Russian Mercenaries in Africa have Attracted Much Attention but Achieved Little, Sukhankin Says

Paul Goble

           

            Staunton, June 12 – Russian mercenary forces, the so-called “private military companies,” that Moscow has dispatched to African countries have attracted a great deal of attention about the world, but they have achieved far less than Moscow hoped for either economically or geopolitically, according to Sergey Sukhankin.

            The Canada-based Russian scholar says that Moscow began to focus attention on Africa after the collapse of the USSR only in 2006 to 2009, only to discover that it lacked the economic resources and attractiveness as an alternative to the West to achieve much with soft power measures (ridl.io/ru/rossijskie-chvk-v-afrike-juzhnee-sahary-missija-ne-vypolnima/).

            And so beginning in 2014, he continues, the Kremlin began to deploy private military companies in some African countries not merely as advisors as had largely been the case in Soviet times but as active fighters. Not surprisingly that attracted attention (thebell.io/kudrin-povar-chvk-vagnera-zhenitba-chto-vazhnogo-i-strannogo-skazal-putin-na-press-konferentsii).

            Moscow’s approach, Sukhankin argues, became “defense in exchange for concessions,” in which the Russian side promised military assistance to one or another faction including the weak governments in exchange for access to raw materials like gold, diamonds, and oil (fontanka.ru/2017/06/26/084/).

            The first example of this occurred in the Central African Republic where Russian private military companies became such key players in the defense of the central government that Moscow not only gained access to some key materials but was able to insert a Russian security officer, Valery Zakharov, as the country’s national security advisor.

            Many analysts treat this as “an indisputable victory” for Russia, the analyst says; “but reality is much more problematic.” The CAR’s natural resources are small, and Russia’s profits from them smaller still. And Moscow has not been able to use it as a trampoline to expand its geopolitical position against France which has more resources and is better dug in.

            The next place the Kremlin sought to make such a play with its government-financed mercenaries was Sudan.  Again, Moscow looked like it had gained a lot, and Western analysts expressed alarm. But in fact, Sukhankin says, local powers whom Moscow backed quickly turned away from it and expanded ties with Russia’s geopolitical opponents.

            Again, he argues, Moscow got little of what it sought beyond the appearance of being a player.

            The third place Moscow made a bet of this kind was Mozambique, a country whose government placed great hopes in Russian mercenaries as allies in the fight against terrorism there. But just as in the CAR and Sudan, these hopes proved to be largely hollow; and Russian actions there called into question Moscow’s ability to play any serious role.

            At the present time, Sukhankin concludes, “the activity of Russian mercenaries in Africa south of the Sahara has still not brought Russia major dividends. More than that, the situation is hardly likely to change.” The countries there need major and complex reforms, and “the presence of Russian mercenaries may even exert a negative effect.”

            Governments that rely on Russian fighters often give their domestic opponents an additional basis for mobilizing against the center and Russia’s foreign opponents an additional reason for intervening in ways that allow these governments to dispense with Russian assistance, exactly the opposite outcome Moscow has been hoping for.