Kremlin Advisor Says Russians Quite Happy to Trade Freedom for Effective Rule

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 29 – The third issue of Gosudarstvo, which is rapidly assuming the role that Kommunist performed in Soviet times, carries an article by Kremlin advisor Gleb Kuznetsov which argues that Russians are quite prepared to give up privacy, competitive elections and other freedoms that would prevent the state from ruling effectively.

            (The article is available online at https://runivers.ru/bookreader/book164337, pp. 14-18 and has been reviewed by Andrey Pertsev at meduza.io/feature/2026/01/28/konsultant-kremlya-gleb-kuznetsov-v-novoy-statie-otkryto-hvalit-rossiyu-i-kitay-za-totalnyy-kontrol-nad-zhiznyu-lyudey.)

            By “illiberal” systems which he says have advantages, Kuznetsov identifies cities in Russia and in China. He doesn’t list countries in the West where legitimacy is “based on procedures like competitive elections, separation of powers and the illusion of public ‘oversight.’”

            According to him as summarized by Pertsev, “’illiberal’ regimes outperform their “liberal” counterparts. In such systems, power is legitimate ‘not because it’s reelected every four years by promising everything to everyone amid real political competition, but because it works for voters on a daily basis.’”

            The digitalization of life, Kuznetsov continues, means that actions by the government as far as citizens are concerned are “visible and measurable,” something that is far more important for the populace than are “abstract discussions of procedural democracy’” because they deliver what people need and don’t need to “manipulate public opinion.”

            That is, these illiberal states work “thanks to rather than in spite of the concentration of power;” and that is why people welcome them and are ready to put up with things like state oversight because it gives them what they want most immediately and is something they would miss were it to disappear.

            Not only does these features of “illiberal” regimes allow them to respond to problems more quickly, but they free these societies from electoral cycles, allowing for the carrying out of long-term projects without the risk that these will be reversed or at least interrupted after the next round of voting.

            According to Kuznetsov, “modern illiberal systems know how to create institutional stability without liberal procedures — through elite rotation, meritocratic selection, and built-in feedback mechanisms – and they thus represent a new type of political order, in which traditional liberal procedures are replaced by technocratic governance legitimized by effectiveness.”