International Movement to Save the Caspian Sea Outlines Its Three Goals for the Future

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 5 – Fourteen months after activists launched the International Movement to Save the Caspian Sea (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/02/save-caspian-sea-organization-holds.html), participants in the group from various countries have come together to outline their goals.

            Their goals, members of the group say, are to counter the three most serious problems the Caspian faces: falling water levels in the Caspian, the absence of transparency in deals between littoral states and oil companies about drilling, and the increasing pollution of that inland sea (ulysmedia.kz/analitika/69201-more-problem-kakie-shagi-delaet-save-the-caspian-sea-chtoby-spasti-kaspii/).

            The movement, created by a Kazakhstan ecologist, is modeled on the anti-nuclear Nevada-Semipalatinsk group and on various groups that have tried, without much success, to save the Aral Sea in Central Asia and is claiming success in attracting international attention to the fate of a body of water so large its disappearance strikes many as an impossibility.

            Its most significant action so far was the holding of a Save the Caspian Week in August 2025 which released a program of “ten steps for the saving of the Caspian Sea.” The new three point program suggests that the movement is seeking to expand its influence by focusing on what it sees as the most critical issues so far. 

Residents of Cities in Russian North Feel Increasingly Insecure Because of Shortage of Policemen

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 2 – The shortage of policemen across the Russian Federation has hit residents of cities in the northern portions of that country especially hard and they say they no longer feel secure because there is little chance any police will show up if they call to report crimes, Denis Zagorye of The Barents Observer says.

            Most of the northern regions are suffering from even greater shortages of police than the national average, the journalist reports, citing both regional media (nord-news.ru/news/2026/03/02/?newsid=211461) and interviews with local people (ru.thebarentsobserver.com/zarezut-prihodite-na-severe-rossii-ne-hvataet-policejskih/446058).

            The situation is deteriorating in most of them, but the regional governments lack the funds to do anything about it. Instead, Zagorye says, they are relying on Moscow to provide such moneys – but as of now, the central Russian government hasn’t, and people in the north are increasingly alarmed. 

            It may very well be that the specter of “a police state without enough police” (jamestown.org/war-against-ukraine-leaving-russian-police-state-without-enough-police/)  will occur in the northern cities of Russia, places where private citizens disproportionately have their own weapons and may use them if they can no longer count on officials to protect them.

Traditional Methods of Holding Russian Federation Together Becoming ‘Ever Less Effective,’ Observers in the Urals Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 4 – For the first 20 years of his reign, Putin relied on a social contract in which the people were to remain loyal “in exchange for relative economic stability and the distribution of rents from the sale of raw materials abroad.” But that is no longer possible, according to a homemaker in the Urals writing anonymously.

            Now, the regime is offering the population something far more honest but also more brutal and less attractive, she says, and that is “austerity in exchange for survival,” a deal that “sets in motion processes which make the decolonization of the Russian empire as currently configured inevitable” (region.expert/contract/).

            According to her, “the economic basis of the old contract has disappeared. The share of oil and gas revenues in the budget has fallen below 20%, hydrocarbon revenues in January fell to half of what they had been, and the overall deficit for the first month has reached almost half of the annual plan.”

            Moscow is compounding this problem by taxing many who weren’t taxed before and by the redistribution of money to support the war in Ukraine, two thing s which have “hit the middle class and skilled workers in the regions harder than Moscow expected” – and that is provoking anger and a greater willingness to protest, according to polls taken by officials.

            That is leading to discussions not only among the populations of the federal subjects but among the leaders of these oblasts, krays and republics over how much they are giving to the center and how much they are receiving back. When the answer becomes obvious, people and officials are talking about a revision of federal relations or even complete independence.

            The Urals homemaker says that “the Russian Empire and the USSR maintained a multinational space through the centralized redistribution of resources;” but when that became impossible, the result was the same: “national and regional elites bean to reassess the benefits of remaining part” of those states and those states collapsed.

            The situation in the Russian Federation today differs not only in scale but in the speed with which it is happening, she continues. “The war in Ukraine is accelerating the depletion of resources while sanctions and declining revenues from exports are making the restoration of the old model impossible.”

            “The Kremlin is attempting to compensate for the economic deficit with ideological and repressive measures: the narrative of ‘patience for the sake of the front,’ the strengthening of the church's role in promoting ‘humility,’ and harsh signals to governors about the need to maintain a "manageable background," the homemaker says.

            “But in regions with a strong identity and resource base, this narrative is causing open irritation. In Tatarstan and Sakha, for example, voices are already being heard calling for the need to protect their interests from a centralized ‘common good,’ which increasingly looks like a unilateral expropriation.”

            That doesn’t mean that the Russian Federation is about to disintegrate in the immediate future. “Decolonization here,” she says, “does not immediately mean disintegration in the classical sense. It can manifest itself in milder forms from de facto increased autonomy” to “demands for a revision of tax arrangements” and a refusal to send taxes revenues to Moscow.

            “But even these "mild" scenarios undermine the imperial vertical: the metropolis-center loses control over resources and loyalty. By 2026, the Muscovite princes themselves have destroyed the main glue that held the system together—the illusion of a mutually beneficial agreement,” she continues.

            And she concludes that the center’s new offer – “quiet survival in exchange for increasing austerity” – “isn’t sustainable” in the long run in a multi-national country. As more and more people in the federal subjects recognize what is going on, they will be less and less willing to have it continue.

Ever Fewer Russians Attending Universities, Closing Off that Social Escalator and Leaving Russia Further Behind Advanced Countries, Kulbaka Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 3 – Since Putin became Kremlin leader, the share of secondary school graduates going on to the universities and the number of university students have both fallen, effectively closing off that important social escalator and leaving Russia ever further behind advanced countries, Nikolay Kulbaka says.

            In Soviet times, officials twice worked to reduce these numbers out of concern that the USSR needed more workers and peasants rather than members of the intelligentsia, but this time around, the Moscow economist says, it isn’t certain whether this is the result of a conscious policy or a reflection of a lack of funds (mostmedia.org/ru/posts/rossia-vse-bolshe-otstaet-po-urovnju-obrazovania-ot-razvityh-stran-eto-sluchainost-ili-sistemnaja-politika).

            On the one hand, the costs of going on to higher education have risen astronomically in recent years, putting such schooling beyond the reach of many; but on the other, the government has reduced the number and amount of scholarship support that could compensate for these price increases.

            But as is most likely, the decline in the number of university students in Russia from seven million in 2010 to four million in 2020 and in the share of secondary school graduates going on to university from86 percent in 2019 to 60 percent in 2024 is the product of both factors, Kulbaka suggests.

            These declines mean, he continues, that there will be fewer opportunities for young Russians to improve their social and economic standing by means of education and Russia itself will increasingly suffer as it faces a growing shortage of educated people and falls ever further behind other advanced countries in that regard.

            If this trend continues for even five more years, Kulbaka says, this will lead to a situation in which Russia will be “fatally” behind these countries as far as the development of technology is concerned, a development which he describes as something “very sad.”

Anger about Putin’s Closing of Village Schools So Intense and Widespread Moscow has Decided Not to Shutter Any More Before Duma Elections

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 3 – When Vladimir Putin came to power, there were more than 45,000 village schools. Now, there are fewer than half that number, the result of his “optimization” program that has accelerated as the Kremlin ruler searches for places to take money to pay for his expanded war in Ukraine.

            But many in Russia’s villages are angry because the program has been carried out with little regard to local interests or even demography – in some places schools have been shut down even though there are many young families present – and villagers have protested against the program.

            (On this rising tide of protest beyond the ring road and outside of even smaller cities and only rarely being reported in Moscow, see tribuna.nad.ru/uroki-optimizacii-kak-v-komi-razrushayut-selskoe-obrazovanie, rtvi.com/stories/inache-my-vymrem-reforma-shkol-privela-k-ih-likvidaczii/, sreda42.pro/articles/tpost/x6yiijnb11-zakritie-shkol-v-kuzbasse-masshtabnaya-o and deita.ru/article/573872).  

            Now, in a concession to the power of rural anger about this program, the Russian government has decided to suspend the closure of any additional village schools until after the Duma elections lest villagers among Putin’s most loyal supporters vote against his United Russia Party (zebra-tv.ru/novosti/vlast/vo-vladimire-na-god-priostanovyat-obedinenie-shkol/ and svpressa.ru/politic/article/505379/).

            That may not be enough because many rural Russians are suspicious about why Moscow is closing their schools and about what it will do next. One retired teacher in a village near Arkhangelsk recalled the words of a local priest: village schools weren’t closed “even in the Great Fatherland War, so what is happening now that makes this necessary?” (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/02/28/urok-muzhestva).

Moscow Plays Ethnic Card by Having Russians with Ukrainian Roots Attack Kyiv in Diplomatic and Media Spheres

Paul Goble     

            Staunton, Mar. 5 – It should come as no surprise given Moscow’s long tradition of playing the ethnic card to advance Kremlin interests, but some may not have noticed how many Russians with Ukrainian roots and names are now being deployed by the Putin regime to denigrate the land of their ancestors.

            On the one hand, of course, this provides support for Putin’s claim that Russians and Ukrainians aren’t two nations but one; but on the other and likely more important, it suggests that some that many Ukrainians are already in Putin’s corner and that even more will be if he occupies Ukraine.

            Perhaps the most prominent of these Ukrainian Russians is Vasily Nebenzya, Russia’s permanent representative to the United Nations who on occasion has suggested that he is “more Ukrainian” than his Ukrainian counterpart at the UN or even Kyiv’s deputy foreign minister, journalist Aleksey Blokhin says (pointmedia.io/story/69a94626e657f59b666dced4).

            But he is far from the only Ukrainian Russian Moscow uses to advance its positions. Flamboyant Moscow commentator Vladimir Soloyev routinely hosts self-identified Ukrainians on his television program  to show that “one need not sacrifice Ukraine’s language or attachment to its culture to become part of the Russian political mainstream.”

            Pro-Moscow Ukrainians who have fled to Russia since 2022 form a major part of the radical nationalist Z segment of the Telegram channel world and also work as part of a network of internet sites that disseminate Moscow’s messages and seek thereby to legitimate them in Ukraine and more broadly, Blokhin says.

            Moscow uses Ukrainian Russians as “peace” negotiators with Kyiv to promote Kremlin notions that Ukrainians are divided and that many support Putin’s war aims. No one should fall for this tactic but rather understand that those engaged in this process aren’t reflecting the views of Ukrainians but of Russians in the Kremlin. 

Mounting Debt of Russia’s Federal Subjects Prompting Regional Officials to Focus on Their Own Problems Rather than on Moscow’s, Shiryayev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 28 – At the end of 2025, 74 federal subject budgets were in the red to the tune of 1.5 trillion rubles (20 billion US dollars), while the others had surpluses of only 46 billion rubles (600 million US dollars), an indication that “the system has devoured itself” and one that is creating the basis for a serious political crisis, Vyacheslav Shiryayev says.

            The MGIMO economist says that regions in deficit are rapidly cutting back their spending, often on things that their own populations care about like schools and hospitals, and officials there aren’t getting the kickbacks from firms that have served as the basis for loyalty to Moscow in the past (nemoskva.net/2026/02/28/sistema-sozhrala-sama-sebya-ekonomist-vyacheslav-shiryaev-o-byudzhetnoj-katastrofe-v-regionah-strany/).

            As a result of this which itself reflects Kremlin decisions, leaders in the regions are increasingly focusing on their own problems rather than about what Moscow wants, a shift that could become the basis for the rise of regionalist movements if things continue for very long and that in fact reflects a mistaken Moscow policy intended to protect the center.

            After all, Shiryayev says, since the start of Putin’s war in Ukraine, “Moscow has been shifting responsibility downwards as it doesn’t want to think or know anything about the problems of the regions.” The message from the center to the regions is “make your own decisions; manage yourselves.”

            That may help the Kremlin in the short term, but in the longer one, regional leader who have been told to make their own decisions without changes in the tax system to give them more money to do so are certain to become more recalcitrant when it comes to following orders and ever more prepared to do what Moscow mistakenly asked them to do: act on their own.   

Some No Longer Feel Compelled to Justify Military Action by Citing International Law and Some Who’ve Benefited from Its Provisions are Going Along, Bogush Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 6 – A profoundly disturbing trend is taking place in international discourse, Gleb Bogush says. Until very recently, most governments taking military action felt the need to justify what they were doing by referring to international law, however implausible and unconvincing their references to its provisions were.

            But now, ever fewer governments feel any need to do so, the Russian scholar at the University of Cologne in Germany says; and indeed, both they and some in their own populations welcome this change as a sign that they can act as they like on the basis of power relations alone (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/03/06/pcheli-protiv-meda-strannaya-radost-po-povodu-razrusheniya-mezhdunarodnogo-prava-a189023).

            And what may be even more disturbing is a related development: many who have benefited from the provisions of international law such as Russian liberals aren’t objecting to this failure to follow international law even though they have been the beneficiaries of other provisions of international law themselves.

            This combination is destroying international law, the Russian scholar continues; and “’the brave new world’ in which only force matters will hardly be a kingdom of freedom. It will simly be a world of illegality – and in this world, international law no longer will be able to defend anyone, neither the state, nor the opposition, nor human rights.”

              Bogush points out that international law as codified by the United Nations allows the use of force in only two cases: in response to an armed attack and if approved by the UN Security Council. Neither has been true in many cases of armed attack in recent years and so it is not surprising that those behind such attacks don’t want to talk about international law.

            What a few of them have done is talk about something they call “preventive self-defense,” but however emotionally satisfying that is, “in international law, such a basis for the use of force simply doesn’t exist; and talk about humanitarian intervention unless it is strictly limited also has not legal justification.

            As Bogush notes, “international law doesn’t permit states to kill and suppress their own citizens; but from this it doesn’t follow that other states have the right to do this instead of them. Otherwise, a right to conduct war will appear, from which humanity, it had appeared, had with justice rejected in the 20^th century.”

            At present, he continues, “in a majority of commentaries [on various current wars], international law has simply disappeared from any discussion. Most often arguments are made that international law is not absolute and is even out of date when one is speaking about dictatorial regimes.”

            That formulation is “convenient, but it is untrue,” Bogush says because “international law doesn’t ‘defend’ dictators. They are defended by the inaction of states and in part they are directly supported by others. Authoritarian regimes are becoming ever more numerous” since “an aggressive foreign policy, wars and militarization are fatal for democracy.”

            Unfortunately, some who have benefited from international law are now joining the ranks of those who think it is perfectly acceptable to ignore that law when they want to. Among those, Bogush says, are some “among Russian liberals” even though their claims and rights are typically based on appeals to international legal principles.

            For reasons that are far from clear, “they suppose that in ‘this brave new world’ they will thus turn out to be on the side of the strong – and that these ‘strongmen’ also for reasons that are unclear, will respect their rights and interests.” At the very least, they are mistaken; and worse, they are likely to destroy the basis for their own claims and protections.

            Their position is “not simply strange” but horrifying, Bogush concludes, because it is “a classic case of when the bees begin to fight against honey.”

Russia’s Demographic Crisis Deepens and under Putin Threatens to Become Irreversible

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 3 – The fertility rate in Russia has fallen to 1.3 children per woman per lifetime, far below the replacement level of 2.2, a trend that means not only will each woman have on average fewer children than are needed to keep the population of that country stable but that with each passing generation there will be fewer potential mothers as well.

            That means that Russia’s demographic crisis is “becoming ever deeper” and threatens to become irreversible because even if the government is able to push up the fertility rate slightly, it is unlikely to reach the 2.2 level needed for the population to remain stable or prevent the number of potential mothers from declining (nakanune.ru/articles/124407/).

            Up to now, Nakanune journalist Elena Rychkova says, Kremlin efforts even to boost the fertility rate have largely failed or even proved counterproductive as far as the desires of the Russian authorities are concerned. Banning or restricting abortions region by region have not boosted the birthrate but increased abortion tourism and the number of illegal abortions.

            Propaganda, the Kremlin’s favorite device, has led women with three or more children already to have more but not boosted birthrates in families with two or less. As a result, fertility rates among Russia’s Muslims are either increasing or at least not falling nearly as fast as increasingly urbanized ethnic Russians, hardly what the powers that be want.

            And offering awards like Hero Mothers or money isn’t working either. Instead, surveys show it is changing the timing of births by women but not the number of children they elect to have. As a result, women may have two children when it pays but not have any more when it not only doesn’t but pushes many of them into poverty.

            According to Rychkova, who writes regularly on demographic issues, fertility rates will continue to fall given urbanization and the government’s failure to provide both adequate housing for families and a stable future. When people are forced to live in two room apartments, they won’t have children; and when they fear far or economic disaster, they won’t either.

            For Moscow to succeed in fighting the near universal decline in fertility rates around te world and especially in its own country, the Kremlin would have to  change its approach, devoting far more money to housing and childcare services and avoiding the kind of crises sparked by war and the fear of war that its current policies are producing.

            But even if the Kremlin did change all those policies, it would likely still fail to reverse the decline in fertility rates by very much. That could happen if and only if the culture of families change and men become more involved in taking care of children and the household. Such a shift isn’t likely given Putin’s cult of manliness.

            And changing that is likely to prove difficult if not impossible, something that will only  accelerate Russia’s demographic decline, especially if the country continues to lose young men who might otherwise become fathers by sending them to fight and die in massive numbers in conflicts like Putin’s war in Ukraine. 

 

Not a Single City, Town, Street or Square in Russia Bears Mikhail Gorbachev’s Name

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 2 – Given the propensity of Russians to memorialize leaders by naming places after them, it may come as a shock to learn that there is not a single city, town, street or square in the Russian Federation named after Mikhail Gorbachev; but it will surprise fewer that this reflects state policy in the age of Putin.

            On the 95^th anniversary of the first and last Soviet president’s birth, Novaya Gazeta observer Natalya Chernova says that even in Gorbachev’s home region of Stavropol, officials have continued to block efforts by his supporters to name any place after him (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/03/02/imeni-gorbacheva-ili-figura-umolchaniia).

            Even there, the only public recognition of Gorbachev comes in the form of a small memorial plaque on an aging school in Krasnogvadeysk that declares only “Here studied the first president of the Soviet Union.” The local historical museum contains no reference to him at all, Chernova says. Officials there say “there is no space” for personal mentions.

            The same total absence of references to the former Soviet leader is also the case in Stavropol’s regional historical museum, although it is the case that at least there is a picture of Gorbachev among Stavropol residents on the museum’s website, something likely to confuse casual visitors that Gorbachev has not been officially whited out in his home region.

            Not long ago, Georgy Lyashov, a realtor and longtime resident, “decided that Stavropol’s lack of memory [of Gorbachev] was truly indecent,” Chernova says; and he circulated a petition calling for the naming of a vacant public lot for the former Soviet leader. Officials turned him down, and he says local residents long accustomed to not having a voice haven’t taken action.

            “Residents want a park, but what it is called is irrelevant,” he says. “People here won’t do anything in Gorbachev’s memory, let alone stand in their own doorways. Indeed,” he adds, “it too me 18 months to get people in my building to come to a general homeowners association meting and sign a petition calling for replacing the doors in their building.”

            Chernova sums up Lyashov’s experience: “it’s understandable why there is no mention of Gorbachev because if we remember and honor Russia’s first present, we’ll have to talk about his perestroika, his pursuit of peace, freedom and choice.  In short, we’ll have to talk ab… about all those things the powers have been taking away from us in recent years.

A Truly Disturbing Proposal: Putin Calls for Filling Depleted Ranks of Police with Veterans of His Expanded War in Ukraine

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 4 – For several years, Russian officials have sounded the alarm that the country suffers from a shortage of policemen given that low salaries, poor working conditions, and the possibility of making more money either by volunteering to serve in the army or joining private security companies have led more to resign than force has been able to hire.

            In some places, especially at the local level outside of Moscow, as many as 40 percent of the positions in the police are currently unfilled, forcing the remaining offers to work overtime and meaning that the police force often lacks the personnel need to combat crime and especially its more serious and violent categories.

            Vladimir Putin has proposed a solution, one that might lead to a filling of the ranks of the police but that should concern all worried about crime fighting and the rule of law (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/03/04/s-ikh-psikhologicheskoi-zakalkoi-putin-predlozhil-zakryvat-defitsit-kadrov-v-politsii-za-schet-uchastnikov-voennykh-deistvii-v-ukraine-news).

            Speaking to the collegium of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of which the police is a part, the Kremlin leader said that he favored recruiting police from among the veterans because “their combat experience and psychological and physical training” makes them serious candidates for the police (vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2026/03/04/1180679-putin-v-strukturi).

            There are at least three serious problems with this idea. First, the police and the military have fundamentally different purposes and pursue those purposes in fundamentally different ways. Suggesting that the approach of one will work well in the other fails to take these differences into account.

            Second, many of the returning veterans suffer from the brutality of combat and the presence in their midst of criminals who agreed to serve in the military to get their sentences commuted, experiences that mean many veterans are hardly good candidates to enforce the law in a humane way. They are thus likely to be more disposed to use violence than current officers.

            And third, a major reason the Russian police can’t hold officers is that pay is so low. For returning veterans, the difference between the money they were getting to fight in Ukraine and that they would receive for joining the police is so large that few are likely to want to join and those that do may be even more inclined to engage in corrupt practices than police already there.

            Putin’s proposal in this regard may go nowhere, but his readiness to suggest this idea indicates that he doesn’t fully understand any of these problems or alternatively and even more worrisome, he wants a police force of the future to be far more willing to use violence than even the Russian police are now. 

Moscow Compiles Digital Catalogue of Russian Heritage Monuments at Risk of Collapse in Hopes Private Sector will Rescue Them

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 3 – The Moscow State Institute for the Study of Art has prepared, on the basis of a presidential grant, digital catalogue of more than 150 heritage monuments including churches and historic sites that are decaying and at risk of collapse in the hopes that people from the private sector will contribute to their salvation.

            Most of the buildings in question are from villages in the Central, North-West and Volga federal districts who lack the resources needed to prevent these sites from being lost for all time. (The catalogue, available at https://archconservation.ru/objects, is discussed at nazaccent.ru/content/45206-v-rossii-zapustili-katalog-obektov-naslediya/.)

            As the catalogue grows and becomes widely known, it may trigger restorationist efforts in various parts of the country, ethnic Russian and now, that, along with ecological protests, have led in the past to the rise of concern about what is being lost and thus to activism that serves as the basis for the emergence or growth of nationalist and regionalist groups.

            That is all the more likely because in announcing the compilation of this list, the specialists have made it clear that the government isn’t prepared to contribute much money to rescue these decaying sites and that it is counting on people and groups in the private sector to shoulder this burden alone.

Moscow Charging Ever More Youths with Political Crimes to Signal Its Ready to Repress Anyone who Opposes Putin, Memorial Expert Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 27 – There are now almost 300 young people in Russia known to be behind bars for political crimes, according to the Memorial human rights organization; and the actual number is almost certainly higher given the difficulties of gathering such information, Anna Karetnikova of that group says.

            She tells the Horizontal Russia portal that each of these cases is of course a profound human tragedy but that it is especially important to recognize what the Putin regime is doing by charging, convicting and then incarcerating young people in Russia today (semnasem.org/articles/2026/02/27/podrostki-politzeki).

            According to Karetnikova, “there is no need today for mass repressions like those of 1937 [because] Russians read the news and get scared. So to scare 100 million people, it’s enough to take ten doctors, ten teachers, ten women, ten youths, ten trans people, ten drivers and show society” what can happen if anyone steps out of line.

            “By locking up children along with everyone else,” she argues, “the authorities are showing that they don’t care whether you’re an adult or a child, a man or a woman. If you’re deemed to be an enemy, you’ll end up in prison.”

            But the incarceration of children for political crimes, Karetnikova continues, also shows that the state recognizes that it hasn’t been able to educate young Russians in ways that keep them obedient and that the only course open to the authorities is to bring political charges against them and put them in prison.

            Of course, she concludes, young people will leave prison and return to society; and tragically, the things they will have learned about the world while behind bars will make recidivism likely and infect the society in even more profound ways. If Russians tolerate such arrests, they may become so desensitized with time that might put up with executions as well.

Regions and Republics will Turn on Moscow if They Sense the Center is Weakening even More Rapidly Now than They Did in 1991 to Get More Autonomy or Even Independence, Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 2 – As Putin’s popularity has declined, the Kremlin leader has increasingly turned to repression to keep himself in power and deployed propaganda to obscure this change in order to prevent the population of the Russian Federation from concluding that the power of the center, now based on repression alone, is weakening and decide to take action, Abbas Gallyamov says.

            If people in the federal subjects draw that conclusion, the former Kremlin speechwriter now classified as a foreign agent says, they will seek to gain more power for themselves, with some even pressing for independence (idelreal.org/a/habirov-vytaschit-kuchu-pretenziy-k-moskve-na-raz-abbas-gallyamov-o-regionalnyh-elitah-i-rossii-posle-putina/33688921.html).

            And as was the case in 1991, such a shift could happen very quickly. Then in a matter of months Ukrainians went from saying they supported the continued existence of the USSR to demanding independence for their republic. Today, Gallyamov says, there are reasons to think such a process would occur even more rapidly than it did in Gorbachev’s time.

            On the one hand, he says as he argued four years ago, the war in Ukraine is likely to have had the effect of weakening ethnic Russian national identity, even though he concedes that this has been obscured by patriotic propaganda and that it can’t currently be measured given the ways in which repression makes sociological studies extremely problematic.

            And on the other, in the regions and republics, anti-Moscow anger is growing, with ethnic Russians almost as likely to share it as non-Russians both in predominantly ethnic Russian oblasts and krays and in non-Russian republics where many ethnic Russians share the anti-Moscow feelings of the non-Russians they live amongst.

            Such anti-Moscow are feelings thus different and more powerful than what is usually described as nationalism, even though they typically receive less attention. Indeed, Gallyamov says, he prefers not to speak about nationalism at all because it conceals the hostility to the center which is broader and deeper than ethnic agendas of various national intelligentsias.

            According to him, anti-Moscow feelings may feed off and/or grow into nationalism, but in the initial stages, such concerns are likely to lead local elites who back Moscow lest they lose their jobs to change sides and thus speed up the devolution of power and even efforts to disintegrate the Russian Federation.

            In many ways, he concludes, the longer elites in the federal subjects remain dominated by anti-Moscow feelings rather than narrower ethno-nationalisms, the more success they are likely to have in gaining more autonomy or even independence because such a stance will make it harder for the Kremlin to mobilize against them.  

Armenian Border Guards Replace Russian Ones on Armenia’s Border with Turkey

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 1 – More than 34 years after gaining independence when the Soviet Union disintegrated, Armenia now has its own officers guarding all of that country’s borders, now that Russians who had been guarding Armenia’s border crossing with Turkey have turned over the operation of that site to the Armenians.

            This completes a process that began when Moscow handed over control of Armenian border crossings with Azerbaijan in 2024 and then transferred such control over Armenian border crossings with Iran and over border control points at the Yerevan International airport. (vpoanalytics.com/sobytiya-i-kommentarii/diversifikatsiya-po-armyanski-rossiyskie-pogranichniki-pokinuli-zastavu-akhurik-na-granitse-s-turtsi/).

            This represents a major expansion of one Armenia’s sovereignty and represents a significant decline in Russia’s influence there, although Moscow does maintain a 4,000-man military base at Gyumri in Armenia that Yerevan has announced that it does not plan to seek the closure of anytime soon.

            But it is even more important as an indication of just how long it has taken to dismantle Soviet-era arrangements in some cases – Tajikistan also retained Russian border guards until 2005, for example – and of how changes in that direction have accelerated since the start of Vladimir Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine.

Local and Regional Media in Russia Play Major Role in Promoting Putin’s War in Ukraine as ‘a Given’ and Entirely ‘Normal,’ ‘NeMoskva’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 26 – When people talk about propaganda on the war in Ukraine, they typically focus on outrageous statements of Moscow TV personalities; but the NeMoskva portal suggests that local and regional media play a major role in delivering the message that the Kremlin now wants, that the war is “a given” of Russian life and entirely “normal.”

            The portal examined more than 200 outlets in regions and localities across the country and spoke with numerous experts on the Russian media scene and said that the propaganda in this part of the Russian scene is less propagandistic and often isn’t even recognized as such by viewers and readers (nemoskva.net/2026/02/26/propaganda-dlya-normisov/).

            That is because local and regional media do not cover the war as such and seek to include stories about those from the region who have been touched by it within the normal flow of coverage about life more generally. That encourages Russians to think about the war as something “entirely normal” and more simply “a given.”

            In reporting the study and especially its conversations with media experts who appear to be in universal agreement, NeMoskva says there are a number of ways in which these outlets are promoting such a view: They talk about how the area is “making its own contribution;” their main hero is “the local soldier, ‘one of us;” they celebrate as “another hero the regional volunteer;” they “heroize those who have died” in the conflict; and they either “idealize” or at least minimize the problems of veterans coming home.

            Such messaging is calmer and more reassuring that the comments of Moscow figures like Vladimir Solovyev and thus corresponds to the way most Russians want to think about it: “They simply want to live their own lives” and see the war as something in the background, according to several commentators.

            One of these commentators pointedly notes that “the regional media do not ‘sell’ the war directly but ‘combine’ it with the whole information flow.” That gives the media at the local and regional levels a kind of “therapeutic effect,” one that makes the war something very much like the weather: it just is – and no one needs to do more than support it.

            And NeMoskva concludes: “Regional propaganda integrates into normalcy and creates a context that becomes acceptable to the audience. All of this, taken together, "holds together the social fabric" in the face of prolonged conflict and helps people feel at least some sense of support.”

As a result, for the consumers of this media, “the fighting becomes a backdrop and that helps the authorities achieve both of their goals: ensuring an influx of people and resources and preventing people from thinking that what is going on in Ukraine is an all-out war” that is going to radically change their lives or even force them to do more than they are doing now. 

Russia’s Far Right Using Denunciations as Primary Weapon to Attack Minorities, Memorial and ‘NeMoskva’ Portal Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 27 – The extreme right in Russia has begun using denunciations on the internet as its primary weapon to attack both migrant workers and ethnic minorities because by putting up charges online extremist groups are able to attract the attention of law enforcement personnel who then pick and choose among those against whom to bring charges.

            That trend has been documented by the NeMoskva portal which tracks developments outside of the Russian capital and by the Memorial human rights organization (nemoskva.net/2026/02/27/ohota-na-bryunetov/ and sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2025/02/d47102/).

            Indeed, these two sources say, the far right and the police are working ever more closely together. The far right sees its attacks being confirmed by official action and has increased its chances of getting it by increasing adopting police language in the internet denunciations they issue. Indeed, it is clear that the police and not others are their intended audience, the two say.

            And the police are only too pleased to have the far right groups bring to their attention actions or reported actions by migrants and minorities so that police and prosecutors can choose among those denounced rather than having to engage in any investigations on their own especially when their political bosses point them in that direction.

            This convergence of the far right and police has been going on since the 1990s but the internet has only exacerbated that trend. Memorial’s Stefaniya Kulayeva in fact cites the words of prominent human rights activist Sergey Kovalyev that the Russian police “aren’t catching bandits but ‘brunettes,” a reference to the darker hair of many minorities.

            Among the extremist Russian nationalist groups which use this tactic the most often are the Russian Community and the less well-known Man’s State, which NeMoskva described as “an internet community based on misogynistic and nationalist discourse, “formally” in defense of traditional values but in fact oppression, women, journalists, LGBT people and migrants.

Could Russia ‘Repeat’ Equivalent of Khrushchev’s De-Stalinization after Putin Leaves the Scene?

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 25 – On the 70^th anniversary of Khrushchev’s secret speech to the 20^th CPSU Congress in 1956, a round date that has occasioned much commentary about what Khrushchev achieved and didn’t, Sergey Medvedev has asked the most important question: Could Russia “repeat” with something similar after Putin leaves the scene?

            The answer is not simple not only because Khrushchev’s attack on Stalin was strictly limited, did not last and now has been largely reversed by Putin, some of whose supporters want Khrushchev denounced for his attacks on Stalin, the Radio Liberty commentator says (svoboda.org/a/razoblachenie-kumira-povtoritsya-li-v-rossii-hh-sezd/33687275.html).

            At the end of a lengthy discussion with Russian historian Yury Pivovarov and Russian political scientist Aleksandr Morozov about Khrushchev’s secret speech, what it achieved and what it didn’t , Medvedev asks pointedly: “is a new 20^th Congress and a new thaw after Putin possible?”

            Morozov suggested that “the 20th Congress as such cannot be repeated, but some form of revision of Putinism's political legacy is inevitable. The question is what form it will take and in what direction it will develop.” But because elites in the 1950s and elites now benefited as well as suffered from what had happened, any changes are likely to be partial and even reversible.

            Putinism is likely to be revised in three main ways, the political scientist continues, including a further consolidation of the bureaucracy, a revision of past foreign policy choices, and a loosening of censorship which clearly has gone too far under Putin and offends even many of his otherwise unquestioning supporters.

            A more radical transformation would occur only if there is a serious domestic conflict, likely between civilian parts of the bureaucracy with access to the means of violence and the siloviki who dominate that area. Clashes between these two forces are conceivable, since they have resources and rely on resources. But will this happen? That's a completely open question.”

For Four Reasons, Putin’s ‘Insane’ War in Ukraine Now New Normal in International Affairs, Inozemtsev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 25 – Few now have any doubt that Putin launched his expanded war against Ukraine in 2022 “not only as the result of the ideology of the new Russian fascism but also as a result of the phenomenal miscalculations of both the fuehrer himself and all his entourage,” Vladislav Inozemtsev says.

            But what needs to be confronted now, the Russian economist and commentator argues, is “why and to what extent this insane war in Europe now taking place at the beginning of the 21^st century has become something normal that the world has grown quite accustomed to” (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/02/25/bezumie-stavshee-normoi-a188010).

            According to Inozemtsev, there are four main reasons why “this insanity as become the norm” for so many. First of all, as the first proxy war in Europe, few if anyone can see the way clear for its end and thus believe that they must adapt themselves and their own behavior to what is going on because it is going to last for a long time to come.

            Second, Inozemtsev says, “too many beneficiaries have appeared over the course of the four years of this war,” including not only powers not directly involved but even in the two frontline states; and even including many Russians and Ukrainians who have fled abroad but live in a world in which the war forms an important part of their lives.

            Third, the war has now lasted so long that it has become background noise for almost everyone especially as the front doesn’t move very war in either direction and because Kremlin relied on paying men to fight rather than on any broader political reason and thus avoided having to mobilize massively, something that could have triggered resistance.

            And fourth, neither side is prepared or even able to defeat the other side completely. Russia can’t deploy sufficient resources to end all resistance, and “the West isn’t interested in escalation which could lead to a nuclear war” and recognizes that now it is “impossible” to defeat Russia as other aggressors in Europe were defeated in the past.

            According to Inozemtsev, the war can come to an end in only two ways, which in fact collapse into one: “the departure from the historical arena of the madman who initiated the war and subordinated Russia to its conduct.” The “more radical” option is to promote “some form of regime change in Russia.”

            The other “allows for an immediate end to the conflict on Russia’s terms, with the consolidation of Ukraine’s support system, the restoration of its economy and its incorporation into Western structures, with implicit non-recognition of new borders and boundaries … and the expectation of inevitable future changes in Russia after the natural death of the dictator.”

            Neither of these options, the Russian commentator continues, “should presuppose the restoration of relations with the aggressor country before a change of political regime as that would completely legitimize aggression” and even ensure that Putin would launch more wars in the future.

            But “the saddest circumstance” of this war as it enters its fifth year is not only the continued losses it entails but “also the continued coexistence of the ‘civilized’ world with this brutal reality, a coexistence which itself becomes an additional factor in the continuation of the war” and “widens the gap between what consumes us and what should be our moral compass.”

Many Russian Liberals have Gradually Shifted Their Views on Putin’s War toward ‘a Partial Acceptance of an Interpretation' Close to the Kremlin’s, Snegovaya Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 24 –Over the course of the four years of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, a segment of Russian liberals, both in the emigration and at home, have gradually shifted their views about that conflict in the direction of accepting an interpretation of that conflict close to Kremlin’s, Mariya Snegovaya says.

            The Russian post-doc at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. argues that this has happened because the liberals involved want to preserve their civic identity as Russians as well as out of the conviction that “we Russians can’t be wrong about everything” (echofm.online/opinions/chetyre-goda-vojny-i-transformacziya-liberalnogo-diskursa-v-rossii).

            According to Snegovaya, this adaptive process has gone through nine stages beginning with denial about the war through expectation of popular resistance to personalization of the issue, acceptance of a variety of false equivalences to a rationalization of what has occurred as being the fault of the West even though Russia was the side that took action.

            She argues that this evolution can be explained as “a mechanism of identity-protective cognition, that is, an inclination to interpret reality so as to preserve a positive view of one’s own group” even though it requires the acceptance of the notion that Russian society at present lacks any ability to influence the situation.

            For many liberal Russians, Putin remains “the instigator of the war” but “the West is increasingly held responsible for its continuation,” even as Russian society is depicted as virtually incapable of influencing events. Thus, the question of whether Russians coud have changed the course of events is not even raised!”

            “As a result,” Snegovaya concludes, “a narrative is formed that simultaneously acknowledges the fact of the war and minimizes the degree of collective involvement of Russians,” a point of view that “over time … facilitates a convergence with narratives close to the Kremlin.”

Kremlin Ready to Tolerate Those Expressing Even Nazi Views as Long as They Back Putin’s War in Ukraine, Russian Experts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 24 – Radical Russian nationalists including those who express neo-Nazi views have become increasingly vocal since the start of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, according to Vera Alperovich of the SOVA Center which monitors such things (sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/2025/07/d52000/?sphrase_id=3960697).

            According to another Russian expert speaking on condition of anonymity, “the war itself ahs not made such views, the Nazi ones in particular, more widespread, but it has made people feel more like expressing them publicly” (themoscowtimes.com/2026/02/24/while-russia-says-it-is-denazifying-ukraine-far-right-groups-are-fighting-for-moscow-a92033).

            That is because, he says, “the state is generally willing to tolerate almost any view as long as the person actively supports the war.”  Meanwhile, a third Russian expert, Nikolay Mitrokhin of the University of Bremen agrees. He says “the Kremlin does not like openly declared Nazis, but it does cooperate with pro-government far-right radicals.”

            What makes the Kremlin’s willingness to cooperate with those expressing extreme right positions as long as they support Putin’s war is that the Kremlin leader has always claimed that he is fighting Nazism in Ukraine, event though he is clearly not doing so at home at least among the politically loyal.

            This has had an impact at home, Alperovich argues. “Nationalist ideas once considered marginal have moved closer to the mainstream,” she argues, “while support for the war in Ukraine serves as ‘a source of legitimacy for nationalists and often serves as a license for their other activities.’”

            Despite that development, Mitrokhin points out “the pro-Kremlin far right ‘has never had any real significance on the battlefield” as Moscow’s efforts to make use of nationalist military formations like Espanola have “largely failed.” The real problem with the neo-Nazi resurgence on the battlelines is elsewhere.

            The real problem, he says, and one that may come home if and when the war ends is that “among Russian military personnel, especially GRU Spetznaz and airborne troops, far-right views and a culture of violence and sadism are widespread,” attitudes the Kremlin isn’t trying to root out but instead is “encouraging.”

 

Non-Russian Activists Now Focusing on Telling the World Russia is an Empire which Must Be Decolonized, Latypova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 25 – Many of the most active groups in Russia since Putin began his expanded war in Ukraine were anti-war organizations in the non-Russian republics from which the Kremlin has drawn a disproportionate number of soldiers to fight and die in that war, Leyla Latypova says.

            But the failure of these groups to force an end to the war combined with repressions at home and the forced emigration of the leaders of these organizations, The Moscow Times who specializes on the non-Russian republics says, has prompted these groups to change their focus (themoscowtimes.com/2026/02/25/russias-exiled-anti-war-movements-are-learning-to-play-the-long-game-a92049).

            While none of them has dropped its opposition to Putin’s war, ever more of them are focusing on cooperating with each other and promoting the view that Russia is an empire and will continue to threaten its own people and the world until it is fully decolonized, another uphill struggle because many in the West assume everything will be fine once Putin leaves.

            Latypova draws this conclusion on her observations of and conversations with the leaders of non-Russian groups in the emigration, including those from Tyva, Sakha, and Buryatia. She notes that some ethnic Russian emigres have also made that shift, but overwhelmingly, Russian émigré groups still focus on the war in Ukraine rather than on the need for decolonization.

            The shift The Moscow Times journalist points to is important for three reasons. First, it is a sign that Putin’s effort to suppress non-Russian groups has backfired because it has made them more nationalistic than they ever were before. Second, it has deepened the divide between these non-Russian groups and their ethnic Russian counterparts, making cooperation more difficult.

            And third – and this is by far the most important – it has become the basis for a new unity among the non-Russian movements and likely among non-Russians themselves who now see their task as the dismantling of the Russian empire rather than just stopping the war and who are working to reach out to governments around the world to deliver that message.

Putin Earlier won Support by Promising Stability and Predictability, but His War in Ukraine has Destroyed Both, Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 24 – With his war in Ukraine that is now entering its fifth year, Vladimir Putin has undermined the stability and predictability that for the first two decades of his rule had been the basis of his popular support among Russians, Abbas Gallyamov argues (t.me/abbasgallyamovpolitics/9775 reposted at echofm.online/opinions/proshhaj-stabilnost-2).

            “People used to know what a waited the country tomorrow and the day after,” the former Putin speechwriter turned anti-Putin commentator. “Now all that remains is a memory; and if there is no stability, then there is no reason for people to cling to Putin” as they have in the past.

            According to Gallyamov, Russia “has suddenly become so unsettled that it seems things can’t get any worse;” and it is that sense which is “the main domestic political outcome” of his war in Ukraine, a situation which in the final analysis is of Putin’s own making. Had he not started the war,  he could have continued in unquestioned power for far longer.

Russian Housing Most Built in Soviet Times Now Facing Collapse and Under Law Can’t Be Fixed

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 25 – One in every 15 buildings where Russians live is now so old that under Russian law, any repairs are considered “economically unfeasible,” thus leaving millions  of Russians in a gray area where their residences have not yet been declared unsafe but that they need repairs that the authorities are not willing to authorize because of the buildings’ ages.

            Such housing stock is set to grow to 54 million square meters by 2030 and 216 million square meters by 2040, according to a study by the Moscow Institute of Economic Forecasting (forecast.ru/_ARCHIVE/Analitics/OM/REK_12_09_23.pdf and newizv.ru/news/2026-02-25/sovetskie-doma-ruhnut-cherez-10-let-kuda-uhodyat-dengi-na-kapremont-438832).

            Most of these aging buildings were erected in Soviet times with a projected lifespan of 25 to 30 years. But many have remained occupied for as much as 60 years and haven’t seen any major renovations for more than half a century. There simply isn’t enough money budgeted or being collected from residents to change that.

            And officials are hiding behind the law that they say prevents them from throwing good money after bad and requires that these aging housing blocks be torn down and replaced with new housing, something that isn’t happening rapidly enough to keep people from remaining in housing that is on the verge of collapse.

            One especially worrisome aspects of this problem is that elevators in multi-story housing in major cities are rapidly reaching the end of their lifetimes and aren’t replaced. In 2025, for example, 70,000 elevators in Russia reached the end of their working life, but the 2026 government plan calls for replacing only 19,000 to 21,000 of them.

            That means that the number of elevators likely to fail will continue to increase, making access to housing in the upper stories even more difficult than it is now for many Russians. 

‘Being Dark-Skinned in Today’s Russia Can Be Dangerous,’ Udmurt Now in Emigration Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 25 – The Horizontal Russia portal features its latest interview with a non-Russian about his experiences in Russia. This time it is with an Udmurt with Mari roots who grew up in his homeland, moved to Moscow and then emigrated and who says that “being dark-skinned in today’s Russia can be dangerous.”

            Artyom, aged 40, grew up in Izhevsk where he says he encouraged xenophobia “only during celebrations of the Day of the Great Fatherland War, but when he moved to Moscow, he came to feel that  being dark-skinned in Moscow could be dangerous because the police singled him out for harassment (semnasem.org/articles/2026/02/25/nerusskij-mir-kak-rossijskim-silovikam-ne-ugodil-cvet-kozhi-udmurta-artema).

Neither his parents nor his grandparents spoke with him in either Udmurt or Mari; but when he was a young child, his parents sent him to live for a time with his grandmother in a Mari El village. There he fell in love with Mari songs and dances and learned some of the language those who engaged in them used.

            But when it was time for him to enter school, his parents brought him back to Izhevask. In the first three classes, he studied Udmurt but then began using only Russian and forgot his native language because “to be from a village and to know his native language was considered ‘not prestigious’ and almost no one would speak with him in it.

            Artyom says he almost never encountered xenophobic attitudes in Izhevsky; but once he was attacked by some other boys who didn’t like him because he was dark-skinned. But the situation deteriorated after he moved to Moscow where both the police and ordinary people singled him out for mistreatment. But that led him to again study Udmurt.

            When he emigrated to the US with his family, he was surprised that no one singled  him out for mistreatment and that many were delighted to find that he was doing all he could to preserve the ethnic identity of himself and his children, teaching them the language he had learned only incompletely earlier.

            Artyom’s story calls attention to a distinction that is not often made by outside observers. Xenophobic attitudes and actions among Russians are not directed at all non-Russians but rather at those who look or speak differently. Those non-Russians who look like Russians and speak Russian generally escape such hostility.

            Thus, in many cases what is described as “merely” xenophobia is in fact openly racist and should be recognized and fought on that basis. For background on this phenomenon and the ways it is manifested in the Russian Federation, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/07/in-rf-members-of-nations-who-physically.html.

Etkind Sees a Dangerous Continuity in American ‘Russian Studies’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 26 – Aleksandr Etkind, a Russian cultural historian at Vienna’s Central European University, sees a dangerous and even self-defeating continuity in “Russian studies” in the United States since the end of World War II and one threatening to extend into the future as well.

            He makes this point by offering what he calls on his Facebook page “a brief history of American ‘Russian studies’” as that discipline responded or failed to respond to changes in the USSR, Russia and the post-Soviet world (echofm.online/opinions/kratkaya-istoriya-amerikanskoj-nauki-o-rossii).

            In the 1950s, during the Cold War, America’s Russianists said that “the people are wonderful, the Kremlin is to blame for everything, we will hold back, and no change is needed.”

            In the 1980s, at the time of perestroika, these US specialists said that “let them be angry but we won’t give them any money” and expressed hopes that the USSR would not break apart, again insisting “we will hold back and no change is needed.”

            In the 1990s, with the collapse of the USSR, many of these specialist said that this was “a pity,” but added that “let’s give them money and we’ll make some for ourselves.” But again underlying that, “we will hold back and no change is needed.”

            In the 2000s, many of these people said that it was “too bad” that they couldn’t earn money,” arguing that “’Russia is a normal country’” and insisting that “America is to blame for everything.” And then adding as always “we will hold back and no change is needed.

            In the 2010s, they said “it will be a pity if Russia doesn’t disintegrate; but then these specialists added “we must restrain ourselves and no change is needed.”

            In the 2020s, many of these experts expressed the wish that Ukraine not win, arguing that the current Russian regime is “no worse than others” and that things were “so good there when I was young … We will hold back and no change is needed.”

            And in the 2030s, Etkind predicts, these same people will be forced to acknowledge that Russia as broken up, although that is too bad because “it was the norm.” And they will again say: “let’s give them money and we’ll make money for ourselves,” adding only that “we will hold back and no change is needed.”