Russia’s Forestry Industry has Collapsed, Driving Down Incomes and Wrecking Regional Budgets East of the Urals

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 23 – In 2025, Russia’s forestry industry “collapsed to a ten-year low,” erasing the gains of earlier years, simultaneously driving down incomes and wrecking the budgets of the governments of federal subjects east of the Urals, according to Russian government figures reported by the Voice of the Regions portal.

            Russian production in this sector fell to 176 million cubic meters, far below the 200 cubic meter mark that the authorities had assumed was the baseline. Indeed, the situation has become so dire that the portal entitles its report about this collapse “Taiga on the Brink” (regionvoice.ru/tayga-na-grani-lesnaya-otrasl-rossii-lesozagotovka/).

            The forestry industry is not just about harvesting trees. It is an enormous system involving everything from cutting down forests to processing the wood and moving it to both domestic and foreign customers. But, according to Voice of the Regions, “when demand falls, tensions arise at every stage.”

            The decline in foreign demand has not been compensated for by a rise in domestic demand, the portal says; and prices continue to rise for fuel, equipment, and infrastructure maintenance. As a result, incomes are falling and jobs disappearing all along this pathway. And regions where it is a dominant force are losing tax revenue and having to retrench. 

            If the current trends continue, not only will the forestry industry face more than “the temporary downturn” Moscow likes to talk about, but it and all who depend on it will have to adjust to “a more profound transformation of the development model” Russia’s forestry industry has long thought it could rely on. 

Bomb Lenin Laid Under Russian Nation ‘Continues to Tick’ and Could Explode at a Most Inopportune Time, Khramov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 4 – Russians must recognize that the bomb Lenin laid under the Russian nation “continues to tick” and could go off at some point if they do not take additional steps to overcome his legacy by eliminating the non-Russian republics and changing the national narrative they currently employ, Aleksandr Khramov says.

            The Moscow paleontologist and Russian nationalist argues that Lenin hated the Russian nation just as much as he hated capitalism and that he did everything he could to undermine the interests of the Russians and prevent them from forming their own nation state (apn.ru/index.php?newsid=49234).

            Indeed, Khramov continues, the main goal of the Bolshevik leader was to ensure that the Russians would never have their own “national home” but instead would “be consumed in the furnace of world revolution.” And he adds that Russian leaders have been fighting to overcome that legacy ever since, but there is a long way to go.

            That task must be completed, the commentator says, because “the bomb of national republics planted under Russia by Lenin has not yet been completely defused and continues to tick, biding its time” for when problems in the country as a whole will reach the point that such explosions will do the most harm.

The Yellow Wedge in the Volga Region: Where Ukrainians Identify as Khokhols and Must Ally with Other Non-Russians against Moscow

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 23 -- The places in what is now the Russian Federation where Ukrainians resettled at the end of imperial times are referred to as “wedges” (kliny). The largest and most famous of these are in the Far East (“the green wedge”) and in the Kuban (“the almond wedge”). But those are far from the only such wedges of this kind scattered across Russia.

(For more on the wedge issue in general, see jamestown.org/program/kyiv-raises-stakes-by-expanding-appeals-to-ukrainian-wedges-inside-russia/, jamestown.org/program/kremlin-worried-about-ukrainian-wedges-inside-russia/  and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/06/a-real-wedge-issue-ukrainian-regions-in.html and especially the sources cited therein.)

            Russian officials typically argue that these regions are fully integrated and that those who were Ukrainian in the past have assimilated, but sometimes these officials express fears that Kyiv will succeed in exploiting these communities against Moscow, comments that suggest that even Moscow doesn’t fully believe its own claims.

            But lest these claims be challenged, Russian officials have done what they can to restrict investigations and reports about the wedges. And thus any reporting about them is precious, especially when it concerns wedges other than the green in the Far East and the almost in the Kuban which remain far better on.

            Among the wedges which have suffered from the least coverage are the Blue Wedge which is located in Omsk Oblast just north of the Russian border with Kazakhstan (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/07/a-rare-report-from-blue-wedge-ukrainian.html) and even more the Yellow (Zhovty klin) in the Volga valley.  

            But two articles by Ukrainian historian Borys Hunko (abn.org.ua/en/history/yellow-klyn-ukrainian-volga-region-the-history-of-the-struggle-for-freedom-and-language/ and abn.org.ua/en/history/yellow-klyn-ukrainian-volga-region-the-history-of-the-struggle-for-freedom-and-language/) provide details on a community few know about.

            The first describes the way in which this Ukrainian wedge came into existence and traces the rise of a Ukrainian national movement there in the 1920s and then again in the 1990s and the way in which Moscow suppressed that movement and sought to ensure that the Yellow Wedge would cease to exist as an organized structure. It is almost elegiac in tone.

            The second, however, describes the nature of identity among the population, an identity far more complicated than Moscow or many Ukrainians elsewhere suspect, and outlines the steps the residents of the Yellow Wedge need to take in alliance with other ethnic groups in that region to defeat Muscovite imperialism and thus have a chance for a better future.

            According to Hunko, Volga Ukrainians “clearly recognize their difference from the dominant ethnos, ‘the Muscovites’ but at the same time do not always identify themselves with Ukrainians in the general national sense of the word.” Instead, they “define themselves as ‘neither Russian nor Ukrainian.’”

            And that in turn means that “the term ‘khokhol,’ which in imperial discourse often has a pejorative meaning, within the community itself is devoid of negative meaning” and for many and on many occasions viewed positively, even though it is fragmented village by village with each seeing its identity as local rather than national.

            The appearance of an identity based on the survival of a home language and home practices was “not an internal ‘choice’ of the community but rather the direct result of Moscow’s colonial policy aimed at severing Ukrainians from their own historical and cultural roots” even as it did not immediately join them completely to the Russian nation.

            Because they are small in number and generally a minority in local populations, the Yellow Wedge “cannot act as an independent force,” he argues. Instead, “their path lies through an alliance with those forces which strive for the complete dismantling of the imperial system,” with Tatars, Chuvash, and others including regional Russians who want the same thing.

More than 30 of Russia’s Federal Subjects have Restored Sobering Up Centers

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 20 – Moscow oblast has decided to open sobering up stations to deal with the rising tide of drunkenness in that region, bringing to almost a third the number of federal subjects which have done so since the Russian government opened the way for such stations in 2021 after banning this longtime feature of Soviet and Russian life in 2011.

            Moscow Oblast will not build new facilities, however. Instead, it will establish sobering up sections in the region’s hospitals and man them with doctors and nurses already on staff rather than hiring anyone new (kommersant.ru/doc/8443564 and ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/02/20/v-podmoskove-vozrodyat-vitrezviteli-a187770).

            The Russian government earlier dispensed with such centers because it claimed that Moscow had made so much progress in fighting alcoholism and drunkenness, progress it argued was shown by official statistics showing declining consumption and less binge drinking of alcohol in Russia since the 1990s.

            The reopening of sobering up stations, independent Russian experts say, show that the Russian government’s claims are unwarranted and that the statistics it has offered as justification fail to capture the large share of the alcohol market, including unregistered and illegal production, that Russians are actually consuming in the same ways they did earlier. 

Moscow has Closed 22 Embassies and Consulates in Western Countries since 2022 but Opened Nine Embassies and Seven Consulates in Africa and Asia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 11 – Since Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine in 2022, Moscow has closed 22 embassies and consulates in Western countries at the demand of the governments of those countries and then in most cases shuttering Western diplomatic representations in the Russian Federation in response.

            But over the same period, the Russian foreign ministry says, Moscow has opened nine embassies and seven consulates in Africa and Asia. It has inaugurated embassies in Niger, Sierra Leone and South Sudan over the last 12 months and is slated to open such missions in the Gambia, Liberia, Togo and the Comoros Islands in the next (iz.ru/en/node/2040463).

            This turn to the east in diplomatic work means that in the West, Russian citizens often face difficulties in getting needed consular services and the Russian government is unable to use these missions for a variety of purposes while elsewhere, Moscow is gearing up both for more Russians needing consular assistance and for its embassies to ramp up Russian activities.

42 Percent of Well-Off Russians Live in Moscow, a City with Less than Ten Percent of that Country’s Populaiton, ‘To Be Precise’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 19 – Forty-two percent of Russians earning at least 276,000 rubles (3,000 US dollars) a month, the amount statisticians say forms the top one percent of earners in their country, live in Moscow, even though the city forms only about nine percent of the total Russian population, the To Be Precise portal says.

            At the same time, the investigative outlet continues, half of all the residents of the Russian Federation currently earn 45,000 rubles (600 US dollars) a month, a fifth of what those in the highest one percent who are concentrated in the Russian capital (tochno.st/materials/42-naibolee-obespecennyx-rossiian-moskvici).

            Moscow had always had more wealthy people than other regions, but over the last decade, its position first fell after the imposition of sanctions, declines in the price of oil and the devaluation of the ruble, but by 2024, the city had recovered its position – and for the first time, its share of Russia’s wealthiest exceeded the level that they had formed in 2013.

            However, To Be Precise says, if one considers the geographic distribution of Russians in the top ten percent of incomes, those making more than 119,000 rubles (1500 US dollars) a month, Moscow’s share of that group is only 23 percent, an indication that Russians in this category are more widely distributed. 

Putin’s War Leaving Russia with Several Hundred Thousand Russians Morally Debased, Threatening the Country for Decades Ahead, Pastukhov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 20 – Horrific reports about how a Russian general shared with his wife pictures of the ears of Ukrainian prisoners his men had cut off have led Vladimir Pastukhov to conclude that Putin’s war in Ukraine is leaving Russia with several hundred thousand morally debased people who can’t be easily cured and who will be a threat for decades.

            The London-based Russian commentator says that Russia is at risk of “ending up with several hundred thousand people as a result of this war, not just morally depraved or corrupted by bloodshed and murder but clinically incurable and irreversibly ill” (t.me/v_pastukhov/1827 reposted at echofm.online/opinions/v-konechnom-schete-vyyasnitsya-chto-odinakovo-bolny-i-voevavshie-i-ne-voevavshie).

            Such people, Pastukhov continues, “will pose a colossal threat” to the country, corroding all constructive social ties and relationships from family to political life, affecting public health in a way comparable to the impact of Novichok on the health of an individual. That is, they will block the transmission of social signals across all communication channels.”

            The Putin regime acts as if they can be brought back into society without any negative consequences because of its adaptation programs, but that is not the case. These people will continue to live and have an impact on society for decades until their deaths and after that because of the impact they will have on others who didn’t take part in the war.

            Of course, Pastukhov concedes, it is “naïve” to think that this is a consequence of Putin’s war alone. Its links to the events of the 1990s is “obvious.” But “it’s just that all the violence that presented itself as the norm in the first and second Chechen campaigns and before that in Afghanistan has been scaled up tens and hundreds of times in the current war.”

            And he concludes: “It took almost 40 years to bring society to this state, and it will take no less time to get society out of it.”

 

No Longer Able to Qualify for Loans, Russians Increasingly are Turning to Pawnshops and Selling Off Not Just Jewelry but Essentials

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 19 – There are many measures of economic hardship among the poor, but one of the most accurate and disturbing is when people cannot get small loans because banks have tightened the rules, they are forced sell off whatever they have in pawnshops in order to survive.

            That is what is happening in Russia, with the Bank of Russia reporting that in the first half of 2025, pawnbrokers extended 190 billion rubles (2.3 billion US dollars) to Russians who had nowhere else to turn (newizv.ru/news/2026-02-19/perforator-za-edu-kak-lombardy-v-2026-godu-stanovyatsya-edinstvennym-bankom-dlya-naroda-438823).

            But the situation is even worse than that massive figure suggests. Before 2025, 90 percent of pawnbroker loans involved jewelry, something most people could afford to live without; but last year, the share of jewelry as a percentage of all things traded to pawnbrokers for money fell to 40 percent with the difference including equipment that people need for work or their lives.

            And what is perhaps most disturbing, Russians are selling such essentials to pawnbrokers for 30 to 50 percent less than they paid for them and will have to pay again if these things are to be replaced, yet another way that the economic decline in Russia is pushing ever more people there into poverty and casting a dark shadow on their futures for years to come.

 

Russians Oppose Violent Overthrow of Dictators Abroad and at Home as Well, Shelin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 20 – Recent polls about events in Venezuela and Iran and older ones about the situation in Belarus in 2020 indicate that Russians side with the incumbents and oppose violent change abroad and likely oppose it at home as well, according to independent Russian commentator Sergey Shelin.

            Given that they live “under a dictator themselves,” he says, Russians would seem to have every reason to see the removal of a dictatorship in Venezuela and a popular challenge to one in Iran are developments they would support (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/02/20/rossiyanin-serednyak-sochuvstvuet-diktatoram-a-ne-tem-kto-protiv-nih-a187733).

            Bur recent polls in the Russian Federation show something else: they show that Russians support the regimes being challenged and oppose moves against them regardless of whether they are taken by a foreign power as in the case of Venezuela or by the population as in Iran – and indeed, in the latter case, they blame outside agitators for the actions of the Iranian people.

            Surveys taken at the same of the popular protests against the Lukashenka dictatorship in Belarus in 2020, protests that Russians paid far more attention to than they have to the events in Venezuela and Iran, show the same pattern of support for those in power and opposition to any violent challenge.

            “Four years of Putin’s escapades,” Shelin continues, “have not weakened Russians propensity to protect those in power or increased their interest in those trying to overthrow a dictatorship. On the contrary, their state of mind has become ever more depressing,” with ever fewer willing to express interest in or solidarity with those opposing dictatorships.

            This pattern should not be attributed to the Russian government’s media campaigns in support of its allies either, Shelin says. It is deeper than that and reflects a willingness to support dictators “no matter how vile” and “a refusal to see anything through the eyes of their opponents and victims.”

            And those attitudes toward foreign dictators parallel those they have to their own dictator, Shelin argues. Russians “don’t particularly adore him, but he can do anything” as “the masses see no replacement for him. They don’t even ask the Russian elite for a coup d’etat as they have no alternative social ideas at all.”

Declining Share of Ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan No Longer Primarily about Out-Migration than Instead Reflects Their Lower Birthrate and Higher Death Rate than Kazakhs

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb.20 – Since 1989, the share of the ethnic Russians in the population of Kazakhstan has declined from 38 percent to 14.6 percent, but the reason for that decline has changed. In the past, it largely reflected the out-migration of ethnic Kazakhs but more recently, it is a reflection of lower birthrates and higher death rates among Russians than among Kazakhs.

            Ethnic Russians, who left Kazakhstan by the tens of thousands in the 1990s, are still leaving; but the number of such departures is now so small – 16,000 in 2022 and 10,100 in 2023 – that it does not explain the continuing decline of the share ethnic Russians form in the Kazakhstan population (altyn-orda.kz/v-kazahstane-sokrashhaetsya-russkoe-naselenie/).

            Instead, the Altyn-Orda portal says on the basis of Kazakhstan government figures, “an ever-greater role is being played by demographic inertia,” a term which refers to the fact that ethnic Russians are on average older, have much lower birthrates and much higher death rates than do ethnic Kazakhs.

            These factors are unlikely to change anytime soon and mean that the share of ethnic Russians in the population of Kazakhstan is likely to continue to decline, possibly at an accelerating rate, even if outmigration falls to almost nothing or even is reversed because some ethnic Russians who left earlier may decide to return to Kazakhstan for their retirement. 

Share of Russian Pupils Studying in Second Shift has Risen Not Fallen Since Putin Pledged in 2018 to Do Away with This Practice by 2025, ‘To Be Precise’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 18 – In 2018, Vladimir Putin pledged to do away with the unpopular practice of having a significant share of pupils in Russian schools study in second shifts by 2025. But in fact, the share doing so over that period has risen from 13 percent to 15.8 percent, with much higher figures in some federal subjects, the To Be Precise portal says.

            That means that as of today, 2.54 million young Russians are inschool beginning in the afternoon and ending in the evening. In a few cases, there are schools which operate not just on the basis of two shifts but rather on the basis of three, although that practice was largely eliminated by 2021 (tochno.st/materials/kazdyi-sedmoi-skolnik-ucitsia-vo-vtoruiu-smenu).

            Parents have long been upset when their children have had to go to school not during their working hours but long after them, and polls showed that Russians were overwhelmingly pleased by Putin’s commitment to end this arrangement. That he hasn’t kept his promise undoubtedly is corroding support for the Kremlin leader.

            In a few federal subjects, there has been real progress. In Ingushetia, for example, the share of pupils in second shift schedules has fallen from 42 percent in 2016 to 14 percent in 2025; in Chechnya, from 43 percent to 24 percent; and in Adygeya, from 25 percent to 16 percent.

            But in 59 of the federal subjects, the situation has “either not changed or gotten worse” since Putin made his promise. In Tyva, for example, almost half of all students are attending via a second shift; and in Tyumen Oblast, the share doing so has risen from 18 percent in 2016 to 33 percent last year.

            These varying trends reflect both demography – where birthrates are higher, it has been harder for the authorities to end the practice of second shifts – and economics – regions and republics that are poorer have been unable to build schools, prevent the closure of others or even pay teachers in a timely fashion (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/02/18/shkoly-net-i-ne-budet).

            In particular, Putin’s optimization campaign intended to save money on education and social costs to have money for war has led to the closure of 861 schools since the start of his expanded war in Ukraine (nemoskva.net/2026/02/18/v-rossii-zakryli-bolee-860-selskih-shkol-s-2022-goda-prichiny-i-regiony-lidery/).

            And as regional governments have had to tighten their belts given budgetary stringencies which are the result of Moscow’s unfunded mandates, officials in ten regions have delayed paying their teachers in a timely fashion, leading many to quit and forcing others to  two shift work (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/02/19/uchitelyam-v-10-regionah-nachali-zaderzhivat-zarplati-iz-za-problem-byudzheta-a187646).

Amur Oblast Official Seeks to Calm Russians East of the Urals about China’s Rise

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb.16 – A senior official in Blagoveshechensk, a Russian city on the border with China and within sight of the much larger and more developed city on the other side of that line, says that the residents of Heihi are doing better than those in his own city because China is richer and has been committed to development far longer.

            But Boris Beloborodov, the business ombudsman for the Amur Oblast, continues, Russians in Blagoveshchensk and other regions east of the Urals need not be afraid of a mythical “yellow peril” and instead recognize that people on the Russian side of the border are catching up (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/02/16/kitaitsy-nachali-gorazdo-ranshe-i-ushli-vpered).

            He says that both Moscow and Russian regions have worked to tighten rules on foreign businesses, including Chinese, and that as a result, while trade between Russia and China has continued to expand, the operations of Chinese firms producing goods in the Russian Federation has declined over the last decade.

            What has happened, Beloborodov says, has been an effort to make the Russian production sphere more Russian with the chances for foreigners to penetrate it far more difficult. Given that, “no one should be speaking about any special preferences for Chinese business.” That may have been a problem earlier, but it isn’t now.

            Russians often compare the city of Blagoveshchensk with the Chinese metropolis of Heihi on the other side of the border. The latter has more skyscrapers and more modern housing but that is because China has more money than Russian does and has for a long time built up its urban centers especially along the border. 

            A major reason why Chinese success inside Russia has been so noticeable, the ombudsman says, is that Chinese businesses are concentrated in the highly visible service sector where they do well because of a Chinese commitment to the idea that the customer is always right, a commitment many Russians don’t share and thus fall behind. 

            Beloborodov also says that Russians are more interested in going to China than the Chinese are in going to Russia and that despite the appearance of ethnic Chinese in Russia east of the Urals, “there have always been more Chinese living permanently in Moscow than in any of the regions of the Far East.”

Fewer Compatriots Returned to Russia in 2025 than at Any Time in Last 15 Years

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 17 – Only 26,700 people took part in Moscow’s program to support the return of people with roots in Russia to their homeland in 2025, more than 16 percent fewer than the year before and the lowest number in the last 15 years, a trend that is only adding to Russia’s demographic difficulties.

            Moscow experts said that the decline reflected propaganda by other countries against this program at a time of Putin’s continuing war in Ukraine, economic difficulties in Russia itself, and language requirements that have been toughed. But most argue that the reason that fewer are returning is because those who wanted to already have (kommersant.ru/doc/8440619).

            Each of these factors certainly played a role in the decline: Coverage of Putin’s war has certainly discouraged some, information about Russia’s economdesiresy has discouraged others, and the risk that children of those returning will have to take Russian language tests has concerned others, prompting Putin to talk about dropping such requirements.

            Moreover, there likely is some truth in the assertion of Russian officials that those who want to return already have. But that is not completely the case as many who do want to claim compatriot status and return are being denied that opportunity because their language skills and ethnicity do not correspond to Moscow’s requirements.

            The most significant of these groups, of course, is the Circassian nation. There are more than seven million Circassians living abroad, and even if only 10 percent of them came back, Moscow could claim victory as far as the return of compatriots is concerned. But the return of Circassians would change the ethnic mix in the North Caucasus, something Moscow is against.

            In many respects, the most important aspect of the current decline in the return of compatriots is that they continue to come from the five countries of Central Asia. Their departure from that region and return to the Russian Federation may slow the decline of the ethnic Russians in that country’s population but it will reduce the influence of Russians in that region. 

Russia’s Nuclear Icebreaker Fleet More Overstretched and Thus Less Intimidating than Moscow Likes to Suggest

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 16 – Moscow officials and media outlets routinely celebrate the fact that Russia now has eight nuclear-powered icebreakers, far outpacing any other country and ensuring that the Russian government is in a position to dominate the Northern Sea Route and the Arctic well into the future.

            Such Russian claims are often picked up by Western media outlets who either adopt a defeatist attitude as far as the so-called “icebreaker race” in the Arctic is concerned or call for the rapid expansion of their own fleets of icebreakers, especially as China, Russia’s current ally, is building such ships at an ever more rapid rate.

            But such appeals, while certainly justified given the growing importance of the northern ocean, typically overstate Russia’s dominance in the region at least as far as its icebreaker fleet there is concerned. There are three major reasons for that conclusion, each of which has only grown in importance over the last several years.

            First of all, given the enormous length of the northern borders of the Russian Federation, its icebreaker fleet is responsible not only for keeping the Northern Sea Route open and projecting Russian power deeper into the Arctic but for a variety of other tasks as well, including keeping ports and even rivers flowing into that ocean open.

            To keep these riverine routes open, Moscow routinely has to shift icebreakers from the NSR to ports, Siberian rivers, and even the Gulf of Finland to keep those open, thus reducing the size of the Russian icebreaker fleet in the Arctic itself (thebarentsobserver.com/news/nuclear-icebreaker-makes-rare-midwinter-transfer-from-arctic-to-baltic-sea/445532,  thebarentsobserver.com/news/shadow-tanker-blocked-by-arctic-sea-icenbsp/442007, sibmix.com/?doc=19705  and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/12/russian-oil-companies-should-use.html).

            Second, global warming is changing the nature of the challenge in the Arctic. Many parts of it are now ice-free far longer, something that has increased the importance of ice-capable ships relative to icebreakers (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/08/western-sections-of-northern-sea-route.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/08/arctic-warming-far-faster-than-expected.html).

            And third – and this may prove to be the most important of all – Russia’s icebreaker fleet suffers from increasing problems with production and repair, problems that mean its fleet of this kind of ships isn’t expanding as planned and that many of its ships are in ill-repair or even confined to distant yards for servicing much of their lives.

            Despite Putin’s promises, Russia has built only one icebreaker since the start of his expanded war in Ukraine (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/09/russia-has-built-only-one-icebreaker.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/10/ukrainian-war-costs-forces-moscow-to.html).

            Its existing vessels suffer from outmoded electronic systems and have been suffering from one problem after another (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/07/moscow-facing-growing-problems-with-its.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/07/russias-much-ballyhooed-new-nuclear.html), problems that require its icebreakers to sail to distant ports for servicing there are no facilities on the Arctic (thebarentsobserver.com/news/nuclear-icebreaker-had-to-sail-all-to-st-petersburg-for-basic-hull-work-as-russias-lacks-northern-dock/432778).

            None of this means that Russia’s icebreaker fleet does not represent a challenge, but it does mean that those who analyze what is going on must recognize that Moscow has not created something that is beyond the capacity of others to challenge and contain given the problems its fleet continues to suffer.   

Russia’s Truck Drivers Demand that No Law Affecting Them be Adopted without Their Participation

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 15 – The Russian Truckdrivers Union has sent a letter to the president, prime minister and transportation minister arguing that no law affecting them should be adopted and that any laws on the books since 1991 should be reviewed and possibly repealed with the participation of the union’s membership.

            The letter, a copy of which has been acquired by the Svobodnaya pressa portal, documents a wide variety of steps Moscow has taken or is currently considering taking without listening to the truck drivers and insists that situation is unjust, unsustainable and must be changed (svpressa.ru/society/article/502720/).

            It is extremely unlikely that Russia’s top officials will agree to such an arrangement, but it is an intriguing one nonetheless because it is an example of how Putin’s de-institutionalization of Russian governance is leading at least some groups to push for a corporatist style of government, one in which powerful sectors would have at least a veto on what Moscow does.

            As such, the union action may be a bellwether of the ways in which the Russian government may function regarding at least some groups in the future, likely without much publicity except in cases where the group involved, as in this case with the truck drivers, feels excluded and decides it has no choice but to raise this to the level of public discussion. 

Under New Constitution, Kazakhstan will Break Free of Soviet Russian Past and Become Kazakh Eli

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 18 – For some time, activists and commentators in Central Asian countries have wanted to change the names of their countries now ending in “stan” because they see it as the imposition of a Soviet Russian definition of their states and one that leads many outsider to dismissively think about “the stans” as something exotic and filled with conflict.

            Now Kazakhstan is on the way to being the first of the five countries in Central Asia to make this change. Its draft constitution set to be approved next month identifies that country not as Kazakhstan but as Kazak ili, “the land of the Kazakhs” (altyn-orda.kz/ot-kazahstana-k-kazak-eli-simvolicheskij-razryv-s-epohoj-sovka/).

In a commentary welcoming this change the Altyn Orda portal says that “the name ‘Kazakhstan’ appeared in the Soviet system of coordinates,” designating a territory but not reflecting “the death of historical traditions. ‘Kazakh eli sounds different: it isn’t an administrative formula but is a name arising from the people and its history.”

“Translated,” the portal continues, “’Kazakh eli’ means ‘the State of the Kazakhs” and represents “a return to its own name without the Soviet superstructure and without the ideological links of the past.” As such, this move is “a symbolic break with the era of things Soviet; it is not a denial of history but a completion of the post-Soviet period.”

It is already the case, Altyn Orda says, that “the young generation does not think of itself in terms of ‘the post-Soviet space.’ Rather it thinks of itself in global terms, mobile and confident. Thus, the adoption of this new name is not some radical step but a logical continuation of ongoing processes.”

Importantly, the portal says, the term is not about exclusion but about the basis of the state. “The historic nucleus of statehood has been formed by the Kazakh people, but the present-day state remains a hope for all its citizens. The name fixes the cultural foundation but it is not about any limiting of rights.”

            There are at least two countries that are likely to be unhappy with this change: Russia, which will view it as yet another sign of Kazakhstan’s divorce from Moscow and the former Soviet space; and Turkey, which has become calling all of Central Asia Turkestan and thus may see the new name as distancing Kazakhstan from Ankara in some way.

Free Russian Forum Now Focuses on Helping Ukraine rather than on Transforming Russia, Shtepa Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 18 – All people of good will can only welcome the commitment of the Free Russia Forum to support Ukraine against Russian aggression, Vadim Shtepa says; but such people can only bemoan the fact that that Forum is almost completely ignoring the need to transform Russia.

            The editor of the Tallinn-based regionalist portal Region.Expert argues that this is doubly unfortunate. On the one hand, unless Russia is transformed, the Muscovite state will remain a threat to Ukraine even if Kyiv succeeds in achieving its proclaimed goal of restoring its control up to its 1991 borders.

            And on the other, such an approach ignores the problems the residents of the country Moscow rules that any group offers itself as being about a Free Russia should be trying to come up with (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/02/18/forum-svobodnoi-ukraini-ili-kak-iz-rossiiskogo-meropriyatiya-ischezla-rossiiskaya-povestka-a187616 reposted at region.expert/fsu/).

            This week, the Forum of Free Russia met in Vilnius for two days. The first day was closed, but the second was open; and the meeting released a statement about what it had hoped ot achieve. What the accessible information suggests, Shtepa says, is that the Forum’s participants see a Ukrainian victory even as defined by Ukraine as a magic solution to Russia’s problems.

            But unless the restoration of Ukrainian control over all that country’s land up to the 199a borders leads to the transformation of Russia, the Muscovite state will still present challenges not only to Ukraine but also to other neighbors of that country and perhaps especially to the peoples living within the borders of the Russian Federation.

            According to the regionalist, “the problem of the Forum of Free Russia from its very first meetings ten years ago is that its organizers from the outset considered the regional issue as something secondary” and its activities showed that “Muscovite politicians even in emigration remained Moscow-centric” rather than considering what a truly Free Russia should look like.

            In the current situation, emigres can have only a limited impact on what goes on inside their country; but the Free Russia Forum should follow the example of earlier Russian emigrations and at a minimum focus on the problems of the entire country and offer ideas for discussion, steps it is not now taking, Shtepa argues.

            Indeed, even the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has recognized this need, given that it has included at least a limited number of representatives of the regions and republics of the current Russian Federation in its platform for discussions with the democratic Russian opposition.

            It is time, Shtepa says, that the Free Russian Forum do at least as much. Otherwise, it won’t help Ukraine as much as it hopes; and it won’t help Russia very much at all. That is because unless the state now called the Russian Federation changes, it will remain a threat to Ukraine even if Kyiv "wins" and a threat to its own people and others regardless of the outcome of Putin's war.

Moscow Patriarchate Denounces as Heresy Call by Senior Russian General to Draw on Traditional Values of Both Orthodox Christianity and Islam

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 16 – In a recent book, Lt.Gen. Apti Alaudinov, the deputy head of the Main Military-Political Administration of the Russian defense ministry, suggested that Moscow combine the best ideas of Orthodoxy and Islam which support traditional values against those who oppose such values.

            That has brought a sharp rejoinder from Sergey Fufayev, the deputy head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s missionary department. He has denounced Alaudinov’s call as “heresy” and as  form of the kind of syncretism among faiths that the Russian Orthodox Church has always opposed (ng.ru/ng_religii/2026-02-16/9_612_syncretism.html).

            Alaudinov clearly intended that such sharing of ideas about values would help traditional Christianity and traditional Islam come together to fight those in the West challenging those ideas; but Fufayev, speaking for the ROC MP, has made it clear that Christians and Muslims can cooperate but that Orthodox Christianity cannot allow any admixture of Islam in its teachings.

Huge New Detention Center near Moscow will Make It Easier for Kremlin to Hold More Russians without Trial and Harder for Those Held There to Defend Themselves

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 14 – The Russian authorities have started the construction of what will be that country’s largest preliminary detention center. Planned to hold 4,000 inmates awaiting trial or sentencing, the facility is located 71 kilometers from the center of the capital, far from public transport.

            That will give the Kremlin the opportunity to detain more Russians not yet tried or sentenced without the risk of protests and to deprive them of their ability to defend themselves by making it difficult for defense lawyers to reach them on a regular basis (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/02/14/za-71-i-kilometr).

            This new super-sized detention center near the Russian capital follows the building of an equally large one just outside of St. Petersburg and is part of a plan, announced in 2024 to build such facilities across the country to replace smaller detention facilities that has long been in use (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/08/moscow-closing-prison-camps-but-it-is.html).

            Conditions in Russian detention centers, where those arrested are often kept for extended periods, are notoriously bad, far worse than in many prisons and prison camps. They are understaffed and under-serviced, with lawyers often forced to wait for many hours to meet with their clients. 

            This is yet another example of the way in which the Putin regime under cover of declarations about modernization of the Russian prison system is not only enriching its friends and giving it more scope for repression but ensuring that arrests and not just convictions are likely to become more widespread, yet another way Russia is becoming ever more authoritarian.

Pope Leo’s Meeting with Head of Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church Calls Attention to Role of That Denomination Not Only in Ukraine but Across Former Soviet Space

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 13 – On February 12, Pope Leo XIV received at the Vatican Major Archbishop Sviatoslav Shevchuk, the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, the second meeting the two have ad since Leo became leader of the world’s Roman Catholics and one that called attention both to the Vatican’s role in Ukraine, and the UGCC’s role there and elsewhere.

            Since Putin launched his expanded invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the papacy has carried out a quiet humanitarian effort in Ukraine as well as calling for an end to the fighting and negotiations toward a just peace (zenit.org/2026/02/13/the-leader-of-the-ukrainian-catholic-church-the-largest-church-in-communion-with-rome-is-received-by-the-pope/).

            Pope Leo reportedly reaffirmed that commitment at his meeting with the UGCC leader, who both welcomed that and emphasized that the UGCC is active not only in Ukraine but is represented across the world. In all places, it remains subordinate to Rome but retains its Byzantine liturgy.--

            If the UGCC – which is all too often referred to as the Uniates – is recognized for its role in the religious and political life of Ukraine, the larger role it has in the world often is ignored; and that is a mistake because its role beyond the borders of Ukraine has become increasingly important over the last decade.

            Among its most important roles in the former Soviet space is the way its churches are serving as a half-way house between those leaving the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate are joining UGCC parishes in Kazakhstan in hope of eventual Orthodox autocephaly there (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/01/uniate-churches-in-kazakhstan-help.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/07/orthodox-in-kazakhstan-seeking.html).

            Moscow is anything but happy about that, but its anger about the UGCC goes much deeper. After Putin illegally seized Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014, Moscow Patriarch Kirill laid the blame for Ukraine’s opposition on the UGCC and its alliance with Orthodox groups in Ukraine committed to autocephaly there (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/07/moscow-patriarch-blames-uniatism-not.html).

Putin’s War is Why So Many Russians are Suffering in the Dark, Cold and without Water, ‘Important Stories’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb.16 – The independent Important Stories portal says that since the start of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, 78 percent of Russia’s federal subjects have significantly reduced their spending on housing infrastructure, a major reason why so many Russians in these regions are suffering in the dark, the cold and without running water.   

            To meet the unfunded mandates that Moscow has imposed on the regional governments, the latter have been forced to make cuts in repairing and updating infrastructure and that has contributed mightily to the disasters in Russia this winter (istories.media/stories/2026/02/16/za-vremya-voini-78-rossiiskikh-regionov-znachitelno-sokrashchali-raskhodi-na-zhkkh/).

            The world including many Russians of good will have reacted with horror to the way in which Putin’s bombing campaign has left so many Ukrainians in the dark, without heat and without running water; but there has been far less understanding that Putin has launched an almost equally horrific but completely unacknowledged operation against his own people.

            What makes this development especially appalling is that Russians have seen their utility bills skyrocket over the same period; but it is becoming clear that the moneys collected by the authorities are not going to ensure that they have the services they thought they were paying for but rather for Putin’s war, an outcome none of them can be happy about.

            And it seems likely that recognition of this fact as it spreads will give rise to references to what Russians earlier called the Kremlin’s proclivity to engage in the “bombing of Voronezh,” a reference to the Putin regime’s inflicting of pain on its own people in order to put the Kremlin in a position to do so against others as well. 

Kremlin’s Ban on Open Discussion of Federalism Leading to Radicalization of Ethnic and Regional Movements, Pylayeva Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 16 – Lana Pylayeva, a Komi activist who is a member of the platform at PACE for dialogue with Russian democratic forces, argues that the Kremlin’s ban on open and honest discussion of federalism is unintentionally leading to the radicalization of ethnic and regional groups in the Russian Federation.

            If the Russian authorities permitted such discussions, she says, there would be a far greater chance that the various groups could build bridges among all groups rather than as now each retiring to their own regional or ethnic group (idelreal.org/a/demontazh-moskvotsentrizma-chlen-platformy-pase-lana-pylaeva-o-tom-zachem-rossii-razgovor-o-dekolonizatsii/33675197.html).

            And while the history of these issues means that any opening of discussions will be difficult and require a long time to produce results on which many if not most groups can agree, the failure of the Putin regime to allow such discussions, a continuation of Soviet practice, makes disagreement and fissiparousness more likely. 

            Everyone, ethnic Russian and non-Russian and Muscovite and regionalist, must recognize that “Russia is after all an empire; and the policy which it conducts in relation to all regions and in particular to representatives of indigenous peoples is a colonial policy,” Pylayeva says. 

            These problems are exacerbated, she continues, because “now, a large part of the information which circulates both in Russian opposition and foreign media is most often information which is taken from federal sources,” that is, “it is information which focuses on what is happening in Moscow” and is inevitably “Moscow-centric.”

            All that helps the Kremlin block discussions about federalism and how Russia might be transformed to better reflect all its residents and not just those within the ring road.

Russians Now Equally Divided as to Whether They Can Trust Others, with Young and Those who Think Their Country is Going in the Wrong Direction Less Likely to Do So, Levada Center Polls Show

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 13 – According to a December 2025 Levada Center poll, 50 percent of Russians say that they believe it is possible to trust the majority of others, while 46 percent say the opposite, figures that show a slight increase in willingness to trust from 2020 when the numbers of those willing to trust others fell sharply.

            A higher percentage of those who are young, have lower incomes and think the country is going in the wrong direction are more likely to say Russians shouldn’t trust one another than those who are older, have higher incomes or think that Russia under Putin is headed in the  right direction (levada.ru/2026/02/13/uroven-mezhlichnostnogo-doveriya-v-dekabre-2025/).

            That is yet another obstacle that opponents of the Kremlin leader must overcome to organize protests or opposition groups, an obstacle that is seldom considered by those who discuss why the level of protests and opposition activity in the Russian Federation at the present time are as low as they are.

Russia’s Fate Being ‘Decided by the Economy and Not with the Seizure of Some Village in Ukraine,’ Kalashnikov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 13 – Maksim Kalashnikov, a Russian commentator who favors an even more aggressive approach to Ukraine than that being conducted by the Kremlin, says that it is a mistake to think that Russia’s fate is being decided on the frontlines in Ukraine. In fact, it “is now being decided by the economy” which is in increasingly disastrous shape.

            The war in Ukraine has exacerbated the economic problems of the country and put it on course to something like 1991 or even 1917, he says, in the course of urging Moscow’s top leadership to recognize this reality and take steps to change it before it is too late (dialog.ua/war/328733_1771012157).

              “What matters,” Kalashnikov says, “is what happens to the budget, production and enterprises rather than whether we’ve captured another Bolshaya Khrenovka. And the situation here is dire” not least because of the West’s imposition of ever more severe sanctions and moves against Russian sales of raw materials abroad.

              But unfortunately, the Z-blogger concludes, what is likely to happen is exactly the reverse of what should: “the Kremlin will drag things out until disaster strikes and only then will it try to negotiate with the West on what will be ever more unfavorable terms.”  Russian elites need to recognize this looming disaster and take action. 

Tolkien’s Orcs, and the Identification of Russians with Them, Key to Understanding Putin’s Country, Savvin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 12—References to Orcs, the evil characters of J.R.R. Tolkien’s novels, have increased in frequency in Russian society since the start of Vladimir Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, although the words is typically dismissed as nothing more than a term of abuse, Dimitry Savvin says.

            But in fact, they provide extraordinarily valuable keys to the understanding of Soviet and post-Soviet Russian society, given that many Russians now view Orcs as something positive, according to the editor of the conservative Russian Harbin portal based in Riga (harbin.lv/obraz-orka-v-tvorchestve-tolkina-i-sovetskaya-identichnost).

            Tolkien’s positive heroes are representatives of what he recognized as the passing of peasant societies, with all their myths, Savvin says. Indeed, he saw as something fundamentally evil the rise of industrial society and the kind of people who became “the servants of darkness,” the Orcs.

            Soviet ideology celebrated “the so-called working class” as the “most progressive and most creative” political force, although those who knew it best could see how its members, who were after all yesterday’s peasants who had passed through urbanization and industrialization were in fact anything but the positive role models the CPSU claimed to see.

            According to Savvin, orcs, whether in Tolkien’s novels or among Russians who identify as such, “are incapable of creating anything beautiful and have no need to do so; but they are skilled in the manufacture of machines and especially of weapons.” Moreover, the two groups share a common morality.

            On the one hand, he says, hey “value discipline and slavishly obey ‘the Master,’ even though deep down they hate their superiors and dream of escaping from them so that they can live freely and “kill ‘for pleasure’” while “making easy money from ‘suckers’” who give in to them.

            What is striking, the conservative Russian wrier says, is that in the 1990s, an ever larger number of Russian writers began to present the Orcs as something “positive,” the victims of aggression by others; and such identification and the attitudes on which it is based have only intensified in the Putin years.

            “Classical Sovietism,” Savvin writes, “attempted to conceal its dark side, to hide and hush up its crimes; but in the 2000s, a major, systemic shift occurred” fir from below and then with the support of the bosses who saw the self-identification of Russians as Orcs as benefitting their rulers.

            “Neo-Sovietism ceased to be assumed of its immorality, its crimes and its sadism,” the Russian conservative says. “Instead of denigrating ‘warrior liberators, they began to display a demonstrative drive ‘to Berlin for the German women.’ Instead of ‘we are for peace,’ they shouted ‘we can do it again.’”

            In short, the surviving Soviet people “no longer want to pretend” they are anything but Orcs; and as a result, “being an Orc is no longer an insult: it is now a source of pride” and a recognition of just how alike the Russian people of the Putin era are to Tolkien’s Orcs. 

 

Russia Threatened by Rise of So-Called ‘Lumpen Intelligentsia’, Club of the Regions Experts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 12 – Thirty-five percent of the graduates of Russian higher educational institutions are now employed in jobs that don’t require that level of education and earn on average 20 percent less than those who work in the fields they were trained for, a pattern that is costing the Russian economy and the Russian state in major ways.

            Those are the conclusions of a new report by the Moscow Center for Macro-Economic Analysis and Short-Term Predictions that is attracting widespread attention as the Kremlin tries to eliminate this imbalance (forecast.ru/_ARCHIVE/Mon_13/2024/TT12_2024s.pdf and  vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/5662).

            Some experts say that this imbalance is growing and represents a threat to the country. One group taking that position are scholars and investigators at the Club of the Regions which tracks what is going on outside of Moscow where gap between educational attainment and the jobs those with it have may be especially great (club-rf.ru/theme/644).

            “When university and college graduates find themselves working in the same jobs,” the Club’s experts say, “this causes serious frustration among the former” because it represents “a breakdown in social mobility and the rise of the so-called lumpen intelligentsia, tens of thousands of people whose financial situation doesn’t match their ambitions.”

            According to these experts, “under certain circumstances, this group may follow any populist who promises to restore ‘justice,’” something especially likely to occur during election seasons when opposition candidates may see making such appeals as something that will contribute to their success.

            The Kremlin is concerned about this imbalance, the Club of the Regions says, noting that problems surrounding it were discussed at a State Council meeting in December of last year and that Putin in February of this year signed orders to eliminate unnecessary educational requirements in many jobs. 

            But perhaps most significantly, Club experts say, is the Russian government’s  efforts to reduce the number of university slots subsidized by Moscow and the transformation of secondary education to meet the needs of employers.

Draft Law Would Ban Religious Services in Russian Apartment Houses, Hitting Muslims Hardest

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 13 – Members of all four parliamentary parties in the Russian Duma have proposed a law that would ban religious services in Russian apartment houses in the name of blocking the spread of extremism and preventing residents from being disturbed by gatherings in such places.

            The bill is likely to pass (rbc.ru/politics/13/02/2026/698ca7b89a79470b563a34be), primarily because, despite provisions potentially affecting all religious groups, it would hit Muslims hardest because given a shortage of mosques in major cities, Islamic communities have more often than others set up prayer rooms to provide services to the faithful.

            Talgat Tajuddin, the head of the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) who styles himself the Supreme Mufti of Russia, has proposed a compromise. He agrees that such prayer rooms should not be used for religious services but should exist in apartment blocks and other places to allow individuals to pray.

            The mufti’s proposal is unlikely to gain traction in the Duma or to be realized in practice whatever the law says because many Russians see Muslim prayer rooms as offensive and dangerous and would likely continue to do so even if collective services in them were banned (akcent.site/novosti/44044).

            And many of Russia’s Muslims are likely to be upset with Tajuddin’s proposal, viewing it providing the Russian authorities with yet another reason for refusing to allow more mosques to be built in Russian cities while preventing them from organizing services in prayer rooms. 

            In Moscow, for example, where there are more than two million Muslims, there are only six mosques, something that has forced Muslims who want to gather for prayer to set up their own prayer rooms.  

 

More than a Quarter Million Muscovites Now Own One or More Guns, Officials Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 12 – Gun ownership among Russians, increasingly for self-defense rather than hunting or target practice, has risen dramatically since Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine in 2022; and most experts expect it to rise still further as veterans bring back guns from the frontlines.

            These experts suggest that there now may be as many as 30 million guns in private hands, far more than the fraction of that number officials concede; but most attention to has been about guns in federal subjects far from the capital (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/04/illegal-arms-sales-possession-and-use.html).

            But guns are now flooding into Russian cities as well, including Moscow, where they appear more likely to be used for self-defense or for criminal activities than is the case in many other places; and Aleksandr Nazarov of the Nakanune news portal gives an update on the situation there (nakanune.ru/articles/124349/).

            He begins by citing the words of Aleksandr Samoylov, the deputy head of the Russian Guard in that city. According to official data, more than 278,000 residents of the capital have own a total of about 650,000 weapons, although it is likely that the real number of owners and weapons there as elsewhere in Russia is a multiple of these figures. 

            In 2025, Samoylov continues, his agency which is responsible for gun security carried out “more than 66,000” inspections. He says that his officers frequently found guns were being retained even though licenses had expired, were not being safely kept, and discovered ammunition of a different caliber than the guns Muscovites had registered ownership of.

            According to the Russian Guard official, “the overall number of gun owners in Moscow is gradually declining,” given that many have handed in their guns for use by the Russian military in Ukraine or have no use for them. But it seems equally plausible that this decline in official gun ownership may in fact reflect that many who own guns aren’t registering them.

            But however that may be, the fact that a quarter of a million Muscovites own guns they have registered and a larger number own guns they haven’t must be a source of worry not only for police working to enforce the laws but to those in power who fear that these guns may be turned on them or at least make it more difficult for the police to protect them. 

Ethnic Russians in Emigration Organizing Regionally to Help Each Other and Retain Ties with People Back Home

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 13 – That non-Russians who have been forced to emigrate typically organize themselves to support one another and to maintain ties with their co-ethnics in the non-Russian republics of the Russian Federation is no surprise. But that ethnic Russians from various regions of that country are doing so is as well and may be at least as important. 

            The largest and most active of these groups is Petersburg without Borders, whose six hundred virtual members include not only those in the diaspora who want to help one another but many in Russia’s northern capital with whom both those who have left and those who haven’t want ties (nemoskva.net/2026/02/13/razrushit-stenu-mezhdu-uehavshimi-i-ostavshimisya/).

            Olga Galkina, a former member of the Petersburg parliament who left Russia after the start of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, is active in that group and also in the Reforum Space Berlin and Inter-Regional Initiative groups and shared her thoughts about that group and others like it as far as regional identities and contacts with people back home are concerned. 

            Both many Russians and many people in the West think about Russia “only through the prism of Moscow,” as if that city by itself could represent the country, Galkina says. But “the regions of Russia are very different, and those differences must be recognized and responded to if Russia is to become the country or countries its residents want.

            The Kremlin has worked tirelessly both to promote Moscow-centrism and to prevent people from any region organizing at home or even abroad to focus on that region’s specific needs. But several years ago, she continues, she and a group of fellow emigres from the northern capital organized European Petersburg to help one another and maintain ties with those at home.

            Convinced that they were on the right path, the group organized something called “the Inter-Regional Initiative” to help Russians from other regions do the same and then to share their ideas with one another. Petersburg without Borders is serving as a resource center for these other groups that now exist in slightly more than a third of all federal subjects.

            Many of these are from the non-Russia republics, Galkina says, but there are also ethnic Russian groups from Perm, Tomsk and Yaroslavl.  These movements are taking off and may become important actors in coming up with new ideas for the future of the country. Later this month, she says, the group will launch its own portal.