Window on Eurasia: Kremlin Will Ultimately Disown and Suppress Those Fighting for It in Ukraine to Save Itself, Mitrokhin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 7 – Russians of various kinds who are fighting on Moscow’s behalf in eastern Ukraine and who are heroes in the eyes of many Russians at home face a future they don’t expect: When Moscow does resolve the Ukrainian crisis, the Kremlin will disown and arrest them lest they become a threat to itself, Nikolay Mitrokhin says.

            Indeed, he suggests in a Grani.ru post yesterday, the Russian authorities are already making plans to do just that, an indication of the cynicism of those who pushed such Russians into the fight and of the fears the authorities have about what could happen if there were a Donetsk-style revolt within the Russian Federation (grani.ru/opinion/mitrokhin/m.230021.html).

            “The day when the arrests of Cossacks and other organizers and participants of the current ‘rising’ in Donbass” and by Moscow rather than by Kyiv “are much closer than this may appear to many who have begun to see as the fate of ‘the strugglers for the interests of the Russian people.”

            The FSB’s Center E has already been conducting a census of those in Russia who are prepared to fight in situations like Donetsk and Luhansk, Mitrokhin says, but it is doing this less to identify new foot soldiers and leaders for such efforts than to make sure the Russian authorities know who might rise against them and thus use this to divide and disorder the latter.

            Despite the obvious intellectual shortcomings of the Russian nationalists and neo-fascists, he continues, “the Donbass conflict has shown that they as a result of their ideology are capable of becoming leaders, in any case in urban conditions” where governments are not accustomed to fighting.

            To put it bluntly, Mitrokhin argues, “in moments of political crisis, particular representatives of the junior officer corps or even of sergeants may turn out to be military leaders” quite capable of overturning the governments and political order of entire regions. Reining them in is far harder than dealing with unarmed demonstrators.

            Moscow certainly knows that “Russian nationalists before the Crimean annexation overwhelmingly hated Putin.” They wanted and want “the uninterrupted widening of the borders of the Russian Empire and its cleansing of internal enemies.”  If the Kremlin backs away from either, they will view Putin and his regime once again as their enemy and act accordingly.

            “Neutralizing” such people when the Ukrainian crisis is “regulated and they return to Russia “will not be so simple,” Mitrokhin continues, “because veteran and Cossack organizations for the last 20 years have been actively supported by the authorities” and there has been “mutual infiltration.”

            Some imagine that these fighters can be redirected to “defend the interests of Russia in Syria,” but as the recent past shows, “for the majority of them this was not especially attractive.”  Instead, they are likely to be drawn “toward a repetition of their Ukrainian experience” but this time inside the Russian Federation in regions like the North Caucasus.

            That is not something the Kremlin wants to see happen, and Mitrokhin says that in his opinion, “the Russian authorities understand this danger quite well.”  Their Russia “doesn’t need extremists however patriotic they may be.”  The danger they represent is not about specific political issues; it is about “the physical survival” of the regime and its leaders.

            Consequently, he says, this fall or whenever Russia pulls back from the Ukrainian conflict, there is likely to be “not only a reduction in the level of anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric in Russian media” but also “an effective purge of the major Russian nationalist and militarist organizations which earlier where under the soft control of the special services.

            From Moscow’s perspective, “’the military brotherhoods’ have done their deed” and, like the Moor, can and must go lest “in the form of an independent and authoritative political actor in certain circles they become extremely dangerous for the Russian authorities and for Russia as well.”

            Because of what will be at stake and because the nationalists understand this as well, the struggle between them that is coming, Mitrokhin says, will be no laughing matter.

Window on Eurasia: Unless Ethnic Russians have Autonomy, Russian Federation will Disintegrate, Moscow Analyst Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 7 – Unless Moscow gives territorial autonomy to ethnic Russians and ends as much as possible inter-regional transfers of government spending, the Russian Federation “in the near future” will explode in “a civil war analogous to the Ukrainian one” and “inevitably “disintegrate,” according to Mariya Butina.

            In a post on Ekho Moskvy, the Moscow analyst argues that “what is taking place in Ukraine is the logical extension of the mass of inter-ethnic conflicts” which are to be found “on the entire periphery of the post-Soviet space” and within the Russian Federation as well (echo.msk.ru/blog/maria_butina/1334562-echo/).

            The Soviet system and its updated variants in the post-Soviet states involve “positive discrimination” on behalf of the titular nationalities, she says, something that in turn involves the suppression of and discrimination against ethnic Russians. When the CPSU was strong, that was not allowed to affect politics, but when the communist system weakened, it came to define it.

            Such weakening of central power, she suggests, is “inevitable for any regime, sooner or later,” and hence the tensions inherent in the post-Soviet countries, including the Russian Federation, are bound to break out into the open.

            To avoid such destructive developments in the Russian Federation, she continues, Moscow must take two steps.  On the one hand, it must allow ethnic Russians “in places of their compact settlement to have their own national autonomy, like Chechnya for the Chechen and Tatarstan for the Tatars.”

And on the other, Moscow must simultaneously amalgamate the countries federal subjects into ever larger units and end or at least reduce to a minimum inter-regional transfers of government money. Otherwise, Butina says, Russians will be left in the status of “orphans” in this federal system, will become increasingly angry and will spark inter-ethnic clashes.

Still worse, she suggests, Russia would in that event become the scene of a civil war much like the one in Ukraine “with its territorial disintegration then inevitable.”  Many believe that a strong central government can prevent that, but such a government can do so only while it is strong. “Inevitably,” she says, it will weaken and lead to “a collapse of legitimacy.”

That is what happened in Russia after the Rurik dyanasty, the Romanovs, and the CPSU, she writes, “and there is no basis for supposing that now the situation will be different if the system is not strengthened” by the steps she outlines. The events in Ukraine, Butina suggests, should be both a warning and a guide to action.

Butina puts her finger on one of the most important sources of tension in the Russian Federation, that between ethnic Russians and non-Russians. But her prescription could easily make the current situation even worse by sparking a new upsurge in nationalism among the non-Russian quarter of the population without giving the Russians what they think they deserve.

And that in turn could lead to the disintegration of the country in much the same way that Mikhail Gorbachev’s turn to the right in 1990-1991 did, with both ethnic Russians and non-Russians increasingly convinced that they would not live within the framework of the Soviet Union.

                Moreover, Butin’s words unwittingly recall something else that was said at the end of Soviet times: “The most difficult time for a country in trouble is when it begins to try to reform itself.”  That explains both why governments so often put off reforms and also why such delays, as politically attractive as they may seem, usually fail.

            In short, the Russian Federation is caught in the same trap that the Soviet Union was at the start of Gorbachev’s time: a liberal Russia carved out of it might be possible, but a significantly liberalized Russian Federation is almost certainly an ever greater contradiction in terms.

Window on Eurasia: A Mini-Brezhnev Doctrine? -- FSB Promises to Block Revolutions in CIS Countries

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 7 – In yet another example of the Kremlin’s shamelessness about its plans to use its power across the former Soviet space in what constitutes an updated but geographically smaller Brezhnev doctrine, FSB head Aleksandr Bortnikov  says his agency will react quickly and harshly to any attempt to overthrow existing regimes in the CIS countries.

            That statement in Mensk on Thursday (newsru.com/russia/06jun2014/bortnikov.html) is a dramatic shift from the euphemisms such as “fraternal help,” “international responsibility,” and “peacekeeping operation” that the FSB has used in the past, Grani.ru commentator Aleksandr Prodrabinek points out (grani.ru/opinion/podrabinek/m.230025.html).

            This openness about the role of the Russian security services reflects the fact that “after the annexation of Crimea, the Russian authorities have ceased to restrain either their actions or their declared intentions” or, it should be said, their fears that the kind of revolutionary change that has already transformed Ukraine will spread, Podrabinek continues.

            Bortnikov told his CIS intelligence service colleagues that Russia’s FSB “considers that there can be in these countries forces with definite intentions concerning the overthrow of the authorities,” that any such actions are “impermissible,” and that “we will act harshly in the framework of the law not to give an opportunity to destructive force” to carry out their plans.

            “The latest events in Ukraine confirm,” he said, that certain figures of the opposition and “foreign forces” intend to “overthrow the authorities with the goal of changing the constitutional system.” The CIS intelligence services must react by “combining forces, in particular by exchanging information.”

Bortnikov’s message is clear, Podrabinek says. “If the authorities of the [CIS] countries don’t take upon themselves a concern about the security of the despotic regimes [there], then the FSB of Russia will,” a warning that echoes what Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev said about challenges to communist rule in the Soviet bloc 40 years ago.

The FSB head added that “destructive forces act illegally and are financed by western NGOs, which are located” in these countries, the commentator says. Thus, the security agencies have as their targets “social activists, NGOs, and the opposition,” or, “in a word, national traitos if one uses the language of Mr. Putin.”

Moreover, Bortnikov continued, the Russian security agencies won’t wait until there is a crisis but will engage “above all” in “prophylactic” measures designed to prevent things from ever getting out of hand, yet another warning that if other governments don’t take steps in this direction, Moscow will.

It seems clear, Podrabinek concludes, that “the main goal of this close interaction [of the security services of the CIS countries] is not the exchange of experience and information but he informal subordination of the special services of these countries to the Lubyanka” and the Russian government.

                What remains to be seen is how the CIS countries will react. Georgia left in 2008, Ukraine is in the process of leaving now, and others, even if their leaders welcome Moscow’s protection but concerned by such intervention, could easily do the same in the future, especially if the CIS gains the reputation of a “club of dictators.”

            Indeed, just as the overbearing attitude and actions of Moscow designed to keep communists in power across the Soviet bloc sparked the movements that ultimately ended that system, so too this latest claim of a right to interfere in CIS countries could hasten the day that that organization finally disintegrates.

           

Window on Eurasia: Kyiv Mufti Urges Muslims from Other Countries Not to Come to Ukraine and Fight Against Kyiv

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 6 – Said Ismagilov, the head of the Kyiv-based Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of Ukraine, said that Muslims in other countries should not come to Ukraine because those who do so will be fighting against a government that has treated the Islamic community well and continues to do so.

            In an appeal on Facebook (facebook.com/said.ismagilov?fref=ts) that has been translated by Halya Coynash (khpg.org/index.php?id=1402001471), Mufti Ismagilov said the following:

 “Everything here was fine [in Ukraine before Moscow intervened]. You can’t imagine how good things were.  We didn’t realize either, by the way. For us it was something that went without saying. We had never had either wars or terrorism. Here Muslims, Christians, Jews had never fought with each other. There weren’t any Muslim pogroms like in Moscow, or killings of sheiks, muftis and imams. There was no ethnic cleansing, no refugees, no purges.

“We built mosques or opened places of worship in virtually every populated area, and they were not once pulled down. Not once! We don’t have lists of prohibited Muslim literature. We simply don’t, not one book. Nobody prohibited the Koran or its translations. We printed our Muslim newspapers without censorship and published what we thought in them. We took part in direct broadcasts on the country’s television channels where you can speak the truth live.  Can you even imagine something like this in your countries?

“Our Crimean Tatar Muslims always held their remembrance gathering in memory of relatives who died during the Deportation on May 18 on the main square in Simferopol. It was only this year that they were prohibited from doing this. They’ve even banned Mustafa Jemiliev, the most venerated elder of the people from entering the Crimea. We have Crimean Tatar, Tatar, Arab schools. Here Muslims are a part of the country, a part of the general history of our land. We are at home here. This is our homeland.  We freely practised Islam, worshipped in mosques, fasted for Ramadan, went on the hajj to Sacred Mecca. And nobody prohibited this.

“More, among us are ethnic Ukrainians who have converted to Islam and nobody persecuted us for openly preaching Islam. Name me even one other such country. Would you like it to be like this in your country?  Everything is fine here. You must not come here to fight against us.  Fear almighty Allah! Remember the words of the Prophet Muhammed [peace and mercy to him from Allah!) “If two Muslims clash with swords, both the killer and the person killed will go to Hell!”  I know that there are Muslims in the Ukrainian army who are defending our country from external aggression and internal madness.

“Do not come here to fight us, remember the words of the Prophet. They are simply defending their Homeland, their families and homes. You remember: “The life, honour and property of a Muslim are inviolable.”  That is the law of Islam. Not everything here was wonderful, but we lived in freedom. And we treasure that freedom. In Ukraine we’ll all obsessed with freedom.  We don’t need bread, give us freedom. Without freedom we don’t have appetite or sleep.  We do not exchange our country for money and a stable dictatorship. There are things which are not for sale.”

            Earlier, the Kyiv mufti said that “if people who love Ukraine and speak for dignity, liberty and equal rights are called Banderites [as the Moscow media routinely do], then Ukrainian Muslims and particularly the Crimean Tatars can with some humor be called Islamo-Banderites” (ukrainianweek.com/Society/108352).

            Ismagilyov’s MSD, although self-described as “the MSD of Ukraine,” is only one of a half dozen such institutions in that country and has far fewer parishes than does the MSD in Russian-occupied Crimea.  Its relations with most Muslim leaders in the peninsula have been good, but none of them is subordinate to this MSD.

            The MSDs are of course a legacy of the Russian and Soviet past rather than being in any way a canonical part of Islam, and thus it is important to read Mufti Ismagilyov’s statements, while clearly heartfelt, as putting his organization in a position to exploit the nationalizing forces within Ukraine’s religious establishment in the wake of the Crimean Anschluss.