Russians ‘Weary’ of Constant Bans on This or That Action, Senior Kremlin Aide Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 23 – Sergey Novikov, a close aide to Presidential Administration official Sergey Kiriyenko, says that “our society has grown weary of prohibitive rhetoric” and “it is thus no loner possible to keep banning things.” Instead, he says, the government must encourage certain attitudes and behaviors rather than simply ban others.

            Speaking to a conference on “The Demographic Turning Point in Russia,” the head of the Kremlin’s directorate for public projects who has been identified as the chief censor, says that this is especially important with regard to new parents who have far too much to worry about and don’t need new bans (rbc.ru/politics/23/04/2026/69e9e8549a7947a4136a5ba1).

            If the state issues bans and threats to new parents, Novikov continues, “it won’t lead to anything good.” The best way forward is to “foster an attitude within society, a stimulating environment” in which people aren’t afraid to have children and can be confident that they will receive support.

            Moreover, Novikov stresses, “the inclination of young people to start families as early as possible—and to have children—is a very delicate process ... Naturally, we need to make this 'fashionable'—to ensure that people truly understand the meaning of happiness, of motherhood, and of fatherhood.”

Repeating What Happened at End of Soviet Times, Russians are Changing in Their Thinking but Not Yet in Their Behavior, Shelin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 24 – “Putin’s subjects are embarking on the path taken by people in the late Soviet era,” Sergey Shelin says. “They are beginning to spend their leisure time engaging in cautious jabs at the regime and are growing accustomed to complaining about the Leader’s obsolescence. But this shift has not yet translated into a change in public behavior.”

            Many have come to believe that the declaration by Vika Bonya has raised “oppositionist sentiments among Russia’s ‘deep people’ to a new and formidable level,” the Russian commentator says; but he argues that this is “an exaggeration” except in one area (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/04/24/chto-menyaetsya-v-golove-u-rossiyanina-a193554).

            The loyalist complaints she made are shared by almost all Russians today, Shelin suggests, except for one thing: her attacks on misogynistic attitudes by Kremlin allies. Such attacks on women are out of step with he views of many, and the Kremlin has responded by declaring through its mouthpieces that Russians must “do more” to combat misogyny.

            “The runaway success of Bony’s show suggests,” Shelin continues, “not so much that popular anger is on the verge of erupting but rather that the public has grown nostalgic for media freedom and is delighted when someone gossips about current troubles in the style” of the earlier Putin years.

            On the key issue of the war in Ukraine, attitudes among Russians “do not appear to have changed over the past year” in terms of willingness to dissent. But “Russians have grown more weary of the war than they were, a form of ‘loyal weariness” that “doesn’t translate into aner or a desire to change the status quota but rather into a wish to disengage from the conflict.”

            Russians haven’t “suddenly experienced a moral awakening” about the war. They have simply become increasingly concerned about their “own personal hardships,” although even there “this anxiety is not translating into any form of collective action, whether grassroots or top-down, even of the most innocuous kind.”

            What has happened is “a growing public appetite for consuming media criticism as a form of leisure,” just as was the case at the end of Soviet times, Shelin says. At the same time, direct attacks on Putin are being offered by military correspondents, where the image of ‘the Leader’ is now associated with obsolescence and a complete loss of touch with reality.”

            That, of course, is “a bad omen for an autocrat!”t

            Moreover, “after a three-year break, discussions, albeit still theoretical, have once again come into vogue among affluent circles, centering on the notion that emigration is after all inevitable.” People in them are withdrawing money from their bank accounts; and while it is still too soon to call this panic, that certainly appears to be something looming in the future.”

            Shelin continues: “Arguably, while the level of loyalty in the minds of Russians has not diminished of late, their sense of discontent has certainly intensified. Disapproval of the regime’s growing irrationality now encompasses virtually everyone—from staunch conformists to rabid statists.”

            And he concludes: “As of today, this discontent is likely no more intense than the routine cynicism that characterized the populace of the late Soviet Union. It could persist for a long time in forms that pose no threat to the regime—but only if Putin ceases his relentless efforts to drive his otherwise compliant subjects to the brink of exasperation.”

Vod Activist on PACE Platform for Dialogue with Russian Democratic Forces Calls for Europe to Restore the Name Ingria to What Moscow Now Calls Leningrad Oblast

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 23 – Yekaterina Kuznetsova, one of the five non-Russians on the Platform for Dialogue with Russian Democratic Forces within the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, is calling for PACE and other European institutions to restore the name Ingria to what Moscow now calls Leningrad Oblast.

            An ethnic Vod who now heads the Ingria House in Estonia’s border city of Narva, lays out her arguments in an appeal to PACE members (t.me/ingerimaja/7276 reposted at region.expert/ingria-lenobl). While it has been overshadowed by the declaration of Russian members of this platform, it may have more immediate consequences.

            Below is the full text in English as prepared by Kuznetsova:

On Changing the Name of Leningrad Oblast on European Maps

In the languages of the indigenous peoples of this territory, most of what is now Russia’s Leningrad Oblast historically bore the name Ingria (Ingeri, Inkeri, Inkerimaa). After the region became part of Sweden in the early 17th century, it was officially called Ingermanland.

This name remained in use for some time even after the region was conquered by the troops of Tsar Peter I and the founding of the city of Saint Petersburg. In 1725, Ingermanland Governorate was renamed Saint Petersburg Governorate. However, the Finnish-speaking indigenous population of the region continued to call their homeland Ingria.

In 1924, the former capital of the Russian Empire was renamed Leningrad, and the surrounding lands became known as Leningrad Oblast, in honor of Vladimir Lenin.

In 1991, by decision of Leningrad’s residents in a referendum, the city was restored to its historical name, Saint Petersburg. However, by that time the city and the surrounding region were separate administrative units, and as a result the official name «Leningrad Oblast» has remained to this day.

Since 2000, a dictatorial regime under Putin has formed and consolidated in Russia. A revival of imperial ideology began. All national autonomies have effectively reverted to the status of disenfranchised colonies. Moreover, the Kremlin has launched an active campaign against any movements advocating for the rights of indigenous peoples. In Leningrad Oblast, this campaign has led to a ban on even mentioning the word «Ingria». It has been removed from official Russian textbooks; Ingrian Finns have been denied recognition as an indigenous people; and in 2025, the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Ingria, which had existed in the region since 1611, was renamed the Russian Lutheran Church by government directive.

Something similar occurred in the 19th century under the ideology of the Russian Empire. As part of Russification and the suppression of national liberation movements, the official use of the names Poland, Lithuania, and Belarus was banned. Instead, terms such as the Vistula Land and the Northwestern Krai were introduced. As is well known, this attempt by imperial ideologues to erase the historical names of vast regions ultimately failed. Today’s map
includes independent Poland, Lithuania, and Belarus.

In a similar manner, the authorities of modern Russia now falsely claim that Ukraine «never existed».

We propose that, as part of supporting policies of decolonization and resisting the Kremlin’s imperial narratives, European countries begin using the historically accurate name «Ingria» instead of «Leningrad Oblast» on their maps. There are precedents for such changes.

For example, in recent years some European countries have begun referring to Georgia by its historical Georgian name, Sakartvelo. A similar situation exists with the largest region of the Russian Federation—Yakutia—which in the 1990s restored its historical name, Sakha.

Ingria is not just the correct historical name of the region. It is a symbol of the struggle for decolonization and for freedom from Russia’s aggressive and deceptive imperial ideology. We ask for your support!

For background on the Ingria movement and its constituent units, including the Vods, see  Ott Kurs , “Ingria: The Broken Landbridge Between Estonia and Finland,” GeoJournal 33.1 (1994): 107–113; Ian Matley, “The Dispersal of the Ingrian Finns,” Slavic Review 38:1 (1979): 1-16; windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/12/ingermanlanders-launch-podcast-to.html,   windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/09/ingermanland-activists-open-house-in.html,  windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/09/ingria-will-be-free-petersburg-hip-hop.html, www.windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/07/two-other-baltic-republics-remembered.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/07/a-new-aspirant-to-be-fourth-baltic.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/06/regionalism-threatens-russia-today-way.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/05/by-attacking-free-ingria-leader-moscow.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2013/10/window-on-eurasia-ingermanland-is-ready.html.

Central Bank Says Russians Overwhelmingly Want to Return to Soviet-Style Economy

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 21 – According to a new study by the Russian Central Bank, a large share of the population of its country want to restore a Soviet-style economy with tight controls over prices, the development of Russia’s own national resources, the production of all necessary goods at home, and the re-industrialization of country.

            The 44-page study says that “many respondents describe the ideal economy as self-sufficient and not dependent on external support, analogous to the USSR or present-day China” so that prices won’t grow faster than incomes and so factories will once again dominate the landscape (cbr.ru/StaticHtml/File/187618/wp_166.pdf).

            Achieving these goals, most Russians believe, requires the active intervention of the state in order to compensate for the greed of producers. The report, however, does not mention the shortages for which the USSR was notorious or the fact that many Soviet plants produced things no one wanted or needed, major reasons for the rejection of the Soviet model at the end of the 1980s.

More than Half of Russia’s Pensioners Can’t Work Because of Their Health or Family Responsibilities, ‘To Be Precise’ Portal Says

Paul Goble

Staunton, April 23 – Given Russia’s intensifying labor shortage and the desire of many Russians to reduce the influx of migrants, many Russian officials are n now looking at pensioners as a potential source of additional workers, either by raising the pension age or encouraging those who have retired to return to the workforce

But this resource is smaller than many think, according to new research by the To Be Precise portal. It finds that “almost 50 percent of pensioners who are not now employed can’t work either because of their own state of health or because they must take care of family members (rbc.ru/society/26/03/2026/69c50b1f9a794785925a5dc3 and  tochno.st/materials/ne-mogut-rabotat-iz-za-zdorovia-ili-semeinyx-obiazannostei).

Moreover, few pensioners currently in good health or without the need to take care of other family members want to work after taking a pension: Only five percent of those with higher educations and only five percent with incomplete secondary educations or less tell To Be Precise that they want to work.

And even among those pensioners who say they do want to work, 75 percent are only prepared to do so part time, while nine percent say they would be willing to work if they could work from home. Consequently, there is little chance that the share of pensioners at work will rise much beyond its current level of 18 percent of the 40.5 million pensioners in Russia.

Yet another limiting factor on pensioners working is that the Russian government reduces pensions of those who do by more radical amounts than is the case in many other countries.

Putin is Conducting an Ethnic Russian War in Ukraine, Not a Soviet or Civic Russian One as Some Suggest, Shusharin Argues

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 19 – Like Stalin before him, Putin has only “one objective: power,” and he is conducting his war in Ukraine on the basis, realizing as the Soviet dictator did before him that “the manipulation of stereotypes and cliches regarding Russian identity is the simplest and most reliable method of governance,” Dmitry Shusharin says.

            The Russian historian and commentator says that neither Putin nor Stalin “actually ‘dumbed down’ or ‘brainwashed’ the Russian people. To the contrary, these rulers merely capitalized on what fell effortlessly into their hands: the self-perceptions of Russians and their concept of their proper places in the world” (kasparovru.com/material.php?id=69E4BCE91BF24).

            From Stalin’s toast to the Russian people at the end of World War II to Putin’s statements in the lead up to and since the beginning of the latter’s expanded war in Ukraine, Shusharin says, there has been no real change “as long as the fundamental core of Russian identity remains intact.”

            That identity holds that Russia is fated to be a great power and to impose its will on others. If they fail to do so, the commentator says, “the Russians would not only cease to be ‘Russian’ in their own eyes, but in fact cease to ‘exist at all’ and thus forfeit their place in both the world and history.”

            This perception of the independent agency of other countries as an inherent threat to their own, of course, arises “from a fundamental lack of such subjectivity” within the Russian nation itself. Unless that changes, Russia will engage in “endless wars waged solely for the purpose of destroying the subjectivity and agency of others.”

Kyiv Moves toward Coexistence with What Many Ukrainians Still Call the Moscow Church, Soldatov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 18 – Following international criticism of its approach to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church which until 2022 was part of the Moscow Patriarchate and controlled by Russia but which since that time has become pro-Ukrainian, Kyiv appears set to accept coexistence between that church and the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

            That is the judgment of Novaya Gazeta journalist Aleksandr Soldatov on the basis of a recent statement by General Kyrylo Budanov who heads the Office of the President of Ukraine. He recently said that “coercive methods don’t work in the religious sphere” and that Kyiv should give the UOC time to fully integrate itself into Ukrainian life (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/04/18/moskovskaia-tserkov-vybiraet-ukrainu

            According to Soldatov, this shift in Kyiv’s position “cannot fail to cause alarm in Moscow where the theme of ‘the persecution of canonical Orthodoxy’ has been actively used to define the objectives of the Special Military Operation including at the very highest levels.” But it will also worry those Ukrainians who don’t see the UOC as having fully broken with Moscow.

            Most Ukrainian Orthodox leaders both in the UOC and the autocephalous OCU do not believe that the UOC can ever return to the role it played as an agency of Russian influence in Ukraine, however; and they are confident that each of these churches will survive, a likely indication that church life in Ukraine will be both freer and more diverse well into the future.

Plan to Build Toll Roads without Free Alternatives Seen Separating Russian Far East from Rest of Country and Sparking Protests

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 21 – The Association of Infrastructure Investors and Creditors is urging Moscow to build toll roads between the Russian Far East and the rest of the country even when there are no free alternatives. Some Russians see these separating that region from Europe, and Sergey Mironov, head of the Just Russia Party, promises protests.

            According to the party leader, if the Russian government agrees to build such toll roads without free alternatives, that will contribution to the disintegration of Russia because large parts of the country will be able to reach others only if they pay tolls, something few will want to do (iarex.ru/news/153175.html).

            Russia has long been underserved by highways especially in the north and to the east of the Urals; and reductions in spending on construction and repair of roads there as the Kremlin has shifted funding from such infrastructure projects to the financing of Putin’s war in Ukraine have only made the situation worse, as many older roads are becoming impassable

            The Association proposal is thus an attempt to restart construction, but as Mironov’s protest suggests, it is something that will anger many Russians not only in distant regions like the Far East but also Russians elsewhere who have concluded that toll roads alone may not tie the country together but increase the danger of disintegration. 

Politically Motivated Convictions in Russia Tripled Between 2022 and 2025 and Half Now Involve Time Behind Bars, Rights Activists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 18 – Russian courts in 2025 handed down three politically motivated verdicts every day, three times the rate during the first year of Putin’s expanded military operation in Ukraine, human rights activists say on the basis of court records; and the severity of sentences has increased as well, with half of those convicted last year given jail terms.

            This trend, Andrey Karyev of Novaya Gazeta says, is continuing in 2026. In less than the first four months of this year, Russian courts have handed down 198 sentences in political cases, a rate only slightly lower than in 2025 when 1100 political sentences were handed down; and they imposed prison sentences in more than half (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/04/18/tri-prigovora-v-den).

            As a result, what were earlier exceptions are now becoming the norm in Russian courts, which have become almost as in Stalin’s time “a conveyor belt” for imposing political convictions that is becoming ever more repressive in this regard by inertia and with little need for Kremlin intervention, the journalist suggests.

Corruption in Russia has Evolved Over Last Eight Years, Procurator General Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 22 – The Russian media focuses on corruption cases involving the powerful and the wealthy, but the Russian Procuracy says that the average individual charged with corrupt actions is someone who has never been charged before, a man between 30 and 49, typically a model family man with a higher education and violated the law near where lived.

            Based on an examination of 120,000 cases of corruption since 2018, the prosecutorial authorities say the most widespread forum of corruption is bribery, with 50 percent of all corruption charges involving such actions. But the share of bribery among corruption charges has risen from 48.4 percent in 2018 to 67.5 percent in 2025 (svpressa.ru/society/article/512072/).

            Fraud as a share of all corrupt actions for which charges have been brought, in contrast, has declined significantly over the same period, 21.4 percent to 12.2 percent, with the total of all corruption charges remaining roughly the same. The Procuracy report also reported that more than 80 percent of such crimes were the result of an individual rather than group action.

            Some Russian experts aren’t impressed with the reported figures. Kirill Kabanov, head of the National Anti-Corruption Committee and a member of the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights, is among them, as is Moscow attorney and rights activist Dmitry Agranovsky

             "I was surprised to learn,” the latter says, “that the 'average corrupt offender' is not a doctor, a teacher, or a traffic police officer for the simple reason that judging by the criminal cases I’ve seen, it is precisely these categories of professionals who are most frequently prosecuted."

            Despite this criticism, the procuracy report offers a glimpse into this aspect of criminality in Russia in the most recent Putin years, with bribery edging out other corruption crimes and fraud being significantly less of a threat or at least one the authorities choose to prosecute than many have thought.

Number of Russians Now Thinking about Emigrating has Tripled from a Year Ago, Online Searches and Passport Applications Show

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 17 – The number of Russians thinking about emigrating has tripled in the first quarter of this year compared to a year ago, to judge from visits to websites about how to do it and applications for foreign passports as well as from the judgments of groups that help those who want to do so.

            These figures are available at verstka.media/rossiyane-nachali-chashhe-iskat-kak-uehat-iz-strany, verstka.media/v-krupnyh-gorodah-okazalis-peregruzheny-otdely-mvd-vydayushhie-zagranpasporta and istories.media/stories/2026/04/17/v-rossii-rastet-interes-k-emigratsii-vpervie-za-neskolko-let-kuda-seichas-proshche-vsego-uekhat/.

            After the dramatic spike in emigration in response to the threat of mobilization at the start of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, interest in emigration among Russians fell sharply not only because it became more difficult as fewer countries displayed an interest in receiving Russians but also because the war itself was normalized.

            But increasing repression, economic decline and the Kremlin’s attacks on the Internet appear to be leading to another increase in the outflow of Russians; and that confronts the Kremlin with a new challenge about how it should respond to limit such flows without making its own situation still worse.

            Ilya Grashchenkov, the head of the Moscow Center for Regional Politics, suggests figures about interest in emigration, largely the result of the Kremlin’s economic failures and attacks on the Internet, highlight a problem that the Putin regime has not faced in anything like the same size before (t.me/kremlebezBashennik/45617).

            “Judging by the latest data,” he says, “the authorities now face a situation where their customary logic in which prohibitions automatically translate into public acquiescence no longer works” and Russians instead are seeking ways to resist or at least avoid having to comply, including such radical steps as leaving the country.

            According to Grashchenkov, Russian society “is beginning to tire—not so much of the harshness itself, but rather of the sense that restrictions are multiplying while no horizon for improvement appears.” This is most likely to lead the Kremlin to seek some kind of balance “between security and frustration,” lest the public’s mood deteriorates further.

            But of course, Putin may choose “further tightening the screws … if the logic of security remains the top priority”  and if the Kremlin leader decides that the declines in public support for him aren’t a signal of the need for a course correction but rather a justification for the imposition of even stricter controls” despite the possibility that could backfire.

To Reduce Deaths from AIDS, Russia's Health Minister Seeks to Expand Testing to Identify HIV Cases Earlier

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 17 – Mikhail Murashko, Russia’s health minister, wants to test at least one in every three Russians for HIV and an even higher proportion among high-risk groups to identify those infected earlier when treatment is easier and likely to be more effective and thus reduce deathrates from this disease.

            At present, nearly one percent of all Russian adults and as many as four percent among men between the ages of 40 and 45 are infected, figures that rival those in the hardest hit countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and that Russia is finding it difficult to combat because of shortages of the most effective medicines (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/04/17/-36-a193057).

            By expanding testing, the minister suggests, Russia can cure more of those infected at an early stage when treatment is easier and requires fewer of the anti-retroviral drugs that are needed when HIV develops into full-blown AIDS, medicines that are not easily obtainable in Russia because of sanctions.

            That Murashko has based his argument for an expansion in testing to the idea that it will lead to a reduction in the number of pre-mature deaths is significant: it shows how Kremlin worries about the demographic collapse of the country are now almost as compelling as a policy argument as are suggestions that this or that policy has national security implications.

            Any expansion in testing, however, faces two major obstacles. On the one hand, there is certain to be massive resistance in the population to such tests just as there was earlier to covid vaccinations. And on the other, carrying out such a program will call attention to just how bad he HIV/AIDS problem in Russia has become, something the Kremlin does not want to advertise.

Kremlin Deliberately Releasing Data on Decline in Public Support for Putin to Serve Both Its Domestic and Foreign Policy Interests, Preobrazhensky Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 20 – Many observers are surprised that the Kremlin has not blocked the release of polling data showing small declines in Russian support for Vladimir Putin,  Ivan Preobrazensky says; but they shouldn’t be as such data serves the Kremlin leader’s domestic and foreign policy interests.

            On the one hand, the Russian analyst who writes for Deutsche Welle says, releasing such data has suggests that Putin cares about what people think; and on the other, it leads many in the West to think that he is weaker than is in fact the case (thebarentsobserver.com/news/putins-rating-is-falling-but-the-picture-isnbspnot-all-straightforward/448957).

            Putin will take some action to show that he is paying attention and that will help him to recover any support he may have lost; and he will be only too pleased if some in the West conclude he is weakened but not without power, thus causing leaders there to behave more cautiously toward him, a development he can exploit.

            The Kremlin leader has often used such a strategy in the past, Preobrazhensky says; and it shouldn’t surprise anyone that he is using it in this case because it has served him so well earlier. Thus, the Boni affair and VTsIOM polls should be viewed primarily as the latest act of political theater orchestrated by the Kremlin.

            That doesn’t mean that there has not been a real decline in support for Putin, he suggests; but it has been smaller than many seem to think and can easily be reversed by cleverly presented Putin actions, something that those analyzing what is going on or deciding how to react should very much keep in mind.

Putin's Policies have Increasingly Left Russians Face to Face with the State and Some May React in Ways Kremlin Won’t Like, Otroshchenko Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 17 – The Putin regime has deprived Russians of a future by insisting that the future is the past, a development that has attracted widespread notice; but it has also deprived the population of any private space by imposing the state on every aspect of Russian life, Fyodor Otroshchenko says.

            The Russian specialist on art and intellectual history says that the Kremlin has eliminated any space “’outside of politics,” thus taking away from Russians one of the most prized aspects of life that they gained at the end of Soviet times and the beginning of post-Soviet ones (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/04/17/vne-politiki-bolshe-net).

            “The entire life of the most apolitical citizen of the country is now subordinated to politics,” Ostroshchenko continues; and that forces an increasing number of those citizens to confront a question that they had not wanted to answer: “how is that individual to respond when he finds himself face to face with the state” and without the ability to retreat to a private space?

            The answers to that question, of course, can be extremely “varied and unpredictable” and “it is certain” that at least some will decide that they must somehow act to oppose the state because the powers have taken away from them not just a future but rather the chance to have a life of their own.

            Many will see what the state is doing in this regard with “all its limitations, bans, and blockages” as increasingly unacceptable, the specialist says; and to the extent they do, “the result of these reflections” could be a response the state won’t like and might threaten that state more than almost anything else.

Collapse of Business Activity in Russia’s North Leading to Regional Budget Shortfalls Moscow May Soon Not Be Able to Cover, ‘The Barents Observer’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 15 – The amount of taxes regions and republics in Russia’s European north have fallen significantly, a reflection of declining business activity and a development that is leaving the governments of these federal subjects with larger budget shortfalls that Moscow’s own deficit may prevent it from being to cover as it has in the past, The Barents Observer says.

            The Russian government is releasing ever less data on such economic trends, Georgy Chentimirov of that outlet says; but there is enough from local media outlets and even from Moscow discussions to reach the conclusion that the situation is bad and getting worse rapidly (ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/provalnyj-start-dohody-regionov-pokatilis-vniz/448754).

            In Russia’s European north, he reports, the number of companies which have gone bankrupt and been liquidated has doubled from the first quarter of last year to the same period of 2026; and “of those which remain in operation, over half are reporting losses.” As result, tax collections from businesses have plummeted by a third or more.

            So far, Chentimirov continues, the federal subject governments are getting enough money from other sources and from Moscow to be able to pay the salaries of state employees; but budgetary problems in Moscow which had a budget deficit in the first quarter equal to what it had projected for the entire year may mean that will soon no longer be possible.

            If Moscow can’t pay, the regional governments won’t be able to either; and they will either be compelled to seek private bank loans which are prohibitively expensive or demand that Moscow allow them to keep more of the taxes they are collecting from other sources. Either step will lead to hardships for their residents and set the stage for a political crisis.

Exclave Issue in Armenia and Azerbaijan Seen Heating Up Again after June Vote in Armenia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 18 – The four Azerbaijani exclaves in Armenia and the three Armenian ones in Azerbaijan, marked on Soviet maps but largely depopulated and destroyed during the Karabakh war and seldom mentioned since, are likely to heat up after the June elections in Armenia, according to Russian Aleksey Baliyev.

            That is because in resolving the Karabakh dispute, he says, the two countries agreed to go back to the borders as established in Soviet times and thus must address the exclave issue as the two work to delimit and then demarcate the exact border between them and the likelihood that one or both sides will have to make concessions at odds with the feelings of their populations (vpoanalytics.com/konflikty/armeniya-azerbaydzhan-budet-li-obmen-anklavami/).

            (Some 50 such exclaves existed at the end of Soviet times, but most have disappeared as residents have left or been pushed out by the governments of the territories on which they are located (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/10/borders-and-enclaves-set-up-in-soviet.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/08/ethnic-exclaves-other-than-qarabagh-add.html).)

            Though small and in most cases either completely depopulated or with only a few remaining residents, all of these exclaves are symbolically important to both the country that wants to maintain them and the one that wants them to be abolished; but several of them are strategically important.

            The most significant of these, Baliyev suggests, one which lies just north of the border of Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan, and a second through which land transport between Yerevan and Armenia’s Syunik Region, which not only lies between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan but across a route Russia has long hoped to use as part of its north-south corridor to Iran.

            The fate of these villages thus continues to agitate national pride, especially in Armenia, because any concessions or even some exchange with Azerbaijan would further reduce the size of the Republic of Armenia, an especially sensitive issue given Yerevan’s loss of Karabakh and the way that still agitates refugees from there and Armenians more generally (e.g., windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/12/yerevan-seeking-to-resettle-refugees.html and  windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/04/only-1437-of-more-than-100000-ethnic.html).

Russian Airlines Carried Nearly Four Percent Fewer Passengers Domestically in 2025 than the Year Before, Mostly Because of a Shortage of Planes, Industry Association Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 17 – Russians travelled 3.8 percent fewer trips on domestic airlines in 2025 than they did the year before. Some of this decline may reflect the worsening economic situation in that country, but Russia’s Association of Air Transport Operators places the blame primarily on the shortage of planes that is the result of Western sanctions.

            But while domestic travel declined, international travel increased by 8.5 percent with carriers shifting their remaining planes from domestic to more profitable foreign routes, thus compounding (echofm.online/news/v-2025-godu-obyom-passazhirskih-aviaperevozok-vnutri-rossii-snizilsya-na-38-v-otraslevoj-assocziaczii-eto-obyasnili-deficzitom-samolyotov).

            According to the Association, these trends have continued into 2026.

Blaming All Russians for War in Ukraine Helps Putin and Hurts Anti-War Effort, Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 15 – Many opponents of Putin’s war in Ukraine blame all Russians for that military adventure because so many residents of the Russian Federation support it and even insist that they should be punished for their support even if they are less committed to the prosecution of the war than earlier, Abbas Gallyamov says.

            But those who blame all Russians for the war and want to punish them for their support of it are failing to recognize that such positions undercut efforts to increase opposition to the war inside Russia but also mean that many Russians will continue to support it, the Russian commentator says (echofm.online/opinions/ne-nado-podtalkivat-grazhdan-v-storonu-vlastej-2).

            They will do so because they do not want to be punished for something many of them now question and thus believe that the only way to avoid being punished by those who blame all of them for the war is to fight on until Moscow achieves victory even if they would prefer to see the war end.

            Gallyamov cites two historical cases in support of his conclusion: Russia’s own experience during World War I when many Russians opposed the war without fear because “no one threatened them with punishment;” and the leaking of the Morgenthau Plan in 1944 which called for the punishment of Germans and led many of them to fight on even harder.

            Obviously, he argues, “the conclusion that it is necessary to stop discussing the issue of the guilt of all Russians is not pleasant, but it must be done as emotions should not get in the way of promoting anti-war agitations.” At the very least, talk about a Punic settlement of the war must stop lest it “push” Russians toward Putin and his war even if they increasing oppose both.

Alcoholism among Russians Increased Last Year by Largest Amount Since 2015, ‘Important Stories’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 16 – Nearly 56 of every 100,000 residents of the Russian Federation were diagnosed as alcoholics or suffering from alcohol-induced psychosis last year, the highest level since 2015, and a 30 percent rise from 2024, strongly suggesting that it is related to the impact of Putin’s war in Ukraine and Russia’s current economic problems, Important Stories says.

            Last year’s dramatic rise reverses the declines between 2010 and 2021 when these alcoholism figures fell by nearly half from 100,000 to 53,000 for the Russian population as a whole, figures from the health ministry and private clinics show (storage.googleapis.com/istories/news/2026/04/16/zabolevaemost-rossiyan-alkogolizmom-i-alkogolnim-psikhozom-virosla-na-tret/index.html, ru.themoscowtimes.com/2024/01/15/v-rossii-uvelichilos-chislo-alkogolikov-na-fone-voini-v-ukraine-a118376 and ru.themoscowtimes.com/2024/06/24/v-moskve-zafiksirovali-vzrivnoi-rost-chisla-bolnih-alkogolizmom-a134827).

            Despite Putin’s calls for sobriety, the sales of hard liquor including vodka but not including moonshine or samogon as Russians call it rose to 8.5 liters per person per year, high enough to have a major impact on health (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2025/03/31/rossiyane-ustanovili-8-letnii-rekord-po-potrebleniyu-krepkogo-alkogolya-a159666).