Paul
Goble
Staunton, June 10 – Increasingly
frequent predictions that Russia will face a wave of mass protests after the
pandemic restrictions have been lifted are unwarranted by the available data, Denis
Volkov says; but declines in support for the regime along with the efforts of
Aleksey Navalny and the KPRF mean that the Kremlin needs to pay for attention
to popular attitudes.
The deputy director of the Levada
Center says that barely a day goes by without someone predicting that there
will soon be mass protests and unrests; but such predictions do not reflect the
available data. The situation may be less stable than it was, but it isn’t the
disaster that many suggest (forbes.ru/obshchestvo/402493-zhdut-li-rossiyu-velikie-potryaseniya).
Some of the predictions of disaster
are based on self-selected samples, hardly the most reliable guide; and other
consider only a small part of the political scene, ignoring data showing a
reluctance to protest or even support for some government policies. Any sensible
prediction must avoid such errors, the sociologist says.
Nonetheless, Volkov continues, it is
certainly worthwhile to consider how the epidemic has affected public opinion,
the level of popular support for the Russian powers that be, and the
possibility for protest that in and of itself may have an impact on the Russian
political system by prompting the regime to take counter-measures in advance.
That requires the examination of a
wide variety of surveys and a discussion of the various component parts of the political
situation in Russia now. Today, people
are most concerned about the economic situation. Those concerns were growing
even before the quarantine was declared.
But when that happened, Russians became significantly more pessimistic.
In April, Russians reported more
concerns about the economy, including the fact that many had not been paid or
had been laid off with up to a third speaking about a reduction in their
incomes compared with last year. What
all this means is this, Volkov says. The state of the economy is going to drive
popular attitudes far more than that of the pandemic.
Among other things, this explains
why the powers that be are pushing to reopen the country and why many Russians
are pleased by such actions, with roughly two-thirds saying that they are happy
with what the regime, both in Moscow and in the regions, has been doing about
the coronavirus.
Moreover, the Kremlin bought itself
some time and some support by replacing Dmitry Medvedev with Mikhail Mishustin.
The reason for that is not so much what the latter has done but that he is a
new face and Russians are inclined to hope that he will take actions that his
predecessor didn’t. At least, they will wait for some time to decide otherwise.
Putin’s replacement of a number of
unpopular governors has also helped the regime, Volkov says. That has meant that popular attitudes about
regional leaders have improved more or less uninterruptedly for the last
several years and that governors now have higher ratings than the government
and Duma and also of Putin.
Putin’s ratings have shown the greatest
decline in recent months, the sociologist continues. The president had been losing popularity even
before the onset of the pandemic. That has only accelerated the process. And
now it is true that the level of public support for the president is about
where it was in 2011-2012.
“However,” Volkov argues, “analogies
with 2011 are still not completely appropriate. The government system looks
today more stable than it did eight or nine years back” and “despite economic
problems,” polls show that optimism and pessimism are roughly in balance now
whereas in 2011, the pessimist were far more numerous.
According to the sociologist, “protest
attitudes today are at the same level as last year … [and] this is lower than
the indicators for 2018, immediately after the announcement of the pension
reform. This means that it is reasonable to expect a continuation of various local
protest actions … but that there is no occasion for mass uprisings.”
Surveys about Russian attitudes
toward the constitutional amendments also suggest that one should be cautious
about predicting regime defeat and popular mobilization. Forty-four percent of Russians say they
approve the measures, while 32 percent say they are against them. But while
less than 50 percent are for, they are people the regime can mobilize more
easily than opposition figures can get those opposed to the polls.
And this means that “supports of the
powers that be still form the main political force and will define the future
of the country.” That of course suggests
a continuation of the status quo, but at the same time, the situation is less
stable than that. “Opposition views are already not marginal, and a decline in
incomes and loss of work will become the breeding ground for the further growth
of the share of the dissatisfied.”
But even with that in prospect,
Volkov argues, it is important to remember that “disappointment in the powers
that be does not automatically lead to the appearance of new authority figures.
Initially, people will remain disoriented” unless those emerge; and the two
leading candidates, Aleksey Navalny and the KPRF, are working hard.
They have not gained significant
traction yet, the analyst suggests, and thus “the preservation of the political
order will depend on how quickly the return to normal life and economic
activity occurs. Today’s indicators of support for the political order are
sufficiently high to preclude mass disorders.”
There is one cautionary note,
however. In earlier crises, Putin had more support in the population than he
does now. That meant the powers could ignore popular attitudes and even
demonstrations. But today, the system
lacks that set of reserves. And that
means the powers that be should move quickly to end restrictions and pay more
attention generally to popular attitudes.
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