Window on Eurasia: Five Arguments Russians Make for Decentralization of Ukraine Even More Compelling for Russian Federation

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 1 – One of the problems that Moscow propagandists face is that many of the arguments they put out for political change in Ukraine apply with equal or even greater force to the Russian Federation and thus have the potential to spark demands inside the latter country that the Kremlin is very much against.

            Nowhere is that possibility of unwelcome blowback more obvious than in Russian discussions of the need for decentralization of power and the creation of genuine federalism in Ukraine, discussions in which every argument about Ukraine could be made with even greater force about Russia.

            An obvious example of this possibility is unintentionally provided by Aleksandr Karavayev, a researcher at the Moscow Institute of Economics, in a commentary on “The Decentralization of Ukraine as a Variant of Soft Federation” on the Politcom.ru portal on Friday (politcom.ru/17657.html).

             As with most Moscow authors on this subject, Karavayev says that “the strategy of decentralization may be the last chance at a minimum to implement the reform of local self-administration and at a maximum to weaken the separatist backlash.”  And he says this strategy must involve the devolution of both electoral and fiscal control.

             The regions and cities of Ukraine would be allowed to elect their own leaders, keep far more of the taxes collected on their territories, and leave to Kyiv only a coordinating function.  Not surprisingly, demands for exactly the same things are regular features of the agendas of regionalists in the Russian Federation where ever fewer officials are elected, ever less of taxes collected are left to the regions, and where Moscow insists on deciding everything.

            In support of his argument about Ukraine, Karavayev says there are five “essential political reasons” why Kyiv should decentralize:

·         First, such a reform would allow the government to adapt to the diversity of Ukraine’s regions.

·         Second, it would open the way for cooperation among regions and not just between individual regions and Kyiv.

·         Third, it would allow for a return to the system of proportional representation in the national legislature in place of the current winner-take-all arrangements.

·         Fourth, decentralization would open the way for talks with Moscow to improve bilateral relations.

·         And fifth, it would open the way for the resolution of the problems the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics by meeting many of the demands they pose and thus reducing pressure for secession.

Karavayev says that the experience of Canada shows that “federation in the Western world is one of the best means of resolving the problems of administration in complex states. And he says that Ukraine could have chosen on its own to do so but now may be forced to do so by the threat of the disintegration of the country.

Exactly the same argument could be made about the Russian Federation, although it is certain that this particular Moscow writer and others like him would be most distressed if anyone in Kazan, Irkutsk, or Makhachkala ever draws the obvious parallels, something they are almost certain to do as the economic and political situation in Russia deteriorates.

Window on Eurasia: Moscow Preparing to Seize Land in Crimea for ‘State Needs’ as It Did in Sochi

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 1 – Russia’s economic development ministry is preparing legislation that would allow Moscow to seize significant amounts of land in Crimea on an accelerated basis in the name of promoting economic development, a measure that is modelled on the one Vladimir Putin used in the run-up to the Sochi Olympiad.

            According to a report in “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” the measure would reduce the amount of time that the authorities would have to give to property owners before their lands or buildings could be seized from the one year standard of existing Russian law to only three months (ej.ru/?a=note&id=25254).

            Much of the pressure for this measure comes from within the Russian government itself which wants to promote a gaming industry in the hopes of reducing the costs of the annexation by raising tax money from that sector.  But as the Moscow newspaper notes, “there are a series of problems” with such a project.

            First, many residents of Crimea aren’t especially interested in the development of such an industry.  They see their land as a place for family vacations, not gambling.  Second, they point out that Crimea lacks the infrastructure and airports to support such a program.  And third, they suspect that the government will seize the land and then privatize it into the hands of its friends.

            The second and third of these concerns are especially important. As “Yezhednevny zhurnal” points out, a gaming business requires a lot of infrastructure and a nearby airport.  That is why today’s Moscow gamblers like Tallinn: “there are good hotels, a good casino and the road from the airport takes only 15 minutes.” None of that exists in Crimea

            And the use of the government’s power of eminent domain to seize land and then “quietly” privatize it can be used to change the face of Crimea. It is not difficult to imagine that such new powers will be used for Russians with close ties to Moscow and against groups like the Crimean Tatars which oppose the annexation.

            Moreover, the paper’s reference to Sochi raises another unfortunate spectre: the rapid turnover in control of property not accompanied by the construction of the necessary infrastructure or by any realistic assessment of whether there will be enough demand to support the new arrangements over the longer term.

            Sochi only a few months after the much-ballyhooed Olympiad is suffering from a lack of visitors, and it is not difficult to imagine that this proposed legislation thus represents simply another occasion for the Russian authorities and their allies to use the power of the state to enrich themselves without regard to those whose rights are violated and interests ignored.

Window on Eurasia: Not One of 2,000 Muslims in Ukraine’s Luhansk Oblast Favors Secession, Leader Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 1 – Not one of the 2,000 Muslims currently living in Ukraine’s Luhansk Oblast favors secession or transferring their region to the Russian Federation, according to the leader of that community. Instead, even though many of them come as he does from parts of Russia, they are proud to be citizens of Ukraine.

            Seyfulla Rashidov, a professor at the university there who came from Daghestan 35 years ago and now heads the Salam Muslim community, told the local newspaper that he does not know anyone among the believers there who is backing or is even sympathetic to the secessionists (realgazeta.com.ua/?p=1896).

            A major reason for that is that most of the Muslims in Luhansk are from parts of the Russian Federation, regularly travel there, and know what is happening in the places of their birth. Those who back the secessionists, on the other hand, have either never been to Russia or were there only a long time ago.

            Many of the latter – and they do not include any Muslims – see their support for the secessionists as a way of complaining about low pay because they think they will get higher wages if they are not part of Ukraine.  That explains the overwhelming support instructors in his university and in the police have given to those who want to break away from Ukraine.

            But Muslims know better. They are living better in Ukraine than they did in the areas from which they came. Otherwise they would not be there, Rashidov said.  And what they have seen in their places of birth in recent times has been anything but inspiring and attractive.  They are loyal Ukrainians, and they are better off in Ukraine.

            At the same time, he continued, all Ukrainians need to work together to end corruption, to ensure the rule of law, and to boost wages, and they need to be open to the possibility of better relations between their country and Russia in the future.  Rashidov suggested that the post-World War II cooperation of France and Germany could be a model.

             Rashidov’s declaration is especially important not only because it suggests that much of the impulse behind the Moscow-backed secessionist movement is economic rather than ethnic but also because it shows that opposition to what Russia is doing in Ukraine is intense among all Muslims there and not just the Crimean Tatars.

            And that in turn means that Moscow’s introduction of fighters from Chechnya will likely fail for yet another reason: the Muslim groups from whom the Kadyrovtsy as they are known might have expected a welcome or even support are likely to be the most consistent in combatting the appearance of such fighters.

Window on Eurasia: Belarus or Northern Kazakhstan Could Be Next Eastern Ukraine, Tishkov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 1 – If the leaders of Kazakhstan or Belarus adopt policies like those Ukraine did, there is no guarantee that those two countries might not suffer the fate that the eastern regions of Ukraine are now facing, according to Valery Tishkov, director of the  Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology and a former Russian nationalities minister.

            In an interview given to Mir-Politika.ru, Tishkov said that “no one can say anything in advance” but the Belarusian opposition has been “very radical and Russophobic,” even though  “Belarus is simply a territory through which have passed various armies” (mir-politika.ru/13800-tishkov-severnyy-kazahstan-mozhet-postich-sudba-yugo-vostoka-ukrainy.html).

            “If suddenly the line of the leadership and the line of the opposition intelligentsia were to come together, then no one could guarantee that both in Belarus and in Kazakhstan would” there not be changes in a negative direction regarding Russia and Russians, the ethnographer says. Indeed, there is evidence of such a trend in Kaakhstan.

            Already there is a manifestation of Kazakh ethnic nationalism which speaks against the conception of the president about a Kazakhstan civic nation. And Northern Kazakhstan which is primarily populated by Russians could overtake the fate of the south-east of Ukraine.” Tishkov added that he “hopes this will not happen.”

            Most of Tishkov’s interview is devoted to the nature of nationalism and to the situation in Ukraine.   With regard to nationalism, the ethnographer says it is important to distinguish between “nationalism in the name of the state” which adopts a messianic position and “nationalism which seeks a special status for this or that nationality.”

            If the former is apparently acceptable in his eyes, the latter “ethnic nationalism” bears “a negative character.”

            Nationalism can appear in any country and has in “all the countries which were formed after the disintegration of the USSR.”  Where governments pushed for the “construction of an ethnocratic state,” he argued, that immediately led to “conflicts,” as in early post-Soviet Georgia where the government declared “’Georgia Only for the Georgians.’”

            A similar conflict arose and has intensified in Ukraine, he continued, “between ethnic Ukrainians, who have declared themselves and their language the only masters of the new state, and Russians, Hungarians, Carpatho-Rusins, and other groups of minorities.”

            Nationalism is most common, Tishov suggested, in countries “where there is poor administration, where the state is constructed without a taking into account of regional historical-cultural differences, where there are no programs for the support of small groups and where the priority of the language and cultural tradition of only one part of the population is affirmed.”

            Those things come out in the open especially when here is a political struggle, economic crises, and a corrupt elite, he added. And when they do the most varied events can trigger a conflict between the dominant group and minorities.  In Ukraine now, he asserted, “Ukrainian ethno-nationalism of a chauvinist kind” is predominant.

                Those resisting it are doing so not on a purely ethnic plane but also “in the name of a regional and cultural-historical community.” They are seeking “worthy representation in a large state or if they cannot achieve such a status and legal guarantees” then”exit from the common state and the establishment of their own formation or a joining together with another state.”

            “Such is a worldwide norm,” Tishkov said.

            Russians and Ukrainians are culturally similar but the idea that they are fraternal peoples who have never been in conflict is “a myth.” Moreover, as Sigmund Freud pointed out in his arguments about the narcissism of small differences, the smaller the differences among peoples, the more important each difference becomes and the more likely it will be a source of conflict.

            Neither in tsarist nor in Soviet times did Ukrainians and Russians view each other as the enemy.  But now, as a result of “the geopolitical competition” between the West and Russia, that has changed, with the West seeing an expansion of its influence in Ukraine as a way to limit and weaken Russia.