Half of Tajiks Who’ve Returned Home from Russia Say They will Seek Work Abroad Again, IOM Study Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 24 – Because economic conditions in Tajikistan are so dire, a third of those who have returned home from working abroad, mostly in the Russian Federation, say they will seek work abroad again, most likely in that country, according to the latest report by the International Organization for Migration.

            The IOM report, based on surveys of more than 2,000 returnees, found that the average income of returnees fell from over 900 US dollars a month when they were working abroad has fallen to just 309 US dollars a month since they returned (tajikistan.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl2216/files/documents/2026-07/iom-tajikistan-annual-report-2025.pdf).

            Those plans mean that many Tajiks who have left Russia often because of official pressure are going to try to come back, creating a serious problem for the Russian authorities and meaning that those Russians who have viewed expulsion as a solution are almost certainly going to be disabused of that idea.

            The income differences and the desire of Tajiks to return to the places of foreign employment, most prominently the Russian Federation, mean that there is no quick solution to this socio-political problem and that Tajiks are likely to find ways to return especially if Russian employers, including the state, need additional workers.

Putin Purging Russia’s Libraries But in a Way that Means the Same Book May Be Treated Very Differently Depending on Who Published It

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 24 – Those who studied the Soviet Union years ago read, will certainly remember Bertram Wolfe’s classic 1969 Survey article, “Krupskaya Purges the Peoples’ Libraries,” an essay that tells the story of how Lenin’s wife imposed an ideological straight jacket on Soviet libraries in the 1920s. And they now have reason to recall that tale

            Putin has been moving against Russia’s libraries as well but ostensibly for different reasons – efficiency and cost effectiveness in the first instance – and has been closing them at the rate of approximately 1,000 a year (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/12/under-putin-russia-has-been-closing.html).  

            And now that his agents are going after specific books, Putin has adopted a policy that is anything but ideologically consistent, frequently treating one and the same book differently depending on who published it rather than what the book contains, according to librarians (ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/prokuratura-komi-iset-v-bibliotekah-nepravilnye-knigi/454599).

            One from the Komi Republic says that this is happening throughout the Russian Federation now, leading to a crazy quilt pattern of library collections. Someone whose local library may no longer have a book published by groups like the Soros organization can find a copy in another library if it is issued by an approved domestic publishing house.

            This frequently happens, the librarian says, because many pre-1917 books and even some issued after that time have been printed multiple times by a variety of publishers and so what is “harmful” and what is “not harmful” in Putin’s Russia as far as libraries are concerned depends as much or even more on publisher than on content. 

Putin Seeking to Reduce Nations to Folklore Alone

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – In the summer months, festivals of various kinds are held throughout the Russian Federation with different ethnic and regional communities showing off their cultural traditions, actions that in almost every case enjoy the enthusiastic support of the Kremlin.

            Many are inclined to accept this arrangement as an indication that Moscow is supporting such groups; but in fact what is going on is something very different: the central authorities are boosting folklore  as part of a general effort to demobilize and strip political subjectivity from these groups.

            Under Putin, regional and ethnic groups have lost much of the political power they had had in the 1990s; and his support for these folkloric extravaganzas has served as a reliable cover as  he has moved against all efforts by these groups to exercise the authority they had earlier.

            (For some of the dozens of recent examples of this process, see nazaccent.ru/content/45737-v-irkutske-bolee-850-artistov-sorevnovalis-v-masterstve-ispolneniya-folklora/, mariuver.eu/2026/07/23/rasken-ozks-v-show/#more-86177, indigenous-russia.com/archives/49123 and arctic.ru/20260722/1620247.html.)

            As a propaganda tactic, what Putin has been doing has worked exceedingly well – many accept that the holding of folkloric events whose he is supporting minorities when in fact he is acting in exactly the opposite way – but there is a danger for him that this process may ultimately backfire.

            Not only do these folkloric events bring together people who may then ask more political questions than he intends, but their appearance reminds even those who aren’t prepared to act at present in defense of the interests of their nations or regions that these communities exist – and ultimately lead them to take action to protect and advance them.

            Thus like so many of Putin’s initiatives, folklorization is a strategy that promises short-term victories for the Kremlin leader but may end by leading to the rise of forces that will result in the defeat of what he is trying to do.

Russia Can Change Itself Not by Changing Policies Alone but Only by Changing the Mechanisms by which Its Policies are Chosen and Implemented, Kovalyev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 23 – Russia has repeatedly fallen into the same set of traps because it has sought to change this or that policy rather than seeking to change the mechanisms and institutions by which policies are adopted, according to economist and commentator Sergey Kovalyev.

            That has meant, he continues, that after a new regime announces its new policies, the country more or less rapidly returns to the situation that produced the earlier ones, leaving the country with “a high concentration of power, weak institutions and limited political competition” (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/07/23/vosem-lovushek-v-kotorie-vsegda-popadaet-rossiya-i-kak-iz-nih-vibratsya-a201566).

            According to Kovalyev, this reflects the fact that Russia continually falls into what he identifies as “eight traps” that prevent it from making and institutionalizing real changes. These are:

First, he says, there is “the historical dominance of the state over society,” a pattern very different from most European countries and one that means the state rather than society is “traditionally viewed as the main subject of history rather than as an instrument of citizens.
· Third, the country’s economy is a rentier one in which the state because most of its income comes from the sale of natural resources abroad is “significantly less dependent on the taxes paid by citizens and businesses,” a pattern that weakens the ability of the population to control the government.
· Fourth, there is a lack of horizontal trust and “informal ties continue to dominate,” something that means that institutions themselves remain weak.
· Fifth, Russia lacks “a coherent image of the future” and continues to argue “not only about the goals of development but also about its own identity.” This “lack of agreement on the rules of political coexistence turns each new course into the denial of the one that went before it.”
· Sixth, Russia is a country of “mobilization modernization,” one that has “repeatedly shown the ability to concentrate resources to achieve major goals” but not to institutionalize these methods when the emergency has ended.
· Seventh, Russia’s political system “traditionally has been built around the personality of the leader much more than around sustainable procedures.” As a result, Russians often seek to find a new strong leader rather than to create “a system in which no leader can destroy what other institutions do exist.
And eighth, Kovalyev continues, Russia’s diversity “does not require administrative uniformity, but an effective distribution of powers and responsibilities between the center, regions and local self-government. Until this happens, federalism remains a form of administrative structure rather than a mechanism of development.”

            What all this means, the analyst says, is that “the future modernization of Russia should not begin with another economic program or the search for a new leader. Rather, it should begin with the design of a constitutional architecture that will make a return to personalized power as impossible, regardless of political conjuncture.

Minority Parties in Duma Succeeding in Getting Their Own Bills Passed and Modifying United Russia Ones, New ‘Club of the Regions’ Report Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – Especially in the period since Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine, few have paid much attention to the role of minority parliamentary parties in advancing their own agenda given that they too have rallied round the flag and generally supported the ruling United Russia Party’s program.

            But a new report by Pavel Skryuanchuk, founder of the Club of the Regions, says that the minority parties are still able to get many of their ideas adopted either by securing the passage of bills they have proposed or modifying government measures in ways that reflect their parties’ agendas (club-rf.ru/detail/7947).

            At the very least, that makes their presence in the Duma more important than many now suspect and at the same time means that any change in their share as may very well occur after the September elections important, this new report, entitled “The Power of the Small,” in fact suggests.

            Dmitry Nechayev, one of Skyanchuk’s colleagues, acknowledges that “in recent years, the subject of small parties in the academic agenda has almost disappeared,” a trend that makes the appearance of this report “an important reminder that these parties are quite involved in legislative work.”

            Dmitry Elovsky, another colleague, goes further. He says that what the new report shows is that “the opposition is learning how to win,” both by security the passage of bills its members produce and modifying legislation offered by the government and United Russia.

            These experts add that the minority parties express their opposition to government measures less by voting against them but by not voting at all. Thus, the share of non-participation in a vote is a far more important indicator of opposition than many suppose. The LDPR leads in using this tactic, with its members not voting in 36 percent of the cases.

More than Half of Russia’s 250,000 KM Oil Pipelines Worn Out and Leaking or at Risk of Doing So in the Near Term, ‘Arctida’ Analyst Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – More than half of Russia’s network of 250,000 km of oil pipelines are worn out and have leaked or are at risk of leaking significant amounts of oil into the environment, according to Raya Levashova. In the case of some Russian companies, those with pipelines leaking or threatening to leak is as high as 80 percent.

            In 2023, the last year for which data on leaks are available, the Arctida analyst who focuses on climate and the environment, says that there were 14,716 oil pipeline ruptures which spilled oil into the surrounding environment, a figure that likely has risen since that time as pipelines have aged still further (arctida.io/en/projects/oil-pipeline-on-thin-ice).

            Oil leaks from ships onto beaches in the southern part of the Russian Federation have attracted a great deal of attention in the past year as have a series of pipeline disasters elsewhere. But the number of such leaks is set to skyrocket as Rosneft pushes to create a new 9,000 km network in the Russian Far North, Levashova says.

            The company says it will begin its first shipments in the Taymyr peninsula in September, although that date may not be met. It has laid only 700 km of track so far. Moreover, the project is over-budget, and it faces special problems because of the melting of the permafrost layer and the distance from services that could ensure protection in he case of spills.

            In 2020, Levashova reports, “the Russian Arctic accounted for 19 percent of all Russian oil production,” a share that Rosneft plans to increase to 26 percent as fields come on line there and pipelines become available to carry the oil from the fields to foreign markets. That build up means there are likely going to be more spills along the way, the analyst says.

            Environmentalists like herself, the Arctida researcher says, are worried that as the project proceeds, the risk of leaks will go up and harm the incredibly fragile eco-systems of the High North.  And they note that the line now being built is based on the assumption environmental conditions will stay as they are. That is clearly wrong and a recipe for disaster, Levashova says.

            Global warming is not only leading to the melting of the permafrost and the increasingly shaky ground across which pipelines pass but also to a decline the difference in temperature between soil and air on which thermosyphons now being installed work less well because they rely on far larger differences than are the case even now.

            As a result, Levashova continues, “at current rates of warming, localized engineering solutions can no longer guarantee the safety and stability of industrial pipelines; the risks of deformation and loss of containment are rising in step with the climate crisis. And that crisis is being worsened in part by the oil being burned after traveling through these pipes.”

            She says that the Russian government has failed to impose the kind of fines that would discourage Rosneft and others from cutting corners and making pipelines more secure. At present, in fact, “it is often more cost-effective for Russian oil companies to pay fines and compensate for damage than to invest” to prevent such disasters.

As Restaurants Close and Economy Worsens, Another Revenant of Soviet Past Appears – the Stolovaya

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – Now that economic conditions are worsening and restaurants are closing or becoming ever more inaccessible to impoverished Russians, a Soviet-era institution that many had thought was gone forever is making a return, the stolovaya or canteen in which poorer Russians can get cheap food.

            Dmitry Akkerman, an analyst for the Siberian Economist, says the return of the stolovaya is especially widespread in Siberia and the Russian Far East because prices for the fresh fruits and vegetables regular restaurants need are going up far more quickly than prices of cheaper things stolovayas provide (sibmix.com/?doc=22119).

            That is because these regions grow few of their own fruits and vegetables and have to bring them in from elsewhere often at increasing expense. The situation is a little better in Russian regions along the Chinese border which can get such products from there; but that source of supply, while increasing, is subject to disruptions.

            Russians still want to eat out or are forced to do so at lunchtimes, Akkerman says; but they can no longer afford restaurants. Those are closing. In the capitals, fast food chains are taking their place because their prices are lower; but elsewhere and especially each of the Urals, stolovayas are.

            Akkerman suggests that this pattern is likely to continue well into the future, something that means among other things that Russians will experience a decline in the quality of the food they consume given that stolovayas as in the Soviet past make price rather than quality the centerpiece of their business plans. 

Moscow’s Policies about Books in Prisons Unwittingly Radicalizing Convicts

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – Prior to 1917, many Russians who became political radicals described tsarist prisons and camps as their “universities,” places where they were able to acquire knowledge about politics. Now, once again, Russia’s detention centers and prison camps are playing a similar role.

            That is because prisoners and former prisoners say, penal policies in Russia today mean that inmates have access to far more books than anyone had suspected. Not only are there prison libraries but books sent to one prisoner remain in his or her cell to be read by others when he or she is moved on.

            As a result, there is always an abundance of reading matter, including some things the authorities may not recognize as a force for radicalism and ones that pass from hand to hand as it were because of the authorities increasing proclivity to move the incarcerated population about and at each stage are forced to leave their books behind.

            With the passing of time, many cells become remarkably large libraries; and many of the books in them by virtue of their own content or the underlining or notes of earlier readers lead a new generation of the incarcerated to get ideas that the authorities beyond doubt would prefer them not to acquire.

            That is just one of the conclusions  one can draw from a remarkable article by activist and journalist Irina Khalip about the state of reading among Russians behind bars, a story that has rarely been told but certainly deserves more attention given its impact on those who eventually leave Russia’s jails and camps (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/07/22/a-chto-tam-u-tebia-za-kniga-byla-chto-vse-menty-v-akhere).

Russian Women who Left in 2022 More Often than Men Driven by Political Considerations, Kartushina Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – While there are no comprehensive statistics about the flight of Russians from their country after Putin began his expanded war against Ukraine and there are no reliable data about the number of women and the number of men in this flow, it is still possible to draw some important conclusions about their differences, Kristina Kartushina says.

            The Posle journalist has interviewed four women who left Russia at that time and concludes that women were “usually driven by political conviction alone” whereas men were often motivated by “the immediate threat of being drafted into military service” (posle.media/article/politics-work-and-care-in-womens-exile).

            Kartushina says that many observers have suggested that women who have left remain “politically disengaged after relocating” and that those who did leave “typically” did so with a financially secure partner.” But neither of these stereotypical images holds up upon examination.

            On the one hand, both before leaving and after doing so, she continues, women have tended to be more politically active than men; and on the other, they often are “more economically vulnerable, face greater obstacles in the labor market, and have narrower professional opportunities” than men.

            Her conversations with the four dispel the myths and show that the women of the latest Russian emigration are quite different than the men as far as their experiences before and after leaving Russia are concerned and that they merit closer observation because of these distinctions.

Russian Hostility Makes Tatar Woman More Attached to Her Own Nation and More Sympathetic to Other Non-Russians

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – In the latest story in its continuing reporting on what is happening among non-Russians, the Horizontal Russia portal tells the story of a young Tatar woman who insisted she was a Russian but who was treated as someone alien by ethnic Russians and only came to accept her own nationality at the age of 25.

            Her experience of parental denial and then hostility from and discrimination by ethnic Russians had two effects, she says. On the one hand, it ultimately led her to identify even more strongly with her own nation than might otherwise have been the case; and on the other, it caused her to be more sympathetic to other non-Russians and less to ethnic Russians (semnasem.org/articles/2026/07/21/nerusskij-mir-alisa).

            Alisa grew up in a family where her father insisted that she was a Russian even though she looked Tatar because he was convinced that “’non-Russian’ means something bad.” When she was a child, she accepted that; but growing up, she experienced such hostility from Russians that she came to recognize she wasn’t one of them.

             Her father was an ethnic Russian who viewed all non-Russians with disdain, while her mother was half German and half Tatar. The girl herself looked like her mother, and her classmates in school not only laughed at her appearance but looked down at her as something less than themselves.

            Alisa says she became ashamed of her looks and tried to do everything to pass as an ethnic Russian to meet the demands of both her father and her fellow pupils. But that didn’t help and she grew up ashamed of what she was and what she apparently would never be able to fully become.

            When she got a job, her coworkers asked her what her nationality was. She suggested they guess. They offered a variety of suggestions but never got it right that she was a Tatar. As a result, Alisa says, she “understood” that they “associated her with all nationalities except Russian” – and she began doing the same thing.

            That led her not only to take pride in being a Tatar but to feeling closer to and identifying with all non-Russians. At the same time, Alisa says, she has come to feel less close to and is less inclined to identify as Russian because so many Russians are hostile to all non-Russians and lump anyone they don’t identify as Russian in that group. 

‘Belarus isn’t Russia’ But Rather a Country ‘Five Minutes Away from Totalitarianism,’ Poczobut Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – Andrzej Poczobut, a Belarusian journalist and activist for the Polish minority in that country who has received a Sakharov Prize in 2025 for his steadfast commitment to freedom despite repeated jailings by the Lukashenka regime, says that “Belarus isn’t Russia” but rather a country “five minutes away from totalitarianism.”

            The activist offered those observations at a meeting in Vilnius this week, his first visit there since his release from a Belarusian prison in April and a session during which he said he is working on a new book about his captivity and his plans to continue to fight for freedom in Belarus (gazetaby.com/post/andzhej-pachobut-belarus-ne-rasiya/215392/).

            Poczubut said that he will return to Belarus because it is belief that while that country today is “five minutes away from totalitarianism,” the actions of Belarusians against the dictatorship have the chance to push that back to ten or even 15 minutes and must view any progress in that direction as a victory.

            Obviously, he continued, what happens in Belarus will depend not only on the Belarusians but on “how the war in Ukraine will develop, how it will end, and what the balance of power in our region will be.”  Given Lukashenka’s recognition that he might lose if he took part in the war, at least the opening of a second front against Ukraine is less likely.

            Lukashenka’s regime consists “mostly” of pro-Russian officials who are prepared to follow Moscow’s line, Poczubut says; but he adds that it is his impression that “Belarus is geographically located in Europe and Politically in Asia, closer to countries like Turkmenistan which has a 100 percent dictatorship.”

            The West needs to recognize that and not to be taken in by Lukashenka’s occasional faints in its direction and must never forget that “Belarus is not Russia and not part of Russia” but a country with its own traditions, interests and needs and will be far better off after Lukashenka passes from the scene. 

Not All Heads of Russia’s MSDs are Muftis with Right to Issue Fetwas, Kazan Mufti Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – One of the sources of confusion among Muslims in the Russian Federation is that the heads of Muslim Spiritual Directorates are typically called muftis even though they are not and do not have the right that those recognized as such have to issue legal opinions or fetwas, Kazan Mufti Samigullin says.

            In the course of a wide-ranging interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Samigullin says that people need to remember that “mufti means ‘he who gives fetwas’” and only those recognized by scholars are such and also that this has been somewhat obscured because nearly all MSD heads are called that even if they don’t have the necessary authority (ng.ru/ng_religii/2026-07-21/7_9542_rel01.html).

            The faithful should check things out concerning fetwas just as they would get a second opinion from doctors in the case of a possible operation, the Kazan mufti says; and they should certainly recognize that there is absolutely no possibility that artificial intelligence will issue fetwas now or in the future.

              Among the other points Samigullin made, the following are especially noteworthy:

 ·       Islam came to Russia before Christian Orthodoxy and thus is not some new arrival but a core part of the country.

 ·       The institution of councils of elders works with the MSDs to block efforts by officials to interfere in the life of the Muslim community in Russia.

 ·       It would be good to have a single MSD for the entire country and that could happen if the state would agree to the convention of a single all-Russian Muslim congress.

Trump’s Captive Nations Week Proclamation Focuses More on Threats in US than on Those Elsewhere

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 20 – Since the US Congress in 1959 required that the president declare the third week of July Captive Nations Week, the content of those declarations have evolved as the world has changed and as US policy has as well. Up until the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the USSR, they focused on peoples being repressed by communist governments there.

            Then, since the victories over communism in 1989 and 1991, these proclamations focused in the first instance on the often tragic situations of peoples living in the remaining communist countries, in particular China. But in the last several years, these presidential messages have moved in two new and very different directions.

            In 2022, then-president Joe Biden broadened the targets of the message from those who continue to call themselves communist to all those who act as the communists have mindful that communism is evil not because of its name but because of its action (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/07/biden-reinvigorates-captive-nations.html).  

In his proclamation Biden made three key points: First, Captive Nations Week is not about anti-communism per se but rather against repression, regardless of what the states carrying it out call themselves. Only three of the regimes he lists among the world’s most repressive are communist – Cuba, North Korea and the People’s Republic of China.

            The other six are either former communist countries or have never been communist – Russia, Iran, Belarus, Syria, Venezuela, and Nicaragua – and it is no accident that the US president listed Russia first among all these countries, not because of its communist roots but because of its continuing imperialist and repressive behavior.

            Second, Biden was explicit that governments which repress their peoples at home as all nine of these countries do seek to repress others abroad through various kinds of repression. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is only the most obvious case of this; and it is no surprise in the current environment that the American president focuses on that.

            And third, and this may be the most important aspect of his message, Biden made it clear that Americans can’t remain unconcerned about such repressive be it within countries or between them and their neighbors. They must “stand in solidarity with the brave human rights and pro-democracy advocates around the world.”

            In his proclamation this week, President Donald Trump goes in a different direction. He does not mention a single country communist or not for attention with one singular and unprecedented exception. He says that the American commitment to the cause of liberty must “hold firm” not just abroad but “at home as well” (whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/07/captive-nations-week-2026/).

            “Today,” President Trump says, “communism remains the gravest threat our Nation faces, and my Administration is confronting it with relentless determination.  Under my leadership, we are defending the sacred rights at the heart of our Republic:  life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the freedom to worship Almighty God without fear.”

“That same promise drives us to usher in a new Golden Age of prosperity, safeguarding the free market that fuels our greatness and unleashing the boundless abundance of our economy for every citizen,” Trump continues, arguing that by “preserving these blessings, America offers hope to every captive people who dream of sharing in them and to the nations yearning to be free.”

 President Trump continues: “For over 250 years, our Nation has stood as the world’s beacon of liberty, and during Captive Nations Week, we vow never to forget the oppressed suffering under communist regimes.  America will never be a communist country, and we will never bow to socialism or the evil ideologies that seek to destroy the essence of who we are as a people and what we stand for as a Nation.”

And he concludes: “We stand with all who yearn to breathe free, are imprisoned for speaking truth, punished for their faith, and denied the abundance that liberty alone can bring.  Together, we will continue to champion peace, prosperity, sovereignty, religious liberty, and human dignity around the world – and as long as America stands, the cause of freedom will never be extinguished.”

Moscow Now Targeting Ukrainian Publishers and Books as Part of Effort to Destroy Ukrainian Culture, Butchenko Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – In the midst of the horrific destruction of Ukrainian cities wrought by Russian rockets, few have noted that among Moscow’s targets are publishers of Ukrainian books, Maksim Butchenko says; but in the last month alone, Russian missiles have destroyed many printing presses and at least 1.4 million books.

            The NV journalist says that Russia is doing this  not by accident as some might think but as part of a concerted effort to destroy Ukrainian national culture; and he calls on all people of good will first to recognize this threat and then work to counter it (nv.ua/opinion/obstrel-kieva-19-iyulya-rossiya-unichtozhaet-ukrainskie-knigi-za-mesyac-utracheno-1-4-mln-ekzemplyarov-50625849.html).

            “When four key objects of book infrastructure burn in less than 30 days” as a result of Russian attacks and when among the ashes are new textbooks on the history of Ukraine,” Butchenko says, no one should dismiss this as an accident of the kind that often happens in wartime.

            According to the journalist, “Russia is fighting not only against our army – it is fighting against our memory. Moscow exported museum funds from Kherson, burned libraries in the occupied territories, threw Ukrainian books out of schools, replacing them with its own methods. Strikes on printing houses simply continue the same logic, but in other ways.”

            And he is blunt in his assessment of where things stand now: “The front of this cultural war is not marked on any battle map; but it exists and we are now losing it.”

            Government support for rebuilding publishing houses and book stores is as important as rebuilding housing. Indeed over the longer haul, it may be even more important because it is about saving not just this or that family but about saving the cultural heritage of Ukraine.

            “If we want the Ukrainian book to survive this war,” Butchenko concludes, “we can’t wait until after victory or until the next budget year. Instead, we must act now while the heart of culture is still beating.” Otherwise, Russia will gain a victory larger than on any other battlefield.

Globalization, Not Just Russianization, Leading Young Tatars to Stop Using Their Language, Shaykhin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 20 – The Moscow-orchestrated Russianization of the Tatars has been going on since the 1930s, Aydar Shaykhin says; but in recent decades, that process has been compounded by globalization and the ways in which information is disseminated via the world wide web especially among the young.

            Between the last two censuses alone, the head of the Kazan Museum of the History of Tatar Literature says, the number of people claiming to speak Tatar declined by a million from 4.3 million to 3.3 million, with most of the losses coming among the young outside the republic rather than inside and in Kazan rather than outside the republic (evening-kazan.ru/obshhestvo/articles/meynstrim-predpolagaet-postepennoe-umenshenie-nositeley-tatarskogo-yazyka).

            What that means, Shaykhin, who also serves as the vice president of the World Forum of Tatar Youth, continues, is that the struggle to save Tatar as a widely used language must proceed on two fronts, not only against Moscow’s longstanding Russianization efforts but also against the impact of globalization.

            Many people talk about the former but neglect the latter, he suggests; but that needs to change and Tatars who want their language and nation to survive must now work to make Tatar a language that is at home on the Internet and that Tatar young people can use when they go online.

            That is a battle, he suggests, the Tatars can win; but to do so, they must first recognize that the challenge from globalization may now be as great or even greater than from Muscovite Russianization. Unless that happens and soon, the falloff in the use of Tatar will accelerate still faster. 

Kremlin-Supported Fantasy Novel Posits a World in Which Top Leaders have Been Killed, Putin is Recovering from Wounds, and Moscow has Reassembled the Empire

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 20 – Taking advantage of widespread Russian interest in fantasy novels about the future, the Kremlin has supported some with prizes and other kinds of backing to ensure that its preferred image of “a bright future” for Russia reaches a large audience, according to Anastasiya Zhigulina.

            The Bumaga journalist says that instead of simply taking books off shelves by means of censorship, the Russian authorities are sponsoring books about the war and the future, the kind of fantasies that polls suggest as many as a third of all Russians currently want to read (paperpaper.io/z-fantastika-kak-obraz-svetlogo-budush/).

            Zhigulina gives a number of examples of such books. Perhaps the most intriguing is one by Moscow IT specialist Olga Uskova entitled The Studies of Cherny. It centers on the fallout from a terrorist act that kills the leaders of the Big Seven who are replaced by underlings. In it, Putin is recovering from his injuries.

            But working with artificial intelligence, and and his government succeed in forcing other countries to replace leaders hostile to Russia with others who want to cooperate with it. That, Uskova says, allows Moscow to fight those with an LGBT agenda and lead a war against opponents of Christianity. Uskova says she sold 50,000 copies in four months.

Almost equally interesting is a second called The Church that Vrubel Painted by Kaluga writer Timur Suvorkin who last year won a major prize (300,000 rubles) in a competition Moscow supported in which novelists were asked to describe Russia 20 to 25 years from now. His novel also begins with the victory of Russia over Ukraine and the formation of a new Union of Fraternal Peoples on the model of the former Soviet Union.

Commenting on these and other such political fantasies, Zhigulina says that Russians really are interested in fantasy literature but not in this particular kind. Many Russians in fact say they can see right through such fiction and aren’t prepared to allow themselves to be led by the nose through it.

Ethnic and Regional Identities in Sakha Intensifying among Ethnic Sakha and Ethnic Russians Living in That Republic, Sociological Survey Shows

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 20 – The Moscow Institute of Sociology posted on its Facebook page yesterday a summary of an article that appeared in its journal last year showing that ethnic and regional identities are on the rise in Sakha among both ethnic Sakha and ethnic Russians and that both groups favor greater autonomy from Moscow.

            Ekaterina Arutyunova’s article, “Ethnicity and regionality in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): the significance and content of identities under external pressure” [in Russian], Vestnik instituta sotsiologii, 16: 1 (2025): pp. 13-29, is summarized on Facebook at facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0ekV6xf5GJNm4nYgXspCzaN3oKrTfnFYpkKsEZKaokk8KXauJKNqBgJccKFGfSnVXl&id=100064692787010. The full text is available at vestnik-isras.ru/files/File/Vestnik_2025_52/Arutyunova_13-29.pdf.

            Both the decision of the Institute to post information now about this article by one of its senior researchers and the findings Aryutyunova are important, suggesting that the ethnicization and regionalization of identities in Sakha and likely elsewhere in the Russian Federation are intensifying and that the Institute wants her work to gain more attention.

            Those with an interest in these topics should go back to the original article; but the summary the Institute has posted on Facebook now is fair and merits reporting as an indication of what that Academy of Sciences body is thinking and wants others to pay attention to at the present time.

            The summary of the article suggests that “the ethnic identity of the Sakha people (ethnic Yakuts) remains consistently high and subjectively significant” and that “among Russian Yakuts its level is rising as well.” For both groups, the most important component of identity is native language.”

            The article specifies that religion is an increasingly important component of ethnic identity in Sakha and notes that for ethnic Russians there, “the statehood and history” they share with ethnic Russians across the country is “significantly important,” not surprising given the intertwining of ethnic and civic identities for that group.

            According to Aryutyinova, “regional and local identities are also very significant for ethnic Yakuts;” and she adds that “high level of regional identity” was also part of the identity of ethnic Russians living in the republic.  Both Sakha and ethnic Russians say they believe that “all citizens of Russia should have equal rights.”

            But, the summary notes, “more than a third of the Sakha agree with the position that "representatives of the indigenous nationality should have more rights in their national republic than representatives of other nationalities." That position could lead to unequal treatment, but the article suggests it may reflect fears of losing their ethnic identity.

            Both groups overwhelmingly believe that “it would be good for the peoples of the republics to have more independence;” but at the same time, both say that “it is important to prevent the growth of influence of outside actors hostile to Russia” who are exploiting “the so-called anti-colonialist and anti-imperial agenda” of some.

Gas Crisis Forcing Many Russians to Turn to Problem-Plagued Public Transport

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 20 – Not surprisingly, Russians who are unable to get gas for their cars are turning to public transportation, only to discover that that system on which they generally had to rely is suffering from serious problems and that these problems which they had ignored because of their cars have seriously intensified since Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine.

            That is the conclusion of an Important Stories investigation written up by the portal’s journalist Rina Nikolayeva who says there do not appear to be any quick fixes and that Russians without gas are often without bus service as well (istories.media/news/2026/07/20/v-35-regionakh-rossii-podnyali-tseni-na-proezd-ili-sokratili-marshruti/).

            In 25 federal subjects, she writes, public transportation operators, both private and governmental, have raised prices since the gas crisis began, a natural response given that they are having to pay more for fuel as well; and in 10 more regions and republics, these services have reduced the number of routes and the frequency of buses.

            “Public transport,” Nikolayeva continues, “can work normally only when the local authorities treat it as a vital infrastructure like sewage or water supply and allocate enough funds from the budget for its development and operation.” But a present, “the level of underfunding is catastrophic.” And Russians are increasing left with no transportation options.

            The gas shortage crisis is only one of the reasons for this, the Important Stories journalist says. There is also a serious shortage in the number of drivers, many of whom left that service to fight in Ukraine given the large bonuses the state offered for those who volunteered to do so. But as a result, there simply are no drivers for many buses.

            This isn’t a headline-grabbing kind of development, but it almost certainly plays a role in the rising anger Russians now feel about their situation and the declining approval they are giving to Vladimir Putin, the person whose policies including the expanded war in Ukraine is behind it.