘the special Russian path’ turns out to be not so special: The entire rest of the world is to follow it as a universal alternative to European liberalism.”

            The new Putin constitution underscores the unfortunate reality that “Putinism is the new European fascism. And either it will swallow up Europe or the Vendee revolt of Russia will be put down.” For everyone’s sake, Skobov argues, “it must be put down.”