Artificial Intelligence Now Allowing Moscow to Increase Repression while Cutting Costs of Doing So, Russian Analyst Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 11 – At the end of July, Aleksandr Bastrykin, head of Russia’s Investigative Committee, celebrated the fact that his agency had been able to integrate artificial intelligence and other IT technologies to improve its monitoring of society by processing data more quickly and cheaply than had ever been possible before.

            Aleksandr Mikhailov, a Russian analyst writing for The Insider, says that this is just one more indication that Russia, like other authoritarian states such as China and North Korea, is using AI to increase repression while at the same time cutting the costs of doing so (theins.ru/obshestvo/295475).

            In a 6,000-word article, Mikhailov describes both what these other states have been doing and how Moscow has copied them in order to make Putin’s authoritarianism not only more comprehensive than any before him but also to do so in ways that don’t require the same commitment of money and time to achieve that end.

            “Traditional methods of authoritarianism—censorship, espionage, propaganda, and forceful suppression—all required significant human and financial resources,” he writes. But “AI has changed the state of affairs” allowing authoritarian states to rapidly increase their repressive control but at far less cost.

            Mikhailov concludes with a sobering warning: “AI has exacerbated the historical confrontation between freedom and tyranny.” As a result, the democratic world no longer has the right to slow down: the algorithms of authoritarian regimes” “are already making decisions to suppress freedoms faster than democratic institutions have time to react.”

Kyrgyz and Uzbek Scholars Mull Promoting Citizens of Central Asian Countries to Identify as ‘Central Asians’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 10 – Researchers from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan believe that the countries of Central Asia should encourage their citizens to identify in the first instance as “Central Asians” so as to provide a foundation for the increasing cooperation among the states in that region.

            At a meeting is Bishkek, the Uzbekistan Institute for Strategic and Interregional Studies and the Kyrgyzstan  Institute for Strategic Initiatives, both of which serve as advisors to their respective presidents, met with representatives of the Swiss PeaceNexus Foundation and came up with a draft concept paper on this (cronos.asia/news/tsentralnoaziat-kto-on-takoy-i-zachem-nuzhen-regionu/).

            The draft concept calls for “coordinating efforts in the humanitarian, information, cultural, educational and other areas” to support among the populations of the five Central Asian countries “a sustainable sense of regional affiliation” and thus support the growing importance of Consultative Meetings of the Chiefs of State there.

            Not even all the participants in the Bishkek meeting think that the idea is a good one. The Kyrgyz hosts, for example, described themselves as “guests” rather than “participants” in the meeting and no one is sure what role Azerbaijan would have in such an effort even though it is increasingly integrated in the chiefs of state meetings.

            The concept paper defines a Central Asian as someone who “while maintaining his ethnic, civil and religious identity also feels that he or she belongs to the community of peoples of the region, one with a common historical memory, the values of good neighborliness and peace loving, and mutual respect for their cultural and linguistic distinctions.”

            Given that, it is unclear how far this project may go; and one thing limiting it still further is that like the meetings of the region’s chiefs of state, the Central Asian identity uses Russian as the common language, even though that language was imposed from the outside. Unless that changes, there is a danger that this idea could be hijacked by Moscow to weaken the states.

            But the participants at the Bishkek meeting expressed confidence that the Central Asian identity they want to promote would be very different from the slightly and even offensive "Central Asia" identity that some in Moscow promote and that, because of that, it may take off as more people become familiar with the concept paper.   

In Unprecedented Move, Moscow Sends Convoy of Oil Tankers North of Severnaya Zemlya on Its Way to China

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 10 – In what Scandinavian experts say is an “extremely risky” move, Russian tankers loaded with as much as one million tons of oil destined for China have travelled north of Severnaya Zemlya, much father north than the normal Northern Sea Route path and a larger on-time convoy to China than anyone can remember.

            Last week, the convoy, which involved some 15 vessels, sailed north of the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago to 81.5 degrees north latitude. In the past, ships moving through that are use the more southern Vikitsky Strait (thebarentsobserver.com/news/in-unprecedented-arctic-operation-russia-sends-convoy-of-oil-tankers-to-815n/455488).

            According to Norvald Kjerstad, a retired Norwegian specialist on the Arctic, there has never been such a large convoy travelling so far north or one whose ships are not specially reenforced for travel in icy wagers.  Indeed, he says this passage is “the northernmost route ordinary oil tankers have ever taken.”

            "Although the waters north of Severnaya Zemlya are now ice-free, there is still a relatively large amount of ice to navigate through in the East Siberian Sea and the De Long Strait (inside Wrangel Island),” he says; and this large convoy is especially at risk for two reasons.

On the one hand, its ships are not the ice class vessels that one sometimes sees the Russians use in the Arctic; and on the other, and potentially more serious, Russian icebreakers are not nearby as they would be if the convoy was following the normal route closer to land. That makes the potential for disaster far higher in this high-risk move.

Pressed, Karelian Government Admits Having Signed Agreement with Notorious ‘Russian Community’ to Keep Order in the Republic

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 12 – Pressed by residents, the Karelian government has admitted to having signed without fanfare a special agreement with the Russian Community that calls for that organization, notorious for its attacks on immigrants and minorities, to help keep order in the republic.

            Petrozavodsk gave no further details about this accord which had been rumored in Karelia  except to say that the arrangement was being handled by the republic interior ministry (ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/administracia-petrozavodska-priznalas-v-zaklucenii-dogovora-s-nacionalistami/455638).

            Such an agreement is worrisome both for Karelia and for Russia as a whole. For Karelia, it is worrisome because the Russian Community organization there last week openly interfered with a commemoration of the victims of Stalin’s crimes at Sandarmokh and thus appears even then to have had official sanction to do so.

            And for the Russian Federation as a whole, it represents yet another precedent for the integration of bullyboys from the Russian community into the Russian state in ways that will allow Moscow to repress more people but preserve the kind of deniability that unfortunately many in Russia and the west will accept.

            For background on the Russian Community and its activities, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/04/russian-community-is-becoming-orthodox.html and www.jamestown.org/program/russian-community-extremists-becoming-the-black-hundreds-of-today  and the sources cited therein.   

Ukrainian Drone Attacks on Russia’s Water Supply Network Would Lead to Disaster and Moscow would Be to Blame, ‘NeMoskva’ Commentator Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 5 – Because Moscow has failed for 25 years to do much to modernize the water supply networks of Russia, Ukrainian drone attacks on those networks can lead to a “cascading” disaster much as such attacks on oil and gas already have, according to Tatyana Rybakova of the NeMoskva portal.

            It is a good question, she says, just how many parts of that system will have to be attacked to “start cascading decay.” And she asks further “does the Ukrainian military know this?” and does Moscow and its minions?  But increasingly the Russian people can and do (nemoskva.net/2026/08/05/ne-pavodok-vinovat-pochemu-v-rossijskih-gorodah-propadayut-voda-i-svet/).

            Communal services are breaking down in Russian cities not so much because of natural disasters like flooding, Rybakova continues, but because of the inaction of officials in Moscow and in the regions. Experts have been warning that the government needs to act, but despite that, it hasn’t taken the necessary steps.

            Between 40 and 80 percent of the country’s water network has aged to the point that it is ready to collapse when any strain is put on it, either by floods or by drones, she says; but officials are happy to continue to blame flooding rather than address the root cause and thus are leaving Russia open to a new line of attack.

            Two things make this situation especially explosive, Rybakova continues. On the one hand, officials have been only to willing to allow charges for water to rise without using the money collected as intended; and on the other, they have not developed a country-wide grid so that problems in one place could quickly be helped to overcome them by others.

            Russians are increasingly angry about both, she suggests; and if Ukrainian drone attacks exacerbate the situation further, that could lead to an explosion, with Russians connecting the dots and placing the blame where it really belongs: on Putin for his failure to invest in water infrastructure as well as for his launching of the expanded war against Ukraine.

UPDATE:  The Ukrainian authorities have taken notice of these problems with Russia's water supply infrastructure and on Aug. 11 they attacked waterworks in Novorossiisk, leaving tens of thousands of Russians there without water (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/08/12/novorossiisk-ostalsya-bez-vodi-posle-massirovannoi-ataki-dronov-a20326).

 

 

 

Putin’s Call for Developing Online Work Opportunities in Rural Areas By Itself Won’t Hold People There, Three Experts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 11 – To prevent the depopulation of large swaths of the territory of the Russian Federation, something that would threaten the country’s security, Vladimir Putin says he favors using modern technologies so that people who live in rural areas and small cities can work remotely rather than have to move to major metropolises.

            But three experts surveyed by the Regional Comment portal say that such an effort by itself will not prevent the decline of population in rural areas and smaller cities (regcomment.ru/reviews/aglomeratsionnye-svyazi-vmesto-izyatiya-deneg-kak-vyrovnyat-razvitie-regionov-bez-konfliktov/).

            Artemy Vvedensky, head of the Russian Field polling organization, says that Moscow must first of all distinguish two different reasons for rural depopulation: the natural loss of people by aging and the outflow of younger people. Any strategy that focuses only on one of these issues won’t work for all.

            He adds that “according to our research,” young Russians in rural areas and smaller cities “don’t leave for money.” Instead, they seek places where they can interact with others of their own age and interests. Those are more common in larger cities than in smaller ones and especially than in villages.

            And Vvedensky says that the most interesting finding of his research is that once people make a move from a village to a small city, they are more likely to move on to larger ones, having learned that they can adapt and therefore that a further move to an ever larger city or even abroad seems entirely reasonable.

            Stanislav Koryakin, a political consultant who is a member of Russia’s Public Chamber, says that the main task is to avoid trying to hold people “administratively” but rather to “create conditions” under which the decision to remain in rural areas or small cities is “a conscious choice.”

            That will be possible only if the government works to ensure “a comparable basic standard of living, regardless of the remoteness of the territory,” he says, something that is now not being done. And a standard of living involves not just pay but a sense that there is justice for all.

            And Igor Dachenkov, director of the Region Media group, says the government has to think bigger. Even if a young person can work remotely in a village, what will he do if he gets sick and there is no hospital?  Accordingly, the provision of “basic social infrastructure” is more important that creating any “digital environment.”

Over Last Five Years, Number of Ethnic Russians in Estonia has Fallen while Number of Ethnic Ukrainians has Doubled

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 11 – The ethnic composition of the population of Estonia has changed since the 2021 census, according to new figures for 2026 just released by the state statistical office. The number of ethnic Estonians has remained little changed, but the share of ethnic Russians has declined and the number of ethnic Ukrainians has doubled.

            The Postimees newspaper has published a selection of this new demographic data (rus.postimees.ee/8525051/statistika-v-estonii-sokratilos-chislo-russkih-i-vyroslo-chislo-ukraincev), Among the most important of its new numbers are the following:

•  Estonians dominate in all age groups. Among children and young people, the Estonian share exceeds 70 percent; but among the elderly, the Estonian share is lower than that and that of others, including the ethnic Russians, higher.

• The number of ethnic Ukrainians has increased dramatically especially since February 2022 when Putin launched his expanded war against Ukraine. They now form 5.5 percent of the Estonian population.

• Under Estonian law, individuals can change their nationality by applying to the government. Over the last three years, 23,686 have done so, shifting from ethnic Russian to some other nationality.

• 82.2 percent of the population has Estonian citizenship, while 5.5. percent of the population consists of citizens of the Russian Federation and 4.6 percent citizens of Ukraine.

• 65.4 percent of the residents speak Estonian as their native language, 26.9 percent identify Russian as their native language, and 4.1 percent Ukrainian. More than 5,000 identify English as their native language and 4,000 Finnish.

• 
  

Make Federalism ‘Sexy’ Again Now, Free Buryatia Activist Says

Paul Goble     

            Staunton, Aug. 10 – Russia can only make progress after the departure of Putin by becoming a genuine rather than a fraudulent federation, and that can only happen if those who understand that get to work now and make federalism “sexy” again, according to Aleksandra Garmazhapova.

            The founder of the Free Buryatia Foundation who has been in exile since 2022 says that she is convinced that Russia after Putin will “either become a real federation or it will reproduce the empire yet again” and that to have the chance for progress in the future, that is a primary task now (semnasem.org/articles/2026/08/10/make-federation-sexy).

            Despite its name, Russia is not a federation, Garmazhapova says. It was not formed on a voluntary basis, does not offer equal rights to all its components, does not give the federal subjects the power to set and collect taxes on their own, and decide on their own what they and their populations want.

            According to the activist, “regions should have the right to determine their priorities, social, cultural and linguistic. We have this on paper, of course, but in fact, everything is determined by Moscow” and the federal subjects have been reduced to being little more than the executors of the will of the center.

            Garmazhapova says she doesn’t understand either of the two most widely expressed objections to this: those who say the future requires the disintegration of the Russian state as a whole and those who insist that there cannot be any change in borders at all, with some leaving and others forming a new whole.

            The former fail to address the possibility that not everyone wants to leave and that there are disputes among the regions that must be addressed. And the latter fail to recognize that if some people want to pursue independence that is their fundamental right and it must be respected.

“Ideally,” she says, “we should talk about what can be done so that people do not want to leave the federation, because they would have a successful life. Make the federation sexy again” is the principle she wants to see realized rather than tearing the country apart or keeping it together by force alone.

Putin’s Aggression Against Ukraine Arose from the Same Impulse as His Destruction of Federalism at Home, Lea and Taskin Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 11 – Convinced that Russia cannot survive without a single powerful leader, Putin dismantled federalism within the country and then turned to attacking democracies along that country’s peripheries in the hope of surrounding Russia with “a belt of authoritarian states,” Aaron Lea and Boruch Taskin say.

            In fact, the two Israeli analysts of Russian origin argue, Putin’s war against Georgia and then against Ukraine “is not an anomaly but rather a continuation of the same policy in a different theater, one intended to extend what he had done at home to these countries as well (kasparovru.com/material.php?id=6A7B0050D9BBB).

            While the two do not make the point that the only way to ensure that a Russia in the future will not be engaged in aggressive action against its neighbors more or less forever is to ensure the creation and rooting of genuine federalism inside the borders of that state whatever they turn out to be.

            If that does not happen – and the two suggest that the personalist dictatorship Putin offers is congruent with what most Russians think and support – then the future of the world as long as a Russia without a federation in place will be bleak indeed, full of wars designed to transform other countries into something like Russia itself.

            The myth that Putin has promoted and that many Russians accept that autocracy is “a natural necessity” for Russia is currently costing the country its freedom, its blood and approximately 10,000 US dollars annually in income. Indeed, that figure is “the true price of the destruction of federalism and the deathonomics Putin has created.”

            Putin says Russia must be run by a single all-powerful leader or it will disintegrate, Lea and Taskin say; but that is nonsense, however widely it is believed by Russians themselves or even by others beyond the borders of that country implicitly or even explicitly.

            “Counties of comparable size and ethnic diversity – India, Brazil and the United States – exist as stable federations unthreatened by the prospect of disintegration,” the two write. And presumably Russia could exist as a federation however much Putin and his ideologues insist otherwise and however much people accept his words as gospel.

            But, Lea and Taskin says, the survival of Putin’s power vertical is very much in doubt because it is “vulnerable at the very point where any physical process breaks downs. The masses are not disillusioned by logical arguments. Indeed, sanctions, losses and isolation merely reenforce his ‘besieged fortress’ narrative.”

            “Yet that narrative could instantly dissolve in the face of economic paralysis, the disappearance of its arbiter or disillusionment with a war that yields no victory,” the two conclude.” Because that is so, what genuine Russian federalism could look like and how Putin’s approach could be reversed merit more attention than they are receiving.

‘Only Desert in Europe’ Spreading Across Southwestern Russia, Experts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 11 – In northern Dagestan, Kalmykia, and adjoining Russian, “the only desert in Europe” is rapidly spreading as a result of global warming, growing human consumption of water, and poor agricultural practices, experts at the Moscow Institute of Oceanology and the Institute of Land Sciences of the Southern Federal University say.

            Tragically, instead of launching a full-scale attack on the problem, the people in the region have done little because the government has not funded programs that do exist to the necessary level and private entrepreneurs have not acted on their own, Aleksey Baliyev, a Stoletiye commentator says (stoletie.ru/ekonomika/vmesto_zemli__pesok_106.htm).

            The desertification of this enormous territory, he says on the basis of the research at the two Russian academic centers, is not only reducing agricultural production across the once-rich region and even forcing the outmigration of residents who no longer have access to sufficient potable water to survive but contributing to the dying of the Caspian Sea.

            Water flowing in the rivers from the north evaporates or is absorbed by the newly desertified territories and so does not replenish the water of the Caspian now being lost by evaporation and filtration. Because of these broader consequences, any serious anti-desertification effort must be led by the government.

            For background on desertification in Russia in recent decades, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/02/conflicts-over-water-intensify-in.html,  windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/08/climate-change-and-official.html and  windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/11/because-of-global-warming-550-square.html.

Migrant Workers Forced to Change Places of Residence Frequently and Thus Face Xenophobic Russian Attitudes More Often, ‘Russian Migration’ Survey Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 10 – Eight out of ten Russian employers of immigrant workers don’t help them to find and keep housing, and as a result, 37 percent are forced to constantly change where they live, something that exacerbates attitudes both among them and among xenophobic landlords, according to a new survey by the Russian Migration organization.

            In response to this situation, the survey by a group that seeks to defend immigrants found, 43 percent of migrants rely on friends and relatives, something that reenforces their tendency to form ethnic enclaves, or turn to Internet listings, where they like other Russians are often subject to manipulation and exploitation (akcent.site/novosti/45675).

            What this means is that the Kremlin’s effort to reduce the number of immigrants by means other than the use of visas infuriating both non-Russians who are experiencing these aspects of Russian life and ethnic Russian residents who are thus more likely to come into contact with immigrants than would otherwise be the case.

            And what that means is obvious: the means the Russian government has adopted to try to ensure that migrants won’t cause social problems or engage in violence of any kind are not solving that problem but in fact making it worse either directly inside Russia or in the homelands of the migrants if they are forced to return there. 

Increasing Immigration into Russia from Beyond Soviet Space May Lead to Ethnic Conflicts, Shustov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 11 – To reduce danger of ethnic conflicts, Moscow has succeeded over the last two years in reducing the number of migrant workers from CIS countries; but at the same time, it has allowed the number of workers from countries beyond the Soviet space to increase who may also cause problems, Aleksandr Shustov says.

            The number of migrants in Russia from CIS countries still numbers in the millions with the reduction only in the hundreds of thousands, the Russian analyst says, while the number of migrants from “the far abroad” is much lower and the increase miniscule in comparison (ritmeurasia.ru/news--2026-08-11--trudovaja-migracija-iz-dalnego-zarubezhja-v-rossiju-rastet-a-iz-sng-sokraschaetsja-89558).

            But despite that and despite the fact that the new immigrants are far more educated and qualified than those who have come earlier and now are being pressed to leave, Shustov argues that the experience of other countries in the region who have made this shift still are experiencing changes in the ethnic composition of their populations and conflicts as a result.

            In the year ending July 1, he says, the number of migrant workers in Russia fell from seven million to 6.4 million because the number counted as leaving the country exceeded the number entering. That was “the direct result of those measures taken to control migration,” Shustov adds.

            But Moscow could not impose visas on CIS countries lest that lead them to reorient themselves to the West and it could not afford to dispense with all migrant labor because of Russia’s deteriorating demographic situation. Consequently, it used administrative means with CIS countries and allowed more workers to come from beyond the borders of the former USSR.

            The latter category increased by the tens of thousands, he says, even though those involved had to get Russian visas and they were especially beneficial to Russia because in contrast to the largely untrained immigrants of the past, a third of the new immigrants were skilled professionals.

            Many assume that because of those qualities, such immigrants don’t pose any challenges, but that is not the case, Shustov insists. He points to the problems Kyrgyzstan has had as it has admitted more workers from South Asia and warns that if Russia continues to admit such people, it may face “a new sharpening of inter-ethnic contradictions,” that is, conflicts.

            The commentator does not say how Russia will cope if it shuts down both flows of migrants from abroad, but his words suggest that at least some in the Russian leadership aren’t happy about having immigration from beyond the borders of the former Soviet space even if they can regulate it more or less easily by a visa requirement.

‘Gabyshev Went Looking for an Enemy but Returned with Understanding of How to Live without One,’ New Book Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 9 – People around the world have been following the saga of Aleksandr Gabyshev, the man originally styled himself as a shaman but has now rejected that status, since he announced in 2019 that he would walk from Sakha to Moscow in order to expel the Kremlin “the demon,” universally understood to be Vladimir Putin.

            That is the conclusion of a new book by anthropologist and film maker Mikhail Bashkirov entitled “Lightning Illuminations” published earlier this year in Russian by the émigré publishing house Babel according to Gasan Gasanov in a review for RFI Russian (rfi.fr/ru/россия/20260809-семь-лет-пытке-шамана-габышева ).

            Gasanov, a philologist from Azerbaijan who studied and taught in Moscow until leaving for the West a decade ago, says that in his view, Bashkirov’s book is “one of the most important written in Russian over the course of the last decade” and deserves the closest possible attention from Russian audiences and from all concerned about Russia’s future.

            As Homer’s Odyssey teaches, Gasanov says, “the most important thing doesn’t happen when the hero goes on the road as the beginning of the journey is almost always an unrealistic promise. The  real story begins with a return” – in Odysseus’ case to Ithaca and in Gabyshev’s to Sakha.

“Unlike Odysseus, with whom Bashkirov compares his hero,” Gasanov writes, “Gabyshev returns not the winner. He did not reach Moscow, did not exorcise ‘the demon’ and did not overthrow the government. He was stopped on the road, put in a car, taken to Yakutia, and sent for psychiatric examination.”

And yet, Gasanov continues, “it is precisely the return and not the campaign which seems today to be the main event of the story” and contains the most important lesson for Russia and Russians about how they can escape the cyclical experiences of the past once they get beyond Putin.

            Following his detention on the road to Moscow and his return to Sakha, the philologist says, Gabyshev could have admitted he had been defeated. “But Gabyshev himself proposed another way to understand that defeat: he compared himself to a hobbit who returns home and having done so finds new strength.”

            According to him, a hero “is not determined by victory but rather by the ability to survive the fall and then return.”  Instead of starting off again after being put in a psychiatric hospital, Gabyshev changed course.  He denied he had ever called himself a shaman, and he talked instead about pride and humility and his earlier mistake in not recognizing that.

Specifically, he said “revenge is a sin; forgiveness is necessary”—and that is a new and unexpected challenge to Russia because “the question of revenge arises whenever a vengeful cruel regime ends.” What is to happen to those who weren’t the main culprit but nonetheless collaborated with him?

            That matters now and not just in the future: If such people know that “after defeat, they will have the opportuitty to step aside” because people will recognize that the amnesty they will receive “will not be an act of weakness but a strong tool to end the war” all have been a part of in the past.

            By taking this position, Gabyshev did more than he may even have been aware, Gasanov says. If today’s siloviki “know that after the fall of the current regime, they won’t be automatically punished but only those really responsible will, with the rest able to return to normal life, they will have something that no sermon gives: the possibility of choice.”

            An authoritarian system works not just by instilling fear about the possibility of punishment now but about the certainty of it if the regime falls, Gasanov continues drawing out the meaning of Gabashov’s words, because someone can hate those in power but still defend them “if he is sure that after the chief falls, he will die himself.”

            Only if that is understood as Gabashov did can Russia escape from another round of conflict and authoritarian rule given that those defeated now will want to take their revenge rather than repenting and returning to a peaceful life. If Russians pay attention to that, it will give the former shaman a greater victory than any other he might have had. 

Moscow Still Leaving Russian North with Less Food than Its Residents Need and at Prices Few of Them Can Afford

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 8 – Because much of the Russian Federation is located in northern regions which can’t produce enough food to support their populations and lack highway and rail links to the south, Moscow has a system known since Soviet times as “the northern delivery;” but it isn’t managing to deliver the food residents of the north need and at prices they can afford.

            After the demise of the USSR, this highly centralized system collapsed, given that prices were no longer controlled and much of the distribution system was privatized. According to an EchoFM report, the situation reached “a critical point” in the so-called Pevek Crisis of 1921” (echofm.online/stories/neft-dovezut-yabloki-kak-poluchitsya-pochemu-severnyj-zavoz-ne-spasaet-arktiku-ot-dorogoj-edy).

            At that time, more than 20 vessels became trapped in the ice in the eastern Arctic. Officials decided to prioritize the escort and unloading of vessels carrying industrial cargo, leaving those ships carrying food supplied to the north “trapped in the ice for days” and the people they were supposed to deliver the food to without.

            That spurred Moscow to take action. In 2023, the Duma passed the first-ever Northern Delivery law; and in 2025, the Kremin named Rosatom Arctic as the single maritime operator for a 15-year term. But neither of those actions solved the problem. Rosatom continued to give priority to oil, gas and coal that could be exported leaving Northern consumers in the lurch.

            Last year, in fact, food accounted for only six percent by weight of the cargo carried by ships involved in the Northern Delivery. Many locations did not get the total amount of food they had been promised, and both they and others saw prices rise to levels where many of the North’s residents could not afford to buy what was on offer.

            EchoFm convincingly argues that one of the reasons for these continuing problems is “the inherent conflict” of priorities in Rosatom’s business model. Carrying food and related goods to the north is far from its most important task, and not surprisingly, the people of the North are short-changed.

            Unless that changes or unless Moscow imposes tighter control on Rosatom, these problems are likely to continue, accelerating the flight of population from the north, and making it impossible for Russia to develop this region in support of both the Northern Sea Route and the development of the natural resources across this region. 

By Donating to Ukraine War-Related Causes, Russians Accused of Various Crimes Now Getting Off without Punishment, ‘Novaya Gazeta Europe' Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 10 – A prominent feature of the Russian legal system since the start of Putin's expanded war in Ukraine in 2022 has been that Russians incarcerated for various crimes, including the most serious, have seen their sentences mitigated or even voided altogether, if they agree to go to fight in Ukraine, an arrangement clearly set up to fill the depleted ranks of Russian forces. 

            But now, according to a report by Novaya Gazeta Europe journalist Dariya Talanova, this system has expanded in a new and even more disturbing way. In recen ttimes, those who are accused of crimes can often get off without punishment not by agreeing to serve but rather if they make contributions to Ukraine-war related causes (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/08/10/donat-vmesto-sroka).

            That practice, the media journalist says, has grown out of a Russian judicial tradition of reducing sentences in cases where the accused shows remorse by making contributions to charitable causes related to the crimes he or she is accused of such as making contributions to orphanages when these crimes have cost children their parents.

            But in the last several years, she continues, this long-standing practice has expanded to allow those accused of various crimes to have their sentences reduced or voided if they give money to support the Russian fighters in Ukraine or to humanitarian efforts intended to help those who have suffered from the conflict.

            The journalist provides examples of such transactions although admits that she does not know how widespread it is. But if it spreads and becomes more widely known, it is likely to outrage those who have suffered from the crimes people are escaping punishment from simply by giving money to the front.

            Not only will such a development harm the reputation of Russian prosecutors and judges, but it will exacerbate class antagonisms, given that only those with money will be able to buy their way out of punishment. Those without such cash in contrast will either have to accept prison or service in the front lines. 

Iranian Government Wants Country’s Parliament to Ratify 2018 Caspian Accord

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 9 – Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi says his government is sending Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea to its parliament for ratification that Iran and the other littoral states signed in 2018 but that Iran has not ratified in the intervening years.

            This announcement comes only a week before Tehran is slated to host a meeting of representatives of the five littoral states – Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation – in Tehran (iranintl.com/en/202608076370 and timesca.com/iran-moves-to-ratify-caspian-sea-agreement-amid-tensions/).

            Iran has resisted ratifying the accord because conservatives in Tehran say it gives up too much of Iran’s claims to the Caspian; but officials like Gharibabadi say that the 2018 accord only deals with delimitation of the surface of the Caspian and that agreements about the seabed remain to be negotiated.

            Moscow has pressed Tehran to ratify the agreement for many years and will no doubt view this as a major Russian diplomatic victory. (On that history, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/12/moscow-urges-iran-to-ratify-caspian.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/07/moscow-tries-to-work-around-tehrans.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/07/iran-remains-stumbling-block-to.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/12/iran-shows-no-signs-of-ratifying-2018.html.)

            Other littoral states, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in the first instance, will also be pleased because Iran’s ratification will make it easier for them to develop trans-Caspian networks and even oil platforms despite the fact that as Tehran is making clear, the 2018 accord does not directly resolve issues involving them.

Young Russians Increasingly Doubt Their Work will be Adequately Rewarded, Academy of Sciences Study Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 9 – Low levels of official unemployment hide a potentially dangerous trend, according to a new sociological study; and this that economic pessimism among the young is significantly increasing because “nearly 40 percent of the young are convinced their labor will not be adequately rewarded.

            The research, conducted by scholars at the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has been summarized by Mikhail Sergeyev, the economics editor of Moscow’s Nezavisimaya Gazeta (ng.ru/economics/2026-08-09/1_9555_pessimism.html).

            According to the investigation, he says, the widespread view among older Russians that younger people don’t want to work has “deep-seated socio-economic causes” that have increasingly led young Russians to conclude that the existing state of labor relations in Russia is unfair and that hard work will not necessarily be rewarded.

            Among the more intriguing findings of the study, Sergeyev reports is that “’the rally ‘round the flag’ effect sparked by the beginning of the special military operation [against Ukraine in February 2022] was short-lived and that by 2024, it had begun to give way to structural pessimism.”

            Those who have such pessimistic attitudes are predominantly female, have vocation and technical education, and identify in class terms, with one in five of them identifying as lower class and three out of five middle class, a pattern that could lead to a growth in social tensions.

            But as of now, the scholars report, even the pessimists are still very loyal to key state institutions like the president and the army, with slightly more of the economic pessimists among the Russian young than among the optimists saying they trust Putin, 80.5 percent as against 77 percent.

If Mobilization Occurs without Bonuses, Moscow will Have a Deeply Divided Military, Inozemstev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 7 – If the military conducts a mobilization without providing bonuses to the new soldiers, Moscow will find itself with an army “in which 500,000 people are fighting for money and another 500,000 are fighting for an idea which they don’t have,” Vladislav Inozemtsev says.

            “It is impossible to imagine” how anyone could expect that to work, the Russian economist and commentator says, given that members of each of these groups would look at those who are members of the other with suspicion or disdain and not cooperate (echofm.online/video-dnya/hvatit-li-u-vlasti-deneg-na-novuyu-mobilizacziyu-vladislav-inozemczev).

            He says that there is a way out: Moscow could cut back on signing bonuses and even more on death benefits and raise the pay for those soldiers who are sent to the front lines. Most men entering military service don’t expect to die, but they would be far more enthusiastic about doing so if they were paid depending on whether they fought at the front or not.

            But that may be too rational a move for the Kremlin given its confidence that money can solve everything and that now Russians are becoming more patriotic as the war with Ukraine extends into its fifth year, two illusions for which the Russian leadership may very well have to pay dearly in the future.

Only ‘About 15 Percent’ of Orthodox Priests in Russia Support Putin’s War, Mitrokhin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 8 – Many assume that Moscow Patriarch Kirill’s  regular statements of support for Putin’s war in Ukraine set the weather for Orthodox priests and laiety in the Russain Federation, Nikolay Mitrokhin says; but that is not the case: Indeed, “only about 15 percent” of Orthodox priests there actively support the expanded Russian invasion.

            Kirill’s delarations, the scholar at the University of Bremen says, are not so much directed at the priests and believers to get them to accept his position – in Orthodoxy, even a patriarch doesn’t have that right – as a sign to the Kremlin that the Patriarchate as such is loyal to Putin (vot-tak.tv/94741767/rpc-voyna).

            Mitrokhin notes that “Patriarch Kirill is often perceived by analogy with the Pope or Ayatollah Khomeini - as a figure whose words automatically encourage believers to act. However, in Orthodoxy in general and in the ROC in particular, there is no direct connection between the rhetoric of the top leadership and the behavior of ordinary laity.”

            Kirill’s words, he points out, “are addressed primarily to the state power, as a demonstration of loyalty. Their practice influence ends at the church pulpit where the speech was made and the real administrative powers of the patriarch are limited to the boundaries of the Moscow diocese alone,” where Kirill is bishop.

            Most priests avoid talking about the war to avoid sparking conflicts within their parishes, and the Patriarchate does not encourage them to travel to Ukraine or to serve in the ranks of the Russian army. It decided on that course when priests who did early in the expanded war began to die, forcing the Patriarchate to take a public position it preferred not do so, Mitrokhin says.

            Few Russian parishes are enthusiastic about the war or actively involved in getting people to serve there either from their own faithful or more generally, although many more are quite prepared to collect money and goods for humanitarian assistance, something they see as a Christian duty but not an indication of support for Putin’s political goals. 

FSB Tells Circassian Repatriant He’ll Be Sent to Fight and Die in Ukraine Unless He Stops Searching for His Son who Already had Been and was Killed There, ‘Kavkaz-Uzel’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 7 – Kalid Qaraf, a Circassian repatriant from Syria who now lives in Kabardino-Balkaria, says he was called by the FSB and told he would be sent to fight in Ukraine unless he stopped searching for his son who had been and was killed there and talking about the travails of the Circassians inside Russia, according to Kavkaz-Uzel.

            The news agency said it did not have independent confirmation, but both Kavkaz-Uzel and Circassian outlets said it was plausible given the way in which the KBR authorities have put pressure on returning Circassians to fight for Russia and keep quiet about their own aspirations (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/425525, oc-media.org/repatriated-circassian-reportedly-threatened-by-fsb/ and personal communication from editor of Justice for the North Caucasus).

            Kalid Qaraf’s story is particularly heart-breaking. He returned to the North Caucasus homeland with his family. Then his son announced he was moving to Moscow, but he never got there, with Qaraf assuming he had and the Moscow friends that he had not yet come. When Kalid learned that, he tried to find out what had happened, even turning to Russian officials for help.

            The official response was to tell him to stop his propaganda campaign and then to inform him that his son had already fought and died in Ukraine and that unless Kalid shut up, he too would be sent to fight in Ukraine, put on the front lines and suffer a similar fate, a threat that they expected would silence him but that has had the opposite effect. 

            Russian propagandists have now taken up the issue and pointed out to all who will listen that many Circassians who have returned are proud to fight for Moscow in Ukraine. Among them was the son of Kalid Qaraf. Moreover, these outlets insist that all the things that Kalid has said are untrue and politically motivated.

Northern Sea Route Saves Only Half as Much Time for Ships to Travel Between China and Europe as Moscow Claims, Russian Captain Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 7 – One of the reasons so many people around the world look to the Northern Sea Route as a replacement for the Suez Canal is that Moscow routinely claims that the travel time of ships travelling between China and Europe is 20 days less than that of vessels going via the Suez Canal.

            But that isn’t true, Vadim Alekseyev, a retired Russian sea captain says, pointing out that because ships using the NSR operate at slower speeds, the actual saving in time is ten days rather than the 20 the Moscow media claim and that many others accept as plausible and even true given the shorter distances involved (svpressa.ru/business/article/526509/).

            Because of ice conditions and safety requirements, he says, “the average travel speeds on the NSR are lower [than those on the routes through the Suez Canal], about 15 knots versus 20 on the southern routes.” That means that savings in time and fuel “turn out to be less significant” than many think.

            But that is only one reason that the NSR still carries only a tiny percentage of the cargo that passes through Suez, Alekseyev continues. Even with global warming, “unrestricted navigation for standard, that is, non-ice-class vessels is currently possible for only three to four months a year.

            Icebreakers can extend this season but only at much higher costs. And one should not forget, “there are vessel requirements: large capacity contain ships optimized for the Suez Canal are unsuitable for the NSR,” something that “limits the pool of potential participants” via the Arctic route.

            Russia’s existing and planned icebreakers can handle projected cargo volumes on the NSR through 2030, Alekseyev says; but “However, if the NSR begins to attract significant numbers of foreign transit vessels, the strain on icebreakers will increase many times over.”

            But there is an even larger “bottleneck,” he indicates, on the development of the NSR: the state of Russian ports. They lack the capacity to handle significantly larger cargo loads than they do now, not having sufficient docks, repair facilities, dredging operations, and worst of all rail and road links from them to other transportation networks. 

Four European Countries Warn Moscow Against Annexing South Ossetia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 7 – On the 18^th anniversary of Russia’s war against Georgia as a result of which Abkhazia and South Ossetia became partially recognized states, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy have warned Moscow against annexing South Ossetia, something that has appeared increasingly likely in recent months.

            The four warn that such a step “will not remain unanswered” and demand that Russia live up to the ceasefire agreement that ended the 2008 war and withdraw its military forces from South Ossetia and Abkhazia (echofm.online/news/evropejskie-strany-zayavili-ob-ugroze-polnomasshtabnoj-anneksii-yuzhnoj-osetii-rossiej).

            This move has less to do with the anniversary of the Russian-Georgian war than with the fact that in May, Russia and South Ossetia took steps which many observers around the world view as moves that will result in the annexation of South Ossetia, a step that appears to have become more possible given what has happened in Ukraine since that time.

            The four also welcome the decision of the Naoero Republic as Nauru has been officially known since June to end its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. After its decision, only three other countries – Nicaragua, Venezuelaand Syria – besides the Russian Federation continue to recognize the two North Caucasian republics as independent.

            For background on Russia’s decision not to annex South Ossetia up to now, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/06/even-though-moscow-has-not-yet-annexed.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/06/russian-military-base-in-south-ossetia.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/08/both-moscow-and-tsinkhval-have-reasons.html.

Moscow Planning to Build Dredging Fleet to Support Northern Sea Route But Likely to Have to Turn to China for Help as It has on the Caspian and the Volga

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 7 – Global warming and expanded human use have forced Moscow to turn to China and Iran for help in dredging portions of the Caspian and major Russian rivers, but now officials say it will build its own “fleet of dredging vessels” to clear portions of the Northern Sea Route and access to ports in the Russian North adjoining it.

            Russia does not now have such ships; and they will have to be either ice-capable or escorted by icebreakers, making this an enormous and expensive task especially given all the problems Russian ship building in general now has, a situation that may force Moscow to turn to China once again.

            But despite that prospect, Yury Trutnyev, the presidential plenipotentiary for the Far Eastern FD and point man for Moscow’s policies on the NSR, says that Moscow is planning to create its own national “dredging fleet” and that Putin will be signing off on that soon  (prochukotku.ru/news/ofitsialno/dnouglubitelnyy_flot_sozdadut_dlya_raboty_na_severnom_morskom_puti/).

            The task Moscow faces both with regard to the need to dredge along the Northern Sea Route is enormous and was outlined by Rosatom earlier this year. It said that the amount of deposits needed to be dredged and removed will reach 60 million cubic meters over the next five years (en.portnews.ru/news/385647/).

            Rosatom at the time acknowledged that Russia doesn’t have the domestic capacity to handle such an amount, making it likely that Moscow will once again turn to China and that China will thus gain more leverage over Russian policy in the north as siltification increases (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/10/as-russia-falters-in-north-china.html).  

Russia’s Federal Subjects Expand Use of Bounty Hunters to Meet Military’s Manpower Needs, ‘Moscow Times’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 7 – In the past year, the number of Russia’s federal subjects using bounty hunters to sign up contract soldiers for Putin’s war in Ukraine has almost doubled from a year ago to 56 now and the amount these bounty hunters are paid had increased by as much a 1000 percent, The Moscow Times reports.

            Of those regions and republics employing this method of boosting recruitment, the paper says, 38 are doing so by the actions of  government agencies, while in the 18 others, these payments are handled privately through recruitment agencies” (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/08/07/esli-verbovka-ne-srabotaet-budet-mobilizatsiya-dve-treti-rossiiskih-regionov-nachali-platit-ohotnikam-za-kontraktnikami-a202907).

            This system allows the governors to say that there is no federal money being spent and that even the amount of regional money is relatively small; but there is no question that the federal subjects are under enormous pressure to spend it even if they have to cut other spending and that the leaders of these subjects are now pressuring businesses to bear some of the burden.

            This system varies from one region to another, the paper continues. “Some offer a reward to anyone who brings in a contract soldier while others do so only if public sector employees are involved” – and in some places such rewards go only to employees of the siloviki.

            On the one hand, The Moscow Times suggests, this effort highlights the Kremlin’s increasing difficulty the government is having in raising enough men to replace the thinning ranks of Russian forces in Ukraine and the ways the regions have been roped in to ensuring that the flow of men continues.

            But on the other, despite the enormous amount of money sometimes mentioned, experts with whom the newspaper spoke say that even the hard-pressed regions have enough money to continue this arrangement for some time, even to the point of increasing rewards to bounty hunters and the soldiers themselves. 

Interests of Kazakhstan’s Regions Likely to Be Underrepresented in New Parliament Filled by Party List Voting Alone, Kazakh Political Scientist Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 6 -- A potentially serious problem some Kazakhstan analysts raised during the discussion of the ratification of the new constitution which replaced the bicameral legislature with a unicameral one appears to be coming true, Kazakhstan political scientist Bauryzhan Makhanov says.

            Because the reform eliminated the upper house which allocated seats on the basis of the regions and because the government has decided to conduct elections on a party-list basis rather than in single-member constituencies, he says, ever more of the deputies are likely to be from the capital than the regions, even though the voters are in that latter (spik.kz/2675-vybry-v-kurlut-golosuet-to-provinci-a-deputatami-stantic-stolichnye.htm).

            The new arrangements thus exacerbate a problem that has been growing in Kazakhstan as in many other post-Soviet states: most of the voters are in the regions rather than major cities because people in the regions vote in far higher percentages but most of the party-list candidates come from major cities and especially from the capital.

            According to Makhanov, “there is good reason to assume that on August 23 when the elections to the Kurultai take place, turnout in the capitals will be even lower than it was three years ago” when there was at least some local interest in the single-mandate constituencies where there was real competition among individuals known to city residents.

            Indeed, he continues, it “would not be surprising” if the level of participation in the voting in cities reaches its lowest level yet and that, as a result, voters in the regions will play an even larger role in the election of deputies, even though they will be choosing by party list and thus electing people who are more likely to be from the capital than ever before.

            Some on the party lists, even though they come from the cities, claim that they can represent the interests of the regions; but they won’t be doing so on the basis of personal experience and so the regions will be less well represented than they would be if it were the case that people from there were to be serving in the parliament.

            A unicameral legislature and party list voting have much to recommend them; but if they lead to a decline in the attention the government gives to the regions, there could be serious problems ahead – and the possibility that this is going to be so should be recognized and steps taken to ensure more people from the regions are in the parliament. 

Putin’s Healthcare Cuts Now to Hit St. Petersburg

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 6 – Putin’s cutting of government spending on healthcare, something he undertook to find more money for his war in Ukraine and has justified by pointing to how few people many medical points in rural areas serve, has now come to St. Petersburg, yet another sign his efforts to isolate the capitals from such policies is failing.

Leaders of the healthcare committee of the city’s parliament say hospitals there must cut their budgets by 15 percent before the end of 2026, a move that means the pain and suffering Putin’s healthcare “optimization” plan has already inflicted on rural Russians will now their fellow citizens in a major urban area (fontanka.ru/2026/08/06/76574835/ and kasparovru.com/material.php?id=6A7572ED370BD&utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=facebook).

Putin has generally been able to keep the two Russian capitals quiet since he launched his expanded war in Ukraine in February 2022 by recruiting soldiers from beyond their borders and cutting spending in the regions more than in the capital. But this announcement is a clear sign that the Kremlin leader’s efforts to keep the big cities isolated in this way are no longer working.

And that in turn means that residents of these two large cities may protest the cuts inflicted on them and, connecting the dots, on the leader and his policies that have made those draconian budgetary moves necessary. The first such protest in fact may come soon, at the ballot box in September’s Duma elections. 

De-Imperialization and De-Colonization of Russia Absolutely Necessary but Disintegration of That Country Not Currently Possible, Shtepa Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 6 – Vadim Shtepa, one of the leading theorists of regionalism in the the Russian Federation, argues that the de-imperialization and de-colonization of the Russian Federation are absolutely necessary for that country to progress but that conditions do not currently exist for disintegration to be the path toward those goals.

            Not only are most Russians horrified by the idea of disintegration and ready to back those like Putin who say they are committed to defending the territorial integrity of the country , the editor of the Tallinn-based Region.Expert portal says (mostmedia.org/ru/posts/pochemu-raspad-rossii-segodnja-vygljadit-nevozmozhnym and region.expert/raspad-2/).

            But the federal subjects, both predominantly ethnic Russian oblasts and krays and non-Russian republics and other autonomies do not have the active political parties and genuine legislatures that these places did in the late 1980s which calls for self-determination possible if not ultimately successful.

            All the current governors are appointees of the Kremlin, something very different from the conditions of 1991, and all the regional parliaments are “dominated” by the ruling and pro-Kremlin United Russia, given that regional parties have been banned in the Russian Federation since 2001.

            Moreover, unlike at the end of Soviet times when the non-Russians formed nearly half of the population, today, the non-Russians form only half that share at best; and they have not shown themselves willing to adopt radical positions. Only those in emigration are able to do so; and they have far less influence than media coverage, Shtepa suggests.

            What that means is this, he continues. Residents of Russia’s federal subjects should be working to promote regionalism and democracy rather than thinking they can achieve their goals via independence. That won’t happen without these intermediate steps; and those are why people beyond the ring road should be focusing on.

            Until that shift takes place, all the talk about disintegration of the Russian Federation will remain at best wishful thinking that is unlikely to have any serious impact on life in the Russian Federation beyond leading Russians to rally around the Kremlin and opening the way to more repression against them and the non-Russians alike. 

Cyrillic Dot.RF Domain Now Allows 18 Non-Russian Languages to Register with It Using Some of the 25 Additional Letters They Have

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 6 – After refusing since its launch last year to register sites in anything but a Russian language format, the .RF domain has now opened registration to 18 non-Russian languages which use Cyrillic alphabets and allows them to use one or more of the 25 additional letters they use to capture the sounds of their languages.

            One the one hand, this might appear to be a concession to the non-Russians; but on the other, it may set the stage for an internet world in the Russian Federation in which only .rf addresses are allowed, something that would work powerfully against these very same peoples (75.ru/news/452209 reposted at asiarussia.ru/news/51865/).

            But even if things do not reach such a pass, this action adds to the pressures Moscow has placed on non-Russian languages not written in Cyrillic, including most prominently Karelian, which is the only titular nationality of a non-Russian republic that is not a state language within its territory.