Church Politics Affecting Pro- and Anti-Moscow Divide in Georgia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 17 – Nowhere have differences between the Kremlin and the Moscow Patriarchate caused more difficulties than on the question of the status of Orthodoxy in Abkhazia; and those difficulties are now exacerbating the political divide in Georgia between pro-Moscow and anti-Moscow groups.

            When Abkhazia broke away from Georgia, political Moscow supported that action – indeed, it helped make it possible – but religious Moscow in the person of the Moscow Patriarchate has refused to recognize any change in the status of the Orthodox church there and insists that the Abkhaz Orthodox remains subordinate to the Georgian Orthodox Church.

            The Georgian Orthodox Church shares that position and not only continues to insist that the Abkhaz Orthodox are part of its canonical territory but like the ROC MP has refused to recognize the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, pleasing Moscow and pro-Russian groups in Georgia but infuriating pro-Western ones.

            (For background on this issue and Moscow’s extension of this same policy to the other breakaway republic South Ossetia, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/12/orthodox-church-in-abkhazia-not-happy.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/07/moscow-patriarchate-extends-abkhaz.html.)

            Now the  issue has heated up again with Abkhazian Orthodox calling on Moscow to take in their church, something the ROC MP desn’t want to do, and both the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople and Georgian nationalists insisting on the status quo there but calling for recognizing Ukrainian autocephaly (ng.ru/ng_religii/2024-07-16/9_11_576_georgia.html).

            This is creating cross-cutting cleavages on both sides of the political divide in Georgia, cleavages that may grow because within the Georgian church, which has not had anything to do with Abkhazia for three decades, there is a small but growing nationalist group that insists on holding Abkhazia within Georgia’s ecumenical territory but wants to recognize the OCU.

            The ROC MP shows little sign of making the changes the Kremlin would like and thus is unintentionally helping the anti-Moscow political movement in Georgia. But how long the Moscow Patriarchate will be able to continue that line given Russia’s efforts to re-subordinate Georgia remains to be seen. 

             The Russian church's position on Abkhazia could help pro-Moscow Georgians gain strength, but it could also become an issue that will undermine Moscow's position in Georgia, especially if the Kremlin feels compelled to tilt toward Abkhazia in order to make expanded use of ports in that breakaway region.