‘Putinophobia’ Increasing Infects Western Media, Peskov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 6 – Russian officials and commentators and their supporters in the West have long complained that criticism of Moscow and its policies reflects not honest and accurate assessments of what the Russian authorities are doing wrong but rather a manifestation of “Russophobia.”

            Now, Dmitry Peskov, Vladimir Putin’s press secretary has introduced a new term to explain and thus dismiss any unwelcome attention to and especially criticism of the Russian regime and its leader: “Putinophobia” (tass.ru/politika/3177274 and rufabula.com/news/2016/04/05/putinofobia).

            According to Peskov, “world media, both print and electronic have concentrated in a completely inexplicable way on [Russia] and on [Russia’s] president. And it is this which we have in mind when we speak about ‘the bacillus of Putinophobia’ which has infected many in the Western community.”

            The press secretary’s linguistic innovation came in his first public reaction to the publication of the so-called Panama documents about the offshore holdings of world leaders, including Putin, who is established to have parked some two billion US dollars in various banks outside of Russia.

            Few countries have been as successful as Russia has over the last two centuries in getting many to agree that any criticism of Russia or Russians represents a kind of phobia or fear. Those who condemn German actions or American ones, for example, are seldom charged with “Germanophobia” or “Americanophobia.”

            But now, as Russia’s political system becomes even more centralized under the dictatorship of Putin, Russophobia apparently is not enough of a defense. And so Peskov has introduced a new term of art, “Putinophobia,” which Russians and defenders of Russia can use against critics.

            It will be interesting to see whether this term will acquire the cachet Russophobia has, especially since from the Kremlin’s point of view, it carries with it a problem for the Putin regime. To the extent that it promotes a distinction between Putin and Russia, its introduction may have the effect of opening the way for more criticism of the Kremlin rather than less.

            After all, many critics of Russian policy do not hate Russia or Russians. Instead, they despise and criticize the criminal actions of its current leader. Consequently, such people may even welcome the term “Putinophobia” because it more accurately describes the object of their anger if not, as Peskov and Putin would have it, their fears.

           

           

Talysh Movement Resurfaces in Azerbaijan

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 4 – One of the most important trends in the south Caucasus over the last 25 years has been the emergence of almost completely mono-ethnic states in that region. As a result of refugee flows, Armenian occupation of parts of Azerbaijan, and the Russian invasion of Georgia, these three countries are more mono-ethnic than at any point in their histories.

            That helps to explain the policies of the three governments there and also those of their most important outside supporters, Russia with regard to Armenia, Turkey with regard to Azerbaijan, and the West with regard to Georgia.  But there are still important ethnic minorities in each of the three, and none is more significant than the two million Talysh of Azerbaijan.

            The Talysh are an Iranian-speaking people who live in southeastern Azerbaijan and northwestern Iran, with an estimated 1.5 to 2.5 million in the former country and at least one million in the latter. The Azerbaijani authorities do not count them as a separate nation lest such identification provoke separatism as it did in 1993 with the Mugdam Republic.

            (That contemporary attitude has its roots in Soviet times. In the 1930s, Talysh began to be written in Cyrillic rather than Persido-Arabic; and the Talysh were encouraged to say no more to declare themselves to be Azerbaijanis rather than members of their own ethnic community.)

            In Iran, the Talysh suffer few limitations linguistically or culturally. Most Talysh there and in Azerbaijan are Shiites, although there are Naqshbqandia Sufis among them as well. However, even the latter follow many of the traditions of the twelver Shiites of Iran and consider Ali to be the only legal heir of the Prophet Muhammed. 

            Talysh activists in Iran and Azerbaijan have continued to call for autonomy or even independence despite the hostility to such appeals in both Baku and Tehran, but except in times of serious trouble in those two countries, the Talysh movement has largely been subsumed by larger social movements.

            One might have expected Talysh activism to increase with the start of a new round of fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia, either sponsored by outsiders or the result of Talysh activists exploiting the situation. But in fact, Talysh activism has been on the rise in Azerbaijan for some months, the result of economic problems there (nar.am/2016/v-azerbaydzhane-neozhidanno-nachalis-protestyi-c-trebovaniem-avtonomii-talyishistan/).

                The Azerbaijani authorities have treated the Talysh moves in recent weeks as being the result of efforts by the Azerbaijani opposition or religious groups to exploit the situation and have ignored the extent to which there is a genuinely Talysh ethno-national movement behind at least some of them

            Most Azerbaijani analysts suggest that the Talysh movement is unlikely to take off not only because of Azerbaijani official actions but also because of the absence of genuine leaders. Those who had been in top positions in the early 1990s have either gone into emigration or been repressed. 

            Consequently, it seems unlikely that the Talysh will make a play for autonomy or independence even now; but they are one of the factors involved in the current crisis. And if the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia expands, it seems likely that just as in the difficult days of 1993, the Talysh may be heard from. At the very least, their demands will have to be addressed.

Moscow Faces Its Own Muslim-Buddhist Clash in Kalmykia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 4 – Russians like many other people around the world were horrified by Taliban destruction of Buddhist shrines in Afghanistan. Now, Russians are having to cope with a related case of Muslim contempt for Buddhist statues within the borders of their own country, one that is generating anger among Russia’s Buddhists and nervousness among its Muslims.

            So far, the actions of Kalmyk and Daghestani officials with regard to the incident appear to have calmed the situation. Indeed, Russian commentators are celebrating the good sense of both. But the incident shows just how close to the surface such tensions are and how easy it would be for them to get out of hand (nazaccent.ru/content/20117-urok-buddy.html).

            On April 1 – and some writers suggested that the whole thing began as an April Fool’s joke – a 22-year-old Daghstani boxer in the Kalmyk capital of Elista for a competition visited a local Buddhist shrine and was photographed hitting a revered statue of Buddha with his fists.  The photograph went viral on line and that night Kalmyks surrounded his hotel to protest.

            The Kalmyk police arrested him, and the Kalmyk authorities postponed the competition in which he was supposed to take part, with five teams from various republics being sent home, accompanied by Kalmyk militiamen. Officials in Elista and Makhachkala condemned the actions of the boxer but said that such bad behavior is to be found among some in every nationality.

            Their actions, the apologies of the coaches and parents of the man involved, and the fact that no one tried to minimize the issue or send the Daghestani boxer home to serve any punishment – he remains in jail in Elista – eliminated any chance that people on either side could suggest that the authorities were hiding something, Nazaccent.ru reported.

            That represents a definite step forward from earlier cases of this kind, the news agency said, adding that it may be the result of efforts by Russia’s Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs to provide immediate guidance to officials involved in clashes – although Nazaccent.ru acknowledged that the Agency has not yet confirmed that.