Russian Supreme Court has Now Defined What the Imaginary International Satanist Movement Believes

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 22 – A year ago, having earlier denounced the international LGBT+ movement as extremist, the Russian Supreme Court did the same thing with the International Satanist Movement. Now, the First Department media group has gained access to a new document in which the court describes this non-existent group is about.

            On its telegram channel, First Department reports, it has gained access to an as-yet-unpublished court decision describing how what things allow Moscow to identify a group as satanist and how this non-existent group is linked to other movements, many of which are real (https://t.me/deptone/18070 reposted at echofm.online/news/pervyj-otdel-uznal-kakuyu-simvoliku-verhovnyj-sud-schitaet-sataninskoj).

            According to the journalists, the Russian Supreme Court declares in its unpublished paper that the symbols of the International Satanist movement include “an inverted Christian cross, an inverted pentagram (two rays up) and an image of Baphomet, a human-like creature with a horned animal head, most often a goat or a ram. It also described modifications of this symbol: a pentagram in a single or double circle, a seven-pointed sign and the number 666.”

            The court also said in this decision document that “the Satanist movement is closely connected with the manifestations of radical nationalism and neo-Nazism,” as can be seen by the fact that followers of Satanism use the swastika, stylyzed eagers, runic signs, and SS symbolism.”

            What makes all this so dangerous, human rights lawyers say, is that it gives Moscow the opportunity to punish people who may be completely unaware that that the symbols they use are forbidden since the specific content of the ban on the non-existent organization has not been made public.

Tuvan Women’s Movement Seeks to Unite Women of All Non-Russian Nations against Common Problems

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 24 – The Tuvan movement, Chavaga Media, has announced plans to launch on March 8, International Women’s Day, a program for women in all the non-Russian regions and republics to protect themselves against phenomena like stalking and the use of sexualized deepfakes without the consent of those pictured.

            Chavaga is dedicated to the life and history of women in Tyv, has organzed exhibits and meetings in that republic, and has a bilingual telegram channel with some 13,000 subscribers (t.me/chavaga_media/5217 and semnasem.org/news/2026/10/24/fem-media-iz-nacionalnyh-respublik-zapustili-proekt-po-bezopasnosti-zhenshin).

            This effort builds on the anti-war efforts of various women’s groups in the last several years to protest Putin’s war in Ukraine and its excessive use of non-Russian men to fight it, but it represents a new development in that it is explicitly directed at uniting non-Russian women against common problems women face everywhere.

            As such, and because this effort is being carried out by people on the ground rather than those who have been compelled to flee Russia, it deserves close attention, something it hasn’t received much of outside of Russia so far because Tyva is so far from Moscow and because Chavaga has focused on everyday issues rather than bold proclamations.

            A perusal of its telegram channel -- t.me/chavaga_media/ -- highlights just how much can be accomplished with this approach and how it even more than some émigré actions can do to lay the foundation for national and pan-national movements now and in the post-Putin future. 

Predominantly Ethnic Russian Regions have Highest Shares of Pension-Age Residents while Non-Russian Areas have Lowest, ‘To Be Precise’ Portal Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 23 – Predominantly ethnic Russian oblasts and krays have the highest shares of pension-age residents in the Russian Federation, the result of lower birthrates and the departure of younger people from thefor work in major cities, according to the To Be Precise portal.

            Non-Russian republics in the Caucasus, Southern Siberia and the Far North in contrast have the lowest share of retirees among their populations, the result of higher birthrates in the first, lower live expectancy in the second, and the departure of those about to retire to warmer areas, the portal continues (tochno.st/materials/gde-v-rossii-samaia-vysokaia-dolia-liudei-pensionnogo-vozrasta-karta-regionov).

            The differences between the federal subjects with predominantly ethnic Russian populations and those which are non-Russian is large, with most of the former having more than 20 percent of their population being above retirement age while most of the latter having less than twice that.

            Moscow ranks in the middle because while its people on average liver longer, their share of the population is kept down by the constant influx of workers from other regions.  The article also notes that more than two thirds of all retiree age people in Russia are women, largely the result of gender differences in longevity.

            In the Russian Federation, women live on average 11 years more than men do, an abnormally high difference compared to other countries. According to To Be Precise, only two years of this reflects biological differences, the rest is the product of behavioral ones, including alcohol consumption and accidents among working-age Russian men. 

Russian Courts Now Act Cruelly Not Because They are Instructed to Be But Because They Fear Exposure as Not Being Cruel Enough, Maksimov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 22 – The imposition of extraordinarily harsh sentences in a series of cases in Russian courts calls attention to a dangerous development: Prosecutors are asking for such punishment and judges are imposing it not because they have been instructed to do so but because they are afraid of being humane, Andrey Maksimov says.

            Under current conditions, the journalist argues, any judge or prosecutor who shows mercy puts himself at risk of being denounced as helping the enemies of the state, a fear that means as long as the situation continues, ever more draconian sentences are likely (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/10/22/o-strakhe-byt-ne-zhestokim).

            That puts in motion a system in which court officers will compete with one another to show how tough and cruel they can be, not because they are being instructed to do so but because the system Putin has put in place makes such a spiral of official cruelty ever more likely and not something that those who launched it can easily reverse.

            These arrangements echo those in Stalin’s time, not as described by Arthur Koestler in Darkness at Noon as a tightly controlled system that carried out the will of one man but rather the one outlined by Victor Serge in The Case of Comrade Tulayev in which the fear of not being cruel enough takes over, a situation even dictators can’t stop at least for a time.

Moscow Patriarchate Sets Rules for Those in ‘Ukrainian Schismatic Structures’ who Want to Join ROC MP

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 22 – In response to requests from its priests in Russian-occupied portions of Ukraine, the Moscow Patriarchate has adopted rules governing requests for membership in the ROC MP by laity and priests in what it calls “Ukrainian schismatic structures,” the largest being the Orthodox Church of Ukraine which was granted autocephaly by Constantinople in 2018.

            The patriarchate’s decision lumps together the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church that was established in 1921, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, the first two of which are small groups who have followed individual leaders (rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=122401).

            The third, which now rivals the Moscow church in Ukraine, arose when the Ecumenical Patriarchate extended a tomor of autocephaly in 2018. Those who are part of it must be told that “by being on the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church, you can be in the fullness of church communication only in unity with it.”

            The most important provision of the new rules is that members of the laity who want to make this transition must be cleared by the local bishop or his representative and that members of the priesthood in schismatic churches can only be admitted as lay members of the ROC MP. Those who have been monks in the schismatic structures can be admitted only as laity but can be cleared to become monks in the ROC MP upon checking by the ROC MP.

            Those originally baptized by the Moscow church and who then fell into schism will have their baptisms recognized while those baptized by the schismatics, the Moscow Patriarchate says, will have to be baptized by the ROC MP. Those who belonged to the Roman Catholic Church or Protestant denominations before joining the schism will join the ROC MP, “according to the rules for the denomination to which he belonged before joining the schismatic group.”

            These new rules will almost certainly lead those in the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine to resist absorption by the ROC MP and quite possibly will spin off new “schismatic” groups who will accept some but not other of these rules, inevitably complicating the process even where Russian troops are in control.

Moscow Patriarchate Bans Priests from Speaking in Public without Advance Permission

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 22 – The Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has added a new requirement in the oath its priests take. From now on, the new language specifies, Russian Orthodox priests won’t be allowed to speak in public without advance permission from their superiors.

            Specifically, the new language reads as follows: “Do not speak publicly on behalf of the Church without the blessing of the priesthood, to prevent statements discrediting the Orthodox Church or distorting its teachings when speaking in the media and when using the Internet space (including social networks and other social media” (patriarchia.ru/article/123480 and svoboda.org/a/rpts-zapretila-svyaschennikam-publichno-vystupatj-bez-blagosloveniya/33881824.html).

            This decision comes in the wake of public remarks by some Orthodox priests about church and government policies and represents the latest tightening of Mosocw Patriarchate control over the priesthood. It remains to be seen whether it will be applied retroactively and whether it will lead to mass expulsions or resignations.

Russian Orthodox Church in Lithuania Outraged by Calls to Require It Subordinate Itself to Ecumenical Patriarchate

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 22 -- Relations between the Lithuanian government and the Russian Orthodox Church in Lithuania have been far less fraught than those between the Estonian and Latvian governments and Orthodox hierarchies in those two Baltic countries, at least in part because the share of Lithuanians who are Orthodox is so small, less than five percent.

            But since the start of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, relations between the state and the Orthodox Church in Lithuania have deteriorated, at least in part because the church remains canonically linked to the Moscow Patriarchate and its leaders usually but not always follow that patriarchate’s line.

            That led some Orthodox priests there to appeal to the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople to form an alternative Orthodox see in Lithuania by creating a Constantinople exarchate for it, something Bartholemew completed during a visit to Vilnius last summer (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/06/ecumenical-patriarch-completes-process.html).

            Some expected that would leave Lithuania with two Orthodox churches much as Estonia has had, but now there are signs that Vilinius is about to follow Tallinn and will seek to force the Russian Orthodox Church there to break with Moscow and align with Constantinople or face a ban.

            Not only has the Lithuanian government declared the Russian church in Lithuania a threat to Lithuania’s national security, but two bills have been submitted to the parliament that would lead to the confiscation of ROC MP property in Lithuania and to declaration that the only permitted Orthodox church in Lithuanian would be one which submits to Constantinople.

            Not surprisingly, the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has expressed outrage at even the consideration of such measures, but it is unclear what it can offer except prayers, although it is possible that the Russian government will intervene to prevent its church in Lithuania from being driven underground or disappearing.

Russian Justice Ministry to Publish Lists of Russians who’ve Fled Abroad to Avoid Punishment for Crimes

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 22 – Russia’s justice ministry has announced that it will be posting a list of Russian citizens now living abroad and thus are evading sentences imposed by Russian courts, analogous to the foreign agents list already maintained by the Russian government but one that appears to be even more threatening to those put on it.

            Deputy Justice Minister Oleg Sviridenko says those put on this new list will be subject to “the blocking of accounts and property in Russia, the banning of registration of real estate and cars, obtaining loans, using remote banking services, as well as registering IPs and self-employment” (tass.ru/obschestvo/28240571 and ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/minust-rf-sozdast-publicnyj-reestr-rossian-skryvausihsa-ot-nakazania-za-granicej/460262).

            Moreover, the deputy minister says that these restrictions will go into effect the moment an individual is put on the list, something that the justice ministry will decide upon on recommendation from the interior ministry, the FSB, the federal bailiffs service, of the Procuracy General.

            According to Sviridenko, there is a way for those put on the list to get off it. “If the perpetrator is ready to return, admit mistakes and suffer well-deserved punishment, he has the right to restore his rights but if he hides abroad and doesn’t take responsibility for his actions, the restrictions will remain in place.”

            Rights activists say that this is yet another measure intended not only to put those who may fall in this category on notice but to intimidate others, both those who have left Russia and those who may be thinking about it because the Russian government can always convict people in absentia and then argue that “the convict” has fled Russia to avoid punishment. 

Moscow Files Charges Against KPRF Politician from Komi Republic who Acted Like a Regionalist Leader

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 21 – One of the greatest fears the Kremlin has about its party system is that the nominally opposition parliamentary parties will begin acting like the regionalist parties that Putin banned at the start of his rule and thus threaten to revive some of the center-periphery tensions that roiled Russian politics in the 1990s.

The case of Sergey Furgal, an LDPR member who served as governor of Krasnoyarsk and whose dismissal sparked massive protests there, is the most well-known; but the situation in the Komi Republic may be even more significant because the KPRF there as a whole has been acting as a regionalist party de facto, protesting Moscow for its plans to build a dump at Shiyes.

(For background on the way in which that parliamentary party in the Komi Republic transformed itself into a regionalist force and how Moscow has worked sometimes with success and sometimes not, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/03/despite-law-against-regional-parties.html.)

In an indication of just how concerned Moscow is about such a possible trend, the case of a Komi KPRF leader is instructive. Oleg Mikhaylov, who helped organize the Shiyes protests and served as head of the KPRF fraction in the republic parliament, served in the last Duma but now has been forced out and charged with a serious crime.

Mikhaylov has been charged with “public calls for terrorist activity, its justification and propaganda on the Internet” by Moscow officials. If he is convicted, as is likely, he could face a prison term for five to seven years (komidaily.com/2026/10/21/v-moskve-zaderzhan-oleg-mihailov/ and thebarentsobserver.com/news/former-member-of-state-duma-from-komi-republic-detainednbsp/460309).

This case likely marks the end of Mikhaylov’s political career, but it is more important as a warning to other parliamentarians in the federal subjects that Moscow will not only seek to drive them out of politics as it tightens central control but send them to prison for good measure, an implicit indication of the strength of regional attitudes and Moscow’s fears of them.

17 of 20 Russian Federal Subjects Where Homelessness or the Threat of Homelessness is Greatest are East of the Urals, ‘To Be Precise’ Calculates

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 21 – No one knows how many homeless there are in Russia as Moscow doesn’t conduct a census of the homeless or report data about this category although estimates suggest at least two million Russians are without a roof over their heads (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/11/russia-now-has-two-million-homeless-and.html).

            The To Be Precise portal has come up with perhaps the best estimate of the size of the problem not directly but by using 15 data sets that are published and that are related to homeless or the threat of homelessness (tochno.st/materials/gde-v-rossii-vyse-risk-ostatsia-bez-doma-reiting-regionov-ot-esli-byt-tocnym-i-noclezki).

            These fifteen are divided into five groups: the first concerns income and employment, the second the concentration of people at risk because of debts, past imprisonment or recent moves, the third, overcrowding and emergency housing, the fourth, mortality from diseases common among the homeless, and the fifth, “the strength of family ties in the region.”

            Using these metrics, the portal said, it concluded that homelessness or the threat of homelessness is greatest east of the Urals, where 17 of the worst regional situations are, and least in the North Caucasus, where family ties remain strongest and relatives are more likely to take in people who lose their housing than is the case elsewhere.

            In the middle of the rankings are Moscow and St. Petersburg, the portal says, with higher incomes and lower unemployment pushing risks down but income inequality and the high cost of housing pushing the figures in the opposite direction. But there the problem that does exist is especially serious because “there are almost no emergency housing and few prisoners.”

             To Be Precise notes that “seven of the 85 regions have no homeless shelter. There are no public shelters in twenty regions. If a person loses housing in a region where there is not a single shelter, and in winter the temperature drops below -25 ° C, the chances of surviving on the street are much less.”

Lacking Funds, Russia’ s Federal Subjects Cutting Back Payments to Those who Sign Military Contracts and to Families of Those who Die in Putin’s War in Ukraine

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 22 – In recent weeks, the governments of numerous Russia’s federal subjects have cut back the payments they have been making to get men to sign military contracts or to survivors of those who have died in Putin’s war in Ukraine, sometimes by enormous amounts and without advance warning.

            Earlier this month, for example, St. Petersburg cut its one-time payment to those who sign military contracts from 3.5 million rubles to 1 million , and other regions and republics have cut by as large or even larger percent (svoboda.org/a/v-rossii-sokraschayut-vyplaty-za-voennye-kontrakty-i-gibelj-na-voyne/33879626.html).

            A similar trend involves regional payments to survivors of those who have lost their lives in Ukraine. In Saratov Oblast, such payments have been reduced by 90 percent; and in Orenburg Oblast, which had paid out one million rubles for such losses, they have been eliminated altogether.

            So far, payments by the federal government for those who sign up or who die have not been reduced or eliminated; but the governments of the federal subjects, who in many cases were offering more than even Moscow, have been forced to take this step because they simply don’t have the money needed to continue to pay out such amounts.

            The reduction in bonuses offered by regions is going to make it more difficult for Moscow to meet its recruitment quotas, although it may be that differences in cutbacks of such payments among regions will lead to yet another form of Russian tourism, with those who want to sign up going to places where payments are highest.

            But families of those who have lost loved ones in Putin’s war do not have that option, and they are likely to become especially angry given what they were very publicly promised in the case of a death and what they are now not going to get, a shortcoming made even more infuriating because it has been done without public explanation.

Governments of Russia’s Federal Subjects Lack Funds to Hire and Hold Even Key Officials, Kalechev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 21 – Many of the increasingly hard-pressed governments of Russia’s federal subjects lack the funds to hire and hold even key officials, Konstantin Kalachev says, losing out in the competition for such people to businesses and thus increasingly unable to perform either their own mandated responsibilities or tasks Moscow assigns them.

            The head of the Political Experts Group focuses on the situation in Tatarstan, in fact one of the regions  that is relatively better off, to point out the fact that even Kazan can’t offer salaries to attract and then retain the staff it needs (regcomment.ru/regions/rossiya/tatarstan-kak-zerkalo-kadrovyj-defitsit-stal-federalnoj-problemoj/).

            “The shortage of qualified personnel in the public service there is really creating risks to the quality and efficiency of management, makes it more likely that deadlines won’t be met, and can be accompanied by an increase in the threat of corruption,” Kalachev continues. As such, it “is not only a republic problem but also a federal one.”

            According to the specialist on regional affairs, this problem requires “not only an increase in the level of wages to competitive values but also a comprehensive improvement in working conditions, incentive mechanisms, a reduction in the burdens on the bureaucracy, a change in management culture, and expanded career opportunities.”

            In the short term at least, shortages of key officials in the regions means that Moscow has to intervene even more often than would otherwise be the case because it can’t count on the regional bureaucracies to carry out its will – or alternatively, the center must be willing to see a decay in governance across much of the country. 

Non-Russians Speak about Putin’s War Very Differently and More Bluntly when They Use Their Native Languages than When They Use Russian, ‘Novaya Gazeta Europe’ Investigation Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 20 – Non-Russian speak about Putin’s war very differently and more bluntly and negatively when they use their native languages than when they use Russian, according Dalya Talanova, a data journalist for Novaya Gazeta Europe who oversaw a study of 800,000 comments on 21,700 channels of the VKontakte network.

            Overwhelmingly, she suggests, non-Russians when using Russian to make comments on VKontakte follow the conventions about Putin’s war that Moscow insists on; but when they use their native languages, they behave very differently (novgaz.com/index.php/2-news/4303-«пусть-тяжелая-земля-станет-легкой»).

            At the same time, she makes clear that more than 90 percent of non-Russians commenting about the war use Russian rather than their native languages, a pattern which means that those who do use native languages have already made a political choice and that likely carries over into their evaluations of the war.

            Few of them use the euphemism “special military operation,” most call the war a war, and many introduce religious or ethnic terms which show how horrified they are by the conflict and its human costs. For these people, who live in republics from which the Kremlin drew so many soldiers, the war is personal; and they use their native languages to underscore that point.

            Talanova gives example after example of this pattern, an indication that non-Russians clearly feel that they can be far more honest in expressing their views and feelings when they use their native languages than when they use Russian, likely because Moscow monitors the non-Russian texts less closely – and non-Russians know that.

New Film in Ukrainian and Polish Stresses ‘Special Place’ of Ukrainians within Promethean Movement

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 18 – To the outrage of some in Moscow (ritmeurasia.ru/news--2026-10-18--polskij-prometej-zhazhdet-krovi-91034), a new film in Ukrainian with Polish subtitles has appeared in Poland stressing “the special place” Ukrainians occupied in the Promethean movement in the 1920s and 1930s and why it continues to play that role.

            The 77-minute film, which features the commentaries of Pawel Liera of the Warsaw Institute of National Remembrance and Valentyna Piskun of Kyiv’s Institute of the History of Ukraine, tells the story of the Promethean League and Ukraine’s place in it. It is available at mieroszewski.pl/wiedza/dokumentalnie/polska-i-ukraina/prometeizm-zapomniany-projekt-przeciw-rosyjskiemu-imperializmowi.

            For background on Prometheanism and its continuing influence in Eastern Europe and on the territory now occupied by the Russian Federation and other former Soviet republics, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/04/prometheanism-showed-that-joint.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/12/revival-of-prometheanism-outrages.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/07/intermarium-idea-whose-time-is-coming.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2013/01/window-on-eurasia-polish-attention-to.html.  

Kremlin Propaganda has Done Something Worse than Generate Support for War in Ukraine, Kuleshova Says; It hadesgs Destroyed Ability of Russians to Make a Moral Assessment

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 19 – Many people suggest that Kremlin propaganda has effectively generated support for Putin’s war in Ukraine, but in fact, it has not done that, Anna Kulashova says. Instead, it has done something far worse: it has destroyed the ability of many Russians to make a moral assessment of that conflict and much else.

            Kremlin propaganda, the Russian sociologist who has worked in Luxembourg since 2022 says, has not “zombified millions of people and turned them into aggressive and ideological supporters of the armed conflict” (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/10/19/tsinizm-lukavogo-cheloveka).

            Polls have shown that the number of convinced supporters of Putin’s war is still about 22 percent, a figure roughly equal to the number of convinced opponents, she continues. Many more simply refuse to make any judgment and thus go along with whatever the regime wants because they no longer feel themselves capable of assessing things for themselves.

            One of the most powerful tools of Kremlin propaganda, she suggests, is the notion of “whataboutism,” the promotion of the idea that since things are far from perfect outside of Russia, “we [in Russia] can do everything” and thus conclude that “we are doing everything right.

            In this way, she says, “attention is shifted from one’s own acts to the motives and sins of those who criticize that individual.” And when the state promotes this view of the world or supports it by monetarizing death and suggesting that war is the eternal state of mankind, it deprives people of their own moral foundations and thus the basis for right action.

            “Once life without war is impossible, then trying to change something is meaningless” Kuleshova says. “Together with fatalism, propaganda imposes total cynicism, and It masterfully neutralizes any idealistic and humanistic values like calls for world peace, the value of human life, empathy and mercy.”

            The sociologist tsays that “the authorities do not need everyone to believe in the necessity of war. They are enough to ensure that no one believes in anything or that it is possible to live differently, nor that his own conscience is more important than a strange bad example, nor that the world is better than war.”

            And that in turn leaves Russian society in a far worse position: “A convinced opponent can be persuaded, but with cynics everything is more difficult, they have nothing to revise.” As a result, the restoration of the ability to moral judgment, to the simple thought “I will not do this, even if others do” is inevitably much more difficult.”

KPRF Duma Deputy Offers Bill to Rename St. Petersburg Leningrad and Volgograd Stalingrad

Paul Goble

Staunton, Oct. 19 – Angelika Glazkova, a KPRF Duma deputy has put forward a bill to restore the names Leningrad and Stalingrad to Russian cities now called St. Petersburg and Volgagrad. The last time the Duma took up and rejected restoring the name Stalingrad to Volgagrad was in 2015. It has not before considered a bill to restore the name Leningrad.

            Communist Party officials have frequently called for such moves, but only rarely have these calls led to the introduction of bills in the Duma that would achieve that end. Moreover, Glazkova has a poor track record of winning support for her ideas: Only 17 of the 57 bills she has put forward have been approved (agents.media/v-gosdumu-vnesli-zakonoproekt-o-pereimenovanii-sankt-peterburga-v-leningrad/).

            But Putin’s promotion of the restoration of the Soviet and Russian past and especially his focus on World War II may mean that this time around, a bill that would restore the name Stalingrad will have a better chance of passage, perhaps especially because it is linked to a change in the name of the northern capital rather than being a stand alone measure.

Over Last Decade, Birthrate in Belarus Fell by 52 Percent while Death Rate Rose by 1.59, Belstat Figures Show

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 19 – Figures released by Belstat, Minsk’s statistical agency, show that between 2015 and 2025, the number of births per 1000 people in the population of Belarus fell by 52 percent while the number of deaths for the same number rose by 1.59 percent, figures that put Belarus on a path of demographic decline.

            Not only do the birth figures mean that there are fewer children being born now but they also mean that the size of the prime child-bearing cohort of women will decline in the future, something that will make it very difficult to reverse (thinktanks.pro/publication/2026/10/19/v-belarusi-za-10-let-rozhdaemost-upala-na-52-a-smertnost-uvelichilas.html).

            At least part of the birthrate decline is the result of urbanization, The city of Minsk saw the largest fall in the number of births during this period while more rural areas saw much less. The relatively small increase in mortality in turn reflects the fact that it was already high ten years ago. 

            What is worrying about the mortality figures is that the number of deaths per 1000 population is nearly twice as high in rural areas as it is in cities, 19.8 as against 11, the result both of the outflow of younger people to the cities and the less adequate medical care available in rural locations.

Ukrainians Should Be Talking about De-Imperialization rather than De-Colonization, Alferov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 17 – Ukrainians and their supporters increasingly speak about the need for the “decolonization” of their country, but that is incorrect from a scholarly point of view, Oleksandr Alferov says. Instead, they should be focusing on the need to “de-imperialize” the way in which they view their history.

The reason for that, the head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory says, is that Ukraine “never had the status of a colony in the classical sense but for centuries acted as a cultural donor and co-creator of Eastern European spaces” (rbc.ua/rus/news/chomu-termin-dekolonizatsiya-pomilkoviy-ukrayini-1791564315.html).

“Even when Ukrainian lands were part of the Russian Empire,” Alferov says, “a separate Little Russian nobility existed, something which highlights Ukraine’s historical agency rather than that of a status of disenfranchised colonial territory.” What it needs now, then, is not so much “decolonization” as “de-imperialization.”

That process, he continues, is a process of “cleansing” itself from the imperial heritage the Russian state has insisted upon, “getting rid of myths about ‘a common cradle,’ and reclaiming cultural figures of its own who worked within imperial borders,” something very different than what African and Asian countries have done in decolonizing themselves.

Alferov’s words are sparking controversy not only in Ukraine but in other former possessions of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union. Suggestive of just how sensitive and complicated this issue is likely to become is offered by Kazakhstan’s Altyn-Orda portal (altyn-orda.kz/dekolonizatsiya-ili-deimperializatsiya-chto-pravilnee/).

That article argues that what scholars and others should be doing is not so much choosing between these two concepts as seeing how each applies in each particular case. In the scholarly literature, Altyn-Orda says, “these concepts are related but not identical;” and the differences are important.

“Decolonization is liberation from colonial domination and its consequences,” the portal says. “In a broad historical and cultural sense, this concept includes the restoration of language, historical memory, cultural autonomy and the right of society to determine its own future. “

In contrast, it argues, “de-imperialization is the overcoming of the political, cultural, and intellectual mechanisms of imperial domination: imperial myths, hierarchies, symbols, and the notion that one people or state has special rights to the history and identity of other nations.”

Because that is so, “deimperialization is not a universal substitute for the term “decolonization”. These processes may partially coincide, but they are not completely identical. Society can free itself from colonial relations and simultaneously overcome imperial representations, even if its specific historical experience does not correspond to the classical model of a foreign colony.”

In support of that approach in the case of Kazakhstan, Altyn-Orda cites the recent work of two Western scholars, Edward Schatz (cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/persistent-problems-with-decolonization-reflections-on-the-central-asian-example/) and Ulrich Hofmeister (cambridge.org/core/journals/slavic-review/article/colonialism-or-kolonizatsiia-why-the-difference-between-ukraine-and-central-asia-matters/).

Russia Needs a State Ideology so Its Soldiers Will Know What They are Fighting and Dying For, Veteran Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 17 – Ever since Russia adopted its 1993 constitution which among other things banned the declaration of a state ideology, there have been voices in Russia urging that Moscow amend the country’s basic law so as to put in place a formal declaration of what Russia is about.

            Because of the Soviet experience, most have been reluctant to take that step; and because those of a liberal persuasion believed that the best chance for their values to remain in place was not to amend the constitution, something that would be difficult and raise more questions about the direction Putin is taking Russia.

            But the idea of having a formal state ideology may now be gaining wider support because one Russian veteran of Putin’s war in Ukraine says Russians in general and Russians fighting and dying for it in particular need to know what their country is about, something they believe only a state ideology can supply (svpressa.ru/politic/article/536357/).

            Lt.Col. Ivan Berstovsky, a Hero of Russia, called for the constitution to be amended so as to make cleaer to all that Russia is a country “based on traditional values” with “a unique identity” and won’t change with the winds at some time in the future as could happen if there isn’t such an ideological statement.

            That kind of appeal is likely to influence many around Putin and thus could prove to be the event that opens the door to yet another revenant of the Soviet past, an official state ideology with all the features it would have and all the institutions that would have to be charged with promoting it.

Abortion Tourism on the Rise in Russia with Regions Where Abortions are Restricted Now Surrounded by Those where Abortions have Increased in Number, Sakevich Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 17 – Abortion tourism, widely known in the United States, is now on the rise in Russia, leading to a situation in which those federal subjects which have restricted access to abortions are increasingly surrounded byregions where the number of abortions have risen, according to Viktoria Sakevich.

            The Higher School of Economics demographer says that it is thus very unlikely that restricting abortions region by region as the Putin regime has been doing will have the demographic consequences the Kremlin wants (“Abortion Policy and Abortion Prevalence Globally and in Russia” (in Russian), Demografichekoye obozreniye 2026 13: 3: 4-28.)

            The leaders of regions where abortions have gone up and thus their own standing with the Kremlin has gone down routinely complain about this development, but even were Moscow to ban abortions  for the country as a whole, that would not depress their number as much as many assume.

            Instead, in that event, Russia women would either travel abroad to get thisprocedure if they could afford to, Sakevich says; or, as the experience of other countries shows, they will turn to illegal providers with horrific consequences for the women, their children, and Russian society as a whole.

To Restart Finno-Ugric Movement, Estonia, Finland and Hungary Should Convene a World Congress and Involve Diasporas, Leaders of Finno-Ugric Capitals Body Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 17 – On the Day of Related Finno-Ugric Peoples in Estonia, four leaders of the Finno-Ugric Capitals organization have called on colleagues in Estonia, Finland and Hungary to convene a world congress of Finno-Ugric peoples and to include representatives of Finno-Ugric peoples who have fled Russia among its participants.

            Such a meeting, Oliver Loode and Liisa Sabolotni of Estonia, Aleksi Palkangas of Finland and Peter Aranyi of Hungary argue will help restore the movement to where it was before 2022 when Putin’s war in Ukraine cut off many Finno-Ugric peoples from each other and from the three Finno-Ugric countries (capitals.uralic.org/news/call_to_revitalize_ru/).

            The reason the four are convinced that this is the best way forward is that it would restore the efforts the three Finno-Ugric countries made before World War II, efforts that involved emigres from Finno-Ugric groups still living under Soviet control and inspired those peoples by offering such unity.

            The four call on the three Finno-Ugric countries to “carefully examine the history of Finno-Ugric cooperation before World War II with the goal of operating on it and adapting it to the realties of the 21^st century,” including involving Finno-Ugric diasporas around the world and especially those including representatives of people within the borders of the Russian Federation.

            Such an effort promises much greater success than attempts to revive the network of arrangements that existed before Putin launched his expanded war of aggression against Ukraine.