Russian Democrats Outnumber Imperialists But Have More Fears than Hopes, Belanovsky and Nikolskaya Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, August 8 – Russians divide into three groups ideologically, Sergey Belanovsky and Anastasiya Nikolskaya says, but both their relative size and specific content as to hopes and fears remain unclear because up to now, there have been few studies that allow for conclusions about either.

            Building on research the two sociologists have done in the past, they conclude that ideologically democrats are the dominant group, with 44 percent of the population, those who have not made an ideological choice are almost as large at 39 percent, and imperialists third with only 17 percent (ridl.io/ru/ideologicheskie-segmenty-rossijskogo-obshhestva/).

            Ideological democrats outnumber imperialists among younger, more educated and more urban groups, and they even have slightly higher incomes, Belanovsky and Nikolskaya say.  They are far more likely to condemn Moscow’s policy toward Ukraine while imperialists are far more approving. Those who have not chosen sides are more evenly split on that issue as well. 

            But perhaps the most important differences among the groups concerns the emotional components of their views.  According to the sociologists, “Democrats” are filled with more anger and disappointment and have more fears about the future. They have the fewest hopes for the future.

            “Imperialists,” in contrast, are full of hope for the future and much less angry and disappointed about the situation now, although if one totals the share of those who are angry and those who are disappointed, it is almost as great as those who have great hopes for the future of their country.

            Those in between have some hope for the future but at the same time have almost as many feelings of denigration, anger and disappointment.

            On the basis of these findings, Belanovsky and Nikolskaya offer several conclusions. Numerically, democrats are predominant in Russian society, outnumbering imperialists by 2.5 times; and given socio-economic trends, there is every reason to think that their share of the population will grow rather than decline.

            But the groups divide in terms of their view of the future. Democrats are pessimistic while imperialists, although a minority, are full of hopes. That drives much of what they say and do even though the numbers are running in directions precisely opposite to their preferences, the two sociologists continue.

            And that opens up a variety of possibilities, especially given that the dichotomy “democrats-imperialists” is not exhaustive. In the future, they suggest, it is entirely possible that portions of these ideological opposites will combine with those who are in between in new ways and lead to a new ideological center in Russian society.

            A half century ago, Alexander Werth published a volume which he had originally intended to call “Russia at Peace” as the companion volume to his classic Russia at War (London, 1964).  He chose instead to give the second volume the title Russia: Hopes and Fears (London, 1969).

            That reflected his view that Russia was not yet at peace. The new research by Belanovsky and Nikolskaya suggests that as well, and it underscores a second and perhaps equally important point: that country’s future may be defined less by formal ideological positions than by the hopes and fears of those who hold them.