Literatures of Numerically Small Nations Often Plays Larger Role than Do Those of Larger Peoples, Hungarian Specialist on Finno-Ugric Nationalities Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan 12 – Janos Pusztay, a Hungarian specialist on Finno-Ugric languages, says the literatures of numerically small nations often plays a larger role than do those of larger peoples and bemoans the fact that Hungarian scholars currently devote little attention to the writers of the numerically small Finno-Ugric nations in the Russian Federation.
    In an article for the Estonian culture magazine, Sirp, he writes that the role of literature among such peoples is so great that those related to them abroad must show Russians that “there is interest in the Finno-Ugric peoples abroad” (sirp.ee/s1-artiklid/c7-kirjandus/mis-saab-soome-ugri-rahvaste-kirjandusest/ in Estonian; mariuver.com/2025/01/15/chto-stanet-s-literaturoj-finno-ugorskih-narodov/#more-80290 in Russian).
    One of the great resources of the numerically small Finno-Ugric nations within the current borders of the Russian Federation is the existence of three Finno-Ugric independent countries, Estonia, Finland and Hungary. Estonia has been the most active in promoting ties with Finno-Ugrics in Russia; Finland somewhat less so; and Hungary active earlier much less so now.
    Pusztay’s article in an Estonian journal bemoaning the decline in Hungarian attention to Finno-Ugric writers in the Russian Federation is thus important as an indication that despite the current orientation of Budapest toward Moscow, there is still much interest in the Finno-Ugric world in Estonia, Finland and the Russian Federation.

Moscow Ambivalent about Trump’s Call for US Acquisition of Greenland

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 12 – Moscow has been pleased by US President-Elect Donald Trump’s suggestion that the US should acquire Denmark both because it believes such a move will divide NATO and because it is confident that Trump’s move will legitimize what Russia is doing in Ukraine.
    But at the same time, Russian officials are concerned that any such American acquisition of Greenland would threaten Moscow’s control of the Northern Sea Route in particular and the Arctic move generally and thus oppose it again as they did when Trump first made this suggestion during his first term as president (ridl.io/ru/grenlandskie-mechty-kremlya/).
    On its ambivalence about the US and Greenland, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/01/by-talking-about-annexing-greenland-pro.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/05/moscow-sees-greenlands-moves-toward.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/05/us-wants-greenland-as-second-alaska.html).
    And on Moscow’s own involvement in earlier efforts to detach Greenland from Denmark but not of course to add it to the US and its calculations about the natural resources of that island,, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2018/04/moscow-not-behind-greenlands-pro.html.

Kyrgyzstan since 1991 has Attracted about 10 Percent of Ethnic Kyrgyz Living Abroad

Paul Goble
Staunton, Jan. 13 – Since 1991, former Soviet republics have sought to attract back members of their titular nations living abroad. Kyrgyzstan, because of financial and political problems, has lagged in this; but now it too has passed a milestone: Bishkek has lured back some 70,000 ethnic Kyrgyz, more than 90 percent of whom have taken Kyrgyzstan citizenship.
    Last year, it attracted 1223 ethnic Kyrgyz from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China, Russia, Turkey, Afghanistan and other countries as well, the government has reported (24.kg/obschestvo/316508_status_kayryilmana_v2024_godu_poluchili_1tyisyacha_223_etnicheskih_kyirgyiza/).
    Such returnees are called kaidylmans, a term analogous to the terms Kazakhstan has used, oralmans and kandases; and they have been given special benefits to help them start live anew in Kyrgyzstan. But the benefits Bishkek has provided are far smaller than those Kazakhstan has given out and the program has been less successful as a result.
    In addition, there have been cases, the most notorious being the Kyrgyz from the Wakhan Corridor in Afghanistan many of whom fled to Turkey, whom the Kyrgyz authorities have been anything but welcome (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/10/kyrgyzstan-officials-again-refuse-to.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/02/are-wakhan-kyrgyz-finally-going-to-get.html).
    If Kyrgyzstan is now going to be more welcoming – and the new rules governing such people suggest that may be the case (cbd.minjust.gov.kg/97678/edition/8283/ru) – than many of the more than 800,000 Kyrgyz now living abroad might return and possibly help Bishkek to establish better control over its territory particularly in the south.
    But at the same time, their return, especially if it is large and rapid, could trigger conflicts not only with Kyrgyz who have been living in the country for a lengthy period but also with Uzbeks, Kazakhs and Russians who might find their positions threatened by such a growth in the Kyrgyz nation.

Ukraine Can Achieve Its Goals Only if Russia Suffers a Strategic Defeat, Something West isn't Ready to Inflict, Pastukhov Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 11 – The possibilities of ending the war in Ukraine by negotiation can be understood only if one is clear about the declared and undeclared but nonetheless real goals of the three parties most immediately involved -- Russia, Ukraine and the United States, Vladimir Pastukhov says.
    The London-based Russian analyst says that the Russia’s declared goals are “the defense of ‘the Russian world’ and ‘the liberation’ of Eastern Ukraine.” Its undeclared ones  are  “the infliction of a non-strategic defeat on the West in Ukraine o as to change the balance of relations between Russia and the West” (echofm.online/opinions/czeli-vojny-i-graniczy-kompromissov).
    Among these desired changes is the establishment of red lines that the West cannot violate regarding countries within what Russia insists is within its zone. “For the Kremlin,” Pastukhov continues, “the very fact of the recognition of ‘red lines’ [by the West] means more than how and where they will be drawn.”
    Ukraine’s declared goals are very different. They include the reversal of Russian occupied and annexed territories and the restoration of Kyiv’s control up to the borders of 1991. Its undeclared goals is to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia, one that would eliminate Russia as a threat in the future.
    In both cases there are problems, Pastukhov suggests. Ukraine’s declared goals aren’t achievable; and even if Kyiv somehow did manage to do so, such an achievement by itself
not only would not lead to an automatic end of the war but more likely will lead instead to its escalation.”
    And that explains why Ukraine has an undeclared goal of promoting the disintegration of the Russian Federation or at least a revolution in Moscow. Only one or both of these things would give Ukraine the victory it really seeks; but unfortunately, neither Ukraine nor the current position of the West makes such an achievement likely.
    As for the West and above all the US, their declared goals are “helping Ukraine achieve its own declared goals” of recovering territory; but these allies of Ukraine are not interested in inflicting on Ukraine more than a non-strategic defeat lest that destabilize the international system even more than now.
    Despite what some in Moscow say, the West does not have the strategic defeat of Russia as a goal and did not provoke the war in Ukraine to achieve that. But at the same time, the West “did not take any particular measures to prevent this conflict” by using its influence in Moscow or Kyiv.
    “In a certain sense,” Pastukhov continues, “Zelensky is right that no effective pressure was put on Russia before Moscow began to bomb Kyiv. But at the same time, Putin is partially right as well: Kyiv did not have ‘the rules of the game’ explained to it; and as a result, the story of the Budapest memorandum was repeated.”
    “The West was ready to help Ukraine with arms and money but not prepared to fight itself and doesn’t intend to do so in the future.” Had that been clear to all parties, the war might not have taken place but Ukraine would have had to accept a status it does not want, the London-based Russian analyst says.
    What does all this mean? “The goals of the war for Russia and for Ukraine are antagonistic but for Russia and the West, they are not antagonistic.” And that in turn means that “the goals of Ukraine and the West in this war correspond only at a superficial level,” Pastukhov says.
    “Ukraine is seeking the strategic defeat of Russia at a time when the West has put as its goal only its non-strategic defeat.” And that more than the subjective stances of Trump, Zelensky or Putin is going to play a key role in any negotiations or in the future course of the war, Pastukhov argues.
    Specifically, “any negotiation process in which Putin appears as a subject and not as an object … will mean the achievement by Putin of his undeclared goals of the war, the return of subjectiveness to Russia, and the non-achievement by Ukraine of its undeclared goals of the de-subjectivization of Russia.”
    And there thus exists “a serious risk that the West, the goals of which in this war are ambivalent will make a deal with Putin behind the back of Ukraine.” The question only is how long Zelensky and Ukraine will “permit themselves to ignore this risk” because it is for better or worse very real.

Uniate Churches in Kazakhstan Help Ukrainians There Retain Identity and Orthodox There to Pursue Autocephaly

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 12 – There are only six Greek Catholic (Uniate) churches in Kazakhstan and some of them do not even have their own facilities but must use Roman Catholic ones, but these churches are playing two important roles by helping ethnic Ukrainians retain their identity and assisting Orthodox in Kazakhstan to escape Moscow’s oversight.
    The first of these roles is highlighted in a new article in Novaya Gazeta which discusses how Ukrainians in Kazakhstan, some who were sent there during Stalin’s times and others who moved there later, have turned to this church to retain their identity as Ukrainians (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/01/12/tam-splosh-58-ia-statia).
    The second which involves the shift of believers from the Russian Orthodox Church in Kazakhstan who do not want to be subordinate to Moscow has been described by the SibReal portal at sibreal.org/a/smenit-moskvu-na-konstantinopol/33004030.html and discussed in more detail at windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/07/orthodox-in-kazakhstan-seeking.html).
    The ROC MP likely views these two roles as complementary and re-enforcing but it appears that they are really separate with the ethnic Ukrainians viewing these churches as a defense of their identity and only Russian Orthodox who want to escape Moscow’s rule viewing them otherwise.
    Nonetheless, it is entirely possible that because of Moscow’s concerns, these churches could become yet another flashpoint in relations between the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan.

Clash in Russia Over Country's Future between Stalinists and Black Hundreds ‘Inevitable,’ Prilepin Says

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 12 – Despite Putin’s efforts to combine the values of the Stalinists and the Black Hundreds, Zakhar Prilepin says, a clash between the two is inevitable; and on its outcome will depend not only how Russia is internally ordered but also how Moscow relates to the former Soviet space.
    In the course of a wide-ranging 9,000-word article in Kazan’s Business-Gazeta, the writer and nationalist politician argues that the world as a whole is engaged in a choice about what civilizational project it will seek to realize in  the future both at home and abroad (business-gazeta.ru/article/659600).
    In Russia, Prilepin says, this choice is between those who want a post-war Russia to be “a mono-ethnic Russian state with minimal national autonomies so that the country will never again disintegrate” and those who want Russia to play a central role in the creation of a new international order “so that we again stand at the head of a great anti-colonial revolution.”
    The former, which may be called the Black Hundreds vision, needs little to do with the former Soviet republics or other neighbors, while the latter, which is Stalinist in its orientation, wants to dominate them and expand Russian influence far beyond the current borders of the Russian Federation.
“These two concepts are already starting to fight each other. I think that in Russia there will be a clash between these two ideas,” Prilepin says. “The left, Leninist-Stalinists, on the one hand, and the neo-White Guards, Black Hundreds, on the other, are already gathering in two large flocks, and a clash between them seems inevitable to me today.”
Putin has a foot in both camps. Thus he has restored the Soviet anthem but talks about Ilyin, brought back the red banner but also Solzhenitsyn, and promotes How the Steel was Tempered as well as The Gulag Archipelago. But “the entire political system can’t be that complex and people are being increasingly pulled to one pole or another.
Consequently, the direction Russia will take will depend on the outcome of this clash, Prilepin suggests.

FSB Designates 172 Ethnic and Regional Groups ‘Terrorist’ Organizations

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Jan. 11 – The FSB has designated 172 ethnic and religious groups associated with the Forum of Free States of PostRussia “terrorist organizations” because that group has called for its followers to work for the decolonization of Russia and to take part in defending Ukraine against Russian aggression.
    Among those so described are Asians of Russia, Free Buryatia, Free Yakutiya, New Tyva, the League of Free Nations, the Association of Indigenous Peoples of the Russian Federation, Free Idel-Ural, Free Bashkortostan, the Congress of Peoples of the North Caucasus, the All-Tatar Social Center, and the Karelian National Movement (zona.media/news/2025/01/10/spisok-172 and nemoskva.net/2025/01/11/fsb-dobavila-v-spisok-terroristicheskih-172-obedineniya-vklyuchaya-naczionalnye/).
    This move follows a decision by the Russian General Procurator to declare the Forum an “undesirable” organization in March 2023 and a ruling by the Supreme Court upholding that position (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/03/17/genprokuratura-priznala-nezhelatelnoi-organizatsiiu-forum-svobodnykh-narodov-postrossii-news and t.me/genprocrf/4472).
    Among the other institutions the FSB has now declared a “terrorist organization” is the Komi Daily, even though it has no relationship with the Forum. Its leaders are now seeking legal redress against the FSB move (t.me/komi_daily/706 and moscowtimes.ru/2025/01/12/vrossii-vpervie-priznali-smi-terroristicheskoi-organizatsiei-a152081).
    This new enumeration of terrorist groups includes some about which nothing has ever been heard and it is entirely possible that the FSB has done more to advertise the existence of such trends than any of those involved could have achieved on their own (e.g., the case of the hitherto unheard of Oryol Autonomous Republic (t.me/orlec/2195).